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PREFACE
This work is the second and last sequel to Major Naval Operations, published by the 
Naval War College Press in 2008 as Newport Paper 32. The first sequel, Major Fleet-
versus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945, was published (as Historical 
Monograph 22) by the Naval War College Press / Government Printing Office in 
2014; a second edition came out in 2016. The focus of that volume was on the 
description and analysis of three major fleet-versus-fleet operations. In contrast, 
this work, Major Naval Operations in European Waters, 1939–1945 (twenty-seventh 
in the Naval War College Press’s Historical Monograph series), looks at three dif-
ferent types of major naval/joint operations: an attack on enemy maritime trade, 
the defense and protection of friendly maritime trade, and a major amphibious/
anti-amphibious operation. The principal purpose is to impress on commanders 
and their staffs the critical importance of studying the theory and practice of major 
naval/joint operations. Another purpose is to present a method for analyzing a 
historical case study from an operational instead of a tactical perspective, and then 
drawing appropriate conclusions and identifying operational lessons.
The first two chapters of this book are devoted to maritime-trade warfare. However, 
the emphasis in chapter 1 (“The Destruction of Convoy PQ17: June 27–July 10, 1942”) 
is on attacking enemy maritime trade, while chapter 2 (“Major Convoy Operation to 
Malta: August 10–15, 1942 [Operation PEDESTAL]”) pertains to the defense and pro-
tection of friendly shipping. The third chapter (“The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno: 
January 22–March 4, 1944 [Operation SHINGLE]”) describes and analyzes in some de-
tail a major amphibious operation and the major anti-amphibious operation that the 
German defenders planned and conducted against it. Each of these chapters is based 
on an article previously published in the Naval War College Review, but is considerably 
longer, with new sections based on additional primary and secondary sources.
The internal structure of each chapter is very similar to that of those of the 
Pacific War volume. Any major operation is planned and executed within a much 
broader and very important framework determined by policy and strategy. Hence, 
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it is necessary here to describe in some detail the strategic setting for each ma-
jor naval operation. Each chapter outlines the main aspects of the operating area 
(e.g., physical characteristics, climate) in which the opposing forces were deployed 
and employed. Another section analyzes the various elements of theater geography 
from a military viewpoint—central and exterior positions, distances, basing areas, 
decisive points, lines of operation, lines of communication, and so on. Each chapter 
also lays out the operational command organizations and command-and-control 
arrangements of the opposing sides.
The decisions of operational commanders are all too commonly critiqued on 
the basis of what became known after the war. Such an approach is both unscien-
tific and wrong. The proper method is to analyze such decisions in light solely of 
the information the commanders had when they made them. Accordingly, each 
chapter distills the information available prior to the planning of the operation and 
prior to its execution. The bulk of each chapter, of course, is devoted to the plan-
ning of, preparation for, and execution of the respective major naval operation.
Any study of major operations or campaigns is essentially a waste of time unless 
it attempts to draw conclusions from them and to derive from these conclusions 
operational lessons; each chapter ends, therefore, with such an analysis. Finally, 
each chapter includes detailed orders of battle and maps that graphically present 
the operational ideas (concepts of operations) involved.
This monograph relies critically on primary sources, especially from the collec-
tions of the German Military Archives in Freiburg; the Military Branch of the Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; and The 
National Archives, Kew Gardens, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude and thanks to several individuals who 
made it possible to complete this book. As in the past, Dr. Carnes Lord, editor, Na-
val War College Press, provided strong and consistent support. Dr. Robert Ayer, Capt., 
USCG (Ret.), managing editor, edited the manuscript and helped enormously by point-
ing out unclear, contradictory, and sometimes erroneous statements in the draft. The 
Naval War College Press’s Publishing Services office did a superb job of proofreading 
the text, as well as of coordinating the production and correction of proofs and their 
preparation for the press. Mr. Art Lamoureux prepared most of the superb maps and 
figures, Mr. Bill Miner the remainder. My heartfelt thanks go to Richard LaBranche, 
Capt., USN, who was chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department when 
most of the work on this book was performed; to Capt. Edmund Hernandez, the cur-
rent chairman; and to Professor Fred Horne, Capt., USN (Ret.), the department’s execu-
tive officer: all allowed me the maximum time available to work on this project.
Milan Vego
Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 
I The Destruction of Convoy PQ17
June 27–July 10, 1942
The most critical and urgent problem for the Western Allies in the northern European theater in 1941–42 was securing the war matériel being sent to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Allied 
convoys sailing to northern Russia. That began to change soon after February 1942, 
when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface forces and a large num-
ber of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway. Attacks by the Luftwaffe and 
U-boats became not only more intensive but increasingly deadly. Correspondingly, 
the Allied convoys suffered ever-larger losses. The single most devastating action was 
the German attack on Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, in which, during a week of at-
tacks, the Luftwaffe and U-boats sank twenty-two out of thirty-six merchant ships 
and one of three rescue ships. The planned augmentation of this effort with a foray 
(code-named Unternehmen [Undertaking] RÖSSELSPRUNG) by the battleship Tirpitz 
and other heavy surface ships was short-lived, because Allied forces detected the Ger-
man ships prematurely. Nevertheless, the Germans had achieved a significant victory 
against the Allies’ efforts to supply their embattled Russian ally. In its aftermath, con-
voys to Russia via the Arctic route were suspended for almost two months; the next 
convoy (PQ18) did not sail until September 2, 1942. Out of forty ships in that convoy, 
thirteen were lost. However, during the next two years, convoys sailed to northern 
Russia only during the long, dark months of winter. As a result, they suffered much 
smaller losses than prior to September 1942: none in October–December 1942 or in 
1943, three in 1944, and two in March 1945.1 
In operational terms, the German attack against Convoy PQ17 was a major naval/
joint operation versus enemy maritime trade. For the Allies, the defense of Convoy 
PQ17 amounted to a major naval/joint operation to defend maritime trade. Strategi-
cally, this operation was an integral part of the Allies’ efforts to defend and preserve 
their military-economic potential at sea, and on the Germans’ part, to destroy it.
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN THEATER
Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 had changed the strate-
gic situation in the northern area radically in Germany’s favor. By obtaining control 
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of the Jutland Peninsula, the Danish straits, and Norway, Germany greatly weak-
ened Britain’s strategic position in the northern area. This loss was ameliorated 
somewhat by the Anglo-American occupation in June 1941 of Iceland, from where 
their land-based aircraft could control surrounding sea areas. From Iceland the Al-
lies also were able to raid the German-controlled Norwegian coast.2
Notwithstanding, German control of Norway made it impossible for the British 
to blockade the Shetlands–southern Norway line, as had been done in World War 
I (when Britain and the United States established the Northern Barrage minefield). 
It also weakened greatly the British position in the Shetland–Faeroes–Iceland gap. 
The northern portion of the North Sea was now open to German naval forces.3 
Further, control of the Norwegian coast significantly improved the effectiveness 
of Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe (air force) attacks on enemy shipping in the 
northern Atlantic Ocean and the Barents Sea.
Nazi Germany also greatly benefited economically from the seizure of Norway. 
Among other things, it gave the Germans access to commodities important to their 
war industries, including aluminum, copper, paper, and timber. Germany also now 
had a more secure route, through Narvik, for Swedish iron ore.4 Along the 1,745 
nautical miles (nm) between Oslo in the south and Kirkenes around North Cape, 
some two hundred thousand tons of Axis shipping moved every day. At the same 
time, the political situation in Norway was difficult for the Germans, who realized 
that the majority of the populace was pro-British, hoping that the British would 
prevail and that the Germans and Soviets would exhaust themselves.5
Hitler placed great strategic importance on Germany’s continued control of 
Norway. He was extremely concerned about the possibility of enemy landings there. 
Hitler’s views were shared by Adm. Erich Raeder, commander in chief (CINC) of 
the Kriegsmarine and the Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung, or SKL). 
On October 10, 1941, Hitler issued his instruction (Führerweisung) Nr. 37, which 
assigned new missions to the German armed forces in northern Norway. The Kriegs-
marine was to attack enemy sea traffic to Murmansk and protect German shipping 
in the Arctic. The Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando, or AOK) Norway, 
the Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine were directed to cooperate closely during the 
coming months in preparing to oppose possible enemy landings in front and on the 
sea flanks of German forces. Hitler directed the 5th Air Fleet to return to Norway 
and to establish there the post of Air Leader (Fliegerführer) North.6
On December 14 Hitler further ordered a buildup of defense installations in 
Norway and the improvement of roads in the coastal area. He believed that if the 
Western Allies captured Norway they would be able to supply the Soviet Union 
regularly, thereby posing a serious threat to the German northern front. The enemy 
also would be able to operate in the Baltic. Information gathered by German agents 
as well as statements by Western leaders and reports in the Western press lent these 
views new urgency.7
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In meetings with Admiral Raeder on December 29, 1941, and January 12, 1942, 
Hitler declared that the enemy threat to Norway required redeployment of heavy 
German ships as a deterrent. On the basis of information from Swedish sources, he 
believed the British and Americans might land between Trondheim and Kirkenes. 
Hitler considered Norway the Schicksalzone (“zone of destiny”) of the entire war.8 
Meeting again with Raeder on January 22, Hitler stated his belief, based on the lat-
est information, that Britain and the United States were planning to attack north-
ern Norway and that if successful they would influence the war decisively.9 
In Hitler’s view, every German heavy surface ship that was not in Norway was in 
the wrong place; Raeder fully agreed.10 The battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 
and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen would be moved from Brest to Norway, additional 
S-boats would be moved to northern Norway, and heavy coastal artillery would 
be significantly increased.11 Hitler also directed Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, 
CINC of the Luftwaffe, to reinforce the air forces in Norway. Hitler demanded un-
conditional execution of his orders for the security of the northern area.12 All these 
measures had to be accelerated: the danger was immediate.13 
THE ALLIED DECISION TO SEND AID TO THE SOVIET UNION
The importance of Norway and adjacent sea areas increased significantly after Ger-
many invaded the Soviet Union (USSR) on June 22, 1941. There was a real possi-
bility that the Germans ultimately might prevail in the war and thereby endanger 
the survival of Great Britain. Hence, the British government, led by Prime Minister 
Winston S. Churchill, and that of the United States, led by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, were determined to do everything possible to help the Soviet war effort. 
At a conference in Moscow (September 29–October 1, 1941) both governments 
gave assurances of aid and support in the common struggle against Nazi Germany. 
The protocol of that meeting, signed on October 1, referred to “the provision of 
supplies, which will be made available at British and U.S.A. centres of production, 
for the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the United States of America within the 
period beginning from October 1941 till the end of June 1942. Great Britain and 
the U.S.A. will give aid to the transportation of these materials to the Soviet Union 
and will help with the delivery.”14 
After significant successes on the Eastern Front within the first few months, the 
Germans suffered a series of setbacks in that theater during the fall of 1941 and early 
winter of 1941–42. Their forces were stopped at the gates of Leningrad (Saint Peters-
burg today) and in southern Russia and were obliged to retreat in the battle of Mos-
cow (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942). Yet, despite these reverses, the Wehrmacht’s 
power was not broken. Because there was no prospect of a second (i.e., Western) 
front in 1942, it was vitally important for the Western Allies to keep the Soviet Union 
in the war; otherwise, victory over Nazi Germany would be impossible. Hence, they 
made every effort to supply the USSR with increasing amounts of war matériel.
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The Western Allies faced serious difficulties in doing so. Three main routes 
were available: across the Pacific to Vladivostok; across the southern Atlantic and 
around the Cape of Good Hope to the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf and thence 
upriver and overland (called the “Persian Corridor”); and the Arctic route, across 
the northern Atlantic to Iceland and then to the north Russian ports of Arkhan-
gelsk and Murmansk. Each had advantages and disadvantages. The Pacific route 
to Vladivostok passed near northern Hokkaido, and once Japan opened hostilities 
with the United States and Britain in December 1941, it could be used only by 
Soviet-flag ships. This route was also the longest of the three. As for the Persian 
route, the trip around the Cape of Good Hope (which shipping from American 
East Coast ports had to use until July 1943, when the Mediterranean route was 
opened) was about 14,500 miles long and required seventy-six days.15 The third and 
shortest, but most dangerous, route was the one from Scotland/Iceland to northern 
Russian ports. The Germans posed a serious threat to this route: Luftwaffe aircraft, 
U-boats, and heavy surface ships were based in northern Norway. The Allied prob-
lem was made worse by extreme cold, bad weather, and ice. Despite all the difficul-
ties of the northern route, however, the Soviets adamantly insisted on it, because it 
could deliver badly needed war matériel more quickly and closer to their forces at 
the front. Another possible reason was Soviet fear of too strong an Anglo-American 
presence in Persia.16 Ultimately, the decision to establish the Arctic route was made 
by Churchill, with the full support of Roosevelt.17 Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, the Brit-
ish First Sea Lord (1939–43), and Adm. Sir John Tovey, commander in chief of the 
Home Fleet, were opposed.18
Between August 1941 and May 1945, the Western Allies shipped some 2.3 million 
tons of war supplies to the Soviet Union. More than half, about 1.2 million tons, went 
via the Arctic route, six hundred thousand were sent through the Persian ports, and 
five hundred thousand arrived via the North Pacific route. These supplies included a 
substantial quantity of war matériel desperately needed by the Soviets; 1,880 aircraft, 
2,150 tanks, 2,250 field guns, 8,300 trucks, and 6,400 other vehicles.19
OPERATING AREA
During the attack on and defense of Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, the opposing naval 
and air forces operated in both the Norwegian and Barents Seas (see map 1); how-
ever, the majority of combat actions took place in the Barents. The Barents Sea is 
one of the marginal seas of the Arctic Ocean. It extends for about 650 miles and has 
an area of 550,000 square miles. It borders in the west on the Greenland Sea, in the 
north on the Svalbard Islands (of which the largest is Spitsbergen) and Franz Josef 
Land (Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa), in the east on Novaya Zemlya, and in the south on 
the Kola Peninsula and northern Norway. 
The Barents Sea is relatively shallow, with an average depth of about 125 fath-
oms. In over half of it, depths range between 109 and 273 fathoms. The maximum 
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depth is found in the western part of the Bjørnøyrenna Channel; depths of less than 
fifty-four fathoms predominate near the Svalbards and in the southeast.20 In the 
eastern part of the Barents Sea the depth of water varies from fifty-five to around 
190 fathoms.21 The Norwegian Sea encompasses an area of 425,000 square miles, 
has an average depth of 1,093 fathoms, and is divided into a deep basin (1,640 to 
2,185 fathoms) and a continental shelf off the Norwegian coast. This shelf var-
ies in width from a hundred miles (at 55° north latitude) to only fifteen miles off 
Vesterålen. Its depths vary between fifty-five and 220 fathoms; several troughs in 
the shelf exceed 164 fathoms.22
The White Sea (Beloye More), at 34,700 square miles, is bounded by Karelia in 
the west, the Kola Peninsula to the north, and the Kanin Peninsula to the northeast. 
Its average depth is 32.5 fathoms, with a maximum depth of 191. The northern 
part of the White Sea contains few islands but is encumbered greatly by shoals and 
reefs.23
The 23,560-square-mile Svalbards are some four hundred miles north of Nor-
way. Spitsbergen, at 15,075 square miles, is the largest island in the Svalbard group. 
The Svalbards are highly mountainous, with peaks up to 5,600 feet, and are char-
acterized by many large and small glaciers that collectively cover some 60 percent 
of the land surface. There is a large number of fjords; the longest, Wijdefjorden, is 
sixty-seven miles long.24
Bear and Jan Mayen Islands are the most important islands in the Barents Sea. The 
seventy-square-mile Bear Island (Bjørnøya) is the southernmost of the Svalbards. Its 
highest elevation is about 1,760 feet. It lies some 250 miles north-northwest of North 
Cape (Nordkapp) and 140 miles south-southeast of Spitsbergen. This triangular-
shaped island is some ten miles long and eight miles wide. The southern and east-
ern part of the island is mountainous. The thirty-four-mile-long, 144-square-mile 
Jan Mayen is a mountainous, volcanic island partly covered by glaciers. It consists 
of two islands, the larger Nord-Jan and smaller Sør-Jan, which are linked by an isth-
mus 1.6 miles wide. Jan Mayen is about 310 miles from the central part of Green-
land, 370 miles northeast of Iceland, and 620 miles west of North Cape.
Iceland’s 39,770 square miles occupy the most important strategic position in the 
northern Atlantic, some 150 miles east of Greenland, four hundred from northern 
Scotland, and 550 from Norway. The Faeroes are only about 250 miles away.25 The 
Denmark Strait, 172–460 miles wide and 358 to 3,587 fathoms deep, separates Ice-
land from Greenland.26 Iceland is volcanic and has numerous mountain ranges. Its 
coast, especially in the north, is highly indented by fjords and large bays. The fjords 
seldom freeze except at their heads; however, drifting ice often interferes with navi-
gation. Some of the best harbors are on the western coast. Iceland’s entire coast is 
fronted by an extensive 109-fathom shelf that extends forty to sixty miles offshore.
 THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17 7 6 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
The southern approaches to the Barents Sea are guarded by the Shetland and 
Faeroe groups of islands. The 540-square-mile Faeroe Islands (Føroyar in Faeroese) 
comprise eighteen islands. The most important are Suðuroy, Sandoy, Vágar, 
Streymoy, Eysturoy, Kalsoy, Kunoy, Borðoy, and Viðoy.27 The Faeroes are locat-
ed 267 miles southeast of Iceland and two hundred miles north-northwest of 
Scotland. The Shetlands occupy 567 square miles and are about fifty miles north-
northeast of the Orkneys and 170 miles southeast of the Faeroes. They consist of 
more than a hundred islands and islets. The most important islands in this group 
are Mainland, Yell, and Fair Isle.28
Northern Norway encompasses some 148,726 square miles (including the Sval-
bards and Jan Mayen). It extends for about 1,100 miles from northeast to south-
west. It has one of the longest, most rugged, and most indented coastlines in the 
world. The coastline stretches some 1,572 miles; 15,627 miles, when fjords and bays 
are included; and 51,747 miles, counting the fifty thousand islands and islets that 
front the coastline.
The Kola Peninsula covers some fifty-six thousand square miles and extends 
from north to south for about 242 miles and 342 from east to west.29 Its north-
ern coast is steep, the southern flat. The highest peak on the peninsula is Mount 
Chasnachorr, 3,900 feet. The Kola Inlet (Kol’skiy Zaliv), the largest fjord on the 
peninsula, extends for some thirty-five miles and has three branches. Depths vary 
between 109 and 164 fathoms. During the period in question, the northern branch 
was always free from ice; only during the most severe winters could ice floes be 
found in February or March.30
In the southeastern part of the Barents Sea, the largest island is the 1,350-square-
mile Kolguyev, forty-seven miles north of Mys Svyatoy Nos.31 Novaya Zemlya, 
35,000 square miles in area, consists of two islands separated by the Matochkin 
Shar, a narrow, fifty-five-mile-long strait separating the northern and southern is-
lands of Novaya Zemlya. The southern island consists of a level plain backed by 
hills and mountains. The Matochkin Shar is backed by high mountains reaching a 
height of 3,445 feet. The northern island is mostly covered by ice caps.32
The duration of a day in the Barents Sea varies greatly with season and lati-
tude (see figure 1). Depending on the latitude, the polar day starts between mid-
March and mid-May, the polar night between mid-September and mid-November.33 
Above the Arctic Circle (66° 33ʹ 46ʺ north) the summer sun does not go down for 
weeks. At latitude 74° north the midnight sun lasts ninety-nine days, the polar 
night eighty-four days. At Jan Mayen (69° 64ʹ north, 18° 09ʹ east) the midnight sun 
extends from May 14 to July 28, the polar night between November 7 and January 
21.34 On January 1 it is dark all day; on March 30 daylight lasts thirteen hours, forty-
eight minutes; and on July 1 the sun shines all day. At Bear Island the midnight sun 
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lasts from May 1 to August 10, the polar night from November 7 to February 4.35 At 
the time of the German attack on Convoy PQ17, there was a midnight sun.36
The oceanographic features of the Barents Sea and the surrounding sea areas are 
influenced heavily by topography and prevailing weather conditions. In the Barents 
Sea, the water temperature in June–July 1942 was several degrees above freezing 
but could go as low as 28.4°F (–2°C).37 Tides in the Barents Sea are semidiurnal; 
their ranges vary from three feet in the Proliv Yugorskiy Shar (linking the Kara 
and Pechora Seas) to seven feet in the southeastern part of the Barents. Off Novaya 
Zemlya, tides vary from 1.4 to 1.8 feet.38
The Barents Sea has a very complex system of currents, because of the mixing of 
relatively warm water from the Atlantic with the cold Arctic Current. One branch 
of the Gulf Stream, the North Atlantic Current, enters the Norwegian Sea across 
the Faeroes–Shetlands gap and the Iceland–Faeroes Ridge. At the northern slope 
of the Iceland–Faeroes Ridge, the encounter of warm Atlantic and cold Arctic wa-
ter produces the Iceland–Faeroes Front. The North Atlantic Current after entering 
the Barents Sea mostly flows northward. After reaching the Bjørnøyrenna Channel 
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one branch becomes the Nordkapp Current, while another of its branches flows 
north of the Hopenrenna (Hopen Trench). It is then divided into several smaller 
branches. One of these, the West Spitsbergen Current, flows northward into the 
Fram Strait (between the Svalbards and Greenland). West of the Fram Strait the 
East Greenland Current flows south from the Arctic Ocean. A major branch of the 
North Atlantic Current flows along the western and northern coast of Norway and 
is called the Norwegian Current (or Norwegian Coastal Current). During winter 
the current is deep and narrow, in the summer wide and shallow.39 It is divided into 
two main branches; one flows in an easterly direction (and changes its name to the 
Murman Current) as it leaves the Norwegian area, then flows along the Kola Pen-
insula coast to the White Sea. The influx of Arctic water into the Barents Sea takes 
place along two routes, one between Spitsbergen and Franz Josef Land, the other 
between Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya.40
The climate in the Barents Sea is subarctic. It is influenced by geographic lati-
tude, the incidence of solar radiation, and the entry and circulation of the relatively 
warm Atlantic water. In the northern part, air temperatures in the winter months 
average –13°F (–25°C), in the summer months 23°F (–5°C). In the southwestern 
part the corresponding temperatures are 32°F (0°C) and 50°F (20°C). In the east, 
air temperatures can be –4°F (–20°C) over the ice-free area, –22°F (–30°C) in the 
north and southeast. On land and in remote areas, the air temperature can go as 
low as –58°F (–50°C).
In the Barents Sea, the winds tend to be moderate, typically eight to ten knots. 
Stronger winds, when they occur, generally do so close to mountainous coasts.41 
In the southwestern part of the sea, the prevailing winds are easterly, gales (Force 
8) and storms usually coming from the northeast-to-northwest sector. Winds in 
the southeastern part of the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea in the fall, winter, and 
early spring generally come from the south-southwest to south. Severe gales ac-
company the passage of cyclonic storms, with winds reaching or exceeding Force 
7 along the open coast for seven or eight days a month from November to the end 
of February.42 The weather and climate in northern Norway are influenced heavily 
by depressions arriving from the Atlantic, relatively warm currents, and the very 
rugged coastal terrain. The Barents Sea is well-known for rough weather and high 
seas that occur frequently and last for extended periods. A high sea state results in 
very wet decks for surface ships—that is, their bows bury themselves in oncoming 
waves.43 In the summer, the dominant winds are from the west, while in the winter 
months they are generally from the northeast.44 These winds can generate waves in 
the fifty-foot range, higher in the western than the eastern part of the sea.45
Northern Norway experiences variable weather conditions because of its rug-
ged topography and its multitude of fjords and offshore islands. The strength and 
direction of the wind can change often and quickly. Strong winds may blow from 
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different directions at locations that are fairly close to each other, and a strong wind 
may blow outside a fjord while calm weather prevails within it.46 The frequency of 
gales varies greatly depending on the time of the year. For example, at Tromsö in 
midwinter the wind averages between Forces 2 and 3, while from July through Sep-
tember it remains below Force 2. There is little seasonal variation in the strength of 
wind near Altafjord, most often Force 2. Gales occur once a month on average. At 
Vardø, the winds are strongest (Forces 4 and 5) in January and February and lightest 
(Force 3 on average) in August.47 In the area from the Russian-Norwegian border to 
the White Sea, winds, fog, and rain arise with great suddenness and change rapidly. 
Prevailing winds are easterly in the summer, strong and variable in the fall; in the 
winter months, southwesterly winds prevail, accompanied by strong storms.48
In the Barents Sea, cloudiness is always common; the highest incidence is in 
July, the lowest in March and April. In the southeastern part of the Barents Sea skies 
are cloudy on average 75 percent of the year. Extensive stratus clouds and ceilings 
below a thousand feet are quite common—especially in summer, less so in winter.49 
There are fewer than thirty clear days and more than 180 cloudy days annually.
Near Jan Mayen, most precipitation occurs during the winter months. In Feb-
ruary there are on average nineteen days with precipitation—seventeen days with 
snow and one or two with hail. Over an entire year there are on average 173 days 
with precipitation, 118 of them with snow and four with hail.50 In the southeastern 
part of the Barents Sea, from November through May it is relatively dry; a short 
season of moderate rain lasts from June through October. In the winter months, 
snow falls ten to fifteen days a month, accumulating until the spring thaw.51
Visibility is at its worst in fog and snow. In the Barents Sea, July and August 
each average ten days of fog; in the winter, fog is very rare.52 Fog is most frequent 
over loose ice; on the boundary of solid ice, the weather is mostly clear.53 In the 
southwestern part of the Barents Sea, fog occurs most frequently in calm weather 
or in easterly and southeasterly winds. Near Iceland, fog is frequent in the summer 
months, its frequency depending on location. For example, in the winter months 
there is little or no fog on Iceland’s west coast and in summer only one or two foggy 
days each month; there are only nine days of fog, on average, during the entire 
year. On the island’s north coast, there are on average only one or two foggy days 
each winter month and seven each summer month; the most fog occurs in July—
thirteen days. On the northern coast there are on average fifty-three days with fog 
during the entire year. On the east coast of Iceland, winter sees one or two foggy 
days per month, eight in summer. The months with the most fog are June and July, 
with thirteen days each. The east coast experiences fog on some sixty-three days 
over the entire year. On the southern coast, winter months have two to three foggy 
days each month and five per month in summer. The month with the most fog is 
June—eight days. The southern coast experiences fifty-two foggy days in a year. 
 THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17 11 10 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
Fog over Iceland is often very dense; especially near the ice boundary, visibility is 
often as little as 330 feet. Fog represents the greatest problem for ships off Iceland’s 
northern coast and in the zone where the cold polar current collides with warm 
water from the south.54
In northern Norway, fog forms more often just off the coast than over the open 
sea. Coastal fog is more frequent in the summer than in the winter; from the 
Norwegian border to the White Sea, thick fog usually occurs at the end of May 
and the beginning of June, especially off the coast. These fogs penetrate fjords but 
are very patchy there; conversely, it can be foggy inside a fjord but clear outside. 
Mirages frequently occur in calm weather in the summer, mainly in the morning 
and evening.55
In the southeastern part of the Barents Sea visibility is often poor during all 
seasons. Fog is prevalent during the entire year, although less frequent in winter. 
After the beginning of April, fogginess increases, reaching a maximum in July and 
August, then decreases. “Sea smoke”—low fog floating over the sea—can be seen in 
the fall and the first half of winter, anywhere that sharp decreases in air tempera-
ture occur. In the area of the Kola Inlet, fog is most prevalent from June through 
August and from October through March. Dense Arctic sea smoke can persist for 
extended periods, especially amid weather patterns that produce strong southerly 
and southeasterly winds.56
In 1942 the four hundred nautical miles of sea between Greenland and Spits-
bergen was covered by ice the entire year. The ice moves with the polar current 
from the Greenland Sea.57 By mid-June, the Barents Sea is navigable to latitude 
75° north and as far east as longitude 50°.58 In September, almost the entire Barents 
Sea is ice-free; in the winter months, about two-thirds of it is covered with ice. The 
eastern part is ice-free in early July; the entire Barents Sea south of 77° north also 
is navigable, because of the influence of the North Atlantic Current.59 Despite the 
presence of large ice fields, the western and northern coasts of Norway rarely see 
ice. Only in strong northern and northwest winds might drift ice appear off the is-
land of Ma geröy (northeast of Hammerfest).60 In the eastern part of the Barents Sea, 
during the navigation season (June–October) a large volume of ice from the Kara 
Sea enters the Barents through the Kara Strait, then scatters.61 In the southeastern 
part of the Barents ice is found in small bays and inlets beginning in early October. 
This area is closed for navigation from November through May. The White Sea is 
generally free from ice from June through October.62
The weather, ice conditions, and duration of daylight in the Barents Sea and 
the adjoining littoral area greatly influenced the combat employment of surface 
ships, submarines, and aircraft during World War II. In the summer months, good 
visibility and low sea state generally prevailed.63 This facilitated air reconnaissance 
and shadowing. At the same time, long hours of daylight made it considerably 
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more difficult for submarines to conduct their typical night surface attacks. Lack of 
cloud cover made it difficult for torpedo bombers to achieve surprise.64 Moreover, 
in summer visibility frequently was reduced by fog, which could conceal targets 
and so leave attackers at a great disadvantage.65
During the winter months, fully laden eastbound convoys frequently met gales 
of great violence. Heavy deck cargo—tanks, wagons, locomotives—endangered the 
stability of ships and forced some to return. Heavy snow and ice on a ship’s upper 
deck and top-hamper are dangerous if allowed to accumulate—they can cause a 
ship to capsize—and once formed increase a ship’s silhouette significantly. In the 
Barents Sea, such topside icing represents a serious hazard: thick layers of ice can 
form on decks, sides, superstructure, hatches, masts, rigging, deck-mounted ma-
chinery, and antennae.66 The most common form, spray icing, occurs when seawa-
ter spray hitting a ship freezes, creating a shell of ice.67 Icing also can be very dan-
gerous for aircraft; it can greatly increase drag and weight and reduce wing lift. Not 
only rain but small water droplets may freeze on contact with aircraft. The most 
severe ice accretion occurs at air temperatures just below 32°F (0°C).68
The westbound convoys from Russia did not carry much cargo. Therefore, the 
light ships ballasted their sterns down, so as to submerge their propellers, and their 
bows up, which sometimes made them unmanageable. Escorts also suffered badly; 
they lost boats, davits, and men on many occasions.69 The employment of destroy-
ers was made difficult by high sea states.70
In the Greenland and Barents Seas, pack ice affected routing of Allied ships 
bound to and from northern Russia. Generally, it was desirable to keep as far as 
possible from the German airfields in northern Norway and from U-boats lurking 
between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. One way to do this was to take ships through 
the ice; however, the Allies soon learned that the thin hulls of escorts were easily 
damaged. Also, ice prevented a convoy from maneuvering as a whole.71 In general, 
ice was always a danger for surface ships, even outside the pack—small floes could 
not be detected easily—so it was preferable to leave a margin of about forty miles 
from an ice boundary.72
Pack ice and icebergs were carried down the east coast of Greenland through 
the Denmark Strait. Between mid-August and November or December there was 
little ice in the strait. However, navigation was more restricted by darkness during 
the rest of the year, especially from March to June, when the strait was mostly cov-
ered by ice. However, ice seldom was found within the hundred-fathom line, along 
which usually lay the boundary between the northward-flowing, warm Irminger 
Current (a branch of the North Atlantic Current) and the cold East Greenland 
Current. Sometimes ice crossed that line and came within the sight of Iceland’s 
coast.73 The ice situation in the Denmark Strait greatly affected the routing of Allied 
convoys to northern Russia. Generally, ice along Iceland’s north coast meant that 
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Allied ships could not pass around the west and north coasts from Reykjavík but 
had to be routed “south-about” if bound northeastward.74
The boundaries of the pack ice in the Barents Sea change considerably over the 
course of a year. From December to early June, pack ice normally extends close to 
or beyond Bear Island. For example, in March the pack ice’s southern limit is the 
northwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island and the west coast of Spitsbergen, extending 
from there to Bear Island and the Kanin Peninsula.75 In April 1942, when ice condi-
tions were the worst, with the pack ice boundary at its southernmost, it might be 
necessary to route ships nearly a hundred miles farther south—leaving only 150–
200 miles to the Norwegian coast. In contrast, when the pack ice boundary moved 
northward, it was possible to sail in a west-to-east direction in the area between 
North Cape and Spitsbergen. In a mild season, there was a passage of fifty miles 
between Bear Island and the ice edge, which allowed the routing of convoys farther 
north to avoid contact with the German surface ships based in northern Norway.
Because of the ice conditions in 1942, Allied ships had to traverse the 260 nauti-
cal miles between longitudes 20° and 35° east while only 230 nautical miles from the 
Norwegian coast. These conditions prevailed through the end of June.76 In March and 
April 1942 the ice limits were farther south than at any other time of the year. This 
forced the convoys to northern Russia to pass south of Bear Island and thus within 
about 250 miles of the Norwegian coast.77 After April, the sea area gradually enlarged, 
because the ice boundary moved north and east. Thereafter, it was more difficult for 
German surface ships to attack Allied convoys. In August, pack ice ran northward 
from Scoresby Sound off Greenland, then from Bell Sound (in western Spitsbergen) 
south of South Cape and Hope Island, then in a northeastern direction.78
BASING/DEPLOYMENT AREAS
The deployment areas of the opposing forces were Iceland and the Faeroes, Shetlands, 
and Orkneys for the Allies, northern and central Norway and the Kola Peninsula for 
the Germans (see map 2).
In northern Norway, the Germans used several large fjords for basing their na-
val forces operating in the Arctic. Altafjord, some twenty nautical miles long, is 
the largest fjord in western Finnmark. It contains three wide and deep passages: 
Stjernsund, Rognsund, and Vargsund.79 Tides in Altafjord are strong, especially 
in Rognsund.80 Altafjord can accommodate ships of any size.81 The largest port in 
Finnmark, Tromsö, is some 190 miles north of the Arctic Circle. Another basing 
area for the German heavy ships was the 110-nautical-mile-long, forty-nautical-
mile-wide Vestfjord, between the Lofoten Archipelago and the Salten district on 
Norway’s mainland. It is fronted by numerous islands and skerries (small rocks, 
reefs, and islets). Its smallest width is seven hundred yards, at Tranøy. The depth of 
water between Røst and Flein Islands is about 164 fathoms.82 Gimsøystraumen was 
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a temporary anchorage for the German surface ships; located between Gimsøya 
and the western side of Austvågøy, it provides access to Vestfjord. 
The forty-eight-mile-long Ofotfjord, or Narvikfjord, has a maximum depth of 
about three hundred fathoms. It backs up to very mountainous terrain, the highest 
peaks at about five thousand feet. The port of Narvik, near the head of Ofotfjord 
some thirty miles from the entrance, is almost completely surrounded and shel-
tered by high mountains. It was the transshipment point for iron ore from Swed-
ish mines and a base for German surface ships and U-boats. The German heavy 
combatants and their accompanying destroyers also used the eighty-one-mile-long 
Trondheimfjord, about four hundred miles to the south. It is more than three hun-
dred fathoms deep and mostly ice-free year-round.
For the Allied convoys, the main ports in Iceland were Reykjavík and Hvalfjord. 
Reykjavík, a major port, comprises Gamla Höfnin (Old Harbor) and Sundahöfn. 
Hvalfjord, seven miles southwest, is on the Álftanes Peninsula at the end of a fjord 
seventeen miles long and three miles wide, with an entrance 492 feet wide and 
thirteen to thirty-nine feet deep.83 The fjord is navigable throughout—ice rarely 
presents a problem—and tides in the port vary from ten to thirteen feet. Seydis-
fjord (Seyðisfjörður), on the northeastern coast of Iceland, was also used, mostly 
by the Allied ships assigned to protect convoys to northern Russia. It extends west-
southwest for about eight miles and is surrounded by steep mountains. Depths in 
the fairway vary from 121 to 295 feet. 
The fifty-six islands of the Orkneys have many excellent harbors. One, Scapa 
Flow, was the main base for the Home Fleet. It is the best anchorage in the Orkneys, 
an almost landlocked shelter. Its depths range up to 118 feet, and tidal currents 
within the harbor itself are almost negligible. However, gale force winds might gen-
erate considerable surge in velocity of currents.84 
The principal destination in northern Russia for the Allied convoys was Mur-
mansk, twenty-five miles south of the Kola Inlet’s entrance. Tides there range from 
4.6 to 8.0 feet, and prevailing winds are from the west and southwest.85 Moder-
ate gales can be expected from two to four days each month throughout the year, 
the most severe weather coming between November and February. From January 
through April, heavy fog makes navigation difficult, sometimes impossible, for 
days at a time.86 The Allied ships also occasionally used the six-mile-long Yokanga 
roadstead, about 190 sea miles to the southeast; its main anchorage could accom-
modate ships of all sizes, with depths varying from nine to eighteen meters; other 
parts of the roadstead contain extensive shoals.87 The main Russian naval base in 
the area was then Polyarny (formerly Aleksandrovsk), at the entrance to the Kola 
Inlet; a naval airfield was at Vayenga, about sixteen miles farther up the inlet, near 
Severomorsk.88 The second most important port for the Allied ships was Arkhan-
gelsk, on the Severnaya (Northern) Dvina River in the White Sea. The port is on 
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the east bank, twenty-eight miles upriver. Tides are negligible, from 1.3 to 2.3 feet, 
but because of ice the port was normally open only from the end of April through 
October. There are numerous shoals, many uncharted, between Ostrov (i.e., island) 
Zelenets and Ostrov Kego at the western approaches to the Severnaya Dvina.89
The German base of operations in northern Norway extended from Trondheim 
to Altafjord, a distance of about seven hundred miles. Naval forces and aircraft 
based in central and northern Norway occupied an exterior position with respect 
to convoys in the Barents Sea and attacked along multiple, converging, and rel-
atively short lines. Trondheim is about 485 miles from Narvik and another 215 
miles from Altafjord. The sea distance from Trondheim to Reykjavík is about 1,116 
miles, from Bear Island to Tromsö 352 miles and Bear Island to Trondheim 470. Jan 
Mayen occupies a central position within the Barents Sea—some 720 miles from 
Trondheim, 620 miles west of North Cape, 513 northeast of Iceland, and 310 east 
of Greenland. Bear Island lies 145 miles from the southern tip of Spitsbergen and 
about 285 miles northwest of North Cape.
The Allied forces that deployed from the Orkneys, northern Scotland, and Ice-
land also operated from an exterior position, but their lines of operation were fewer 
and much longer than those of the Germans. Iceland is 150 miles east of Greenland, 
four hundred miles northwest of Scotland, and six hundred miles west of Norway. 
The distance between Reykjavík and Jan Mayen is 590 miles, and another 527 miles 
separate Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. Pentland Firth (a strait separating the Ork-
neys from Caithness, in northern Scotland) is about 788 miles from Reykjavík. The 
distances from Scapa Flow to Stavanger, Trondheim, and Narvik are 239, 794, and 
1,248 miles, respectively. 
ALLIED OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, under the civilian First Lord, 
Albert V. Alexander. (His position was the equivalent of today’s Secretary of the 
Navy in the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted of five uniformed “sea 
lords” plus four other high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was 
Admiral Pound. He was the senior naval officer responsible for naval operations. 
In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Admiralty’s responsibilities included both op-
erational planning and execution. Its most important divisions were Plans and Op-
erations, Trade, and Intelligence. The Plans and Operations Division coordinated 
closely with the Intelligence Division.90
The principal operational-level command for European waters was the Home 
Fleet. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, it consisted of the 2nd Battle 
Squadron, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, aircraft carriers, cruisers (the 2nd, 7th, 
12th, and 18th Squadrons), Destroyer Command (6th, 7th, 8th, and 18th Destroyer 
Flotillas), submarines (2nd and 6th Submarine Flotillas), and minesweepers (the 
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1st Minesweeping Flotilla), plus Orkney and Shetland forces. The majority of the 
Home Fleet’s ships were based at Scapa Flow and on the Channel coast at Portland. 
Other bases were at Rosyth and Dundee in Scotland and on the North Sea coast of 
England at Blyth and on the Humber River.91
With the outbreak of war, the composition of the Home Fleet underwent sig-
nificant changes, in that many heavy units were reassigned. The CINC of the Home 
Fleet after November 1940 was Admiral Tovey. On March 26, 1942, to reinforce the 
Home Fleet, the U.S. Navy formed Task Force (TF) 39, initially led by Rear Adm. 
John W. Wilcox. On that day the task force—composed of the battleship Wash-
ington (BB 56), the carrier Wasp (CV 7), and heavy cruisers Wichita (CA 45) and 
Tuscaloosa (CA 37), plus eight destroyers—sailed from Portland, Maine, for Scapa 
Flow. One day later Admiral Wilcox was lost overboard in a heavy sea; he was re-
placed by Rear Adm. Robert C. Giffen.92
The Home Fleet’s geographic area of responsibility was never formally defined 
but in practice encompassed the northern part of the North Sea and the waters 
north of the Shetlands–Faeroes–Iceland–Greenland line. Initially, its main mission 
was to prevent German naval forces from breaking out of the North Sea and op-
erating in the Atlantic. After the summer of 1941, its focus shifted to Norwegian 
waters and the Barents Sea. Overall responsibility for convoys to northern Russia 
rested with its commander in chief, Admiral Tovey. 
The southern part of the North Sea and the English Channel constituted sepa-
rate commands deploying light forces. The squarish ocean area bounded by the 
northernmost tip of Scotland, the southwestern tip of England, and longitude 30° 
west was the responsibility of the Western Approaches Command, in Liverpool 
(moved from Plymouth on February 7, 1941). Its commander in chief, Adm. Sir 
Percy Noble (after February 17, 1941), was mainly concerned with the protection 
of convoys between North American and British ports.93 However, Western Ap-
proaches Command also provided the ships necessary for the close, direct screen-
ing of convoys to the northern USSR.
CONVOYS TO NORTHERN RUSSIA
The first convoy (code-named DERVISH) to the USSR by the Arctic route departed 
from Hvalfjord, Iceland, on August 21, 1941—only two months after the Nazi in-
vasion of the Soviet Union. This convoy consisted of only six merchant ships, and 
all reached Arkhangelsk after a ten-day voyage.94 From September 13, 1941, serial 
numbers were given to each convoy heading to (the PQ series) or from (QP) north-
ern Russia.95 The first of the eastbound, PQ convoys left Hvalfjord on the 28th.96 
The first westbound convoy, QP1, left Arkhangelsk on September 28 and arrived at 
Dunnet Head in northern Scotland on October 11.97 Between 1941 and 1945, forty-
two eastbound escorted convoys (comprising 848 ships) and thirty-six westbound 
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escorted convoys (735 ships), plus one eastbound and one westbound unescorted 
convoy, sailed the Arctic route between Russia and the West.98
Ports of origin for the Allied convoys to the Soviet Union were on the American 
East Coast and in northern Scotland. The American ships sailed from Philadelphia 
and then joined one of the transatlantic convoys in Halifax or Sydney, Nova Scotia, 
Canada. Afterward they sailed under U.S. or Canadian escorts across the northern 
Atlantic to a point where their escorts turned westward to their home bases while 
the merchant vessels continued to Iceland. There, at Hvalfjord or Reykjavík, they 
were joined by British ships that had been organized at Gare Loch or Loch Ewe on 
the western coast of Scotland. Together, they formed PQ convoys.99
The port facilities in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, the principal destina-
tions, were very primitive.100 However, as noted previously, Murmansk is always ice- 
free, but Arkhangelsk was closed to large ships for six months out of the year because 
of ice.101 The sea routes from Reykjavík to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are 1,500 and 
1,900 nautical miles long, respectively; however, the run to Murmansk was actually 
some two thousand nautical miles, to keep as far as possible from the Luftwaffe’s 
aircraft (see map 3). Transit time for a convoy from Iceland to Murmansk was about 
ten days, to Arkhangelsk twelve days.102 The merchant ships from the United States 
had already steamed a long distance merely to assembly points in Iceland. For exam-
ple, a merchant vessel out of Philadelphia had to travel 645 nautical miles to Halifax 
or 960 to Sydney; the distances from Halifax and Sydney to Reykjavík are 1,940 and 
1,655 nautical miles, respectively. PQ convoys ran generally through the Denmark 
Strait (which was mined); then eastward, keeping as far north as ice conditions al-
lowed; then south toward the Kola Inlet or southeastward to Arkhangelsk.103
Allied convoys to Russia varied in size between fifteen and thirty ships, although 
some were larger. Smaller convoys ran to the USSR until early 1942, when it was 
decided to increase their size.104 On February 26, 1942, Admiral Tovey requested 
that westbound and eastbound convoys sail simultaneously so that their tran-
sits through the most dangerous areas could be synchronized. This would entail 
fourteen-day cycles for convoys to and from Russia.105 The first pair sailed in early 
March 1942, and the synchronization became standard thereafter.106 In May, Ad-
miral Tovey further requested reducing the number of convoys during the coming 
summer months, because improved weather would greatly aid enemy reconnais-
sance, whereas the ice boundary would not have receded northward sufficiently to 
avoid air attacks.107 However, his second request was not accepted by the Admiralty.
The Allied convoys were very vulnerable to attack by surface ships and U-boats 
the entire way and by aircraft for some 1,400 miles.108 Both ends of the convoy route 
were within range of Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft. In contrast, the British re-
connaissance seaplanes operated from a single base, Sullom Voe in the Shetland 
Islands. (The Germans believed that seaplanes were also based on the Langanes 
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Peninsula, Iceland.) The maneuvering area for a convoy and its covering forces 
was limited northward and westward by ice and southward and southeastward by 
the enemy-occupied coast. Within that zone the currents were uncertain, and fre-
quent gales could disperse a convoy, driving ships many miles from their intended 
routes.109
Initially, the Allied convoys to northern Russia were defended only weakly. This 
highly unfavorable situation began to change for the better when in late April 1942 
additional destroyers, corvettes, and trawlers were transferred from Western Ap-
proaches Command to the Home Fleet, bringing the number of antisubmarine 
(A/S) escorts for each convoy to about ten.110 However, the Allies’ continuing short-
age of destroyers and the difficulty of refueling them at sea (each convoy was ac-
companied by at least one fleet oiler for refueling the short-legged destroyers and 
corvettes) limited the ability to hunt U-boats at significant distances from con-
voys.111 Each eastbound convoy was accompanied by two submarines to discourage 
enemy surface attack. Several British and Soviet submarines patrolled northwest 
and west of North Cape.112
The Allies tried repeatedly to involve the Soviet Northern Fleet further in pro-
tecting convoys. Admiral Tovey pressed the Admiralty “for strong and continuous 
Russian patrol activity off the Kola Inlet, to make that area untenable by U-boats, 
and for short-range and long-range fighter protection.”113 Tovey believed that fight-
er cover during what was the most dangerous part of the voyage—both long-range 
(two hundred miles off the Kola Inlet) and short-range (sixty miles off)—was both 
crucial and within Soviet capabilities. The Northern Fleet had enough destroyers 
and smaller A/S ships to operate farther from its bases than heretofore. Specifically, 
Tovey felt the Soviets should take responsibility for defense of the convoys while in 
the White Sea and that their submarines based in Polyarny, on the Kola Peninsula, 
could be employed for scouting and intercepting heavy German surface ships.114
The inadequacy of the protection of convoys east of Bear Island was a matter of 
great urgency for the Allies. On May 9, 1942, Churchill argued to Stalin that “it is 
essential that U.S.S.R. Naval and Air Forces should realize that they must be largely 
responsible for the convoys whether incoming or outgoing, when to the Eastward 
of the meridian of longitude 28° East in waters which are out of sight of Murman 
Coast.”115 The British also asked the Russians not only to reinforce escorts at the 
eastern end of the voyage with long-range fighters or A/S aircraft but also to bomb 
enemy airfields during convoy transits to discourage German surface attacks east 
of Bear Island.116 In his response to the prime minister on May 13 Stalin did not 
specifically mention 28° east longitude but assured him that “you may not doubt 
that on our part all possible measures will be taken immediately. It is necessary, 
however, to take into consideration the fact that our Naval Forces are very limited, 
and that our Air Forces in its [sic] vast majority are engaged at the battlefront.”117 
On May 24 Stalin wrote, “On our part our naval and air forces will do their utmost 
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Map 3
Operational situation,  
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for the protection of these transports which was indicated in your message to me 
on 9th May, i.e., when Eastward of the 28th Meridian.”118 
The Soviets promised repeatedly to provide adequate protection to the Allied 
convoys but seldom did so in practice.119 Formally, the Soviets did in fact take re-
sponsibility for protecting Allied convoys once they crossed longitude 28° east.120 
They also conducted intensive reconnaissance of the German naval and air bases 
in northern Norway. Submarines of the Northern Fleet patrolled off the Norwegian 
coast, covering the possible deployment routes of German surface forces.121 How-
ever, the fact is that the Soviets were unable to protect the Allied convoys effectively 
during the most dangerous phase of their run.122
THE GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The Germans’ command organization in the northern theater was highly fragment-
ed. The Germans never established a true multiservice or joint command in this the-
ater; instead, each of the three services controlled its own forces. Cooperation was 
supposed to be achieved through liaison officers posted at the main headquarters of 
each service. The highest command echelon controlling army troops in Norway and 
Finland was Armeeoberkommando Norwegen (High Army Command Norway), led 
by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst from Command Post Finland in Rovaniemi, 
Finland. His command had been created from Army Group XXI in Norway in De-
cember 1940. On January 14, 1942, a part of AOK Norway was designated AOK Lap-
pland (Lapland) for operations in Finland; two weeks earlier, General Falkenhorst 
had been directed to move his headquarters back to Norway.123
Admiral Raeder and Reichsmarschall Göring each had operational com-
mand over all their respective forces. Raeder led the High Command of the Navy 
(Oberkommando der Marine, or OKM, established January 11, 1936). The Naval 
Warfare Directorate, SKL, formed on April 1, 1937, had responsibility for the con-
duct of naval warfare as a whole; its Operations Directorate (1./SKL) was the most 
important of its six staff subdirectorates in 1942. The OKM had a permanent repre-
sentative at Hitler’s headquarters (see figure 2). Contact with the Luftwaffe was also 
maintained through a liaison officer, at the Luftwaffe CINC level.124
By the end of 1941, the highest operational headquarters of the Kriegsmarine 
overall were the Fleet Command (Flottenkommando) and four naval group com-
mands (Marinegruppenkommandos, or MGKs): North, East, West, and South. 
Other major commands were Naval Station Baltic (Marinestation Ostsee), Naval 
Station North Sea (Marinestation Nordsee), and German Naval Command Italy 
(Deutsches Marinekommando Italien). Naval Group Command North (MGK 
Nord) was led at this time by Gen. Adm. Rolf Carls; the month before he ar-
rived his new command had been renamed (originally Naval Group Command 
East, established in November 1938) and moved from Kiel to Sengwarden, near 
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Wilhelmshaven, on August 8, 1940.125 MGK Nord was responsible for all Kriegsma-
rine activity in the Baltic, the German Bight, Denmark, and Norway.126
MGK West was established in August 1939, its original area of responsibility en-
compassing the German Bight, the North Sea, and the Atlantic. When its headquar-
ters moved to Paris in August 1940, the German Bight and central and northern part 
of the North Sea were transferred to MGK Nord. MGK West, retaining operational 
control in the Atlantic, now became specifically responsible for the southern part of 
the North Sea, the English Channel, Bay of Biscay, and the “southwest approaches” to 
the British Isles.127 (Subordinate to the Flottenkommandant, fleet commander, were 
various “type” commanders.) In general, the establishment of naval group commands 
transferred ashore the operational control of seagoing forces, in essence reducing the 
fleet commander to a tactical commander in combat.128
In 1942, the bulk of the German fleet was deployed to northern Norway. The 
fleet commander was Adm. Otto Schniewind, flying his flag in Tirpitz. His direct 
subordinates were the commanders of battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlacht -
s chiffe, or B.d.S.), of destroyers (Führer der Zerstörer), and of T(orpedo)-boats 
(Führer der Torpedoboote). The commander of battleships was retitled Befehlsha-
ber der Kreuzer (commander of cruisers), or B.d.K., in June 1942, and the leader of 
torpedo boats became Führer der Schnellboote (leader of S-boats, which displaced 
a hundred tons and were capable of forty-four knots) in April 1942. At Kirkenes 
was the 8th S-boat Flotilla (dissolved on July 10, 1942), while the 6th S-boat Flotilla 
was temporarily deployed to northern Norway.129
The post of leader of U-boats (Führer der U-Boote) had been renamed com-
mander of U-boats (Befehlshaber der U-Boote) on October 17, 1939, the latter 
Figure 2
German naval organization 
in Norway, June 1942
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German term signifying enhanced importance. In the operational chain of com-
mand, that made the U-boat commander, Adm. Karl Dönitz, directly subordinate 
to the OKM; administratively, U-boats still reported to the fleet command.130 
Directly under Naval Group Command North was the Commanding Admiral 
Norway (Kommandierende Admiral Norwegen), Gen. Adm. Hermann Boehm. 
The entire Norwegian coast was divided into three geographically based com-
mands: Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast (at Tromsö), Admiral Norwegian North-
ern Coast (at Trondheim), and Admiral Norwegian Western Coast (at Bergen).
There was also a Commandant of Naval Defenses Oslofjord (at Horten). In accor-
dance with Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37, the post of Admiral Arctic was established 
on October 16, 1941. Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast became subordinate to Ad-
miral Arctic.131 Adm. Hubert Schmundt, with headquarters in Kirkenes, was the 
first Admiral Arctic (October 1941–August 1942), reporting to Commanding Ad-
miral Norway. However, at the beginning of 1942 the latter proposed that Admiral 
Arctic be directly subordinated to Naval Group Command North, to unify conduct 
of the naval war in Arctic waters. Another reason was that Commanding Admiral 
Norway lacked the necessary communications means.132
After April 1942, Commanding Admiral Norway became responsible for the 
security of sea traffic around North Cape to supply the frontline forces in Finland 
and for the sustainment of Mountain Corps Norway in Finnmark.133 For his part, 
Admiral Arctic was directed to attack enemy maritime traffic, protect German 
coastal shipping, and conduct defensive mining of coastal waters and ports. A spe-
cial naval commander was to be appointed for these tasks.134 However, in practice it 
was Admiral Carls who controlled all operations in the Arctic—Admiral Schmundt 
essentially relayed Carls’s orders to subordinates.135
On June 18, 1942, the SKL made Admiral Arctic responsible for U-boat war-
fare against shipping and escorts east of the Denmark Strait and Jan Mayen Island. 
The weight of the main effort (Schwerpunkt) would be the U-boat attacks on PQ 
convoys; however, should an Allied landing occur, the main effort would shift to 
enemy transports and their escorts.136
After the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the 5th Air Fleet (Luft-
flotte 5), under Gen. Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, was the highest Luftwaffe command 
echelon in Norway and Finland. Until the end of 1941, Air Leader North (West) in 
Stavanger was its principal subordinate (see map 4). His forces were based in the 
area of Stavanger and Trondheim.137 In Instruction Nr. 37 of October 1941, Hitler 
directed that a major part of the 5th Air Fleet be transferred from Finland back to 
Norway. Headquarters was moved to Oslo, while a command post was established 
at the Finnish town of Kemi (on the Gulf of Bothnia and near Sweden’s border). Air 
Leader North (West) was in Forus/Stavanger, Air Leader Lofoten in Bardufoss, and 
Air Leader North (East) in Kirkenes (see figure 3).138
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The 5th Air Fleet’s operational area (Operationsgebiet) encompassed the Skager-
rak (between Norway and Denmark), the northern part of the North Sea, northern 
Scotland, the northern Atlantic, the Arctic Ocean, and the Murmansk front.139 Its 
main missions were defending against any enemy amphibious landing, reconnoi-
tering coastal waters, and attacking Arctic convoys in cooperation with the Kriegs-
marine.140 Specifically, it was responsible for cooperation with naval forces, security 
for German sea supplies, offensive mining, and defense against raids. With respect 
to U-boats, the Luftwaffe’s main tasks were to scout the operating areas of boats en-
gaging convoys, combat any fighter aircraft posing a threat to U-boats, and attack, 
jointly with the U-boats, the PQ convoys. With naval surface forces, the Luftwaffe’s 
main missions were reconnaissance of operating areas and attacks on naval targets 
within the framework of an operation.141
In practice, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine in the 
northern area was unsatisfactory, primarily because both practiced rather rigid, 
centralized command and control. For example, if Admiral Arctic needed air re-
connaissance, he had to send a request to Naval Group Command North in Seng-
warden, from where it was forwarded to the 5th Air Fleet in Oslo or the command 
post in Kemi. This arrangement resulted in a long delay in obtaining permission. 
If the request was granted, the headquarters that granted it gave orders to the ap-
propriate air commanders.142 Other factors that made radio communications dif-
ficult were a lack of interoperability (the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe used different 
transmitters) and the highly mountainous and fragmented terrain of Norway.143 All 
Figure 3
Organization of the 5th 
Air Fleet, June 1942
Source: Müller-Meinhard, “Der Einfluss der Feindlagebeurteilung . . . (l),” p. 519.
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of this made it very difficult to organize cooperation between the Luftwaffe and 
the Kriegsmarine. Raeder complained about the problem to Hitler, who ordered 
the Luftwaffe to reinforce its units in Norway and improve its cooperation with 
the Kriegsmarine. The leaders of the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine discussed 
the matter and decided to exchange liaison officers between the 5th Air Fleet and 
Admiral Arctic.144
ALLIED VERSUS GERMAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
For both the Allies and the Germans, accurate and timely intelligence about the 
enemy’s order of battle (OOB), plans, intentions, and movements was essential. 
The British Admiralty’s Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was responsible for pre-
paring daily, often hourly, reports regarding enemy forces anywhere in the world. 
The Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC), created in February 1939 as the most 
important of NID’s eight sections, was headed by a navy captain.145 The Director of 
Naval Intelligence (DNI) worked closely with his counterparts in the War Office 
and the Air Ministry within the Joint Intelligence Committee.146
The British relied on several sources of intelligence: direction finding, photo-
graphic reconnaissance, captured enemy documents, prisoners of war, and signals 
intelligence, the last being the most important. The main source of decrypted en-
emy messages was the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, 
Buckinghamshire, England.147 Normally, German ships at anchor in Trondheim 
did not use radio communications, but ships anchored at Vestfjord and Altafjord 
did, between themselves. Shore commands communicated by radio with the heavy 
ships when they were at sea—sending a steady stream of messages, in fact. So, the 
absence of such signals was a good indicator that the ships were still in port or in 
some other fjord.148 
British air reconnaissance of the German naval bases and anchorages and of air-
fields in northern Norway was extremely difficult, because of the long distances 
involved and the often appalling weather. The British deployed submarines between 
North Cape and Bear Island to observe enemy naval movements. The Allies’ net-
work of Norwegian agents, which would prove so valuable later in the war, had not 
yet been established fully.149 However, the British were lucky in having some ex-
cellent Swedish sources on German forces in Norway. The British naval attaché in 
Stockholm, Capt. Henry M. Denham, established good relations with the Swedish 
secret service, especially a Major Törnberg (assistant to Maj. Carl Petersén, head 
of C-Bureau, engaged in secret intelligence collection). The Swedes, in turn, had 
a good source of intelligence: the Germans’ telegraph and teleprinter lines to their 
naval, army, and Luftwaffe forces in Norway passed through Swedish territory. The 
Swedes tapped those lines, broke a number of German ciphers, and often provided 
the results to Denham. To avoid suspicion being cast on the Swedish secret service, 
Denham met his contacts in parks or other public places; he would memorize the 
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information, get back to his embassy, and send a signal to the DNI in London. It was 
these Swedish sources, for instance, that gave the first positive clues about the move-
ments of the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in May 1941.150
The single most critical factor in the ultimate success of the British in the Battle 
of the Atlantic was their own ability to read the German navy’s radio messages. 
Yet not all messages were read, and the codes were generally difficult to crack.151 
But the British did break the German naval cipher HYDRA, which was used by not 
only the patrol vessels and minesweepers but also the U-boats based in Norway, as 
well as the heavy ships. (The exception was that in special operations the Germans 
used their NEPTUNE cipher, which the British code breakers at Bletchley Park only 
partially penetrated.) Major changes in the German cipher settings occurred every 
forty-eight hours and minor ones every twenty-four hours. Bletchley Park largely 
mastered the daily changes of cipher settings; it was the major changes that caused 
a problem. Once a major code change was broken, the lesser ones usually were 
cracked quickly.152 However, delays did occur, leaving gaps varying in length from 
four to forty-eight hours.153 Hence, there were cases when the British were blind, 
or at least not “current,” at critical moments. The British were unable to learn any-
thing about landline communications except for what they received from Stock-
holm. They also were unaware of German written instructions. In short, the British 
intelligence service, excellent as it was, could not be relied on to give a complete and 
continuous picture even of what was happening, let alone what was going to happen, 
on the other side of the North Sea.154
Further, on February 1, 1942, the Germans directed all U-boat cipher operators 
to abandon the HYDRA codes. To tighten security, they introduced a new version 
of the ENIGMA coding machine, the Triton M4, which used four rotors instead of 
three. Codes generated by the Triton M4 (called SHARK by the British) were un-
readable by existing methods;155 it was not until late 1942 that Bletchley Park was 
able to read these SHARK messages.156
For the Kriegsmarine the primary intelligence agency was the Naval Intelligence 
Service (Marinenachrichtendienst), established in June 1941, replacing the Naval 
Intelligence Inspectorate (Marinenachrichten Inspektion).157 It was initially the 2nd 
Office Group (Amtsgruppe) of the SKL (2./SKL) and in 1944 became the 4th Di-
vision, one of the most important office groups. Its Division of Radio Intelligence 
(Funkaufklärung) (4./SKL/III), better known as B-Dienst (Beobachtung-Dienst, 
Observation Service), had primary responsibility for monitoring, deciphering, and 
evaluating enemy radio communications.158 
B-Dienst was regarded highly by the rest of the Kriegsmarine for its profession-
alism and the excellent quality of its analysis. Admiral Raeder praised its work high-
ly.159 B-Dienst and German Military Intelligence (the Abwehr) had at least a loose 
administrative relationship, because two of the Abwehr’s departments dealt with 
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“naval matters”—Group IV (Radio Intelligence) and Group V (Naval Espionage).160 
B-Dienst played a pivotal role in the first part of the Battle of the Atlantic.161 It 
generally had a reasonably clear and current picture of the convoy situation and 
provided U-boats information essential to their attacks.162 It achieved a great suc-
cess when in March 1942 it cracked the Allied convoy code and became able to give 
Dönitz decoded signals within twenty-four hours of their transmission. From June 
through November 1942, almost all orders to U-boats were based on knowledge of 
decoded signals.163
The Germans had fairly good knowledge of the Allies’ naval OOB in northern 
Scotland and Iceland, mostly from radio intercepts obtained by B-Dienst, photo-
graphic reconnaissance by Luftwaffe aircraft, and reports from U-boats. Initially, 
however, they did not have precise information on Allied efforts to supply the Sovi-
et Union via the Arctic route. Yet as early as September 1941 the German Supreme 
Command of the Wehrmacht and the OKM noticed their increased importance. 
They believed at first that these convoys were intended solely to support Soviet 
forces on the Murmansk front. They also thought that the Soviets, with the help of 
the British and Canadians, would try to capture the vital nickel mines at Petsamo, 
in Finland. This estimate of the situation informed Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 36, is-
sued September 22, 1941, for winter operations in Norway.164
In time, air reconnaissance and information obtained from agents indicated 
that the enemy convoys were bringing in supplies to be used on the entire East-
ern Front. The Germans also deduced that Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were their 
principal destinations. German radio intercepts revealed that eastbound convoys 
were designated PQ, westbound QP. The Germans knew that the enemy had sent 
seven eastbound convoys (PQs 1–7) by the end of 1941. However, because of bad 
weather conditions in the Arctic, the Germans never learned the positions of those 
convoys or the compositions of their screens.165
By mid-January 1942, the SKL had a clearer picture of the operational situation. 
It learned that convoys originated in Scottish ports, but erroneously believed that 
partial convoys from the United States stopped at Seydisfjord, Iceland, and from 
there sailed to northern Russia, three or four times per month (see map 1). Their 
screens were composed of cruisers and destroyers, sometimes with a single aircraft 
carrier.166 In mid-February the Germans learned that the PQ route ran from Iceland 
to the southern tip of Bear Island, then eastward to longitude 38° 40ʹ east, then 
southward to latitude 70° north, where the routes to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk 
separated. The return QP convoys left the northern Russian ports at the same time 
as the PQ convoys heading to those ports and were routed southward of the PQs. 
The intervals between successive convoy pairs, the Germans concluded, were about 
fifteen days.167
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ATTACKS ON THE ALLIED CONVOYS, JANUARY–JUNE 1942
Until the winter of 1941–42, the operational situation for the Allies in northern wa-
ters was highly favorable: the German forces were not strong enough to endanger 
the convoys to Russia. This situation gradually changed after Hitler directed Ad-
miral Raeder to deploy all available heavy ships and U-boats to Norwegian waters. 
During the first few months of 1942, the Kriegsmarine sent all of its combat-ready 
heavy surface ships and a major part of its destroyers. The battleship Tirpitz was 
sent to Norway on January 16, 1942. The battleships (often referred to as battle 
cruisers) Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were to 
be redeployed from Brest to German ports. However, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 
were damaged during that redeployment on February 11–13, 1942 (Operation 
CERBERUS), and their arrival in Norway was delayed. Prinz Eugen and the heavy 
cruiser Admiral Scheer were ordered to Norway. However, Prinz Eugen was tor-
pedoed by the British submarine Trident on February 23 and put out of action for 
nine months; it was to serve for the remainder of the war in the Baltic. The Germans 
also deployed about 20 percent of all their U-boats to Norway.168 Tirpitz and Admiral 
Scheer, which arrived in Norway safely, were based at Trondheim, from where they 
could either operate in the Arctic or break out into the northern Atlantic.169
Between January 1 and the end of June 1942, the Allies ran nine eastbound con-
voys (PQs 8–16) to, and eight westbound convoys (QPs 5–12) from, northern Rus-
sia. PQs 8 and 9 consisted of seven and eight merchant ships, respectively. The third 
convoy (PQ10) had only three; the fourth (PQ11), thirteen. The Germans made 
only halfhearted efforts to stop these convoys. Out of thirty-one ships in these four 
convoys, none were sunk and only one was damaged.170 Eighteen merchant ships 
sailed in the first three westbound convoys (QPs 5–7), and none suffered any loss 
before reaching Icelandic ports.171
In contrast, from March through the end of June 1942 virtually every convoy to 
Russia came under attack.172 Initially, the Germans used their surface ships timidly; 
had they been more aggressive, it is difficult to see how convoys to northern Russia 
could have continued.173 The Germans progressively increased their efforts against 
the Arctic route, starting with the PQ12/QP8 convoys. The eastbound PQ12, of six-
teen merchant ships, sailed from Reykjavík on March 1 and arrived at Murmansk 
twelve days later. The westbound QP8, with fifteen ships, also left Murmansk on 
the 1st, arriving at Reykjavík on the 11th.174
PQ12 was the first heavily protected convoy to northern Russia. Cover was pro-
vided by the entire Home Fleet up to longitude 14° east. Admiral Tovey was un-
able to obtain escorts for antiaircraft (AA) defense beyond that line; the Russians 
had promised long-range fighter cover for convoys approaching the Kola Inlet, but 
only at some future, unspecified date. PQ12 was detected by a Luftwaffe aircraft 
on March 5, and the next day the Germans sent out Tirpitz with three destroyers 
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(Operation SPORTPALAST) to find and destroy the convoy. (Tovey believed that the 
Germans must have assumed the convoy was carrying troops.) However, after two 
days of searching, Tirpitz failed to detect the convoy, which arrived at Murmansk 
on the 12th without loss. From the westbound QP8 only one straggler was sunk, 
by the Tirpitz’s destroyers on March 7. Aircraft from the carrier Victorious attacked 
Tirpitz on its way back to Trondheim, but unsuccessfully; Tirpitz took refuge in 
Narvik and then completed its sortie on the 15th. In the meantime, Tovey sent the 
8th Destroyer Flotilla to sweep up the Norwegian coast, to latitude 66° north, to 
intercept Tirpitz, and on the night of March 12/13 five British submarines were off 
the southern entrance to Trondheim. None of these forces were able to attack.175 
Nevertheless, the Germans realized they had been lucky that Tirpitz had survived 
the attack by the British carrier planes. Afterward, Hitler issued strict orders that 
in the future Tirpitz should not be put at risk unless any enemy carrier in striking 
range had been detected and neutralized.176
Admiral Raeder briefed Hitler on March 12 that Tirpitz’s inability to detect the 
enemy convoy PQ12 showed the weakness of the German naval situation in the 
northern area. The enemy, it was seen, would react to any German foray with a 
strong combat group, possibly including aircraft carriers. Carriers were the most 
dangerous threat to the German heavy ships. They could operate close to the Nor-
wegian coast, obscured from the air, and not be destroyed by the Luftwaffe. The 
German destroyers and torpedo boats were numerically weak and could be threat-
ened from the air.177 Raeder argued that because the Kriegsmarine had no aircraft 
carriers, a successful foray in the Arctic absolutely required support, especially for 
reconnaissance, from a strong air force in the Norwegian area. Any operation in 
the Arctic would involve German naval forces, but these had to maintain readiness 
against an enemy landing; they would be employed only if air reconnaissance was 
effective. The Luftwaffe must also, he asserted, be employed against any enemy 
carriers; their destruction at sea or in their bases must be the Luftwaffe’s highest 
objective in the northern area. Taking out the enemy carrier would mean a funda-
mental improvement in German operational possibilities.178 In Raeder’s view, the 
best ultimate solution was to speed up the construction of German aircraft carriers 
and carrier aircraft. A serious threat to the enemy in the northern area would be 
posed by a combat group composed of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, one carrier, two heavy 
cruisers, and twelve to fourteen destroyers.179
From March to May 1942, the Germans attacked Convoys PQs 13–15 with land-
based bombers, other aircraft, destroyers, and U-boats. Results were meager: only a 
single enemy cruiser, two destroyers, and several steamers were sunk. However, the 
Germans learned some valuable lessons from these operations.180
Convoys PQ13 and QP9, each consisting of nineteen ships, sailed on March 
20 and 21, respectively. PQ13 sailed from Reykjavík to Murmansk; QP9 (after a 
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delay of forty-eight hours because of the presence of U-boats off the Kola Inlet) 
left Murmansk for Reykjavík.181 The A/S escort for PQ13 consisted of two destroy-
ers, one minesweeper, and two trawlers and for the QP9 convoy one destroyer and 
two minesweepers. One cruiser accompanied each convoy as close screen; anoth-
er cruiser west of Bear Island and a third covering the western half of the route 
guarded against the enemy surface forces in Trondheim. Five minesweepers and 
one Russian destroyer reinforced the A/S escort off the Kola Inlet. However, no air 
support was available outside the immediate vicinity of the inlet.182
Convoy PQ13 was detected by the Luftwaffe off Bear Island on March 28. Shortly 
afterward dive-bombers attacked the convoy repeatedly, sinking three Allied ships. 
The next day, the eight-thousand-ton light cruiser Trinidad and the 1,940-ton (full 
load) destroyer Eclipse came in contact with enemy destroyers. In a brief engage-
ment in low visibility one German destroyer was sunk and another damaged; Trini-
dad was hit by a torpedo, while Eclipse suffered damage as well. The convoy ran 
into heavy weather and became widely scattered. Nevertheless, all ships but two 
that were sunk by U-boats reached Murmansk on the 31st. Convoy QP9 was fortu-
nate: it was not attacked. It arrived at Reykjavík on April 3.183 The SKL considered 
the operation against Convoy PQ13 to have been successful. Tirpitz did not take 
part in the attack, because bad weather prevented good air reconnaissance.184 
The next eastbound convoy, PQ14, twenty-three ships, left Reykjavík on April 
8 for Murmansk. The westbound QP10’s ten ships left Murmansk on April 10 
bound for Reykjavík.185 PQ14 was escorted by five destroyers, four corvettes, two 
minesweepers, and four A/S trawlers. Close cover was provided by the cruisers 
Edinburgh and Norfolk and two destroyers. QP10 was accompanied by the cruiser 
Liverpool, five destroyers, one minesweeper, and two trawlers; for heavy cover there 
were two battleships (King George V and Duke of York), one aircraft carrier (Victo-
rious), two cruisers (Kent and Nigeria), and eight destroyers.186 Convoy PQ14 ran 
into ice southwest of Jan Mayen, and about two-thirds of the convoy lost touch. 
Some fifteen ships returned to Iceland, with several escorts that had been damaged 
by ice. The remaining eight ships with most of the escorts carried on, to be sighted 
by enemy aircraft on April 13. Three days later they were attacked by U-boats east 
of Bear Island, which sank one ship. The remaining seven arrived safely at Mur-
mansk on the 19th.187 Convoy QP10, attacked by the Luftwaffe and U-boats for 
three days between the Kola Inlet and Bear Island, lost four ships; one ship returned 
to the Kola Peninsula; the remaining eleven reached Iceland on the 21st.188 From 
the German perspective, the results of the attack on Convoys PQ14 and QP10 were 
unimpressive for so many aircraft and ten U-boats. The reasons were probably the 
Allies’ strong distant and close screens and the continuous daylight; these factors 
together made it impossible to employ the Luftwaffe on the most decisive days.189
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In early April, however, Admiral Pound warned the cabinet’s Defence Commit-
tee that geographic conditions in the Arctic, especially the ice boundary, were so 
heavily in the enemy’s favor that convoy losses might well reach a point at which 
their sailing became an uneconomical proposition. During the third week of April, 
Admiral Tovey proposed that if the convoys could not be postponed until the ice 
boundary moved northward, they should at least be limited in size.190 On April 27, 
however, President Roosevelt cabled to Churchill that the United States, it seemed 
to him, had made such a tremendous effort to get supplies to Russia that it would 
be a serious mistake to allow them to be interrupted “except for most compelling 
reasons.”191 Roosevelt informed Churchill soon afterward, at the end of April, that 
107 U.S. ships were already loaded or were being loaded in Britain and the United 
States and he wanted to use them within the next month. On May 2 Churchill 
replied, “With great respect, what you suggest is beyond our power to fulfill.” 
Churchill could not press the Admiralty any further.192
In the meantime, eastbound Convoy PQ15, twenty-five ships, sailed from Reyk-
javík on April 26, while westbound Convoy QP11, thirteen ships, left Murmansk 
two days later.193 PQ15 was escorted by four destroyers, one AA ship, and three 
minesweepers, QP11 by five destroyers, five corvettes, and two trawlers. A light 
cruiser (Edinburgh) was in close cover for QP11; distant cover for both convoys 
was provided by a force in which for the first time U.S. ships operated as part of 
the Home Fleet: two battleships (King George V and USS Washington), one aircraft 
carrier (Victorious), two U.S. heavy cruisers (Wichita and Tuscaloosa), and ten de-
stroyers (four of them American).194 Four British submarines off the Norwegian 
coast moved northeastward with the convoy to provide cover from enemy surface 
forces based in Trondheim. One British submarine sailed with the convoy itself as 
far as longitude 5° east.195
Convoy PQ15 was detected by enemy aircraft on April 28 and the next day by 
U-boats as well. It was attacked by six Junkers Ju-88 bombers on May 1. Admiral 
Tovey directed two heavy cruisers (Nigeria and London) then west of Bear Island 
to stay out of the U-boat operating area unless the convoy was threatened by en-
emy cruisers or battleships.196 PQ15 lost three ships before it reached Murmansk on 
May 5.197 For some reason, the Germans tried harder to destroy QP11 than PQ15; 
QP11 was attacked five times by three destroyers east of Bear Island. QP11 lost one 
merchant ship and had one escorting destroyer (Amazon) damaged but suffered no 
further losses before it arrived at Reykjavík on May 7.198 However, three German 
destroyers clashed with and torpedoed the cruiser Edinburgh, which had to be aban-
doned. Two British destroyers, Foresight and Forrester, received serious damage. The 
Germans lost one destroyer, and two others were damaged.199 On May 2, a Polish 
submarine (P551) was mistakenly attacked by the British escorts and sunk.200 The 
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Allied heavy covering forces, meanwhile, had been detected by the German aircraft 
while coming out from Scapa Flow and shadowed up to the latitude of Seydisfjord.201
The British believed that Lützow (formerly Deutschland) moved to Norway on 
May 12 and ten days later to Narvik to join Admiral Scheer. Conversely, Tovey as-
serted—incorrectly—in a dispatch that all German destroyers based in northern 
Norway had been either sunk or damaged and accordingly he changed the protec-
tion afforded to Arctic convoys. Four cruisers accompanied by three destroyers 
would provide close cover west of Bear Island for defense against “pocket” battle-
ships.202 Admiral Tovey surmised that the enemy would leave the eastern part of the 
route to the U-boats and Luftwaffe but assign its surface ships to attack convoys be-
tween Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. There the convoys would require heavy cover.203 
Henceforth the main body of the Home Fleet would cruise northeast of Iceland in 
case Tirpitz sortied.204
Convoy PQ16, of thirty-five ships, sailed from Hvalfjord on May 21.205 It was 
escorted by five destroyers, four corvettes, four trawlers, one minesweeper, and one 
AA sloop (a rough equivalent of the U.S. destroyer escort type).206 Some degree of 
protection from U-boats was provided as far as longitude 10° east by four flying 
boats based in Iceland. The Soviets promised to support the operation by attacking 
German air bases in northern Norway with two hundred bombers. In the event, they 
carried out only a minor attack—after the Germans ended their attacks on PQ16.207
Convoy PQ16 was detected by enemy aircraft on May 24 and for the next six 
days was shadowed continuously. The first air attack came on the evening of the 
first day, about 380 miles from the German air bases in Norway. Over the next five 
days the Germans used no fewer than thirty-four torpedo bombers and two hun-
dred other bombers against the convoy. They sank seven ships and damaged three 
others at a cost of, according to British sources, three aircraft confirmed lost and 
twelve others probably shot down. U-boats tried repeatedly to attack the convoy 
but, with one exception in which they sank a ship, were driven off by escorts.208 The 
ships of Convoy PQ16 entered Murmansk and Arkhangelsk on May 30 and June 
1, respectively.209 After five days of attack, out of its thirty-four ships (one having 
turned back), seven had been sunk by Luftwaffe aircraft, only one by U-boats. The 
Germans lost two U-boats.210 
The westbound QP12, with fifteen ships, left Murmansk on May 21 escorted by 
six destroyers, one AA ship, and four trawlers. It was sighted by German aircraft 
shortly after it sailed but was not attacked; the Germans concentrated on PQ16.211 
QP12 arrived at Reykjavík on the 29th.212
ALLIED PLANS
Allied planning for Convoys PQ17 and its “pair,” QP13, followed a well-established 
pattern. While the Admiralty and the Home Fleet were gravely concerned about 
the safety of convoys to northern Russia during the summer months, they had no 
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choice but to send them; political reasons—support of the embattled Soviet Union—
trumped purely military considerations.213 The sailings of the convoys could not be 
concealed from the Germans for more than a day or two. It was clear to Admirals 
Pound and Tovey that sooner or later a disaster was bound to occur, especially when 
perpetual summer daylight prevailed. Pound believed firmly that another sortie by 
Tirpitz was inevitable, notwithstanding the failure of its first foray, against Convoys 
PQ12 and QP8. His urging to the War Cabinet that convoys be postponed until win-
ter being overruled, preparations for Convoy PQ17 went ahead.214 
Admiral Tovey received information in June 1942 that the enemy intended to 
bring out his main force to attack an eastbound convoy. This meant that enemy sur-
face ships would be between Norway and Spitsbergen—where British ships would 
be operating about a thousand miles from friendly air bases. The British destroyers 
also would be too short on fuel to escort any damaged ships.215 The only hope, Tovey 
argued, was to induce the Germans to use their heavy ships toward the west. That 
might be done by holding an eastbound convoy at longitude 10° east for twelve to 
eighteen hours (unless it was known that the German heavy ships were still in port 
or weather prevented shadowing by enemy aircraft). Tovey hoped that this seem-
ing withdrawal would either tempt the German heavy ships to pursue, cause them 
to return to port, or draw them into the operating area of the British and Soviet 
submarines.216 The Admiralty rejected Tovey’s proposal, although, interestingly, its 
instructions of June 27 envisaged the possibility, under certain circumstances, of 
the convoy being temporarily turned back on Admiralty orders.217 The same docu-
ment stated that the safety of the convoy against surface attack west of Bear Island 
“must be met by our surface forces, and to the eastward of that meridian [10° east] 
must be met by submarines; and that the cruiser covering force was not intended to 
go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface 
force which the cruisers could fight, or in any case to go beyond longitude 25° E.”218
Convoy PQ17 consisted of thirty-six merchant ships (twenty-three of them 
American), plus three rescue ships, which technically were not part of the con-
voy. Cdre. John C. K. Dowding was in command.219 The convoy carried 156,492 
tons of weapons, equipment, and other supplies, including 594 tanks, 4,246 mo-
tor vehicles, and 297 aircraft.220 Two oilers (designated Force Q) would accompany 
the convoy to refuel destroyers accompanying Convoys PQ17 and QP13 and the 
Cruiser Covering Force.221
The route ran from Hvalfjord around the western and northern coasts of Iceland; 
through the Denmark Strait; past the east coast of Jan Mayen; northeast to the vicin-
ity of latitude 75° north, longitude 19° east; from there due east, passing north of Bear 
Island, and then southeast.222 Upon crossing the longitude of the Kola Inlet (approxi-
mately 33° east), the track would split, one leading into Murmansk and the other to 
Arkhangelsk.223 This route passed farther north than usual, because the ice boundary 
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had moved farther from Bear Island, allowing the convoy to be routed farther from 
the enemy air bases in northern Norway.224 It was also thereby longer than usual.225
Defenses for the PQ17/QP13 convoys were similar to those for PQ16/QP12. 
They comprised a direct A/S screen and “long-range escort force” sailing with the 
convoy, a Cruiser Covering Force for close cover, and a Battle Fleet for distant cov-
er and support. The direct screen and long-range escort were under Cdr. John E. 
Broome, RN. The direct A/S screen consisted of four corvettes, two auxiliary AA 
ships, four minesweepers, and four armed trawlers; the long-range escort consisted 
of six destroyers and two submarines. (See “Allied Order of Battle” sidebar.)226
The Cruiser Covering Force comprised the ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (CS 
1), under Rear Adm. Louis H. K. Hamilton, RN, with a substantial U.S. Navy aug-
mentation. CS 1 consisted of two British (London and Norfolk) and two American 
(Tuscaloosa and Wichita) heavy cruisers, plus one British (Somali) and two Ameri-
can (Wainwright and Rowan) destroyers. The force was organized into the 1st Divi-
sion (London and Norfolk), 2nd Division (Tuscaloosa and Wichita), and 3rd Division 
(Somali, Wainwright, and Rowan).227 This force would provide cover as far as Bear 
Island.228 The Battle Fleet, under Admiral Tovey, was composed of the British battle-
ship Duke of York, the U.S. battleship Washington, the British carrier Victorious, the 
British heavy cruiser Cumberland and light cruiser Nigeria, and twelve destroyers.229
Tovey’s plan was for the Battle Fleet to reach latitude 65° 56ʹ north, longitude 10° 
30ʹ east at 0730 on July 1. Four destroyers from Seydisfjord would join the force, the 
others would be detached to Seydisfjord, and the Battle Fleet would station itself so 
as to provide distant cover for Convoy PQ17. CINC Rosyth (Scotland) was asked 
to arrange antisubmarine and long-range fighter escorts for the Battle Fleet as far 
northward as possible.230
Initially, eight British submarines and one Free French patrolled between North 
Cape and Bear Island.231 British submarines north of latitude 51° north were in-
formed that the main German units might be near the longitude of Bear Island 
south of their patrol lines prior to attacking the convoys. Ice conditions might force 
the convoy to pass south of Bear Island. Hence, the submarines were told, it was 
of utmost importance to report their positions accurately, particularly with regard 
to latitude.232 Five Soviet submarines patrolled north of Ingøy Island (thirty-seven 
miles west of North Cape).233
Admiral Hamilton issued on June 25 an operation order positing that the Ger-
mans would be tempted sufficiently by PQ17 and QP13 to send their heavy ships 
to sea. The British believed that two pocket battleships and some destroyers had 
been moved to more northerly ports in Norway, and more aircraft as well. Hamil-
ton assumed that the enemy units most likely to be encountered would be Tirpitz, 
Lützow, Admiral Hipper, and Admiral Scheer, plus some ten destroyers. Considering 
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Allied Order of Battle
Convoy PQ17
(Cdre. John C. K. Dowding; total 39 ships)
Merchant Ships
(Total 36: 23 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch)




Bolton Castle (U.K.) (sunk)
Carlton (U.S.) (sunk)
Christopher Newport (U.S.) (sunk)
Daniel Morgan (U.S.) (sunk)
Donbass (Soviet)
Earlston (U.K.) (sunk)
El Capitan (Panamanian) (sunk)
Empire Byron (U.K.) (sunk)
Empire Tide (U.K.)
Exford (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
Fairfield City (U.S.) (sunk)
Hartlebury (U.K.) (sunk)
Honomu (U.S.) (sunk)
Hoosier (U.S.) (sunk)  
Ironclad (U.S.)
John Witherspoon (U.S.) (sunk)
Navarino (U.K.) (sunk) 
Ocean Freedom (U.K.)
Olopana (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Atlantic (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Kraft (U.S.) (sunk)
Paulus Potter (Dutch) (sunk)
Peter Kerr (U.S.) (sunk)
Richard Bland (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)














(Cdr. John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)
Long-Range Escorts
6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton
2 submarines: P614, P615
A/S Screen
4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)
4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem
2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica
4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander
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Supply Group 
(Force Q)




(Cruiser Squadron 1, Rear Adm. Louis H. K. Hamilton, RN)
4 heavy cruisers 
2 British: London (flag), Norfolk 
2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa (CA 37), Wichita (CA 45)
3 destroyers 
1 British: Somali 
2 U.S.: Rowan (DD 405), Wainwright (DD 419)
Battle Fleet
(Adm. Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)
2 battleships 
1 British: Duke of York 
1 U.S.: Washington (BB 56) (Rear Adm. R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Adm. Sir Bruce Fraser)
1 heavy cruiser: Cumberland
1 light cruiser: Nigeria
12 destroyers 
 10 British: Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, Middleton,  
Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland  
2 U.S.: Mayrant (DD 402), Rhind (DD 404)
Submarines
(Total 14)
8 British: Sahib (P212), Sea Wolf (47S), Sturgeon (73S), Tribune (N76), Trident,  
Unrivalled (P45), Unshaken (P54), Ursula (N59)





2 light cruisers (Sirius, Curacoa)
5 destroyers
Several trawlers
Sources: Naval Staff, Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Dowding, “Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of ‘Scat-
ter’”; “War Diary U.S.S. Washington, for Period from July 1, 1942, to July 31, 1942,” folder BB 56 Washington War Diary—with 
Home Fleet, box 1554, Wasatch to Washington, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records 
Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942). 
those ships’ respective speeds, the most likely combination would be Tirpitz with 
Admiral Hipper and Lützow with Admiral Scheer.234
In Hamilton’s view, CS 1’s primary objective was to get PQ17 to Russia. A slight-
ly less important objective was to bring the enemy heavy ships into action with the 
Battle Fleet and Cruiser Covering Force. To increase the chances of the latter, PQ17 
probably would be turned back at approximately 10° east longitude and then run 
eastward again. The hope was, he explained, to lure the German ships thereby far-
ther from their bases or keep them longer at sea within Allied submarine zones.235
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The Battle Fleet would begin covering an area in the vicinity of 71° north, 0° east 
by the afternoon of the sixth day since leaving Iceland (D+6) and remain until D+8, 
keeping south of latitude 72° 30ʹ north.236 The Cruiser Covering Force would leave 
Seydisfjord on the morning of D+5 to reach its covering area at latitude 73° north, 
longitude 4° east at about noon on D+6. It would remain there until D+8—longer if 
circumstances dictated. Hamilton’s expressed intent was to avoid being drawn close 
to enemy shore-based aircraft or submarine concentrations.237
In support of the operation, Allied planners devised a deception (Operation 
E.S.), a dummy convoy aimed at deceiving the Germans into believing that an Al-
lied attack on Norway was imminent. Five ships of the 1st Mining Squadron, four 
colliers, two light cruisers (Sirius and Curacoa), five destroyers, and some trawlers 
were assembled at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys.238 This group would sortie several 
days prior to the departure of PQ17 and pass west of the Shetlands, hoping to be 
seen and reported by enemy aircraft; at latitude 61° 30ʹ north, longitude 1° east it 
would turn back toward Scapa Flow. The deception would be reinforced by the 
bombing of targets in southern Norway, as if the “convoy” was heading there.239
In June 1942, arrangements were made with the Soviets to deploy a few British 
PBY-2 Catalinas (the aircraft of No. 210 Squadron) to Arkhangelsk for reconnoiter-
ing the area between Altafjord and Convoy PQ17 on July 1–3 as it moved eastward. 
(The resulting patrol encountered nothing remarkable.)240 Rear Adm. Geoffrey J. 
A. Miles, head of the British military mission to Moscow, informed the Admiral-
ty on June 16 that the people’s commissar (minister) of the navy, Adm. Nikolay 
Kuznetsov, had promised that all Soviet resources would be devoted to convoy pro-
tection. Kuznetsov, Miles reported, had not been satisfied with the Soviet air effort 
for PQ16 but was optimistic about the future and would again ask the State Defense 
Committee (chaired by Stalin) for more long-range fighters. In addition, bombers, 
instead of bombing aerodromes, might in the future help long-range fighters. The 
Royal Air Force would send as many long-range Hurricane fighters as possible to 
the air base at Ponoy, near Murmansk, before Convoy PQ17’s arrival.241
GERMAN PLANS
German general plans for the employment of heavy surface ships against PQ con-
voys were based on “appreciations” (staff studies) prepared by various naval com-
mands during the winter and spring of 1941–42. As was the custom in the Kriegs-
marine (and the Wehrmacht in general), the highest command echelon, in this 
case Naval Group Command North, issued an “operational instruction” (operative 
Weisung), on the basis of which the subordinate commanders issued “operation 
orders” (Operationsbefehle). The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe prepared separate 
operation orders for the attack on Convoy PQ17, but the plan of each service envis-
aged close cooperation with the other.
 THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17 39 38 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
On June 4 Admiral Carls issued an operational instruction for employing the 
Trondheim and Narvik groups (designated the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups, re-
spectively) against the next PQ convoy. The instruction anticipated that because the 
PQ/QP convoys ran at fourteen-to-fifteen-day intervals, the next could be expected 
in the Jan Mayen area on June 20. Generally, the PQ convoys sailed in column for-
mation, four or five merchant ships in each column. The screen usually consisted 
of one cruiser in the convoy’s midsection and three to four destroyers some 5,500 
yards ahead. Individual destroyers and any other escorts secured the flanks. The last 
convoy had sailed close to the ice boundary, and now a heavy security group that 
included a carrier had been positioned by the enemy eastward of the Jan Mayen–
Faeroes area.242
The operational instruction established two chains of command, one for the 
first phase (deployment of the combat groups to their “jumping-off ” positions) 
and another for the second phase (movement from the jumping-off positions to the 
attacking positions). In the first phase, for the Trondheim force, Naval Group Com-
mand North would exercise operational control, while the fleet commander in Tir-
pitz would have tactical control. For the Narvik group, operational control would 
be in the hands of Admiral Arctic on board the S-boat mother ship Tanga, while 
tactical command and control would be exercised by the commander of cruisers, in 
Lützow.243 In the second phase of the operation, the groups would proceed to a ren-
dezvous at a point to be determined; overall operational control over both surface 
forces and U-boats would reside with Commander, Naval Group Command North, 
though Admiral Arctic would retain operational control of the S-boats operating 
in the Kola Peninsula area. After both groups joined, tactical command and con-
trol would rest in the hands of the fleet commander. The headquarters of Admiral 
Arctic would serve as radio relay for the U-boats. The fleet commander would not 
directly control the U-boats.244
The June 4 instruction also specified the composition of the Trondheim and 
Narvik combat groups: the Trondheim group would be composed of Tirpitz, Ad-
miral Hipper, two destroyers, and three torpedo boats; at Narvik Lützow, Admiral 
Scheer, and six destroyers would assemble. Besides two combat groups, Admiral 
Carls expected to have three U-boats northeast of Jan Mayen by June 10 to obtain 
early contact with the next PQ convoy and its heavy covering forces. Additional U-
boat groups would be between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.245
Operationally, RÖSSELSPRUNG was simple in concept but difficult in execution. 
Almost everything depended on a timely and covert joining of the two combat 
groups, followed by unobserved movement toward the anticipated position of 
Convoy PQ17 (see map 4). Specifically, the Trondheim group’s jumping-off posi-
tion would be Gimsøystraumen, in Vestfjord; at the same time, the Narvik group, 
directed by Admiral Arctic, would move to its jumping-off position at the northern 
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exit of Altafjord, in the skerries of Sørøya. Both groups were to be at their jumping-
off points within twenty-four hours. Destroyers and torpedo boats were to be fully 
refueled. After the combat groups joined, the torpedo boats would refuel at 
Altafjord and remain there on three-hour alert. Owing to their short radius of ac-
tion, the destroyers’ speed would be limited.246 There was danger of torpedoes from 
not only enemy surface forces and aircraft but also submarines; the latter had been 
used to screen the previous PQ convoy. On signal from Commander, Naval Group 
Command North both combat groups would sortie so as to arrive at a meeting 
point he would promulgate.247 Orders to break off the action, if necessary, would 
either come from MGK Nord or result from an independent decision of the fleet 
commander.248
German Order of Battle
1st Combat Group 
(I Kampfgruppe, Trondheim)
1 battleship: Tirpitz (flag)
1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Hipper
5 destroyers: 
 5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (flag) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen 
 6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (flag) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6 Theodor Riedel
2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15
2nd Combat Group 
(II Kampfgruppe, Narvik)
1 pocket battleship (Panzerschiff): Lützow
1 heavy cruiser (formerly pocket battleship): Admiral Scheer
8th Destroyer Flotilla
 5 destroyers: Z-28 (flag), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30
 1 oiler: Dithmarschen
9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703
5th Air Fleet
Reconnaissance
I./K.G. 40, 1. (F)/22, 1. (F)/124; 2./406; 3./406; 3./906; 1./125 Vestfjord; 74  
reconnaissance aircraft (including three squadrons of Focke-Wulf FW-200 
Condors and four squadrons of Blohm & Voss BV-138 Seedrache seaplanes)
Combat Units
K.G. 30; I./K.G. 26 (LT); 1./406 (LT); 1./906 (LT) 103 Ju-88 bombers; 42 He-111 tor-
pedo bombers; 15 He-115 torpedo bombers (on floats); 30 Ju-87 dive-bombers
Sources: Flottenchef/B.d.S., “Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug 
(Deckname Rösselsprung),” 14 June 1942, pp. 100–102, Akte VIII, 13 (PQ17) May 1942–July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA; 
Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, Abschlussbericht, “Rösselsprung,” 20 July 1942, p. 32, Akte VIII, 13 
(PQ17) May 1942–July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA; Vertragsnotiz Unternehmung “Rösselsprung,” Juli 1942, p. 81, RM 7/1024, 
BA-MA; Operationen von Flottenstreitkräften im Nordpolarmeer im Jahre 1942, pp. 19–21; Irving, Destruction of Convoy 
PQ.17, p. 40.
Legend:
(F) = Fern Aufklärungsgruppe (Long Range Reconnaissance Group)
K.G. = Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing)
LT = Lufttorpedo (Aerial Torpedo)
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The situation would require massing German forces rapidly and keeping the 
duration of the operation short—here the commander had the suspected heavy 
covering group in mind. The primary mission was the quick destruction of the en-
emy’s merchant ships. The heavy surface ships should merely neutralize the cargo 
ships; their actual sinking should be left to the U-boats and Luftwaffe. Among these 
the tankers would be especially important targets. It also would be desirable to 
capture several enemy ships. In any case, it was attacking the convoy, not the heavy 
covering group, that was the primary mission of Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper.249
The enemy convoy was to be detected by U-boat patrol lines, after which the 
Luftwaffe would maintain continuous contact. The Luftwaffe also would search 
for the enemy heavy group, in the Shetland–Faeroe–Iceland–Jan Mayen area. If the 
heavy group was not detected there, it would be critically important next to recon-
noiter the sea 250 nautical miles around the convoy. The Luftwaffe also was tasked 
with scouting the vicinities of Reykjavík, Scapa Flow, and the Firths of Forth and 
Moray (in Scotland).250 On the day the combat groups sortied from their Trond-
heim and Narvik bases, the Luftwaffe would reconnoiter a quadrant out to two 
hundred nautical miles from the coast northeastward from latitude 62° north to the 
longitude of North Cape. The day they left the jumping-off positions, the Luftwaffe 
would search an arc two hundred nautical miles offshore from the latitude of the 
southern tip of Lofoten to the longitude of North Cape.251
Pursuant to an instruction from Hitler on March 14, 1942, Naval Group Command 
North requested that the 5th Air Fleet assign three squadrons of Focke-Wulf (FW) 200 
Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft, four squadrons of Blohm & Voss (BV) 138s 
and several three-plane “chains” (Kette) of bombers and Ju-88 fighter-bombers for air 
reconnaissance.252 However, the 5th Air Fleet informed Naval Group Command 
North on June 19 that its request could not be fulfilled. In the 5th Air Fleet’s view, 
the attack on PQ16 in late May had shown clearly that the Luftwaffe was capable of 
inflicting heavy losses on convoys by itself but only at the cost of further diluting 
the 5th Air Fleet’s already inadequate forces.253
On June 14, Admiral Schniewind, the fleet commander, issued a six-and-a-half-
page operation order, “Employment of Fleet Forces in the Northern Area against 
a PQ Convoy.” The mission was simple: “destroy a PQ-convoy in cooperation with 
U-boats and Luftwaffe.”254 In keeping with the overall instruction, Schniewind’s or-
der divided his forces into three: the Trondheim group, the Narvik group, and the 
U-boats. (See “German Order of Battle” sidebar.) The Trondheim group consisted 
of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper (with the fleet commander embarked), and five destroy-
ers (in contrast to the two envisaged in Carls’s operational instruction). The Nar-
vik group had Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and five destroyers. Three U-boats would 
be stationed northeast of Iceland beginning on the 10th. Other available U-boats, 
“probably three to four,” would be in the attacking position between Jan Mayen 
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and Bear Islands. Any other U-boats available later would be stationed off Bear 
Island. At the time the operation order was issued, there were only two destroyers 
in Trondheim (Ihn and Lody); four other destroyers were to be transferred from 
Germany to Norway within the next few days. There were also two or three tor-
pedo boats in Trondheim to escort the group.255 In the skerries of Vestfjord and 
other coastal waters would be minesweepers and submarine chasers. The U-boats 
would follow a route through Andfjord; a former fishing steamer (Schiff 31) would 
escort them.256
Upon issuance of a coded signal from Naval Group Command North, the 
fleet forces would move to their jumping-off points as had been specified by Na-
val Group Command North, arriving, combat ready, within twenty-four hours.257 
About five hours prior to the sortie of the combat groups from jumping-off points, 
Air Leader Lofoten and Air Leader North (East) would fly reconnaissance in the 
quadrant bounded by latitude 68° north and longitude 25° east, out to two hundred 
nautical miles offshore. Within the effective range of the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft, 
close air support would be provided during all phases of the operation.258
Admiral Schniewind reiterated the need for quick massing, concentrated em-
ployment, and quick destruction of the enemy. The primary objective was destruc-
tion of the enemy’s merchant ships; screening ships were to be attacked only if they 
jeopardized the primary objective. The most favorable conditions for the attack 
would be found east of Bear Island, between longitudes 20° and 30° east. The main 
objective would be accomplished faster and more effectively if the U-boats and the 
Luftwaffe provided reliable reconnaissance.259
In his written intent (Absicht), Admiral Schniewind laid down that suppression 
of the strongest enemy force would be the responsibility of the 1st Combat Group. 
As soon as Convoy PQ17 was detected and located, the combat groups would take 
up their stations—but as late as possible, to reduce the reaction time available for 
the enemy.260 The enemy should be attacked on the bow sectors and from the east; 
the enemy was to be encircled only when his combat power was broken up.261 If 
the enemy’s close screen consisted of no more than two cruisers, the attack could 
be conducted from two directions from the outset; this would result in quicker 
destruction of the convoy.262
Schniewind stressed that engagement with superior enemy forces should be 
avoided. The operation, he reaffirmed, was to be executed quickly, before an en-
emy force composed of battleships and carriers and believed to be in the Faeroes–
Iceland area would have an opportunity to intervene.263 If enemy heavy forces were 
encountered, the action should continue only as long as the prospects for success 
were favorable.264
On June 2 Admiral Schmundt (Admiral Arctic) issued his operation order for 
the movement of the pocket-battleship group from Narvik to Altafjord (code name 
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KONZERT). In addition to Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and the five destroyers, the Nar-
vik combat group included the 6th S-boat Flotilla (seven boats) and a supply ship.265 
Close air support en route to Altafjord would be provided by Luftwaffe fighters 
based in Bardufoss and Altengaard (near Altafjord). Air reconnaissance would 
search primarily for enemy carriers from latitude 67° north, longitude 26° east out 
to two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. Higher-density reconnais-
sance would be flown between latitudes 69° and 79° north and longitudes 14° and 
19° east. Air reconnaissance would be conducted throughout the movement.266
On June 11 Admiral Schmundt directed three U-boats, organized as the 
Eisteufel (“Ice Devil”) group, to take up patrol positions in the Denmark Strait to 
watch for the first sign of PQ17. These U-boats’ primary mission was first detect-
ing and then tracking the convoy. Surface ships of destroyer size and larger could 
be attacked only when positively identified as hostile. In any uncertain situation, 
such as thick weather, all attacks on warships were prohibited. The German ships 
also were directed not to attack enemy submarines but otherwise “to act as though 
submarines they meet are hostile.”267
The 5th Air Fleet issued its operation order on the 14th. It gave as the main 
missions air reconnaissance and the close support of naval forces. Subordinate 
commanders were to use all available forces in attacking the PQ convoy.268 Upon 
execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG Luftwaffe aircraft would begin a three-hundred-
nautical-mile-wide search off the Norwegian coast. Specific assignments were the 
following: Air Leader North (West), from latitude 62° north to a line from the south-
ern tip of the Lofotens to the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen; Air Leader Lofoten, 
from the southern tip of the Lofotens to a line connecting North Cape to the southern 
tip of Spitsbergen; Air Leader North (East), from the line between North Cape (longi-
tude 25° east) and the southern tip of Spitsbergen out to longitude 30° east.269
Air Leader North (West) was to cover the Trondheim group, Air Leader Lofoten 
the Narvik group.270 Fighter protection would be organized by the commander of 
fighters, Norway, in cooperation with the fleet commander at Trondheim, and by 
Air Leader Lofoten in cooperation with the commander of cruisers.271 After the 
PQ convoy crossed longitude 5° east, Air Leader Lofoten would be responsible for 
the sea area to three hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast, from a line 
connecting the southern tip of Lofoten and the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen to 
another between the southern tip of Spitsbergen and North Cape. Air Leader North 
(West) would have the zone west and southwest of the Lofoten–Jan Mayen line (see 
map 4).272
In the meantime, on June 6, Admiral Raeder met with Hitler to discuss opera-
tions in the Arctic. Hitler was informed of the pending operation in which Tirpitz 
was to participate; his agreement was lukewarm at best, but he did not reject the idea. 
Hitler was unclear about the operation’s form but felt it should not be risky for heavy 
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Map 5
German attack on Convoy 
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ships in any case. After the meeting, Raeder directed Vice Adm. Theodor Krancke, 
OKM’s liaison to the Führer’s headquarters, to explain to Hitler once again that 
the operation, on which the SKL placed great importance, would require sufficient 
Luftwaffe air cover; it could not be successful otherwise.273
Hitler formally approved the plan for RÖSSELSPRUNG on the 9th. However, Raeder 
failed to respond forcefully to Hitler’s remark that he now saw “great danger for 
heavy ships by the [enemy] aircraft carrier,” a reservation meaning that the enemy 
carrier had to be located prior to the attack on the convoy and eliminated. The SKL 
was allowed to move the Trondheim group to Altafjord but then had to await or-
ders to attack, orders that could come only with Hitler’s approval. Raeder’s unwill-
ingness to act energetically—to confront Hitler and get him to lift his restrictions 
on the employment of the heavy ships—was the key element in the ultimate failure 
of RÖSSELSPRUNG, notwithstanding the German forces’ overall success against 
Convoy PQ17.274
EXECUTION
Convoy PQ17, now consisting of thirty-six ships plus one rescue ship, sailed from 
Hvalfjord at 1600 on June 27 at six knots (see map 5).275 The next day the convoy 
encountered heavy fog and ice floes in the Denmark Strait. One merchant vessel 
ran aground, and an oiler was damaged so heavily by ice that it had to return. Sev-
eral other ships suffered slight damage from ice.276
The Home Fleet’s Battle Force sailed from Scapa Flow on June 29 and steamed 
northward so as to support both PQ17 and QP13.277 Convoy PQ17 was fully formed 
at 1200 on the 30th when it was joined by a long-range escort force under Com-
mander Broome and two rescue ships.278 The convoy was then about a hundred 
miles southwest of Jan Mayen Island.279 The next day, the Cruiser Covering Force 
sailed from Seydisfjord.280
Operation E.S.’s dummy convoy sailed on the 29th and carried out its movement 
eastward toward the Norwegian coast on June 30 and July 1. However, Luftwaffe 
reconnaissance aircraft did not observe it, and so the Germans did not react at all.281 
The entire deception plan was a failure.
At 1640 on June 30, Luftwaffe aircraft detected westbound Convoy QP13, re-
porting it as consisting of thirty-nine ships and ten escorts, some two hundred nau-
tical miles north of North Cape. However, because of heavy fog they were unable to 
maintain contact.282 At 1050 on July 1, QP13 was sighted by U-88 250 nautical miles 
northeast of Jan Mayen but was not attacked.283 At 1615 on the 1st, U-255 reported 
the convoy’s position as sixty nautical miles east of Jan Mayen and its composition 
as thirty-eight steamers and ten to twelve destroyers and other escort vessels. U-255 
estimated the convoy’s speed at eight knots; B-Dienst later confirmed this.284
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At noon on July 1, the British first noted German shadowing aircraft over Convoy 
PQ17. The weather was calm, all the Allied destroyers had been refueled, and the 
convoy was two hundred miles west of Bear Island.285 The PQ17 and QP13 convoys 
passed each other at latitude 73° north, longitude 3° east at a distance of some ten 
miles on the afternoon of the 1st.286 The Cruiser Covering Force overtook Convoy 
PQ17 and sailed parallel to it but forty miles north, so as to avoid German detection.287
In the meantime, Bletchley Park learned that the Luftwaffe had detected PQ17.288 
The OIC began to decrypt special intelligence traffic of between noon on July 1 
and noon on July 2 and learned that the Germans’ Narvik group had arrived at 
Altafjord that morning. It also knew that Tirpitz had sortied from Trondheim the 
previous night; a British aircraft confirmed its absence. Yet Tirpitz was not actually 
located by air reconnaissance that day.289
On July 2, one fleet tanker and one destroyer left PQ17 to join westbound QP13. 
That evening PQ17 ran into fog, which persisted until the forenoon of the 3rd. 
Bad weather prevented Allied aircraft from reconnoitering the Norwegian ports 
for several days.290
Admiral Carls, despite the failure to detect the enemy’s heavy surface group, 
believed that the pending operation, including the heavy surface ships, was fully 
justified. Deployment of the German ships would start when the enemy PQ convoy 
crossed 5° east longitude, anticipated for the evening of July 2.291 Accordingly, Na-
val Group Command North requested during the forenoon of the 2nd that 1./SKL 
issue “execute” orders. This request was approved, and signals were sent at 1257. 
At 1200, the Trondheim group received an order to be in three-hour readiness.292 
On the basis of reports from U-266, Admiral Arctic decided to keep four U-boats 
in continuous contact with the convoy. By 1400 on July 2 a patrol line of six U-
boats was in place halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.293 As planned, the 
Trondheim group sortied at 2000 for Gimsøystraumen, and four hours later the 
Narvik group left for Altafjord.294 Lützow ran aground in the Tjeldsund and took no 
further part in the operation. Likewise, three destroyers (Lody, Riedel, and Galster) 
of the Trondheim group touched ground in Gimsøystraumen and suffered damage; 
they returned to Trondheim the next day.295 The Germans believed (wrongly, as it 
turned out) that the enemy did not notice the deployment of the Trondheim and 
Narvik groups.296
At about midnight on July 2/3, the U-boats and aircraft lost contact with Con-
voy PQ17.297 At 0700 on the 3rd, the convoy changed course to due east, to pass 
Bear Island into the Barents Sea. The Admiralty reported that the ice boundary was 
even farther north than had been anticipated, and Admiral Hamilton suggested 
to Commander Broome that he change to a more northward course. Broome did 
not entirely accept that suggestion, being anxious to make progress eastward;298 he 
changed the convoy’s course northward, to 021 degrees.299
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At 1600, Admiral Carls asked for a decision regarding RÖSSELSPRUNG. He shared 
his intention to deploy the Tirpitz group to Altafjord with Raeder and the SKL. Af-
terward, Raeder directed Admiral Krancke to transmit Raeder’s approval of Carls’s 
intent to Hitler, explaining to Hitler that movement of the Tirpitz group to Altafjord 
was only a preliminary and did not constitute execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG. In a 
message sent at 1720, Carls ordered Schniewind to carry out the redeployment.300 
With the Tirpitz group at Altafjord, only a few hours would have been lost if Hitler’s 
approval for the larger operation came before midday on July 4.301 
In the early morning of the 3rd, the Admiralty informed CINC Home Fleet that 
a PBY-2 Catalina seaplane, backed by one B-24 Liberator heavy bomber if neces-
sary, would patrol between latitude 71° 30ʹ north, longitude 19° 10ʹ east and lati-
tude 71° 55ʹ north, longitude 23° 40ʹ east from 1530 on July 3 to 0300 on July 5. This 
patrol was intended to cover the approaches from Altafjord to the convoy’s route. 
Aircraft from Sullom Voe would fly additional searches westward of Lofoten. Five 
Catalinas would be available at Arkhangelsk to search ahead of the convoy after it 
crossed longitude 35° east.302
At 0130 on the 4th, PQ17 changed course to the northeast and entered an area 
full of heavy ice growlers.303 At 0415, Luftwaffe aircraft detected it eighty nautical 
miles northeast of Bear Island, equidistant from that island and Spitsbergen.304 At 
0450, Convoy PQ17 suffered its first loss when an aircraft torpedoed the Ameri-
can merchantman Christopher Newport, of seven thousand gross registered tons 
(in German documents, Bruttoregistertonnen, or BRT).305 During the day German 
aircraft maintained contact, with only short interruptions caused by bad weather.306 
As of 1700, however, the Germans still did not have definite information on the 
heavy cover group—with probably one battleship, two or three cruisers, and three 
destroyers—reported at 1352 northeast of Convoy PQ17 and on a southeasterly 
course.307 The area north of latitude 71° north was, as Admiral Carls reported to the 
SKL at 1745, not being observed continuously. Accordingly, Admiral Carls believed 
that RÖSSELSPRUNG should be launched no later than 1700 on July 5. The 1st and 
2nd Combat Groups were in a three-hour readiness status at Altafjord.308
In the meantime, at about 1230 on July 4, the Admiralty bypassed Admiral Tovey 
to give his subordinate Admiral Hamilton, with the Cruiser Covering Force, per-
mission to pass east of longitude 25° east should the situation require it. However, 
the Admiralty had no information that specifically justified the change in Tovey’s 
plans, so Tovey qualified it, directing Hamilton that “once the convoy is east of 25° 
E or earlier at your discretion, you are to leave the Barents Sea unless assured by 
Admiralty that Tirpitz cannot be met.”309 At 1520, Hamilton signaled that he would 
stay with the convoy until the enemy surface threat had been clarified, but certainly 
no longer than 1200 on the 5th.310 These Admiralty messages marked the beginning 
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of interference by Admiral Pound in the decisions and actions of subordinate com-
manders during the operation.311
During the afternoon of the 4th, British aircraft reported that Tirpitz and Ad-
miral Hipper had left Trondheim. Admiral Tovey’s force was then 180–200 miles 
northwest of Bear Island, within the mutually supporting distance of the carrier 
Victorious.312 At 1640, Hamilton ordered the convoy to change course from 090 to 
045 degrees to open the distance from the enemy airfield at Banak to four hundred 
miles.313 Also that afternoon, Bletchley Park assessed that although there was no 
verification via photographic reconnaissance, it was “tolerably certain” that Admi-
ral Scheer and Lützow had been in Altafjord since 1400 on July 3 (when it became 
known they had left Trondheim). By then all four German heavy ships might be at 
sea heading toward the convoy.314
At 1809, Admiral Hamilton replied to the Admiralty that he intended to with-
draw to the westward of Convoy PQ17 at about 2200 on July 4, after refueling 
his destroyers.315 The Admiralty at 1839 directed Hamilton, because new infor-
mation might be available shortly, to remain with the convoy “pending further 
instruction.”316 At that time, Hamilton’s Cruiser Covering Force was between ten 
and twenty miles ahead of the convoy.317 Some 350 miles away the Battle Fleet was 
hovering southwest of Spitsbergen.318
All that day the weather north of Bear Island had steadily improved; however, 
the cloud ceiling was low (985 to 1,640 feet), making it easier for enemy aircraft to 
attack the convoy.319 The first attack, by a few bombers, came at 1930. It scored no 
hits, but Luftwaffe aircraft carried out a series of more-deadly raids during the eve-
ning. At about 2030, twenty-three Heinkel (He) 111 torpedo bombers attacked the 
convoy. They torpedoed three ships; two of these had to be sunk by the escort, but 
the other was able to continue the voyage. Four enemy planes were shot down.320 
Convoy PQ17 had come out of heavy air attacks remarkably well—its antiair de-
fense had proved very effective.321
At 2325, Bletchley Park sent the Admiralty an intercepted message: 
Most Secret Source (Ultra): 
1.  [The Germans have] located westbound convoy from Russia on North Cape meridian 
P.M. yesterday July 2nd and have since lost in fog. 
2.  Eastbound convoy is expected to be sighted shortly and will be attacked in accordance 
with plan; 
3.  Warships are expected to move from Trondheim and Narvik (? 36) hours before convoy 
reaches meridian 5 deg E. Main attack to be concentrated during passage between 15th and 
30th meridian; 
4.  U-boats already on station close to Arctic. A two repeat A two. [A2 was the level of reli-
ability of this part of the report.]322 
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THE DECISION TO SCATTER THE CONVOY
On the evening on the 4th, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get 
a close look at the stream of decrypted messages.323 The OIC received good news 
at about 1900: the “break-in” for the most recent ENIGMA rotor settings had been 
accomplished and decrypts for the twenty-four hours up to noon that day could be 
expected very shortly.324 At 1918, Bletchley advised Tovey that the German “CINC 
of the Fleet in Tirpitz arrived to Alta[fjord] 0900/4th. Destroyers and torpedo boats 
[were to] complete with fuel at once. Scheer was already present at Alta[fjord]. [Ac-
tually, Hipper and Lützow were also.] At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their 
main task was to shadow convoy.”325 Cdr. Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to 
add a comment that the new evidence indicated that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. 
However, after discussion with Admiral Pound, Denning’s assessment was deleted 
from the message sent at 1918.326 
It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although ex-
pected, the German ships’ arrival in Altafjord reinforced the view that a move 
against the convoy was imminent if not already under way.327 But it was not certain, 
Denning was convinced, that the German ships had yet left Altafjord. He was sup-
ported in his view by his superior, John “Jock” Clayton, the deputy director of the 
OIC. (Clayton, a rear admiral on the retired list, had been brought back on active 
service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the German-traffic 
analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, who compared the current situation with Tir-
pitz’s foray against Convoy PQ12 in March, the absence of any signal from Naval 
Group Command North to Tirpitz was an indicator that the heavy ships were still at 
Altafjord. There also were no reports from the British submarines. Denning briefed 
Pound but was given little opportunity to explain his reasoning; the admiral instead 
asked direct questions to which he expected short, factual answers. At one point 
Pound asked Denning whether he knew that Tirpitz was not at sea.328 Denning re-
sponded that the German sortie against Convoy PQ12 suggested that the Germans 
would not now risk Tirpitz if there were danger from the “Home Fleet, particularly 
its aircraft carriers.”329 He also assured Pound that “if Tirpitz has put out to sea you 
can be sure that we should have known very shortly afterward[,] within four to six 
hours.”330
Denning also pointed to several “negative” indicators. For example, Bletchley 
Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but erroneously thought it included 
a battleship. That would indicate a large force, and therefore the Germans would 
not send Tirpitz to sea. (Bletchley had found no evidence that the Germans had 
detected the heavy covering force.) Another point was that the Germans had not 
warned their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy (i.e., so as not mistakenly to at-
tack German ships). Neither had the German wireless-telegraphy traffic mark-
edly increased since noon. The British and Soviet submarines off North Cape had 
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reported no sightings. Collectively, all these “negatives” made a good case that Tir-
pitz was still at Altafjord.331
Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound’s question, “Can you assure me that Tirpitz is 
still at anchor in Altafjord?” Denning could only respond, “No. I shall have infor-
mation only after the Tirpitz has left.”332 On this question, in fact, hung the entire 
future of Convoy PQ17, but Denning was not in a position to give the desired as-
surance.333 Pound then asked, “Can you at least tell me whether Tirpitz is ready to 
go to sea?” To which Denning responded, “I can at least say that she will not leave 
in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort would 
have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been reported 
by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord.”334
At 2000 the expected stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC but provided no 
new “positive” information bearing on Admiral Pound’s question. At 2030, Pound 
convened a staff meeting, at which Clayton was present.335 (Coincidentally, that meet-
ing was held just as Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy air attacks.)336 At 2031, the 
OIC received a decrypt of a German message from 1130 on July 4 confirming that 
Tirpitz had not left Altafjord as of noon. This signal, which was included in the 2110 
ULTRA summary, had informed the U-boats that no German surface ships were then 
in their operating area and that the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be 
their main targets. However, this information did not change the situation, because 
an assessment already had been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accom-
panying Tirpitz would not have completed refueling until about noon.337
At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy attack 
could occur anytime after 0200 on the 5th; if that happened, Admiral Hamilton’s 
cruisers would be destroyed. The participants also (falsely) believed that the farther 
apart the merchant ships were, the better their chances of escape: once the alarm 
was given, the enemy would stay in the vicinity no longer than necessary to pick 
off a few ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require a good deal of time 
to disperse over a large area, whereas the air and U-boat attacks had started already 
and were certain to continue.338
When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his own staff 
that Admiral Pound was now taking the view that the convoy had to be dispersed, 
that Tirpitz had sortied and could reach the convoy by 0200 on July 5. Clayton’s staff 
persuaded him to go back to Admiral Pound and make the case that instead Admi-
ral Tovey should be advised that Tirpitz had not sailed out and would not until the 
Germans had information on the strength of the Allied heavy covering force.339 The 
naval section at Bletchley Park agreed. But Clayton was unable to convince Admiral 
Pound, who had made up his mind.340
The fate of Convoy PQ17 was now decided, by three short Admiralty messag-
es. At 2111 Pound sent a signal to Hamilton (repeated to Tovey): “Cruiser force 
 THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17 51 50 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
withdraw to westward at high speed.” Another (repeated to Hamilton) went direct-
ly to Broome, the screen commander, at 2123: “Owing to threat from surface ships 
convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports.” This was followed by another 
at 2136: “[Reference] My 2123/4th. Convoy is to scatter.”341
At the time Admiral Pound made his decision, Convoy PQ17 was some 130 
miles north-northeast of Bear Island and almost due north of North Cape (bearing 
008) at a distance of about 240 miles (see map 6).342 The Allied ships had some 450 
miles to go to reach Novaya Zemlya. The Battle Fleet was then some 230 miles from 
the convoy and four hundred from the Tirpitz group—too far away from either the 
convoy or the enemy heavy ships.343
At 2215, Commander Broome passed the signal to scatter to the convoy com-
modore. The convoy was then at latitude 75° 55ʹ north, longitude 22° 52ʹ east. 
Broome, with his destroyers (other ships of the A/S screen remained with the con-
voy), steamed away to join Admiral Hamilton’s force.344 Commodore Dowding sent 
a message to Broome: “Many thanks. Goodbye and good hunting”; Broome replied, 
“It’s a grim business leaving you here.”345
At 2230, Hamilton turned his force onto a westerly course that would pass south 
of the convoy—that is, between the convoy and the probable enemy forces. The vis-
ibility was extremely variable, with numerous fog patches. The Cruiser Covering 
Force, with the destroyers, withdrew westward at twenty-five knots.346
Both Hamilton and Broome were affected less by the content of Pound’s three 
messages than by the quick succession in which they had been sent. Their cumu-
lative effect—especially since the last signal had a more urgent priority marking 
than the previous one—was to imply that danger was pressing.347 From that they 
inferred that an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. Commander Broome duly obeyed 
the order to scatter the convoy—for which he was never to forgive himself.348 In a 
bitter irony, the third message’s order to “scatter” the convoy was actually a merely 
technical amendment of the term “disperse” that had been used in the second sig-
nal; Hamilton and Broome could not have known this. Later, the official Royal 
Navy history would explain the two terms in a footnote: “disperse” meant ships 
should break formation and proceed at convenient speed toward their destinations, 
remaining for some hours in proximity to each other; by contrast, to “scatter” was 
to turn to widely varying courses, in accordance with a scheme laid down in convoy 
instructions.349
Officially, the decision to scatter the convoy was explained later in this way. 
Convoy PQ17 still had thirty ships intact. The combined threat of air and U-boat 
attacks was considerable. The convoy had reached a position beyond the effective 
range of the Battle Fleet, even if that force were put at risk to engage Tirpitz and the 
enemy’s other heavy ships. In the Admiralty’s view, if the convoy continued on its 
way, it would be harassed by enemy U-boats and aircraft. Any enemy heavy ships 
 THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17 53 52 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
Map 6
Movements of remnants 
























   
   
   























MOVEMENTS OF REMNANTS OF CONVOY PQ17, 4–17 JULY 1942


































In ice, 5–7 July
To Novaya Zemlya














 THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17 53 52 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
that approached most likely would be encountered east of North Cape. The enemy 
would need no more than ten hours to reach the convoy and could return to safety 
in even less time. Thus, the decision to scatter the convoy: the losses to be antici-
pated from a surface attack were worse, by this argument, than those that would be 
inflicted by U-boats and aircraft. But as it turned out, the convoy lost twenty ships 
after the signal to scatter was given, and only fourteen ships reached Soviet ports.350 
The Admiralty’s reasoning was faulty: the effectiveness of Luftwaffe bombers and 
Kriegsmarine U-boats in attacking individual merchant ships had been proved. 
The threat of enemy aircraft could be neutralized only by superior airpower—
unlikely to be provided by the Soviets.
This was only the second time an Allied convoy had been scattered. In the first 
instance, Convoy HX84 (Halifax to Liverpool) had received such an order on No-
vember 5, 1940, when Admiral Scheer was about to attack. However, there were 
significant differences: the area in which HX84’s thirty-seven ships could disperse 
was much larger, and neither German aircraft nor U-boats were attacking. Also, 
the earlier convoy was protected by only a single ship, the armed merchant cruiser 
Jarvis Bay. Admiral Scheer subsequently sank five ships, including the escort.351
The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the 
“Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders” that Admiral Tovey had issued in March 
1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts should 
remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, attack enemy surface 
ships. Tovey was to note that Convoy PQ17 had more than half completed its voy-
age, to within eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk, having lost only three 
ships. In his view, the decision to scatter had been premature—and disastrous.352
In a personal letter to Admiral Noble of the Western Approaches Command 
on July 12, 1942, Admiral Tovey would place responsibility for the destruction of 
Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for the “scattering of [the] convoy un-
necessarily early and . . . the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the signals 
they made.” He had sent an officer “down to the Admiralty to make clear to them 
what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out and to those three 
signals in particular.” Tovey, he wrote to Noble, had himself told the Admiralty by 
telephone that he considered it “wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders to 
the convoy and escort.” The Admiralty should “give them information by all means 
and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on the spot to 
decide the action to be taken.” The Admiralty had responded to the last point that 
it “consider[ed] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander’s 
rank [i.e., Broome].”353 
Whatever the merit of the Admiralty’s reply, it did not absolve Admiral Pound of 
bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey also wrote to Noble that Hamilton 
was entirely responsible for the inaction, having “failed completely to appreciate the al-
tered situation due to his imagining that there was still a strong likelihood of his being 
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brought to action by the Tirpitz.” Hamilton had thought it best to have the convoy’s 
destroyer escort join his own three destroyers in CS 1’s screen. “I deeply regret,” 
Tovey commented, “this mistake of his as there was not the slightest doubt that if 
the destroyers had returned to the convoy within a reasonable time they could have 
helped materially in its defence and in rescuing survivors.”354 Indeed, the presence 
of destroyers obviously would have strengthened Convoy PQ17’s AA defenses; 
however, it is unlikely that they would have reduced significantly the number of 
merchant ships sunk.
At 0115 on the 5th, Admiral Hamilton sent the following message to his ships, 
addressing also Commodore Dowding, the convoy’s merchant ships, and the re-
maining escorts:
I know you will all be feeling as distressed as I am at having to leave that fine collection of 
ships to find their own way to harbor. The enemy under the cover of his shore-based aircraft 
has succeeded in concentrating a far superior force in this area. We were therefore ordered 
to withdraw. We are all sorry that the good work of the close escort could not be completed. 
I hope we shall all have a chance of settling this score with them soon.355 
Hamilton was very much concerned about the potential effect on morale of the 
escort force’s apparent desertion of the merchant ships. Had he known that the 
Admiralty possessed no more information regarding the enemy heavy units than 
he did himself, he would have remained in a covering position until the convoy had 
dispersed widely.356 It was claimed later that Admiral Pound would not have made 
his fateful decision except for the presence of two U.S. cruisers; the American ships 
were operating under British command for the first time, and he did not want to 
lose them.357 
DESTRUCTION OF THE CONVOY, JULY 5–8 
On July 5, the weather in the operating area was variable, between four-tenths and 
fully overcast, with fog banks. Atmospheric disturbances sporadically interrupted ra-
dio traffic. Convoy PQ17 was being shadowed continuously by Luftwaffe aircraft.358 
After the order to scatter was issued, most merchant ships proceeded alone, 
some in groups of two or three—most to seek shelter at Novaya Zemlya, a few to-
ward Arkhangelsk. Two AA ships (Palomares and Pozarica) joined a small convoy 
of merchant ships protected by one corvette and two or three minesweepers; on 
July 5, these ships headed for Novaya Zemlya. One corvette (Dianella) escorted the 
submarines until they separated from the merchant ships to patrol to the west; the 
corvette carried on eastward and alone. One minesweeper, Salamander, escorted a 
rescue ship and two merchant vessels.359
Less than half of PQ17’s merchant ships that remained by the end of July 4 
reached safety. On July 5 and over the following two days, eighteen, including the 
oiler Aldersdale and the rescue ship Zaafaran, were sunk, most of them between 
approximately latitudes 74° and 77° north and longitudes 35° to 45° east. Eight, 
including the rescue ship and oiler, were sunk by bombs and six were torpedoed 
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by U-boats. Between the evening of the 6th and the early morning of the 8th, four 
more ships were torpedoed off the southwest coast of Novaya Zemlya, probably by 
a single U-boat.360
HITLER FINALLY GIVES PERMISSION, JULY 5
In the early morning on July 5, the Admiralty was still in the dark about whether 
German heavy forces had left Altafjord. At 0238 on July 5, Admiral Tovey received 
this ULTRA message: 
1.  It is not repeat not known if German heavy forces have sailed from Altenfjord [Altafjord], 
but they are unlikely to have done so before 1200/4th 
2.  It appears that Germans may be in some confusion whether a battleship is in company 
with CS 1. Germans do not repeat not appear to be aware of positions of C-in-C Home 
Fleet.361 
At 0322, the Admiralty informed Admiral Miles in Moscow that air reconnais-
sance indicated that
enemy heavy units have moved from Trondheim to Narvik and [are] believed to be using a 
base in Altafjord area from which to operate against PQ17. British forces other than close 
escort for PQ17 have been withdrawn west of Bear Island and convoy ordered to scatter in 
approximate position 76 degs North 28 degs East at 2200B/4 [in the +2 time zone, on the 
4th] to proceed to North Russia ports. British submarines are being moved from previous 
patrol positions to area between latitudes 73 degs and 72 degs N and longitudes 23 degs and 
32 degs E. Catalina aircraft temporarily based in Arkhangelsk will carry out reconnaissance 
between positions 74 degs N 28 degs E and 73 degs N 32 degs E. 
The Admiralty requested that Admiral Miles try to arrange with Soviet authorities 
for regular air reconnaissance of the Altafjord area, for air attacks against enemy 
heavy units in harbors or at sea, and for the bombing of enemy airfields, “which is 
of added importance with convoy scattered.”362
At 1625, an ULTRA message was sent to Rear Adm. Richard Bevan, the senior 
British naval officer in northern Russia, advising him that the “most likely time 
of enemy surface attack is now tonight 5/6 July or early hours of tomorrow 6th 
July.” The “enemy may strike on 065 degs direction from North Cape. Submarine 
and Catalina aircraft might sight enemy. Request striking force [presumably Soviet] 
may be at short notice from 2000 today 5th July.”363
In the meantime, at 0655 German air reconnaissance had reported an enemy 
force composed of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, one possible battleship, four heavy 
cruisers, eight destroyers, and two torpedo boats, proceeding on a westerly course 
at fifteen knots.364 This group was some five hundred miles away from the convoy, 
which the Germans now knew had scattered. For the Germans, this new sight-
ing confirmed the aircraft report concerning the enemy cruiser force received the 
previous afternoon to the effect that no enemy heavy units were anywhere near the 
convoy. It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get Hitler’s final permis-
sion for the Tirpitz foray.365
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During the forenoon of the 5th, the operational situation for the Germans was 
mixed. On the positive side, the convoy had been dissolved, probably, they thought, 
because of the aerial and U-boat attacks. Most of its ships were still to be found 
within an area approximately sixty nautical miles on a side, but that was too large 
an area to allow its composition to be determined precisely.366 The Germans mis-
takenly believed that the enemy cruiser group’s retirement westward must mean it 
had lost a heavy cruiser. The heavy covering force was well to the west of Bear Is-
land, making full use of fog banks to disguise its location and makeup, 450 nautical 
miles from the convoy and from North Cape. This distance meant there would be 
minimal danger to the German forces if they approached the convoy unobserved 
and got the engagement over with quickly. If the enemy heavy force were spotted 
during the Germans’ approach to the convoy, there would be sufficient time to turn 
away.367 In sum, the Allied heavy covering force was too far off to interfere with an 
attack on PQ17 by the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups.368 On the negative side, gen-
eral conditions for an attack by the German heavy ships on July 5 were less favor-
able than they had been the previous day. The convoy was now farther away—the 
combat would be eastward of North Cape. Also, during the withdrawal phase the 
distance to the enemy heavy forces would decrease steadily. But the risk was still 
bearable.369
Admiral Carls believed, first, that if any enemy battleship close to the convoy 
were damaged by U-boats and aircraft by 1200, he would be justified in carrying 
out the operation regardless of the presence of an enemy carrier; and second, that 
carrier aircraft would have less impact if the convoy were attacked above latitude 
72° north. The deadline for initiating RÖSSELSPRUNG was 1300 on the 5th; after 
that, the attack would take place too close to the Russian coast.370 Carls accordingly 
requested Admiral Raeder not only to issue the code word for executing the opera-
tion but also to leave no option to cancel the order later (Rückbefehl). However, 
Raeder refused to do either, because of Hitler’s precondition that the enemy carrier 
must be taken out of the equation first. This was communicated at 0915 to Admiral 
Carls, who pressed the matter. The precondition, he argued, made everything de-
pendent on the quality of air reconnaissance. The enemy was unwilling to operate 
its heavy covering group within the effective range of Luftwaffe torpedo and heavy 
bombers. However, Admiral Carls understood the group to have been already at 
sea on July 1 and doubted it could continue to operate for long. It might withdraw 
to refuel and then take up a waiting position. Therefore, he was convinced, the en-
emy carrier group would not pose a threat to the German heavy ships.371
Hitler finally gave permission for the operation during the forenoon of the 5th, 
the latest favorable time. The code word was issued at 1137, and Naval Group Com-
mand North took operational control of the U-boats in Arctic waters.372 The Füh-
rer’s approval for RÖSSELSPRUNG was transmitted to Admiral Carls three minutes 
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later, with a caveat from Raeder that the conditions permitting its execution would 
no longer exist if the enemy carrier were detected or the German combat groups 
were found by enemy aircraft. Forces that had been on one-hour combat alert 
since 0900 were directed at 1052 to be in immediate readiness to sortie. At 1141, 
the combat groups received the requisite code word from Naval Group Command 
North. At 1230, Naval Group Command North took control of the entire opera-
tion and directed Admiral Schniewind in Tirpitz to sortie toward North Cape, 
passing Breisund and escorted by minesweepers.373
At 1700, the Soviet submarine K21 reported (inaccurately) the presence of Tir-
pitz, Admiral Scheer, and eight destroyers at latitude 71° 25ʹ north, longitude 23° 40ʹ 
east, or some forty-five miles southwest of North Cape, on a northeasterly course. 
The submarine claimed to have hit Tirpitz with two torpedoes.374 However, British 
intelligence considered that, in view of subsequent sightings, “improbable.”375 
Tirpitz had not in fact been hit; nevertheless, K21’s sighting report was of great val-
ue to Admiral Tovey.376 At 1816, Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported eleven en-
emy ships at latitude 71° 31ʹ north, longitude 27° 10ʹ east on a northeasterly course 
at ten knots. The British submarine Unshaken (P54) shifted farther east and at 2029 
reported Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper, escorted by at least six destroyers, in latitude 
71° 30ʹ north, longitude 28° 40ʹ east, steering 060 degrees at twenty-two knots.377
At 1700 the Germans received an important message, an intercepted Allied sub-
marine sighting report of two battleships at latitude 71° 25ʹ north, longitude 23° 40ʹ 
east, moving northeasterly. The Allied 1816 sighting report also was intercepted, 
and the two together left no doubt that the enemy had detected the German com-
bat groups.378 Also, at 1945 the Germans learned that the enemy had begun system-
atically to jam radio communications on all channels, making the transmission of 
orders difficult.379 
RÖSSELSPRUNG IS CANCELED
Naval Group Command North concluded at 2000 on July 5 that the enemy heavy 
group was in generally the same position as on the 4th. The enemy heavy cruis-
ers had been detected at 1745 on a westerly course and had been tracked until 
2010, when they disappeared in fog. The Germans calculated that the enemy heavy 
covering group would have to close the German combat groups to about two hun-
dred nautical miles to attack but would not go closer, because of the danger of 
attacks from the Luftwaffe. This meant that RÖSSELSPRUNG could be carried out 
only between 2000 on July 5 and 0200 the next morning. The chances of success 
in attacking a now widely dispersed convoy were small. Hence, although an attack 
on PQ17 might have psychological benefits for the Germans, it was not worth the 
risk of engaging an enemy carrier force.380 Carls had been told by Raeder that if 
the enemy sighted the German combat groups, the entire operation would have to 
be aborted. A clash with the enemy heavy covering group must be avoided in any 
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case; the possibility that its carrier might cut off the combat groups’ withdrawal was 
unacceptable.381
Raeder and Carls conferred by telephone at 2035 and 2103 and agreed that, giv-
en where it had been sighted, the enemy would be able to bring his heavy covering 
group to bear against the German combat groups during their return to base.382 On 
that basis, Raeder decided to abandon the entire operation; at 2132, Admiral Carls 
sent a message to Admiral Schniewind aborting RÖSSELSPRUNG.383 Schniewind was 
directed to take Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper, and five destroyers to 
North Cape and then through the “inner leads” (the channel between Norway’s 
mainland and outer island chain) to Vestfjord. Operational control of the U-boats 
was returned to Admiral Arctic.384 Lützow, two destroyers, and the torpedo boats 
were directed to Trondheim and were put under the control of Admiral Arctic.385
Raeder’s decision was based on Hitler’s view that Germany could not afford to 
put its few remaining heavy ships at risk. Because Allied air reconnaissance had de-
tected the German combat groups prematurely, it was highly possible that the Tir-
pitz group would be attacked by carrier aircraft. Another factor was that, the con-
voy already having dispersed widely, the risk entailed in employing surface forces 
against it would not be commensurate with the remaining mission elements—that 
is, finishing off the enemy convoy would be better left to the U-boats and aircraft.386
At 0230 on July 6 the Admiralty sent a message to Convoy PQ17’s escorts stating 
that an “attack by enemy surface forces is probable in next few hours. Your primary 
duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to scene of attack and pick up 
survivors after enemy have retired.”387 Shortly afterward, the Admiralty requested 
that after such an attack, once it was clear “that enemy heavy ships have retired to 
westward,” the escorts “arrange for a search for survivors by all available means 
including my Catalinas in north Russia not required for searching and shadowing 
enemy.”388
At 1946, however, the Admiralty advised that the “risk of attack by enemy sur-
face vessels is now greatly lessened” and directed the remaining escorts to pick 
up survivors from the sunken ships.389 Those unable to do so but in contact with 
several merchantmen should form them into groups and escort them to Yokanga 
“unless otherwise directed by S.B.N.O. North Russia [Senior British Naval Officer, 
Rear Admiral Bevan].” Escorts short on fuel should proceed to Arkhangelsk, where 
they would be refueled. The two auxiliary AA ships should not risk taking part in 
rescue operations but instead proceed without delay to Arkhangelsk.390
At 1040 on the 6th, Admiral Hamilton’s force joined the Battle Fleet. The weath-
er in the area was unfavorable for air reconnaissance. Tovey felt that nothing was 
to be gained by steering northeastward and so detached Hamilton’s cruisers and 
eight destroyers to Seydisfjord at 1230. Shortly afterward, the Battle Fleet turned 
southward. All the ships reached their home bases on July 8.391
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In the meantime, the Germans continued their efforts to detect and attack the 
remnants of Convoy PQ17. On the morning of the 6th, those remnants covered an 
area of three hundred kilometers by sixty (186 by 37 miles), east of longitude 40° 
east. The U-boats at that point had no contact with the remnants of PQ17 and were 
directed by Admiral Arctic to search between longitudes 42° and 48° east. Two U-
boats returned to Narvik during the night of July 6/7; two other boats were on their 
way to Kirkenes, where they would arrive on the evening of the 6th.392
On the 7th, Commodore Dowding (who had survived the sinking of his ship 
by a U-boat on the 5th) collected five merchant ships and one rescue ship in the 
Matochkin Shar, organized them as a convoy, and headed for Arkhangelsk that eve-
ning. They were accompanied by the two auxiliary AA ships, three corvettes, three 
minesweepers, and three trawlers, all remnants of Convoy PQ17’s escort force.393 
Ashore in the USSR, Admiral Bevan planned to send a British corvette to reinforce 
the escorts and bring the ships to Arkhangelsk on a track passing near the east coast 
of Novaya Zemlya, south of Kolguyev Island, and around Cape Kanin. Bevan also 
informed the Admiralty that “C. in C. White Sea [commander of the White Sea 
Flotilla] is requesting C. in C. Northern Fleet that additional cover may be provided 
by 3 Soviet Union destroyers. Catalina leaves for reconnaissance 1000B 8th. 4 more 
Flying boats approaching Svyatoy Nos.”394
The ensuing voyage of the Convoy PQ17 remnants was a succession of acci-
dents. The ships encountered heavy fog and then ran into a solid ice barrier south 
of Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya (the British had not known about the ice, but the 
Germans did). Several ships were forced to head for the Yokanga anchorage; Admi-
ral Bevan was completely unaware that remnants of PQ17 had left the Matochkin 
Shar until these ships reported entering Yokanga. The Soviet Northern Fleet had 
failed to inform him. Neither had the Soviets given Bevan information about ice 
conditions.395
During the night of July 8/9, German aircraft reconnoitered off Novaya Zemlya, 
the Kanin Peninsula, other western waterways, the piers at Yokanga, the Murmansk–
Leningrad railway, and airfields in the Byelomorsk area (Onega Bay).396 Because of 
heavy fog, they did not fly north of latitude 72° north on the 8th or 9th. However, at 
1151 on the 9th German aircraft reported five enemy merchant vessels. Attacks by 
thirty-eight aircraft in two groups from 1st Group, 30th Battle Wing (I./KG 30) at 
Banak followed. The Germans claimed one seven-thousand-ton vessel and another 
of eight thousand tons damaged. Because of fog at Banak on the flyers’ return, 
I./KG 30 was diverted to Petsamo, while II./KG 30 reached Banak.397
The Luftwaffe received information on the convoy from U-boats operating in 
the area. During the night of July 9/10 some forty German bombers carried out 
a high-level attack against them for four hours, ending at 0230. Two Allied mer-
chant ships were sunk, while four German aircraft were believed to be shot down. 
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The surviving ships reached Arkhangelsk on July 11.398 Also on the 10th, German 
aircraft attacked docking facilities and fuel tanks at Rost and airfields in the Mur-
mansk area and suppressed coastal batteries on the Rybachy Peninsula.399
On July 16 Commodore Dowding returned northward, with three corvettes, to 
Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya, to find more remnants of PQ17, organize them as a 
convoy, and bring it to Arkhangelsk. After a stormy voyage, he arrived on the 19th 
to find five merchant ships, two British trawlers, and one Soviet icebreaker at an-
chor. The new convoy soon got under way, to be joined by another merchant ship 
at Moller Bay, Novaya Zemlya, on the morning of the 21st. The convoy’s defenses 
were reinforced on July 22, by one auxiliary AA ship, one corvette, two minesweep-
ers, and two Soviet destroyers. Two days later it arrived in Arkhangelsk, having 
suffered no losses.400
To sum up: between July 2 and 10, the 5th Air Fleet employed 130 Ju-88s, forty-
three He-111s (twenty aborted), and twenty-nine He-115s (six aborted) in attack-
ing Convoy PQ17. U-boats were able to sink many ships heavily damaged by the 
Luftwaffe. The 5th Air Fleet stopped its attacks on Convoy PQ17 only when it could 
find no more ships.401 German losses in these attacks totaled only five aircraft: one 
BV-138, two He-111s, one He-115, and one FW-200.402 In the aftermath, the Ger-
mans would grossly exaggerate their success. On the basis largely of B-Dienst radio 
intercepts, they were to claim that between July 4 and 11, their aircraft and U-boats 
had sunk thirty-seven ships of combined 231,090 BRT.403 They firmly believed that 
of these, U-boats had sunk sixteen ships of 107,947 combined BRT, while the 5th 
Air Fleet had sunk twenty-one, of 136,081 combined BRT (figures that actually add 
up to 244,028).404 
The true losses were heavy enough. The Luftwaffe and U-boats destroyed twenty-
two merchant ships (fourteen American) of Convoy PQ17’s thirty-four that tried 
to get through (or 65 percent; thirty-six and three rescue ships had started).405 The 
ships sunk carried 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, and 3,350 motor vehicles, plus 99,316 
tons of other cargo.406 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES
The almost total destruction of PQ17 had significant military, psychological, and 
political effects. In purely military terms, the Germans accomplished a major tacti-
cal objective. The decision of the British chiefs of staff on July 13 to recommend 
that convoys “not be sent to Northern Russia in present circumstances” had a nega-
tive operational effect. The Royal Navy suffered a major loss of confidence regard-
ing its ability to protect convoys to northern Russia.407
On the 14th Churchill informed Roosevelt of the situation. Only four ships had 
reached Arkhangelsk, with “four or five more precariously in the ice off Nova Zembla 
[Novaya Zemlya] out of the thirty-three included in Convoy P.Q.17. If a half [of the 
convoy] had got through we should have persevered, but with only about a quar-
ter arriving the operation is not good enough.” Churchill pointed out that out of six 
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hundred tanks, only slightly more than one hundred had arrived. The British Admi-
ralty “cannot see what better protection can be devised, nor can they hazard battle-
ships east of Bear Island.” He claimed that Adm. Harold R. Stark, the commander of 
U.S. naval forces in Europe in London, agreed with the Admiralty’s view and “that 
all possible was done by us last time.” Also, the U.S. battleship Washington had al-
ready been withdrawn to the Pacific. Churchill advised against “running P.Q.18 [con-
voy] which must start 18th [July] at latest.” He asked Roosevelt “how you feel about 
it,” inasmuch as twenty-two ships in the planned convoy were American. Churchill 
concluded that “future prospects of supplying Russia by this northern route are bad. 
Murmansk has been largely burnt out and there are several signs of an impending 
German attack upon it. By the time that perpetual daylight gives place to the dark pe-
riod, Archangel will be frozen.” He also wanted to know Roosevelt’s view of a draft of 
a forthcoming message to Stalin about suspension of all convoys to northern Russia.408
On July 16, Churchill sent another message to Roosevelt in which he laid out the 
possibility of only a temporary stoppage of convoys to northern Russia. He wrote 
that if the planned major effort to resupply Malta in August (PEDESTAL) was car-
ried off “without serious losses it might render possible an attempt in September to 
run an even more powerfully mounted and protected convoy to Russia.” Further, 
“The Malta convoy will decide whether very strong sea-borne fighter protection is 
effective. That can only be proved by trial.”409 Roosevelt replied the same day: after 
consultation with Adm. Ernest J. King, he was obliged “reluctantly [to] agree to 
the position which the Admiralty has taken regarding the Russian convoy to the 
North and I think your message to Stalin is a good one. I assume you will send it 
at once.”410
Churchill did so the next day: “In the case of P.Q.17, however, the Germans at 
last used their forces in the manner we had always feared. They concentrated their 
U-boats to the westward of Bear Island and reserved their surface forces for attack 
to the eastward of Bear Island. The final story of P.Q.17 convoy is not yet clear. At 
the moment only four ships have arrived at Archangel, but six others are in Nova 
Zembla harbours. The latter may, however, be attacked from the air at any time. 
At the best, therefore, only one-third will have survived.”411 In the same telegram, 
Churchill explained
the dangers and difficulties of these convoy operations, when the enemy’s battle-squadron 
takes its station in the extreme North. We do not think it right to risk our Home Fleet east of 
Bear Island or where it can be brought under the attack of the powerful German shore-based 
aircraft. If one or two of our very few most powerful battleships were to be lost or even seri-
ously damaged while Tirpitz and her consorts, soon to be joined by Scharnhorst, remained 
in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be lost. Besides affecting the food 
supplies by which we live, our war effort would be crippled; and above all the great convoys 
of American troops across the ocean, rising presently to as many as 80,000 in a month, 
would be prevented and the building up of a really strong second front in 1943 rendered 
impossible.412 
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Moreover, Churchill’s naval advisers had told him that 
if they had the handling of the German surface, submarine and air forces, in present circum-
stances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia. They 
have not been able so far to hold out hopes that convoys attempting to make the passage in 
perpetual daylight would fare better than P.Q.17. It is, therefore, with the greatest regret that 
we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy, P.Q.18, would bring no 
benefit to you and would only involve dead loss to the common cause. At the same time, I give 
you my assurance that, if we can devise arrangements which give a reasonable chance of at 
least a fair proportion of the contents of the convoys reaching you, we will start them again 
at once. The crux of the problem is to make the Barents Sea as dangerous for German war-
ships as they make it for ours. This is what we should aim at doing with our joint resources. 
At the same time, however, Churchill promised that “we are prepared to despatch 
immediately to the Persian Gulf some of the ships which were to have sailed in P.Q. 
convoy. Selection of ships would be made in consultation with Soviet authorities in 
London in order that priorities of cargo may be agreed.”413
In his response on July 23, Stalin was direct, crude, and dismissive. He falsely 
charged, “First, the British Government refuses to continue the sending of war ma-
terials to the Soviet Union via the Northern route. Second, in spite of the agreed 
communique concerning the urgent tasks of creating a second front in 1942 the 
British Government postpones this matter until 1943.” Stalin’s own naval experts 
“consider[ed] the reasons put forward by the British naval experts to justify the 
cessation of convoys to the Northern ports of the U.S.S.R. wholly unconvincing. 
They are of the opinion that with goodwill and readiness to fulfil the contracted 
obligations these convoys could be regularly undertaken and heavy losses could be 
inflicted on the enemy.” Stalin continued, 
Of course I do not think that regular convoys to the Soviet Northern ports could be effected 
without risk or losses. But in war time no important undertaking could be effected without 
risk or losses. In any case I never expected that the British Government will stop despatch 
of war materials to us just at the very moment when the Soviet Union in view of the serious 
situation on the Soviet-German front requires these materials more than ever. It is obvious 
that the transport via Persian Gulf could in no way compensate for the cessation of convoys 
to the Northern ports.414 
In the same telegram Stalin criticized the Admiralty’s decision to disperse Convoy 
PQ17: “Our [naval] experts find it also difficult to understand and to explain the 
order given by the Admiralty that the escorting vessels of the P.Q.17 should return 
whereas the cargo boats should disperse and try to reach the Soviet ports one by 
one without any protection at all.”415 
The most probable reason for Stalin’s accusatory tone was that he had become 
intensely suspicious of Churchill’s true motives. He even believed that Britain might 
seek a separate peace with Nazi Germany.416 Churchill and his cabinet agreed not to 
respond to Stalin’s unfounded charges, to “avoid a wrangle, which would be of no 
advantage to either of us.”417 
On July 29, Churchill wrote instead to Roosevelt, that he hoped “to resume con-
voys in September, if Russians can provide necessary air force to deny the German 
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surface ships use of the Barents Sea and that if the battle in Egypt goes well we 
should be able to make a firm offer of air support.”418 Roosevelt responded that 
he agreed with Churchill’s reply to Stalin but at the same time cautioned that “we 
have got always to bear in mind the personality of our ally and the very difficult 
and dangerous situation that confronts him, no one can be expected to approach 
the war from a world point of view whose country has been invaded.”419 On the 
31st, Churchill informed Stalin that “we are making preliminary arrangements for 
sailing a convoy of forty ships during the first week in September.” He also made 
it clear that “there is little chance of even one-third of the ships getting through to 
you, as was the case in P.Q.17, unless the air threat to the German surface forces in 
the Barents Sea is such as to deter the latter from operating against the convoy.”420
PQ18, with forty ships, the first eastbound convoy after PQ17, left Loch Ewe 
in northwest Scotland on September 2, 1942. It was attacked by U-boats and Luft-
waffe aircraft. Thirteen ships were lost, three to U-boats and the rest to torpedo 
bombers. The remaining twenty-seven ships reached Arkhangelsk on the 17th. The 
westbound QP15, with twenty-eight ships, sailed out of Arkhangelsk on November 
17 and reached Loch Ewe on November 30 and December 3, having lost only two 
ships, both to U-boats.421 
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The decision to send badly needed supplies to the Soviet Union was made purely 
for political and strategic reasons. Admirals Pound and Tovey were opposed to that 
decision. Their main concerns seem to have been the lack of adequate forces to 
support such an effort and the possibility of large losses in naval ships and person-
nel. (The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were either unable or unwilling to provide 
much support in defense of the Allied convoys.) The British admirals’ concerns 
were well-founded. The convoy route to northern Russia was not only long but open 
to deadly attacks by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. The problem was compounded by 
the prevalence of bad weather and ice conditions and by the long daylight hours 
in summer. Yet in retrospect, the decision to help the Soviet Union was sound and 
fully justified strategically. It played a critical role in the Soviet ability to withstand 
the German offensive on the Eastern Front in 1941–42.
Political and military strategic decisions always should be made by the highest na-
tional political leadership, the highest alliance/coalition political leadership, or both. 
At the same time, military leaders always should forcefully present their views on 
whether political or military strategic objectives or both are achievable with the forces 
that are available or becoming available. Ultimately, strategic decisions made by the 
highest political leadership must be accepted and faithfully carried out by subordinate 
military and naval leaders.
The Allied operational command organization seemed fairly simple and 
straightforward. However, for some reason the Home Fleet’s area of responsibility 
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was not defined formally. The Home Fleet was the single largest British naval com-
mand available for keeping the Kriegsmarine in check. However, its forces were 
never adequate, because of competing demands from other theaters. In fact, it was 
forced repeatedly to provide ships to other fleets. The Home Fleet was composed 
primarily of heavy surface ships and carriers; it lacked an adequate number of 
smaller ships suitable for convoying duties. That is why Western Approaches Com-
mand provided most of the A/S escorts for Allied convoys to northern Russia. The 
U.S. Navy also reinforced the Home Fleet, sending its newly formed TF 39.
The German operational command organization in Norway and the adjacent 
area was highly unsatisfactory. No multiservice (joint) command was established 
in that theater throughout the entire war. This meant that each service prepared 
and executed its own operational plans. The effectiveness of the joint employment 
of naval forces and the Luftwaffe depended almost entirely on close cooperation 
among middle- and low-level commanders. For the Kriegsmarine, the problem 
was not made much easier by the Fleet Command forces’ being within the area of 
responsibility of Naval Group Command North. In addition, Naval Group Com-
mand North’s headquarters was too far away from its subordinate commands in 
Norway. To make things yet worse, the Kriegsmarine had a penchant for changing 
both the titles of and the subordination among various forces. This was especially 
the case with the Fleet Command. Another major problem was the insufficient 
freedom of action allowed to subordinate naval commanders, the result of too-
close supervision by seniors. This was seen especially in the relationship between 
Naval Group Command North and Admiral Arctic.
Both the Allies and the Germans in preparing plans for and employing their 
respective forces in combat required well-organized and effective intelligence ap-
paratuses. British naval intelligence proved much more effective, thanks especially 
to the superb abilities of the decoders at Bletchley Park who decrypted German 
naval messages. Despite widely held belief to the contrary since the program be-
came public knowledge, this task was never easy, because the German codes were 
difficult to crack; there were many times when Bletchley and the OIC were in the 
dark about German intentions, plans, and movements. Critically, for a large part of 
1942 Bletchley Park was unable to read coded messages sent to U-boats.
German naval intelligence was well organized and quite effective at providing 
naval commanders with fairly accurate and timely intelligence on the Allied OOB, 
convoys, and the losses inflicted by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. B-Dienst was espe-
cially effective at reading messages regarding the composition, departure dates, and 
routes of Allied convoys. All this proved invaluable to the Kriegsmarine, particu-
larly its U-boat arm.
Operational intelligence is one of the main prerequisites of developing sound op-
erational plans and executing them successfully. Intercepting enemy messages and 
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decoding them in a timely manner can provide a decisive advantage. Nonetheless, one 
should never assume either that the enemy does not have positive knowledge that his 
radio traffic is being intercepted and read or that he is not feeding back false informa-
tion. Hence, when obtaining information on the enemy, it is prudent to use diverse 
sources of information and to avoid overreliance in operational planning on informa-
tion obtained by cryptanalysis. No code is unbreakable. Hence, one should change 
one’s codes often and on short notice.
The Allies refined their plans for convoying to northern Russia over time. Al-
though changes were made for each convoy, the pattern was consistent. Geography 
and ice conditions in the Barents Sea simply gave planners little or no choice in 
routes and defense forces for each convoy. Admirals Pound and Tovey were strong-
ly opposed to sending convoys during the summer months, when ships were highly 
vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft and U-boats but they had to execute the 
decisions made by the British and American governments. Purely political consid-
erations dominated Allied planning for convoys to northern Russia.
The German plans for RÖSSELSPRUNG were the result of numerous studies pre-
pared by all the major naval commands in Norway concerning the possibility of 
employing heavy surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic. As usual in the German 
military, the operational-level command issued an operational instruction, on the 
basis of which subordinate commanders issued operation orders. However, the ab-
sence of joint force commanders meant that no single plan was produced for the 
employment of heavy surface ships, U-boats, and Luftwaffe aircraft.
The operational instruction that Naval Group Command North issued on June 
4 envisaged employing both the Trondheim and Narvik groups of surface ships. A 
major flaw in the plan was the unnecessarily complicated command structure: the 
Trondheim group was subordinate to Naval Group Command North, the Narvik 
group under Admiral Arctic. Only during the second phase of the operation were 
both groups under the operational command of Naval Group Command North.
A major prerequisite for the success of RÖSSELSPRUNG was comprehensive air 
reconnaissance of the potential operating area, followed by the weakening by air 
attack of the enemy heavy covering force. Naval Group Command North duly re-
quested the 5th Air Fleet to assign more aircraft for reconnaissance—but the 5th 
Air Fleet simply refused to do so.
One of the main disadvantages of the lack of sound theater or operational com-
mand organization is the resultant highly negative effect on the planning and execu-
tion of major naval/joint operations. Optimally, a single commander should have full 
authority and responsibility for the combat employment and support of assigned sub-
ordinate multiservice forces; otherwise, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to develop 
and execute a plan for a major naval/joint operation.
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But perhaps the single greatest problem was Hitler’s unwillingness to risk heavy 
surface ships to attack enemy convoys. This risk aversion, in essence, precluded any 
effective employment of the German heavy surface ships based in Norway, from 
where they might well have prevented the Allies from running convoys to northern 
Russia. The German ships retained value only “in being”—that is, to the extent that 
they deterred enemy amphibious landing and invasion.
Convoy PQ17 went ahead as planned. Although early detected and thereafter 
tracked by German U-boats and aircraft, only three merchant ships were sunk until 
the evening of July 4. Admiral Pound’s decision to “scatter” the convoy at that point 
was perhaps understandable but cannot be considered sound. No convoy should 
be left to proceed independently without direct and distant cover. If the convoy 
was considered to be faced with destruction by a superior force, it should have 
been directed to withdraw temporarily to a safer distance or return to a safe port. 
Admiral Pound also violated basic principles of sound naval command and control 
by directly interfering with and bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey’s 
criticism of the Admiralty was fully justified. Higher commanders normally should 
leave their subordinate commanders freedom of action to exercise initiative in the 
course of an operation.
An operational commander ashore should not unnecessarily bypass the 
next-subordinate commander and issue orders directly to lower tactical commanders. 
Doing so shows distrust of the professional abilities of the subordinate commander 
and cannot but have a highly detrimental effect on the exercise of initiative by the 
subordinate commander and on morale in general. It also diminishes the bypassed 
commander’s prestige and influence among tactical commanders. Generally, an op-
erational commander should intervene only when the decisions and actions of a next-
echelon commander endanger the success of the operation as a whole or the success of 
adjacent commanders.
The positioning of the Home Fleet’s Battle Fleet in relation to Convoy PQ17 on 
July 5 was clearly unsound. The heavy ships remained too far away either to pro-
vide distant cover and support to the convoy or to engage the enemy heavy surface 
group effectively.
Finally, Admiral Raeder’s decision to cancel RÖSSELSPRUNG on the evening of 
July 5 was unavoidable: there was little to gain from asking heavy surface ships to 
destroy the now widely dispersed ships of (the former) Convoy PQ17. The time to 
employ those heavy surface ships would have been prior to the 5th. Yet doing so 
then had been clearly impossible, given the strictness of Hitler’s conditions for em-
ploying Tirpitz and its ilk. Yet Tirpitz’s presence in Altafjord and the ever-present 
possibility of its attacking Convoy PQ17 were the most important factors in the 
fateful British decision to scatter the convoy, with its subsequent consequences.
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II Major Convoy Operation to Malta
August 10–15, 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL)
The fifteen-mile-long central Mediterranean island of Malta had played a vital role in British theater strategy since its capture by Britain in Septem-ber 1800. Its importance was most dramatic, however, during World War 
II, when it served as an air and naval base from which the British could attack 
Axis convoys to Libya. For the Allies, resupplying Malta with fuel, ammunition, 
and foodstuffs was a major problem, however, because of intensive efforts—by 
land-based Axis aircraft on Sicily and Sardinia and in North Africa, in combina-
tion with heavy surface forces, submarines, and mines—to cut off the island from 
the outside world.
The resupply convoy to Malta of August 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL, or Opera-
tion MEZZO AGOSTO, “Mid-August,” in Italian accounts) was, in operational terms, 
a major defensive naval/joint operation aimed to ensure survival of the island as 
a major naval and air base. For the Germans and Italians, it was a major offensive 
naval/joint operation to destroy a large convoy. 
The Allies were aware of the enormous risks of an all-out effort to supply be-
sieged Malta. Yet supplies were badly needed, and the consequences of failing to 
mount an attempt would have been even more disastrous—for the Allied campaign 
in North Africa and possibly the entire Mediterranean theater. The execution of 
PEDESTAl did in fact result in horrendous losses for the Allies. However, the ships 
that reached Malta brought sufficient quantities of fuel and food to keep the island 
alive until the great Allied victory at El Alamein, Egypt, in November 1942 turned 
the tide of the war in North Africa.
Despite the passage of time, the planning, preparation, and execution by both 
sides of this major naval/joint operation offer many lessons on how to employ one’s 
naval forces in the littorals—lessons that remain valid today.
OPERATIONAL SITUATION
When Italy entered the war on the side of Germany in June 1940, Malta ceased 
to be the main base for the British Mediterranean Fleet. A major part of the fleet 
moved to Alexandria, Egypt. After June 1940, the newly created Force H, at Gibral-
tar, became responsible for the operations in the western Mediterranean and eastern 
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Atlantic. Force H was directly subordinate to the Admiralty in London. The high 
effectiveness of the German Luftwaffe and the Italian air force units based on Sic-
ily and Sardinia had closed the central Mediterranean to Allied ships sailing to the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. The British forces deployed 
in the Middle East had to be supplied, mostly from the United Kingdom and Unit-
ed States, by the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Ships from 
the United States had to steam some fourteen thousand miles (passing around the 
Cape of Good Hope) before reaching the Suez Canal. Other supplies were carried 
by ships from India, Australia, and South Africa.1 
In the late spring of 1942, the situation in the central Mediterranean was ex-
tremely unfavorable for the Allies. The British Eighth Army in North Africa was 
in retreat. The Allied airfields near Benghazi and Derna fell; single-engine fighters 
such as Spitfires in bases farther east could not reach Malta. The loss of air bases 
also greatly restricted the ability of British Desert Air Force bombers to attack the 
Axis lines of supply to North Africa.2 All this gravely threatened the survival of 
Malta as a base for the Allied aircraft and submarines. The island came under con-
stant and increasingly effective attacks by Axis aircraft based in Sicily and Sardinia, 
and in North Africa. By April 1942 Malta’s reserves of wheat and flour, fodder, 
benzene, and kerosene fuel would last only until mid-to-late June. Stocks of white 
oil and aviation fuel were sufficient only through mid-August. About 920 tons of 
diesel fuel and two thousand tons of furnace oil for refueling warships were by 
then available. Stocks of antiaircraft ammunition were sufficient for only about six 
weeks of fighting.3
For these reasons, the Allies attempted a dual resupply convoy operation in mid-
June 1942, one from the west (Operation HARPOON) and another from the east 
(Operation VIGOROUS). However, both resulted in significant losses for the Allies. 
In HARPOON, out of a convoy composed of six merchant ships totaling forty-three 
thousand tons’ burden, only two, carrying some eighteen thousand tons of sup-
plies, reached Malta.4 In VIGOROUS, out of eleven ships carrying 81,500 tons only 
two ships, with fifteen thousand tons of supplies, reached the island. The Germans 
and Italians had sunk only two merchant ships in the VIGOROUS convoy, but seven 
had been directed to return to Alexandria or to Tobruk, Libya. In addition, dam-
age had been suffered by three cruisers, a special service ship, a corvette, and two 
merchant ships.5 Nevertheless, the governor of Malta, Gen. John S. S. P. Vereker, 
Viscount Gort, was able to report to London on June 20 that the unloading of the 
ships that had arrived was almost completed and that he was examining how best 
to husband supplies until late September.6
After the failure of the dual-convoy operation (HARPOON/VIGOROUS) in June 
1942 and the destruction of the convoy PQ17 to northern Russia in early July, the 
mood among senior British civilian and military leaders was distinctly gloomy. 
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Nevertheless, they decided to run another major convoy to Malta, but only from 
the west. The intent was essentially to repeat the HARPOON operation but with 
much stronger air cover.7
For the Germans and Italians, Malta was a growing problem for their efforts 
to transport troops and matériel to North Africa. At a conference in Garmisch, 
Germany, on January 14–15, 1942, the German navy’s Naval Warfare Directorate 
(Seekriegsleitung), and the Italian Admiral Staff fully agreed that in the Mediter-
ranean their most urgent problem was getting supplies to North Africa. For that 
the prerequisite was neutralization and elimination of Malta as a base. Hence, there 
had to be a Luftwaffe offensive against Malta, and effective blockades of both Malta 
and the Sicilian Narrows.8 The German and Italian navies also agreed to employ 
their submarines jointly; for that, a prerequisite was considerable improvement in 
air reconnaissance.9 Another problem discussed at the conference was the diffi-
culty being experienced in supplying Greece and the Aegean, including Crete. The 
Italian navy promised to do everything possible to speed up the supply to Greece, 
especially of coal.10
At a meeting with Hitler on March 12, 1942, Adm. Erich Raeder discussed 
the Mediterranean problem. Among other things, Hitler agreed that an offensive 
should be carried out against the Suez Canal in 1942 but only if it did not reduce the 
Luftwaffe’s strength in the Mediterranean. Malta, he agreed, should be captured by 
Axis troops or at least, if that was not possible, continue to be attacked by the Luft-
waffe; otherwise, the enemy would build up its forces there. That, in turn, would 
jeopardize Axis supply traffic to North Africa. Hitler was greatly concerned that the 
planned capture of Malta, set for July 1942, might be delayed because of the Italians. 
He promised to Raeder to raise the issue of Malta with Benito Mussolini, the Italian 
dictator, at their next meeting.11 
In June 1942, the SKL assessed that the outcome of the next offensive by Field 
Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of the Panzerarmee Afrika (Panzer Army 
Africa, formerly Panzer Group Africa), against Egypt would depend heavily on the 
naval situation in the Mediterranean. The British, the SKL posited, clearly recog-
nized that they needed to avoid catastrophe in Egypt; that doing so meant cutting 
off the Axis supply routes to North Africa; and that doing that, in turn, would 
require the employment of all the submarines in the central Mediterranean and 
the use of Malta as a base. The SKL assumed that the British would employ all 
naval forces available in Gibraltar and Alexandria and would transfer more from 
the Indian Ocean. They would deploy the British troops in Syria to defend Egypt. 
In addition, they would bring in strong air forces from the Middle East, the Red 
Sea, India, and the eastern Mediterranean.12 The SKL argued that the German reac-
tion to the British actions should include stronger defense of convoys, stronger air 
cover for transports, and diverse routing. The most important objective was at least 
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the aerial “suppression” (isolation) of Malta, and ideally its capture. This objective 
could not be abandoned: Malta in British hands represented the greatest danger to 
Axis sea routes to North Africa.13
In North Africa in late June the Allies abandoned defensive positions in Al-Gazala, 
Libya, and nearby Tobruk fell on the 21st. Seven days later Axis forces were at Mersa 
Matrûh, Egypt, and in possession of airfields 160 miles from Alexandria. The British 
dispersed merchant vessels and warships from the Suez Canal zone to the ports of 
Haifa and Beirut. They also prepared to block Alexandria’s harbor and port facilities. 
Vice Adm. (Acting Adm.) Henry H. Harwood, CINC of the British Mediterranean 
Fleet, moved his headquarters to Haifa on July 2.14 The retreat on land and the with-
drawal of the fleet greatly increased the lines of operation the Royal Air Force and 
the Royal Navy would have to cover to attack Axis convoys to Libya.
By early July 1942, the Panzer Army Africa was forced to stop its offensive at 
the first battle of El Alamein.15 However, the engagement was inconclusive, and 
the Germans intended to renew the advance in the fall of 1942, in preparation for 
which they intensified their resupply to North Africa by sea. The Allies too were 
preparing to go on the offensive, in the fall. Among their most important tasks was 
restoring Malta’s ability to support attacks on Axis convoys to Libya. Success was 
contingent on having sufficient reserves of fuel, food, and other supplies on Malta; 
otherwise, Allied submarines and bombers that returned to Malta in mid-July 1942 
would have to leave again. In addition, starvation threatened the civilian popu-
lace.16 Nevertheless, and despite the mounting losses incurred in resupplying Malta, 
British resolve remained unbroken.17
Operating Area
The Mediterranean Sea, with its 970,000 square miles, is the largest of the globe’s 
narrow seas. Geographically, the Mediterranean is divided into western and eastern 
basins: the western basin consists of the Alborán, Balearic (or Iberian), and Liguri-
an Seas, while the eastern basin contains the Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean, 
and Levantine Seas. The link between the two basins is the Sicilian Narrows.18 The 
western Mediterranean and the Sicilian Narrows were the principal operating areas 
for the forces opposing each other during PEDESTAL.
The Mediterranean extends more than 2,400 miles from west to east. The dis-
tance from Gibraltar to Beirut, Lebanon (then still part of the French Mandate of 
Syria and Lebanon), is about 2,015 nautical miles; Gibraltar to Malta is 935 nauti-
cal miles; Naples and Taranto in Italy are 983 and 1,250 nautical miles, respectively, 
from Gibraltar. The distance from Malta to Alexandria is 823 nautical miles. From the 
Strait of Gibraltar to Marseille (France) the distance is about 710 nautical miles. The 
maximum width of the Mediterranean is about a thousand miles, but only some 410 
separate Marseille and Tunis.
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The average depth of water in the Mediterranean is 820 fathoms. The eastern 
Mediterranean is generally deeper than the western part; the greatest depth, 2,815 
fathoms, is found off Cape Matapan in the Ionian Sea. The greatest depth of water 
in the western basin is 1,914 fathoms, although the waters off the Algerian coast are 
generally very deep, reaching 1,367 fathoms.
The Mediterranean contains some 3,300 islands, most of them in the eastern ba-
sin. In the west, the largest islands are Sicily (10,000 square miles), Sardinia (9,300), 
Corsica (3,350), and the Balearics (1,927 combined). Other, smaller islands and 
groups are Malta (115 square miles), the Tuscan Archipelago (114), the Aeolian 
Islands (34), and the Aegadian Islands (14.5).
The Strait of Gibraltar, Bonifacio Strait, Messina Strait, and Sicilian Narrows 
are the most important choke points in the western basin (see map 7). The thirty-
three-mile-long Strait of Gibraltar runs generally east and west. Navigation pre-
sents no difficulties. The strait is deep—more than six hundred fathoms at some 
places. Its width varies from ten to twenty-four miles, and the narrowest navigable 
width (i.e., between the ten-fathom curves) is about seven miles. There are no is-
lands or drying banks (islets exposed at low tide) in the strait other than a few 
detached dry rocks very close inshore. Ships usually sail close to either the Spanish 
or North African shore to take maximum advantage of currents and tidal streams.19
The Bonifacio Strait between Corsica and Sardinia varies in width in its west-
ern part from nine to twenty-two miles; its narrowest point is three and a half 
miles wide. The strait is navigationally difficult because of shoals and frequent bad 
weather. It is obstructed by numerous islands and rocks. Maddalena is the largest 
among the ten islands of the Bucinarian group guarding the eastern approaches to 
the strait. Depths in the western approaches to the Bonifacio Strait vary between 
twenty-seven and eighty fathoms. In the strait proper, the water in the fairway is 
from twenty-seven to forty fathoms. Depths in the strait’s eastern approaches vary 
from forty to fifty fathoms.20 The thirty-mile-long Strait of Messina, between the 
eastern tip of Sicily and the western tip of Calabria, is between seven and a half and 
twenty miles wide and between 150 and 300 fathoms deep.21 The seventy-six-mile-
wide Sicilian Narrows, connecting the western and eastern Mediterranean, is about 
137 fathoms deep at the maximum. East of the Sicilian Narrows is the forty-six-
mile-wide Malta Channel, between southern Sicily and Malta; to the west of the 
Narrows is the 150-mile-wide Sardinian Channel, between Sardinia and Tunisia.
The thirty-two-square-mile volcanic island of Pantelleria (ancient Cossyra) is 
fifty-six miles southwest of Cape Granitola, Sicily, and forty-six miles east-southeast 
of Cape Bon (six miles northwest of Bizerte; today Watan-el-Kibli, Tunisia). Its ter-
rain is high and broken, rising to some 2,730 feet in the center. The hundred-fathom 
curve generally lies between three-quarters of a mile and a mile offshore. The 
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eight-square-mile island of Lampedusa, the largest of the Pelagie Islands, is around 
seventy miles east-southeast of Cape Bon, 127 miles south of Sicily, and 110 west 
of Malta. Some thirty-five miles north-northwest of Cape Bon is Skerki Bank, or 
Skerki Channel (Ras al Tib). Composed of rock, coral, and shells, it extends thirty-
six miles in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction. It is significant because its 
waters are less than a hundred fathoms deep, shallowest over the half-mile-long, 
seven-hundred-yard-wide Keith Reef.
Tides in the Mediterranean are relatively small—for example, three feet on av-
erage in the Strait of Gibraltar. They are almost nonexistent off Algeria’s coast be-
tween Ténès and Jijel and, elsewhere off the Algerian and Tunisian coasts, slightly 
less than one foot. The exception is the Gulf of Gabès, where tides reach six and a 
half feet.22
The surface current patterns in the Mediterranean are very different from those 
in the Atlantic Ocean. The main reason is the existence of two major basins and 
several lesser ones. Evaporation exceeds precipitation. Surface heat loss is signifi-
cant, especially in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Surface currents are gen-
erally from west to east. Water from the Atlantic entering through the Strait of 
Gibraltar moves first northeastward, then generates a clockwise gyre in the eastern 
Alborán Sea, its average speed dropping from 1.75 knots to about 0.75 knots in 
the vicinity of Alborán.23 Afterward, the water mass flows eastward along Algeria’s 
coast, becoming the Algerian Current, to Cape Bizerte at a speed of 0.75 knots. East 
of Cape Bizerte the current veers away from the coast toward the east and flows 
into the Sicilian Narrows. Between Cape Bon and the Gulf of Tunis the speed of 
the current is between 0.5 and 1.0 knots; however, currents over Skerki Bank and 
Keith Reef can, in westerly winds, reach four knots.24 In the Sicilian Narrows the 
current divides into two main branches. One branch, two-thirds of the Algerian 
Current, flows through the Narrows and the Malta Channel, then east of Sicily and 
toward the Tyrrhenian Sea. Its speed is between half and three-quarters of a knot; 
strong west-northwest winds in the winter can increase the current’s speed to two 
knots, whereas strong easterly winds in the fall and spring can temporarily reverse 
its direction.25 Afterward this branch follows the Italian, French, and Spanish coasts 
westward until it returns to the Strait of Gibraltar. The other main branch flows 
west of Sicily into the Tyrrhenian, then along the western Italian coast to the Ligu-
rian Sea. There it becomes the Ligurian Current and continues to flow off the Gulf 
of Lion (Golfe du Lion, on which Marseille lies) and Spain’s Catalonian coastline.26 
Its speed increases after it encounters Spain’s northeastern coast. Afterward, the 
Ligurian Current flows along the continental slope in the northern and southern 
part of the Catalonian Sea. A minor branch of the Ligurian Current is deflected to 
the northeast, toward the Balearic Islands. The rest flows along the Spanish coast 
and exits through the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic.27 
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The water in the western Mediterranean ranges in color from green in the vi-
cinity of the Strait of Gibraltar to greenish blue around the Balearics, to blue else-
where. The average depth of water transparency is about sixty-three feet.28 This 
factor made it relatively easy to detect enemy submarines at periscope depth.
The Mediterranean climate is characterized by hot, dry summers and temperate 
and wet winters. The south and southeast have an arid, even desert climate. Most 
rainfall occurs in late fall and winter, mainly in the form of heavy showers. Winds 
of Force 7 (twenty-eight to thirty-three miles per hour, or nearly “moderate-gale 
force” on the Beaufort scale) and higher are possible but rare in the summer 
months. In the Gulf of Lion, the frequency of gales increases steadily during 
October.29
Weather in the Mediterranean is greatly influenced by local winds. Along the 
eastern coast of Spain blows an easterly wind that brings storms from the northeast 
and east-northeast to between France and Algeria, commonly in the fall and spring. 
The northwesterly wind known as the “mistral” blows down the Rhône Valley into 
the Gulf of Lion, usually coinciding with low pressure in the Balkans. During the 
winter, these winds are reinforced by cold air moving down from the Alps and the 
Massif Central of France. Not surprisingly, then, the Gulf of Lion is notorious for 
bad weather and northwestern gales. In the winter it is given to cloud cover, heavy 
rainfall, and occasional snow, accompanied by violent squalls.30 The warm south-
westerly wind called the “sirocco” is most common in the spring, as subtropical 
high pressure moves northward across the Mediterranean.
In the western Mediterranean, the sea is roughest during a “levanter.” These 
easterly winds are particularly strong off the eastern and southern coast of Spain 
and the northern coast of Morocco. Gibraltar is largely protected from them. 
Rough seas around the Balearics and Sardinia are often generated by winds up 
to gale force blowing from between the northwest and northeast—in some cases 
from the southwest, when it is called the “libeccio.” Strong winds from the west and 
northwest produce rough seas off the North African coast from Oran to Cape Bon, 
as can those from the north and east off the eastern coast of Tunisia. In the vicinity 
of Malta, northwesterly and northeasterly winds called “gregales” generate rough 
seas for several days at a time between October and April.31
In the western Mediterranean, rains are frequent in the winter but very rare in 
summer. For example, in August 1932 average rainfall in Cagliari, Sardinia, was 
0.2 inches; in Palermo, Sicily, 0.3 inches; Catania, Sicily, 0.6 inches; and Naples 
0.8 inches. In Sicily, Sardinia, and adjacent waters July has the most sunny days, 
December the fewest.32 Fog over the open sea occurs only rarely, except east of 
Gibraltar, where it forms more often, between July and September. Generally vis-
ibility is reduced during a sirocco wind. Sandstorms off the North African coast 
can reduce visibility to less than two miles; however, they are generally short-lived 
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and localized. South and east of Sicily and around Malta, visibility might be poor 
for several days during siroccos.33
Effect of the Physical Environment
The geographic characteristics of the western Mediterranean offered both advan-
tages and disadvantages to the opposing forces. The Allies had de facto strategic 
dominance of the Mediterranean, because they controlled the Strait of Gibraltar 
and the Suez Canal. Another strategically important exit was the Bosporus and 
the Dardanelles (collectively the Turkish Straits), controlled by Turkey, a neutral. 
On the Atlantic side, the approach to the Strait of Gibraltar runs from Cape Saint 
Vincent (the southwestern corner of Portugal) to Rota (some eight miles northwest 
of Cádiz) to Tarifa (the southern tip of Iberia) and Ceuta (on the African side); 
the Alborán and Balearic Islands lie in the background.34 Alborán Island and the 
Balearics lie just outside the eastern approaches, distant from the strait respectively 
about 130 miles to the east and 520 miles to the northeast. The Allied control of the 
Strait of Gibraltar was made much easier by the control of Alborán. 
Within the western Mediterranean the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, and the 
Balearics occupied the most important positions, affecting the employment of na-
val and aerial forces. Sardinia occupied a flanking position with regard to the Al-
lied sea route from the Strait of Gibraltar. Axis aircraft based there had to fly 150 to 
200 miles to attack ships approaching the Sicilian Narrows from the west or sailing 
westward to Gibraltar.
In the central Mediterranean, the Apennine (or Italian) Peninsula occupies a 
commanding geostrategic position with regard to the surrounding lands and seas. 
One leg of the peninsula (the “toe,” as often called) faces the Messina Strait, while 
the other (the “heel”) borders the Strait of Otranto. Whoever controlled the south-
ern part of the peninsula held the key to Sicily and guarded the exit to and from the 
Adriatic Sea. Any power that controlled Sicily, in turn, was in an excellent position 
to dominate the approaches to the central Mediterranean. In 1942 that power was 
the Axis: the Italian air force and the Luftwaffe had nine major airfields on Sicily 
and four on Sardinia, as well as numerous airstrips and landing grounds.35
The Italian cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats based on Sicily and Sardinia 
could effectively attack Allied traffic to and from Malta. The distance from Sicily 
to Cape Bon is only ninety miles, which a cruiser or destroyer at high speed could 
cover in about three hours. An Italian or Luftwaffe bomber needed only some 
thirty minutes. The Italian position was strengthened by control of the island of 
Pantelleria.36 Pantelleria, strongly garrisoned, was a base for Italian fighters housed 
in underground hangars.37 
As for Malta itself, its great military/naval importance largely lay in its com-
manding position in the approaches to both the western and eastern Mediterra-
nean. Malta lies only about eighty nautical miles from Licata, Sicily, and 360 from 
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Benghazi, Libya. The distances from Malta to the Libyan coast and to Cape Bon are 
190 and 175 nautical miles, respectively. The distances in nautical miles between 
Malta and the Italian naval bases at Cagliari (in Sardinia) and Naples and Taranto 
(on the Italian mainland) are 330, 322, and 337, respectively. Toulon, France, and 
Palma, in the Balearics, are 605 and 620 miles from Malta.
The Sicilian Narrows posed a particular hazard for Allied ships because of Ital-
ian mines and the short distances to Axis airfields on Sicily. The mines and the 
restricted sea room of the Narrows made it next to impossible to use battleships 
and carriers beyond Skerki Bank. Hence, for the last 250 miles of the voyage to 
Malta every convoy had to rely on protection from cruisers and destroyers.38 The 
Sicilian Narrows were also well suited for the employment of Italian and German 
torpedo craft, cruisers, and destroyers. In the early days of the war the Allies swept 
the mines easily but with more difficulty and danger later, when the Italians laid 
new and more advanced German mines.
Operation PEDESTAL was conducted over very long distances. About 2,350 nau-
tical miles separate Glasgow and the harbor at Valletta, Malta, via Bishop Rock (off 
the southwestern corner of the British Isles) and Gibraltar. From Gibraltar to Malta 
a convoy had to sail 1,145 nautical miles (or seventy-six hours, at fifteen knots) and 
within 150 miles of enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily.39 
There were also navigational hazards. Prior to the war, steamers en route to 
Malta would steer directly to Cape Caxine (northwest of Ras Sidi-Ferruch, Algeria) 
and thence along the North African coast, passing to the south of the two Sorelles 
Rocks (submerged some eleven miles west of the La Galite Islands) and the La 
Galite group itself (twenty-four miles northwest of Cape Serrat, Tunisia), toward 
Cape Bon, then northward of Pantelleria and Gozo.40 Ships had to stay well clear 
of Keith Reef (forty-six nautical miles north of Cape Bon).41 Bound westward from 
Malta to Gibraltar, they would pass north of the La Galite and then toward Cape 
Gata (Almería, Spain) to avoid adverse currents, then steer for Gibraltar.42
Allied naval forces at Gibraltar that accompanied convoys sailed essentially 
along a single, long line of operations. In contrast, the German and Italian air bases 
on Sardinia and Sicily and in North Africa occupied flanking positions, and their 
aircraft operated on lines of operation that were multiple, exterior, and short. The 
lines of operation of Allied aircraft on Malta, in its central position, though simi-
larly multiple and short, were divergent. 
OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE 
One of the worst problems of the Allies was their highly fragmented command 
organization in the Mediterranean. Even two years after the outbreak of hostili-
ties there was no single theater commander responsible for planning and execut-
ing all operations, whether involving the army, the Royal Air Force (RAF), or the 
Royal Navy. In June 1939 the British established the Middle East Command, with 
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headquarters in Cairo, responsible for all operations there and in the Western Des-
ert, later in Greece, British Somaliland, Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Libya as well. 
However, the three services were individually responsible for defense of the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
For the army, the CINC of the Middle East (Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck until 
August 15, 1942, then Gen. Harold Alexander) controlled only ground forces. Di-
rectly subordinate to him were the British troops in Egypt, Sudan, Persia, and Iraq, 
comprising the British Eighth Army (formerly Western Desert Force), the Ninth 
Army (formerly forces in Palestine and Transjordan), and the Tenth Army (for-
merly Persia and Iraq forces), and also the troops on Malta.43 The RAF commander 
in the theater was Air Officer, CINC Middle East Command (Air Marshal Arthur 
W. Tedder); in August 1942, the RAF units were deployed in the Western Desert, 
Malta, Palestine and Transjordan, Iraq, Aden, East Africa, and Sudan.44 
The naval counterpart was CINC, Mediterranean Fleet, Adm. Sir Andrew B. Cun-
ningham. The principal British naval commanders reporting to him in the summer 
of 1942 were Vice Admiral (VA) 1st Battle Squadron and Second in Command 
Mediterranean Fleet (H. D. Pridham-Wippell); Flag Officer Force H (Vice Adm. 
Edward N. Syfret); Flag Officer Commanding Red Sea and Canal Area (Vice Adm. 
R. H. C. Halifax); Rear Admiral (RA) Mediterranean Aircraft Carriers (A. L. St. G. 
Lyster); RA 15th Cruiser Squadron (Philip L. Vian); RA 7th Cruiser Squadron (H. 
B. Rawlings); RA Destroyers (I. G. Glennie); VA in Charge Malta (Ralph Leatham); 
RA Alexandria (G. A. Creswell); and RA Training Establishment (R. J. R. Scott).45
The Axis command structure in the Mediterranean was centralized at the 
national-strategic level but disjointed at the operational level. Mussolini concen-
trated all authority over Italian armed forces in his own hands. He was simulta-
neously minister of war, minister of the navy, and minister of the air force from 
late 1933 until his regime ended in July 1943. He appointed undersecretaries who 
served as chiefs of staff of the respective services. The chief of the Supreme General 
Staff (Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale) was essentially a technical adviser, with no 
command authority.
The German command structure in Italy was highly fragmented, hampering 
full cooperation in the conduct of operations—a problem considerably worsened 
by service rivalries. Hitler, in his Instruction No. 38 of December 2, 1941, appoint-
ed Luftwaffe field marshal Albert Kesselring as CINC South (Oberbefehlshaber 
Süd). On one hand, Kesselring became responsible for the overall conduct of war 
in the Mediterranean and North Africa, directed specifically to “obtain control of 
the air and the sea in the area between southern Italy and North Africa, ensuring 
the safety of communication to Libya and Cyrenaica, cooperation with the German 
and allied [Italian] troops employed in North Africa, stopping enemy traffic in the 
Mediterranean and also English supply of Tobruk and Malta in cooperation with 
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available German and Italian naval forces.” Kesselring was nominally (not in real-
ity) subordinate to Il Duce (Mussolini) and was to conform in general to guidance 
and tasks from the Italian High Command (Comando Supremo). On overarch-
ing questions affecting warfare in the Mediterranean and North Africa, Kesselring 
was at the same time subordinate to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW).46 
But on the other hand, Kesselring did not control all the German ground, air, 
and naval forces in his theater. He had full control only of all the Luftwaffe units in the 
Mediterranean and North Africa. Directly subordinate to him were the commanders 
of the 2nd Air Fleet (Luftflotte 2): II Air Corps (Fliegerkorps-Gen. Bruno Lörzer), X 
Air Corps (Gen. Hans Geisler), and Air Leader Africa (Fliegerführer Afri ka, Gen. 
Otto Hoffmann von Waldau). However, Kesselring did not have authority over the 
naval forces in the central Mediterranean; these remained subordinate to Admiral 
Raeder. Yet Kesselring was authorized to issue instructions to Naval Group Com-
mand South (Marinegruppenkommando Süd), in Sofia, Bulgaria. This command, 
established in July 1941, replaced Admiral Southeast (Admiral Südost), which had 
been set up in April.47 Also, Kesselring did not control the German-Italian cam-
paign in North Africa, which was the responsibility of OKW. 
As for coordination with the Italians, Kesselring could send instructions to the 
German liaison at the Italian naval high command, Rear Adm. Eberhard Weichold. 
Kesselring’s requests for joint employment of German and Italian naval forces had 
to be routed through Admiral Weichold. On December 1, 1941, the German Naval 
Command Italy (Deutsches Marinekommando Italien) was formally established, 
under Weichold. Administratively, this new command was subordinate to Naval 
Station North Sea.48 Directly subordinate to the German Naval Command Italy was 
the chief of German Sea Transport Italy (Deutscher Seetransportchef Italien), Rear 
Adm. Günther Horstmann, in Rome.49 In November 1941, all the U-boats in the 
Mediterranean became subordinate to a newly created command, Leader of the 
U-boats Italy (Führer der Unterseeboote [F.d.U.]–Italien), in La Spezia. Its chief 
was, in turn, directly subordinate to Adm. Karl Dönitz. F.d.U.-Italien comprised the 
29th U-boat Flotilla, with six boats.
To make all this complexity even worse, there was little unity of effort between 
Germany and Italy in the Mediterranean theater. Neither the Germans nor the Ital-
ians fully trusted their nominal partners. Kesselring had the authority only to coor-
dinate, but not to prepare plans for, the joint undertakings. He had some influence 
on the employment of Italian air squadrons for the defense of convoys to North 
Africa, but the Italian navy resisted all such German attempts. Italian ships from 
different squadrons never trained together. Supermarina constantly interfered with 
its tactical commanders.50 
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What the Allied Commanders Knew
The Allies had fair knowledge of Italian and German naval and air dispositions in 
the central Mediterranean. Their most important sources of intelligence were inter-
cepted and decoded German ENIGMA messages. The Allies had solid knowledge not 
only of air dispositions but also of Luftwaffe operation orders, air-reconnaissance 
reports, and U-boat observations, even appreciations of the situation by Kesselring 
and his subordinate commanders. Such intelligence obtained was distributed to 
major Allied commanders in the form of “special intelligence summaries” prepared 
by the OIC in London.
On the basis of analysis of ENIGMA messages, the Allies assessed that on July 
22, 1942, the Italians had deployed at Taranto four battleships (one Littorio-class, 
three Cavour-class); three light cruisers (Abruzzi, Garibaldi, and Aosta) at Nava-
rino (Pylos today), Greece; two heavy cruisers at Messina, Sicily; five destroyers, 
two torpedo boats, two submarines, and eighteen motor torpedo boats at various 
other bases in Sicily; four torpedo boats at Pantelleria; and two light cruisers, six 
submarines, and three destroyers at Cagliari, Sardinia.51
Allied intelligence estimated that at Naples there were one Italian light cruiser 
(in dock, out of service), three destroyers, and eight submarines. It noted that the 
number of destroyers at Taranto varied between ten and twenty, according to the 
requirements of convoys from Italy to Greece, Crete, and North Africa.52 Allied 
intelligence assessed that if Axis high commanders suspected the Allies of mount-
ing convoys to Malta, the Italians most likely would establish a patrol line of three 
or four submarines between Sardinia and the French North African coast and that 
four other submarines probably would patrol the Cartagena–Ibiza–Algiers triangle. 
To Allied intelligence analysts the German U-boats did not appear “to have main-
tained patrols in the western Mediterranean.” Yet their view was mistaken, as was 
their presumption that boats encountered in that area “so far were apparently on 
transit.” More reliably, Allied intelligence also provided detailed analyses of French 
naval deployment and shipping routes across the western Mediterranean.53
With regard to enemy air strength, the Allies estimated that on July 23 the Luft-
waffe had in service 315 aircraft, including one hundred long-range bombers and 
torpedo bombers on Sicily and fifty on Sardinia. In their view, the increase in the 
number of long-range bombers was owing to the removal of two air groups (each of 
sixty-five to seventy aircraft) from Crete, supposedly because of not any operation-
al need but rather a lack of fuel on Crete.54 The Allies believed the Luftwaffe had on 
Sardinia twenty Ju-88 multirole bombers, and the Italian air force had fifteen long-
range bombers, thirty single-engine fighter aircraft, thirty-five torpedo bombers, 
twenty reconnaissance aircraft, and thirty coastal seaplanes. On Sicily the Luftwaffe 
had 120 long-range bombers, twelve reconnaissance bombers, and thirty-six and 
twenty-seven single- and twin-engine fighters, respectively. The Italian air force
 MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA 89 88 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
had there about eighty long-range bombers, 120 single-engine fighters, twenty tor-
pedo bombers, fifteen dive-bombers, ten reconnaissance aircraft, and fifty coastal 
seaplanes.55
On August 5, 1942, the Allies learned from ENIGMA intercepts that the Germans 
interpreted the reduction in RAF activity over Malta and Egypt as an indication 
of a planned large-scale operation to resupply Malta. The Germans also believed, 
intercepts revealed, that the Allies would launch diversionary attacks on the Pan-
zer Army Africa and a combined operation against Mersa Matrûh. The Allies also 
knew that the Germans planned to counter these possible moves by redeploying 
Luftwaffe aircraft from Greece to Sicily and increasing the combat readiness of air 
units in both areas. They also planned to discuss with the commander of the Italian 
air forces on Sicily joint bombing, torpedo attacks, and training exercises.56
Allied intelligence revised its estimates of enemy air dispositions on August 9, 
1942. It now erroneously concluded that no German aircraft were based on Sar-
dinia. Actually, the Germans then had 144 long-range bombers, twenty-seven 
reconnaissance bombers, and sixty-six single-engine fighters on the island.57 The 
Italian air force had deployed on both Sicily and Sardinia a total of some seventy 
long-range bombers, thirty-five to forty torpedo bombers, fifteen to twenty dive-
bombers, forty reconnaissance aircraft, fifty coastal seaplanes, fifteen to twenty 
fighter-bombers, and ninety-five single-engine fighters. Roughly 55 percent of 
these aircraft were operational.58
What the Axis Commanders Knew
In contrast to the Allies, the Italians and Germans lacked information about Allied 
plans and intentions prior to August 10. However, they had a reasonably accurate 
knowledge of the enemy order of battle and movements once enemy vessels entered 
the Mediterranean. Their main sources were Abwehr agents in the Gibraltar area 
and in Ceuta and reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. The German and Ital-
ian aircraft regularly reconnoitered the Strait of Gibraltar, its eastern approaches, 
Malta, Alexandria, the Suez Canal area (especially Port Said and Suez), and Haifa. 
For example, at about 1800 on August 2, German aircraft reported the presence in 
Gibraltar of one enemy carrier, three cruisers (two in dry docks, one at pier and 
under repair), twelve destroyers (two under repair), eight submarines (one under 
repair), two auxiliary cruisers, twenty-six freighters (one under repair, four dam-
aged), and eight tankers.59 
At 2100 on August 4, the Germans sighted one armed tanker and four destroyers 
arriving at Gibraltar from the east and, at 0300, the carrier Eagle, one cruiser (Cha-
rybdis), and four destroyers steaming westward from there.60 On August 5, German 
naval intelligence reported two destroyers, four submarines, five other warships, and 
two steamers in Malta. Several small warships, three tankers, and ten steamers were 
sighted in Alexandria. At Port Said observers located one mock-up battleship, one 
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cruiser, four destroyers, four submarines, one tanker, four ferries, and twenty-two 
freighters. At Suez were four destroyers, a torpedo boat, a depot ship, a submarine, 
eight tankers, and thirty-three freighters, plus three other craft.61 At 1800 on August 
5 the Germans sighted in Gibraltar two cruisers (one under repair), eight destroy-
ers (two under repair), five submarines (one under repair), two auxiliary cruisers, 
twenty-eight freighters (one docked, four damaged), and eight tankers.62
According to Italian agents’ reports, two freighters at Gibraltar were preparing to 
leave. At midnight on August 5/6, the cruiser Liverpool with three destroyers sailed 
out from Gibraltar, direction unknown. At about 1100 one tanker, two destroyers, 
and one submarine proceeded eastward from Gibraltar.63 At about 1200 the next 
day, Luftwaffe aircraft sighted two destroyers, two escort boats, two patrol boats, 
and two merchant ships at latitude 32° 29ʹ north, longitude 34° 45ʹ east, twenty-
six nautical miles southwest of Haifa.64 Around noon, German aircraft sighted two 
enemy cruisers (Dido and Aurora), two destroyers, three escort boats, four tankers, 
and seven freighters. In Beirut was one C-class light cruiser.65 
On the morning of August 8, the same German report indicated (erroneously) 
that one Argus-class carrier and four destroyers had entered Gibraltar. The Abwehr 
reported intensive shipping traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar on the night of August 
8/9.66 Finally, the B-Dienst reported that on August 9 there had been observed in 
Gibraltar Cairo (light cruiser), Maidstone (depot ship), fourteen destroyers, two 
submarines, twenty-three small craft, twenty freighters, six tankers, and one gun-
boat (in a dock). The Germans also noticed intensified activity by enemy subma-
rines in the eastern Mediterranean.67 
OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
In the aftermath of the failed dual-convoy operation in June, the need to mount 
another resupply of besieged Malta was obvious. The First Sea Lord, Adm. Sir Dudley 
Pound, agreed with Prime Minister Churchill that the loss of Malta would be a disas-
ter of the first magnitude to the British Empire, probably fatal in the long run to the 
defense of the Nile valley.68 The Allies were willing to accept high risk to resupply 
Malta, but their decision became easier when, after the Convoy PQ17 disaster, it 
was decided to suspend Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the 
easing of the situation in the Indian Ocean freed forces that could be applied to a 
convoy operation to relieve Malta.69 
Allied Preliminary Plans
The dual-convoy experience had demonstrated the inability of Allied naval and air 
forces to defend the Malta convoys against Axis air forces in the central Mediter-
ranean. Hence, the next major convoy operation to Malta would be mounted from 
the west only.70
The overall commander of the new convoy operation, code-named PEDESTAL, 
was to be Vice Adm. Edward N. Syfret. He was on his way back from capturing the 
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Vichy base at Diégo-Suarez (Antsiranana today), on Madagascar, when he received 
orders to disembark at Takoradi, Gold Coast, and fly directly to the United King-
dom. Planning for the new operation started on July 13, 1942, and was conducted 
at high intensity.71 
The Allies considered four variant plans—known as A, B, C, and D—to resupply 
Malta from the west. Most of them required the availability of the U.S. aircraft car-
rier Ranger (CV 4, of 17,580 tons full load) for the operation. The Admiralty was in 
favor of plan A, if Ranger and its five destroyers were available at Scapa Flow. Under 
that plan, the battleships Nelson and Rodney, then with the Eastern Fleet in the In-
dian Ocean, also would take part. The Admiralty received information from Malta 
that the island could survive until September. Hence, there was no great urgency 
to run a convoy in July. This latitude would affect the degree to which the British 
government pressed the Americans to release Ranger as envisaged under plan A.72
Plan B would require Ranger to move to Scapa Flow, to transfer twenty-four folding-
wing Martlet fighters (U.S. F4F Wildcats) with their crews to the carrier HMS Vic-
torious. Ranger would operate with the Home Fleet to relieve Victorious during its 
absence. Ranger would need to retain at least twelve Martlets. However, the Admi-
ralty believed that execution in July 1942 would not allow adequate time for Victo-
rious and the transferred U.S. fighter squadrons to become familiar with each other. 
Therefore, should the Americans reject plan A, the Admiralty favored a delay to the 
August new moon period. Modified plan B would not interfere with the schedule 
of PQ convoys bound for Russia but could be pursued only if Ranger would be 
available for service with the Home Fleet until the end of August.
Plan C—simply to employ Victorious alone and with its usual air wing—was con-
sidered unacceptable at the outset, because the obsolete Fulmar fighters that Victori-
ous carried were inadequate to protect both the convoy and the battleships south of 
Sardinia, where the threat was expected to be greatest. This assessment was based on 
the heavy losses to enemy land-based aircraft during Operation HARPOON.73
Plan D contemplated execution in August using British forces exclusively. This 
plan would not require American help and would make more time available for 
training and for building up a heavy-bomber force in the Middle East to support 
the operation. Another advantage was that in August there would be one more 
hour of darkness than in July. However, a major disadvantage of plan D was that it 
would delay relief to Malta by a month and tie up the merchant ships destined for 
the convoy for that month. It also would postpone the assembly and training of the 
Eastern Fleet by two and a half months, because that fleet’s sole carrier, Indomitable, 
and its two battleships Nelson and Rodney would be in the Mediterranean.74
The Admiralty favored plan A, if Ranger could reach Scapa Flow by July 30; 
otherwise the modified plan B would be executed in August. Failing either of those 
two plans and setting aside C, the Admiralty would have no alternative but to adopt 
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plan D.75 However, adopting plan D would make it unnecessary to send Ranger. Be-
cause the Royal Navy was severely short of cruisers and destroyers, Deputy Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee and the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. 
Alan Brooke, suggested that the government request the service with the Home 
Fleet of the U.S. heavy cruisers Tuscaloosa and Wichita and four destroyers be ex-
tended until the end of August 1942.76
The Allied Final Plan for the Main Operation
All planning for the convoy (now officially Operation PEDESTAL) was in the hands 
of the Admiralty in London. Among other things, this centralization considerably 
reduced the need for transmitting proposals and decisions. In addition, the Admi-
ralty’s planners were already knowledgeable regarding general policy and were able 
on short notice to get help and advice from the Naval Staff.77
The final plan for Operation PEDESTAL was similar to that for HARPOON in 
June.78 The planners assumed that surprise would be difficult to achieve, because 
the Axis had excellent intelligence in the Gibraltar area.79 In its broad outlines, the 
plan visualized assembling sufficient forces to counter the diverse threats posed by 
Axis air and naval forces based in Sardinia, Sicily, southern Italy, and Tripolitania.80 
The planners posited that Operation VIGOROUS had failed because Allied airpower 
had been unable to force enemy battleships to withdraw. Also, there had been an 
acute shortage of AA ammunition and fuel. This was part of the reason why the 
convoy had to sail after dark on June 15. Because it was impossible to increase 
the number of land-based aircraft, the only way to bolster the defenses of the next 
Malta convoy was to assign much stronger surface forces.81 Enough fighter aircraft 
would be required to match the enemy fighters and also deal with the heavy and 
torpedo bombers that would threaten the convoy.82 
The lessons drawn from the experience of convoys to northern Russia and Mal-
ta emphasized the need for tankers. While the British merchant marine did not 
have fast (sixteen-knot) tankers, the U.S. Maritime Administration operated two, 
Kentucky and Ohio. After some difficult negotiations, the British government was 
able to lease these tankers. However, Kentucky was sunk on June 15, 1942, during 
VIGOROUS. Ohio alone, of 14,150 deadweight tons (DWT) and carrying 11,500 tons 
of black and white oil, was assigned to the convoy.83 
In planning PEDESTAL, the Allies correctly assumed that the enemy would con-
centrate his heavy surface forces south of Sardinia, where they would either attack 
the convoy or draw off its escorts to open the way for attack by light forces. They 
also expected synchronized attacks by high-level bombers, torpedo bombers, and 
dive-bombers on the third and fourth days of the operation and, on the second and 
fifth days, high-level bombing and torpedo bomber attacks.84 To minimize losses to 
aircraft the convoy would transit the Sicilian Narrows at night.85
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Allied Order of Battle
Operation PEDESTAL (August 10–15)
Main Forces
Force F
(Vice Adm. Edward N. Syfret [Rodney]) 
 Force Z (Rear Adm. A. L. St. G. Lyster)
 2 battleships (Nelson [flag], Rodney)
 3 aircraft carriers
  Victorious (6 Sea Hurricanes, 16 Fulmars, 12 Albacores)
  Eagle* (16 Sea Hurricanes)
  Indomitable** (10 Martlets, 24 Sea Hurricanes, 16 Albacores)
  (Total: 72 fighters, 28 torpedo bombers)
 3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
 15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla: Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin, Eskimo, Tartar,  
 Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel, Antelope, Vansittart)
 Force P (Convoy WS.5.21.S, Cdre. A. G. Venables)
 13 freighters
  Empire Hope*
  Dorset*
  Wairangi* 
  Rochester Castle**
  Waimarama*
  Brisbane Star**
  Port Chalmers
  Almeria Lykes (U.S.)* 
  Santa Elisa (U.S.)*
  Clan Ferguson*
  Glenorchy*
  Melbourne Star
  Deucalion*
 1 oiler (Ohio) (U.S.)**
 5 destroyers (accompanied convoy from Clyde to Gibraltar: Keppel, Malcolm, Amazon, 
  Venomous, Wolverine)
 Force X (Rear Adm. Harold M. Burrough) 
 4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla: Nigeria** [flag], Kenya,** Manchester,* Cairo*)
 11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla: Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight,* Fury, Derwent, 
  Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
 1 ocean tug (Jaunty)
Reserve Escort Group
8 destroyers (Keppel, Westcott, Venomous, Malcolm, Wolverine, Amazon, Wrestler, Vidette)
Force R
2 fleet oil tankers (Brown Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spiraea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)
Supporting Forces
Submarine Group: 10th Submarine Flotilla 
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.42, P.211)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.31, P.34, P.44, P.46, P.222, Utmost)
Malta Escort Force
4 minesweepers (17th Minesweeping Flotilla: Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 462)
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Land-Based Aircraft on Malta
(Air Vice Marshal Keith Park)
9 fighter squadrons 
 Fighters: Supermarine Spitfire Mk V B 
 Night fighters: Bristol Beaufighter Mk IV F
 Fighters / dive fighters: Hawker Hurricane Mk I
 Heavy fighters: Bristol Beaufighter Mk I F
3 torpedo-bomber squadrons
 Torpedo bombers: Bristol Beaufighter Mk VI C
 Torpedo bombers / recce: Bristol Beaufort I
4 bomber squadrons 
 Heavy bombers: Consolidated Liberator B-24
 Attack/antiship: Bristol Beaufighter Mk I C
2 air recce squadrons
 Attack/recce: Short Sunderland Mk II
 Recce bombers: Vickers Wellington Mk III; Martin A-30/Baltimore (U.S.)
Secondary Operations
Operation Bellows
1 aircraft carrier (Furious: 38 Spitfires, ferried to Malta)
2 destroyers, August 6–11 (Laforey, Lookout) 
5 destroyers, after fly-off on August 11 (Keppel, Venomous, Wolverine, Wrestler) 
Operation AscendAnt
Force Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)
Operation MG 3
(Adm. Sir Henry Harwood, Port Said)
Convoy MW 12: 3 merchant vessels 
Escort: 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers
At Haifa
(Rear Adm. Philip Vian)
1 merchant vessel 
2 cruisers
3 destroyers
Key: * sunk, ** damaged
Sources: Llewellyn-Jones, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; Between Hostile Shores, pp. 237–40; 
Nassigh, Operazione Mezzo Agosto, pp. 206–207, 221–22; Fioravanzo, Azioni navali in Mediterraneo, pp. 410–11.
The planners also made major changes in the convoy screen, based on the les-
sons learned in June. The escorts had to be powerful enough to thwart an attack 
by Italian heavy surface forces.86 The Admiralty considered it too risky to employ 
the two battleships in the Sicilian Narrows, so close to the enemy airfields in North 
Africa and Sicily. 
All three available large British aircraft carriers (Eagle, Indomitable, and Victori-
ous) were assigned to the protection of the convoy. Sea Hurricanes and Martlets 
gradually replaced Fulmars. The carriers would be positioned inside the destroyer 
screen and in the convoy’s rear. The Italian heavy surface ships were based at Messi-
na, Taranto, and Naples.87 The carriers’ aircraft would have the critical task of dam-
aging them and thereby slowing them down, should they pose an active threat.88 
The planners had considerable difficulty in assembling merchant ships, ow-
ing to the heavy losses being inflicted by U-boats in the northern Atlantic. On 
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the basis of a July 3 request by Malta’s governor to the Admiralty, the planners at 
first envisaged a convoy composed of ten merchant ships with a total capacity of 
75,000 DWT.89 In mid-July, however, they decided on thirteen freighters and one 
tanker, totaling 123,000 DWT.90 The freighters would carry mainly flour and am-
munition. The planners allocated cargo so at least some of every commodity would 
get through even if the expected heavy losses occurred.91 To enhance its survival 
chances, the convoy’s speed of advance (average overall speed) had to be at least 
fifteen knots. On the basis of a lesson from HARPOON, an ocean tug would accom-
pany the convoy.92 The Admiralty also decided that—so as not to lose both escorts 
and convoy—merchant vessels damaged during the operation would be scuttled, 
whereas every effort would be made to preserve warships.93
The convoy was to leave the United Kingdom about August 2 and arrive at Mal-
ta on the 13th. In an attempt to confuse German intelligence, the convoy was des-
ignated WS (“Winston Special”) 5.21.S, which would ordinarily indicate a convoy 
bound around the Cape of Good Hope to Suez.94 Primarily, however, the success of 
PEDESTAL would depend on the Allied ability to assemble a powerful support force 
and to time the passage so as to outwit the Italians and Germans. Specifically, the 
convoy would need to cross the critical area in a moonless period, which meant 
between August 10 and 16. The planners selected August 10 as the day the convoy 
and its escorts would enter the Mediterranean at Gibraltar: first day of the opera-
tion, or D.1 (D+0 in American terms). 
The objective of PEDESTAL, as stated in the plan, “was to pass a convoy of 14 mo-
tor vessels through the western Mediterranean to Malta and to cover the passage 
of two merchant ships and two destroyers from Malta to Gibraltar.”95 The princi-
pal objective was to deliver enough fuel, ammunition, and food to allow Malta to 
operate as a major naval and air base beyond September 1942—an objective that 
was operational in its scale. Major tactical objectives in PEDESTAL were defense and 
protection of the convoy, neutralization of the enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sic-
ily, and diversion of enemy forces from the western to eastern Mediterranean. An 
essential element of operational planning is determination of the overall force’s size 
and composition. The principal factors in this process are the type of operation, the 
combat potential of friendly and enemy forces, the number and scale of intermedi-
ate objectives and their sequencing, the distances between the base of operations 
and the prospective operating area, weather and climatological conditions, and, 
notably, intelligence and logistics. Yet the operational commander’s judgment and 
experience are most important. For PEDESTAL the Allies assigned the largest avail-
able force of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to Admiral Syfret.96 He com-
manded Force F, composed of the convoy and the naval forces of direct screen and 
distant cover and support, collected from the Home and Eastern Fleets. 
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Not under Syfret’s command but assigned to his defense and support were sub-
marines in the eastern Mediterranean, subordinate to the CINC of the Mediter-
ranean Fleet in Haifa, and land-based aircraft, controlled by the RAF’s Middle East 
Command. Force Y at Malta consisted of two destroyers. The Malta Escort Force 
(the 17th Minesweeping Flotilla) comprised four minesweepers and seven motor 
launches. In addition, the Admiralty assigned eight destroyers as reserve escorts to 
screen Force R (the refueling group—two fleet oilers, corvettes, and a tug) and the 
carrier Furious.97
Initial lines of operation are critical in both the planning and the execution of a 
major naval operation. (In contrast, a geostrategic position is more important in a 
campaign.) This Allied convoy and its supporting forces moved along a very long 
exterior line of operation. Once in the Mediterranean, all the Allied forces taking 
part in the operation used a single line of operation, stretching from the Strait of 
Gibraltar to Malta—and accordingly, all faced increasing threat from the air as they 
entered the effective range of Axis bombers.
After determining the ultimate objective of the operation, the commander 
and his planners must determine corresponding enemy and friendly operational 
“centers of gravity,” sources of the massed strength, physical or moral, or leverage 
whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have 
the most decisive impact on one’s own or the enemy’s ability to accomplish a given 
military objective. The principal value of determining the proper enemy center 
of gravity is to enhance significantly the odds that one’s forces will be used in the 
quickest and most effective way to accomplish a given military objective. 
Once the enemy center of gravity is destroyed or effectively neutralized, the 
objective has been accomplished but the combat success must be consolidated. Of 
course, one’s forces have a center of gravity of their own, which the commander 
must assign highly capable, but not overly strong, forces to protect; otherwise, the 
operation could be open to a devastating attack. 
From the Allied perspective, the enemy’s operational center of gravity in the sec-
ond phase of the operation (from Gibraltar to the Sicilian Narrows) was clearly the 
German heavy bombers and dive-bombers based on Sicily and Sardinia. However, 
in the third phase, south of Sardinia, it would shift to the Italian heavy surface forces 
(if they sortied from their bases). For the Axis, the enemy operational center of grav-
ity in the second phase was Force Z (three large aircraft carriers, with their fighter 
aircraft). Once through the Sicilian Narrows, Force X (the convoy’s direct screen) be-
came the Allied operational center of gravity. Finally, the operational center of gravity 
would shift to the Allied fighter aircraft on Malta, once the convoy was within their 
effective radius. The reasons there were three successive operational centers of grav-
ity were the flanking position occupied by the enemy land-based aircraft, the restrict-
ed operating area, and the high threat posed by the enemy aircraft and submarines. 
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Forces assigned for the defense of the convoy would have to be withdrawn when they 
reached the area where the odds of their survival were too low.
The operational idea (or scheme) is the very heart of a design for a major naval 
operation. In essence, it is identical to what is today commonly called “concept of 
operations” (or CONOPS, sometimes “scheme of maneuver”). Ideally, it should be 
bold and provide for speedy execution. The simpler the operational idea, the higher 
the chances of its successful execution. The operational idea also should be flex-
ible, so that it can accommodate changes to the situation during its execution. It 
should ensure decisive employment of one’s forces by focusing their efforts on the 
destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity. It should present the 
enemy with multidimensional threats that he has little or no chance of countering 
successfully. 
Perhaps most important, the operational idea should be novel, avoiding stereo-
typed patterns: it should surprise and deceive the enemy. The operational idea for 
PEDESTAL, however, was traditional (see map 8). The unfavorable initial geographic 
position was a major reason that it was, while bold, not novel; lines of operation for 
each force element were so constrained as to allow little or no flexibility. The Ital-
ians and Germans were neither surprised nor deceived; the objective of the opera-
tion was all too transparent. The Allies were also unable to achieve surprise because 
of the large number of Axis agents in the Gibraltar area.98 The speed of execution 
was limited to the fifteen-knot speed of the convoy.
The Allied operational idea envisaged both simultaneous and successive move-
ments of several force elements in both the western and eastern Mediterranean. 
Force F would pass through the Strait of Gibraltar on the night of D.1. Its compo-
nent Force Z (the battleships, carriers, and their escorts) would turn westward, but 
remain in the vicinity, on reaching the entrance to Skerki Bank (an area of relatively 
shallow water in the Sicilian Narrows) at about 1900 on D.3.99 Force X (the direct 
screen) and convoy WS.5.21.S would proceed toward Malta. Force X would halt in 
the approaches to Malta during the afternoon of D.4, when the Malta Escort Force 
would take over escort duties.100 Force Z would remain near the entrance to Skerki 
Bank until the night fighters from Malta took over protection of the convoy (Force 
P) and Force X. At that point, on D.4, Force Z would operate to the westward of 
Sardinia to distract attention from Force Y (a secondary operation, described be-
low); once its support was no longer necessary, it would return to Gibraltar. Force 
X would return to Gibraltar as soon as Vice Admiral in Charge of Malta released 
it from protecting the convoy.101 Minesweepers would clear the waterways, thereby 
avoiding the loss of merchant vessels to mines that the June convoy had suffered.102 
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Allied operational idea for 
Operation PEDESTAL
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The Allied initial operational center of gravity—the carrier forces—was well 
protected by the fighter aircraft and AA defenses of the carriers’ screens. However, 
Force X—the second operational center of gravity—had to rely solely on its own 
AA defenses.
The Allied sector of main effort in PEDESTAL was the western Mediterranean, 
the eastern Mediterranean that of secondary effort—necessarily, because the con-
voy would steam from Gibraltar to Malta. Normally, the sectors of effort in a major 
naval operation dictate where the main forces and supporting forces are deployed. 
In the case of a defensive major naval/joint operation, as was PEDESTAL, the main 
forces and most of the supporting ones operate in the sector of main effort—in this 
case, the western Mediterranean.
A major naval operation cannot be successful unless it is adequately and re-
liably supported and sustained logistically. In general, sustainment is the exten-
sion of logistical support from the start of combat actions until the ultimate ob-
jective is accomplished. Operational sustainment is required to support combat 
forces throughout all phases of a major operation. Because of the long distances 
involved, the short-legged destroyers needed refueling during the convoy transit. 
Malta was not in a position to provide fuel. The lessons of the Arctic and Malta 
convoys showed the need to have tankers to accompany the convoy and escorts. 
Force R would perform this critically important task. The plan provided that Force 
R would enter the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar with the main force and 
then wait near the convoy route to refuel the destroyers as needed.103 
The planners for PEDESTAL had great difficulty in preparing a plausible decep-
tion plan. The enemy could not be easily deceived, because the geography severely 
limited false objectives toward which attention might be diverted. The deception 
target, the Axis high commanders, would simply assume that any large convoy with 
heavy escort from either Gibraltar or Alexandria was bound to Malta: the ultimate 
objective of PEDESTAL was obvious. The Allied planners accordingly did not at-
tempt a deception but only a feint, in the eastern Mediterranean (Operation MG 3), 
hoping to convince the Axis commanders not to commit all their forces in the west. 
Specifically, a convoy (MW 12) composed of three merchant ships covered by 
a force of two cruisers and five destroyers would sail from Port Said, in Egypt, to-
ward a position about one hundred miles south of Crete.104 The group would get 
under way on D.2, as soon as possible after learning that the WS.5.21.S convoy had 
passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, or on D.3 if it did not receive that report.105 
The intent was to lure out the Italian 8th (Naval) Division at Navarino and keep the 
Luftwaffe’s aircraft based on Crete on the ground. One Allied submarine would be 
off Navarino, while two other boats would be farther west to intercept any Italian 
ship from Taranto. To divert further the Italians’ attention from the events in the 
western Mediterranean, an Allied submarine would land commandos off Catania 
to raid a nearby airfield.106
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Secondary Operations 
Under the cover of the convoy operation, the Admiralty planned two secondary 
operations: to reinforce Malta with fighter aircraft (Operation BELLOWS) and (Op-
eration ASCENDANT) to bring back from Malta the ships that had survived June’s 
dual-convoy operation. The former was undertaken when, during the planning 
of PEDESTAL, the British chief of the air staff, Marshal Sir Charles Portal, raised 
the issue of the number of fighter aircraft on Malta: by the end of July the island 
had only about eighty fighters still in service and was losing about seventeen per 
week.107 Hence, the planners decided to reinforce Malta’s air defenses by some forty 
Spitfires, ferried by an aircraft carrier prior to the arrival of WS.5.21.S.108 These new 
aircraft would not only buttress Malta’s defense but improve the chances of suc-
cess of PEDESTAL itself. The carrier Furious was selected for BELLOWS, because the 
other available carrier, Argus, required (because of its relatively slow speed) wind 
of at least fifteen knots to launch aircraft, which it was unlikely to encounter in the 
western Mediterranean in August.109 The Admiralty directed Admiral Syfret that 
Operation BELLOWS should interfere as little as possible with Operation PEDESTAL. 
Furious (carrying four Albacore torpedo bombers and forty Spitfires) would enter 
the Mediterranean with the convoy and without making a stop at Gibraltar proceed 
to a position south of Sardinia and about 550 miles west of Malta. The Spitfires 
would fly off on D.2 or D.3 at any time during daylight.110 Force F would provide 
fighter protection until Furious was well west. Five destroyers would escort Furious 
back to Gibraltar and then the United Kingdom immediately after the fly-off.111
The second subsidiary operation was meant to get the merchant ships Troilus 
and Orari and a screen, collectively Force Y, out of Malta and to Gibraltar. The in-
tent was to mount ASCENDANT after dark on D.1 (August 10).112 Force Y would pass 
a point thirty nautical miles south of Lampedusa, pass Kélibia on Cape Bon, hug 
the Tunisian coast to Galite Channel, then proceed to Gibraltar.113
Support from Other Forces
The Allies planned to employ submarines and fighter aircraft based on Malta, pa-
trol aircraft based in Gibraltar, and long-range bombers of the RAF Middle East 
Command in support of PEDESTAL. The initial plan, drafted on July 20, contem-
plated stationing eight submarines near Sicily to prevent Italian surface forces in 
the Tyrrhenian from attacking the convoy during the last leg of its transit. Of these, 
three submarines would take positions between Cape Gallo and Trapani (patrol ar-
eas A, B, and C), four submarines between Cavallo and Marettimo (patrol areas D, 
E, F, and G), and one between Vulcano and Cape Milazzo, on Sicily’s northeastern 
coast (patrol area H). These patrols were to be established by D.1.114
By late July, however, the plan for employing Allied submarines had changed. 
Now, one submarine would deploy off Milazzo, one off Palermo, and six between 
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Malta and Pantelleria.115 All would reach their assigned positions by dawn on D.4 
(August 13).116 They would have complete freedom of action in attacking enemy 
ships, making Italian battleships and cruisers their primary targets. After the con-
voy passed their patrol line, the submarines would screen it, proceeding on the 
surface, on a parallel course. They also would report the presence of enemy aircraft 
in the convoy’s vicinity.117
The outcome of PEDESTAL was contingent also on close cooperation with RAF 
units based on Malta and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. By August 3 the num-
ber of serviceable aircraft on Malta had grown somewhat over the July figure, to 
between ninety and ninety-five Spitfire fighters and about fifty-five bombers. By 
August 10, the number of Spitfires had dropped again to eighty. On August 12, 
estimated air strength would be 202 aircraft, including 113 Spitfires.118 At any given 
time during the operation itself, there would be serviceable about a hundred Spit-
fires, thirty Beauforts (twin-engine bombers), thirty-six Beaufighters (a Beaufort 
variant whose multiple roles included torpedo bombing), three Wellingtons (long-
range medium bombers), two Liberators (the U.S. B-24 design), two Baltimores 
(U.S.-designed light attack bombers), and three Albacores and Swordfish belong-
ing to the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA). In addition, some sixteen reconnais-
sance aircraft (five Baltimores, six Spitfires, and five Wellington VIIIs) were avail-
able at any one time.119 
The Allied aircraft on Malta would conduct reconnaissance day and night along 
the probable routes of enemy naval forces; attack the Italian and German bases on 
Sicily, Sardinia, and Pantelleria; protect the convoy after it came within their effective 
range from Malta; and attack with torpedoes Italian naval forces entering Taranto.120
The Allied aircraft based in North Africa primarily supported the British Eighth 
Army. Their additional tasks were to locate, shadow, and report all enemy surface 
ships, protect the Allied convoys from air attack, destroy enemy surface ships, and 
dislocate enemy air forces on the ground. The enemy bases on Sardinia would be 
attacked during the day by low-flying Beaufighters, and during the night by Libera-
tors, from the RAF Middle East Command.121 
On August 3, Sir Ralph Leatham, VA in Charge Malta, requested from the Mid-
dle East Command four Liberators for bombing enemy airfields on Sardinia and 
Sicily during the nights of D.3/D.4 and D.4/D.5. He suggested using also six Boston 
light bombers (a variant of the U.S. Douglas A-20 Havoc) or similar aircraft suitable 
for high-speed daylight bombing.122 Leatham wanted the RAF to send long-range 
escort aircraft from Gibraltar and Malta to the limits of their effective ranges. He 
specifically requested, to keep track of enemy surface vessels, air reconnaissance 
between Sardinia and North Africa from D.2 to D.5; between Cavallo Island Light-
house and Marettimo (in the Aegadian Islands) during daylight hours on D.3 and 
D.5; and reconnaissance of the Italian naval bases at Taranto, Messina, Pa lermo, 
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Axis Order of Battle
Italian Surface Forces
3rd (Naval) Division (Messina, Rear Adm. Angelo Parona) 
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia [flag], Bolzano,** Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro, Grecale)
7th (Naval) Division (Cagliari, Rear Adm. Alberto Da Zara)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia [flag], Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio Attendolo**)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
8th (Naval) Division (Navarino, Rear Adm. Raffaele de Courten)
3 light cruisers (Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto Duca d’Aosta)
5 destroyers
Submarines
18 Italian submarines 
 Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo, Emo, Cobalto,* Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wol-
framio, Granito, Dagabur,* Giada,** Uarsciek, Vellela
Leader of U-boats, Italy (F.d.U. Italien) (La Spezia)
29th U-boat Flotilla
 2 U-boats in western Mediterranean (U-73, U-333)
 4 U-boats in eastern Mediterranean
Light Forces
Italian torpedo boats
6 MSs (2nd MS Squadron: MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
13 MASs (15th MAS Squadron: MAS 543, 548, 549, 563; 18th MAS Squadron: MAS 533, 553, 556, 560, 562;
 20th MAS Squadron: MAS 552, 554, 557, 564)  
German torpedo boats
4 S-boats (S30, S36, S58, S59)
Land-Based Aircraft 
328 Italian aircraft
 144th, 146th, 170th, 197th, 287th Air Squadrons (Sardinia, Sicily) 
 90 torpedo bombers: Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79 Sparviero
 62 bombers: Savoia-Marchetti S.M.84
 25 dive-bombers: Regianne Re 2001; Fiat Rosatelli CR. 42
 151 fighters: Aeromacchi Castoldi MC 202, G.50 / G.50 bis A / G.50 ter
 Reconnaissance aircraft: (long-range) Cant. Z 107 bis; (seaplane) Cant. Z 501/506B 
456 Luftwaffe aircraft
II Air Corps (II Fliegerkorps, at Sala Consilina, 73 miles SE of Naples, Gen. Bruno Lörzer) 
Stab (F)/122 (Trapani)
1.(F)/122 (Catania), Stab/JG 53 (Comiso), II./JG 53 (Comiso), I./NJG 2 (Comiso), I./NJG 2 (Heraklion, Crete), 
Stab/KG 54/Kü.Fl.Gr. 806 (Catania) 
X Air Corps (Athens-Kifissia, Gen. Hans Geisler)
2.(F)/123 (Greece-Crete); Jagd Sta. (Eleusis-Athens); 1./JG 53 (Greece-Crete); 2./NJG 2 (Greece); I./LG, 1/II./
LG, 1/III./LG, 1/2./SAGr, 126/1./SAGr, 126/3./SAGr 126 (Greece-Crete)
328 dive-bombers: Ju-87 B-2/D-3/R-2 Stuka 
32 bombers / dive-bombers / torpedo bombers: Ju-88A/A-4, He-111
96 fighters / heavy fighters: Me-109 G-2/G-6 / Bf-109 G-2/G-6, Me-109 F-4 / Bf-109 F-4; (heavy) Me-110 C /
Bf-110C; Me-110 C-4 / Bf-110 C-4; Me-110/Bf-110
Airfields
Sicily
Augusta (seaplanes); Biscari / San Pietro,± Caltagirone,± Catania, Catania/Torazzo,§ Chinisia, Comiso, Cor-
leone,± Enna,± Gela, Gerbini (14 satellite fields), Licata,± Marsala/Stagnone (seaplanes), Milazzo 
(seaplanes), Oratel,± Pachino,± Palermo (seaplanes), Palermo / Bocca di Falco, Ragusa, Salemi,± 
Sciacca,± Syracuse (seaplanes), Taormina,± Termini,± Torre di Faro,± Trapani/Milo
Sardinia 
Alghero / Porto Conte (seaplanes), Borore,± Cagliari/Elmas, Cagliari/Elmas (seplanes), Cagliari/Monserrato, 
Capoterra,± Casa Zeppara,± Chilivani, Decimomannu,± Milis, Olbia,± Oristano, Oristano (sea-
planes), Ottana,± Pabillonis, Piscina Mendola,± Senorbi,± Tortolì, Venafiorita,± Villacidro±




±  landing strip
§   satellite strip
(F)   Aufklärunggruppe (reconnaissance group)
Jagd Sta.   Jagd Station (fighter station) 
JG   Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing)
KG   Kampfgeschwader (battle wing)
Kü.Fl.Gr.  Küstenfliegergruppe (coastal air group)
LG   Lehrgeschwader (training wing)
NJG   Nachtjagdgeschwader (night-fighter wing)
SAGr   Seeaufklärunggruppe (naval reconnaissance group)
Stab   staff
Sources: Fioravanzo, Azioni navali in Mediterraneo, pp. 410–13; Llewellyn-Jones, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean 
Convoys, pp. 129–31; “Operation Pedestal,” supplement, London Gazette, p. 4506; Nassigh, Operazione Mezzo 
Agosto, pp. 218–22; DeZeng, Luftwaffe Airfields, pp. 8–255.
Naples, and Cagliari from D.1 to D.5. Daylight air patrols between Cavallo and 
Marettimo would be flown from D.3 to D.5, dawn patrols between Sardinia and 
North Africa from D.2 to D.5.123 Beaufighters would protect Force X from 1930 
to dark on D.3 and from daylight on D.4 until Spitfires could take over. Torpedo 
bombers would maintain readiness to attack surface ships and cover the westward 
passage of Force X to Gibraltar on D.4.124 RAF aircraft based at Gibraltar would fly 
an antisubmarine patrol east of the Strait of Gibraltar.125 
Finally, Admiral Syfret expected the British army to support the operation by 
staging an attack in Egypt. But he was disappointed—the army refused to take any 
action.126 The British army never seemed to understand the importance of Malta to 
ultimate Allied victory in the Mediterranean.
Axis Planning
German and Italian operational planning focused on the employment of land-
based aircraft from Sicily and Sardinia. The partners prepared their plans separate-
ly but agreed to coordinate their attacks; specifically, the Luftwaffe’s II Air Corps 
in Sicily coordinated its planning with the sector command of the Italian air force 
in Sicily.127 The Axis plans were prepared on very short notice, because the enemy 
intent was not discerned until a few days before the convoy operation started. On 
August 5, reliable reports from Abwehr agents convinced CINC South, Field Mar-
shal Kesselring, that the enemy was preparing a large-scale attempt to supply Malta 
from the west.128 The Germans believed that the enemy would try to pin down 
Axis forces by a simultaneous attack against the Panzer Army Africa; they assumed 
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there would be a combined sea, ground, and air attempt to capture Mersa Matrûh. 
The activity of the enemy air forces in Egypt and on Malta was remarkably light, 
considering their known strength; the Germans took this as a sign that prepara-
tions were being made for a large-scale operation.129 The enemy was holding forces 
in reserve on Malta, probably to support the transit of a convoy through the Sicil-
ian Narrows with fighter protection and by bombing Italian naval forces.130 At the 
same time, the Germans correctly inferred the possibility of a simultaneous threat 
to Crete by enemy forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, Kesselring 
directed increased readiness for Luftwaffe units on Sicily and Crete. On August 5, 
the day the intelligence was received, he directed aircraft be moved from Crete to 
Sardinia and Sicily.131 Kesselring also opened discussions with the Italian air force 
about joint employment.132
II Air Corps increased the combat readiness of its bombers and fighters but 
planned to employ them sparingly. Kesselring directed II Air Corps also to prepare 
to accommodate reinforcements from X Air Corps that would be transferred for 
short-term employment. These reinforcements would, in cooperation with the Ital-
ian air force, strengthen the ground organization at Elmas, Sardinia.133
The Allies learned through ENIGMA that the Luftwaffe on Sardinia was having 
difficulty with supplies, which prevented full deployment of long-range bombers 
and fighters. They also learned that the Germans transferred from the eastern to 
the western Mediterranean forty to forty-five long-range bombers and six twin-
engine fighters. This, in turn, complicated the German situation in North Africa. 
Air Leader Africa had been obliged to shift from ground support to provide air 
cover for the Axis convoys in the Tobruk area. However, if Field Marshal Rommel 
had been engaged heavily at the time, it seems doubtful that even these limited 
reinforcements could have been made available.134
The Germans observed in July 1942 the increased activity of enemy forces in the 
Strait of Gibraltar area and the western Mediterranean. In their view, if the enemy 
were to employ heavy and medium ships for screening convoys to Malta, they re-
quired U-boats in the western Mediterranean. Because British forces had operated 
in the Majorca–Algiers area, the Operations Division of SKL (1./SKL) believed that 
it was necessary to keep two U-boats in that area.135 It also insisted that the weight of 
main effort (Schwerpunkt) of U-boat employment should be in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. Now, however, because of the increased threat Malta posed to the Axis supply 
traffic to North Africa, SKL directed four U-boats be redeployed from the eastern to 
the western Mediterranean. (In the event, they were not on station in time to attack 
the convoy.) What the Germans considered strong enemy defenses made employ-
ment of U-boats west of longitude 2° east difficult; accordingly, they were deployed 
on the Ibiza–Algiers line. The plan was to send one U-boat out of La Spezia each day 
from August 1 to the 3rd. The Germans had four U-boats deployed in the eastern 
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Map 9
Axis operational idea for the 
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Mediterranean. It was also thought desirable to employ U-boats jointly with the Ital-
ian submarines. However, that could not be done effectively, because a message from 
an Italian submarine to the U-boats required, on average, four hours to arrive.136 
In Rome, Supermarina considered four options the enemy might pursue: first, 
to use superior naval strength in direct escort of the convoy; second, to sortie the 
main battle force to lure the Italians to react in kind; third, to use a strong covering 
force to force a passage north of Pantelleria (whereas the Allies planned, instead, 
to turn the covering force westward at the entrance to Skerki Bank); and fourth, to 
attack the Italian airfields on Sardinia with carrier-based aircraft.137
The Axis operational idea was simpler than that of the Allies (see map 9). The 
Germans and Italians essentially followed the same script they had used against 
a Malta convoy in September 1941 (Operation HALBERD). There would be joint, 
special air reconnaissance of the western Mediterranean by Italian and Luftwaffe 
aircraft on August 11 and 12.138 Also, Italian and German aircraft on Sicily and Sar-
dinia, Italian submarines and German U-boats, Italian and German torpedo boats, 
and minefields would form successive barriers. These four barriers were intended 
to cause the convoy to disperse, allowing a powerful cruiser-destroyer force to at-
tack successfully.139
The Germans and Italians planned the main air attack on the convoy for Au-
gust 12, south of Sardinia, when fighter escorts would be available to the bomb-
ers.140 There would be twenty-two torpedo bombers, 125 dive-bombers, and forty 
high-level bombers, all in a tightly synchronized attack. The Italian air force would 
deliver the main attack; the Luftwaffe would attack in two waves.141 The principal 
objective would be the aircraft carriers (the enemy operational center of gravity, in 
operational terms), to render them unable to intervene when the Italian heavy sur-
face forces closed in.142 The Italians planned to deploy eighteen submarines in the 
western Mediterranean.143 Seven Italian submarines and two (not four as originally 
planned) U-boats would be deployed along the convoy’s estimated route south of 
the Balearics, between longitudes 1° 40ʹ and 2° 40ʹ east.144 Ten Italian boats would 
be deployed between the Fratelli Rocks and the northern entrance to Skerki Bank.145 
Some of these boats would operate in cooperation with aircraft northwest of Cape 
Bon.146 One Italian submarine would patrol west of Malta, another off Navarino, 
and three more about a hundred miles west-southwest of Crete.147
The Germans and Italians assumed that the enemy convoy would have a stron-
ger screen than they had in June. However, they did not expect the enemy to use 
battleships.148 The Italian plan had the 3rd and 7th (Naval) Divisions joining about 
a hundred miles north of Marettimo (westernmost of the Aegadian Islands) in the 
afternoon of August 12 and then sailing on an intercept course south of Pantel-
leria through the night.149 Both would attack the remnants of the convoy and its 
direct screen (Force X) south of Pantelleria at first light on August 13.150 The Italian 
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planners based this timing on the possibility that Axis aircraft could provide effec-
tive cover with fighters, because of the larger number of enemy aircraft based on 
Malta. Any enemy convoy from Egypt would be dealt with by the 8th (Naval) Divi-
sion, based at Navarino.151 
However, the issue of providing strong air support to the Italian heavy surface 
forces was hotly debated between Kesselring and Mussolini and the Italian high 
command. The problem was that there were not enough fighters to escort bombers 
and torpedo bombers and provide air support to surface ships at the same time.152 
Mussolini personally favored cover for surface forces but ultimately decided in 
favor of fighter escorts for the bombers.153 The Italian chief of the General Staff, 
Marshal Ugo Cavallero, believed the Italian surface forces should be employed, but 
Supermarina was unwilling to do so without air cover.154 Admiral Weichold ar-
gued that the Luftwaffe should provide that air cover.155 However, Kesselring did 
not agree.156 Reportedly, Kesselring was convinced not only that there were too few 
fighters but that, based on the experience of the second battle of Sirte, of March 22, 
1942, and the encounter off Pantelleria on June 15, the Italian heavy cruisers would 
fail with or without air cover.157 Ultimately, the Germans used the pretext of lack of 
fuel to refuse to provide air cover for the Italian heavy surface forces.158 
As for other arms, the Axis planned to have nineteen Italian MAS (motoscafo 
armato silurante) boats and four German Schnellbooten (fast torpedo-armed boats, 
or S-boats) attack the convoy, for which they would wait off Cape Bon, Pantelleria, 
and south of Marettimo.159 Also, between June 1940 and April 1942 the Italians 
had laid 2,320 mines between Cape Granitola (the southwestern tip of Sicily) and 
Pantelleria; 1,020 between Pantelleria and Ras el Mustafa, Tunisia; 6,880 between 
the Aegadians and Cape Bon; and 1,040 between Bizerte and Keith Reef.160 One 
Italian destroyer would lay more mines in the Sicilian Narrows during the night of 
August 12.161
Opposing Forces
The entire resupply operation to Malta was under the command of Acting Vice Ad-
miral Syfret (see “Allied Order of Battle” sidebar).162 He was in command of Force 
F, composed of the convoy and direct-screen and distant-cover forces. Assigned 
to the operation was a collection of ships from the Home Fleet and Eastern Fleet. 
Submarines deployed in the eastern Mediterranean were subordinate to CINC of 
the Mediterranean Fleet, in Haifa. Most of the land-based aircraft were controlled 
by the RAF’s Middle East Command.
Supporting naval forces were divided into four force elements, designated Forces 
Z, X, Y, and R. Force Z, led by Syfret himself, consisted of two battleships and three 
large aircraft carriers (with seventy-two fighters and twenty-eight torpedo bomb-
ers), three cruisers, and the 19th Destroyer Flotilla, with fifteen destroyers. Force X, 
under Rear Adm. H. M. Burrough, was composed of three light cruisers and one 
AA ship of the 10th Cruiser Flotilla, eleven destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla, 
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and one ocean tug.163 Two of these cruisers, Nigeria and Cairo, were fitted for fighter 
direction.164 An additional five destroyers were assigned to provide antisubmarine 
escort for the convoy during its transit from Britain to the Strait of Gibraltar.165 
Force Y, at Malta, consisted of two freighters and two destroyers. Force 
R(efueling) was composed of two fleet oilers and one ocean tug, plus four cor-
vettes for escort.166 Malta Escort Force (the 17th Minesweeping Flotilla) consisted 
of four minesweepers and seven motor launches. In addition, the Admiralty as-
signed eight destroyers as reserves; they were intended to provide escort for Force 
R and a screen for the carrier Furious.167 
The Germans and Italians possessed substantial and diverse forces in the the-
ater, sufficient to inflict heavy losses on the Allied convoy and its covering forces. 
The Italians had available for the operation 328 aircraft (ninety torpedo bombers, 
sixty-two bombers, twenty-five dive-bombers, and 151 fighters), the Germans 456 
(328 dive-bombers, thirty-two high-level bombers, and ninety-six fighters).168 (See 
the sidebar for details of the Axis order of battle.) The German II Air Corps mainly 
supported the Panzer Army Africa. Some twenty Ju-88s from two air groups of X 
Air Corps on Crete moved to Sicily on August 11 and were ready for action the next 
morning. Eight more Ju-88s from Crete flew to Sicily on August 12, after complet-
ing convoy escort duties in the Aegean. However, most of the torpedo bombers, 
whose crews were newly trained, moved from the Mediterranean to Norway in 
June 1942 and did not return in time for the operation.169
The Italian navy had theoretically available four battleships, three heavy and 
ten light cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, twenty-eight torpedo boats, and sixty-
four submarines. However, the Italians were unable to deploy most of these, lack-
ing fuel and adequate air cover. The Italian navy had received twelve thousand 
tons of fuel in June 1942—only about one-fifth the amount consumed by convoys 
(fuel reserves then amounted to about 121,000 tons); its battleships were directed 
to transfer their fuel to the escorts. Because of this shortage, Mussolini suggested to 
Hitler that further enemy attempts to supply Malta be opposed using submarines 
and land-based aircraft alone.170 
Supermarina planned to employ for the pending operation three cruiser-
destroyer formations: the 3rd (Naval) Division, with three heavy cruisers and seven 
destroyers; the 7th (Naval) Division, with three light cruisers and four destroyers; 
and the 8th (Naval) Division, with three light cruisers and five destroyers. The Ital-
ians also had eighteen submarines in the western Mediterranean. Nineteen torpedo 
boats (six motoscafo silurante [MS] and thirteen of the larger MAS) were based 
within striking range of the Sicilian Narrows. The Germans had available two U-
boats and four S-boats.171
EXECUTION 
Operation PEDESTAL consisted of four related phases (map 10): assembly of the con-
voy at the Clyde River estuary, in Scotland, and transit to Gibraltar; from Gibraltar 
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to the Sicilian Narrows; from the Narrows to Valletta, Malta; and return of the 
distant- and direct-screening forces to Gibraltar. 
The movements of the support groups for PEDESTAL started on July 31, when the 
carrier Victorious with its escorts sortied from Scapa Flow.172 On August 6–9 all three 
large carriers and their escorts conducted an exercise (Operation BERSERK) between 
the Azores and Gibraltar. The main purpose was to rehearse fighter direction and 
cooperation among the three carriers.173 Taking part were Force M, from the United 
Kingdom (Victorious, the cruiser Sirius, and three destroyers); Force K from Free-
town, Sierra Leone (Indomitable, the cruiser Phoebe, three destroyers, and two cor-
vettes); Force J from Gibraltar (Eagle, the cruiser Charybdis, and three destroyers); 
and Force W from Freetown (one fleet oiler and two corvettes).174
Prior to the sortie from the Clyde, Admiral Burrough, the Force X commander, 
held a meeting on board his flagship with the masters of all the merchant ships and 
explained the plan in detail. Convoy WS.5.21.S, escorted by the light cruisers Nige-
ria (Burrough’s flagship) and Kenya and several destroyers, sailed during the night 
of August 2/3 and joined the main body the next morning.175 On August 9, Force R 
left Gibraltar and sailed to a position south of Majorca, Balearics.
The assembled Force F passed through the Strait of Gibraltar between 0245 and 
0500 on August 10 (D.1) in a dense fog, visibility only about 650 feet.176 The transit, 
however, was uneventful. Admiral Syfret believed at the time that because of the 
fog and the moonless night enemy agents were unlikely to have observed the Allied 
convoy; subsequently, however, he would acknowledge later reports that showed 
the enemy was “fully cognizant of our passage of the strait.”177 By 0600 the Germans 
had the information: some twenty-four ships had entered the Strait of Gibraltar 
from the west, without lights. They also knew that in Gibraltar were a cruiser, eight 
destroyers (two under repair), five submarines (one under repair), two auxiliary 
cruisers, twenty-two freighters, and seven tankers.178 A German agent reported that 
between 0000 and 0200 on August 10 some fifty enemy ships of various sizes had 
transited the strait. At 0700, the carrier Argus and four destroyers were (mistak-
enly) reported in Gibraltar.179 At about 0800, B-Dienst reported that during the 
night of August 9/10 an enemy convoy sailing in three groups had passed through 
the strait on an easterly course.180
At 1130, after the visibility in the area had improved, an Italian agent reported the 
presence of the cruiser Cairo and destroyers.181 Also at about 1130, the Tetuán station 
(in Morocco) was directed to pass sighting reports from Alborán Island to Madrid.182
Around noon on August 10, Supermarina too received information that fifty-
seven British ships had transited the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound.183 One hour later 
the Italians concluded that a large number of enemy warships and merchant ves-
sels, including six large warships, had passed into the Mediterranean during the 
night.184 The Italians assigned five air squadrons to reconnoiter the sea area west 
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of Sardinia. Seven Italian submarines and two German U-boats were sent to patrol 
north of Algiers.185 
At 1245 on August 10, Luftwaffe aircraft reported that the enemy convoy was 
about seventy nautical miles north of Algiers. The main group was composed of 
three battleships, probably of the Nelson class (actually this class comprised only 
two ships, Rodney and Nelson). The convoy was accompanied by three carriers, 
including what the Germans erroneously believed was USS Wasp, plus twenty to 
twenty-five cruisers and destroyers, and twenty large steamers trailing westward of 
the van. A separate group of six destroyers was reported to be some seventy-five 
nautical miles northwest of Algiers.186
On the afternoon of August 10, Kesselring learned, on the basis of visual obser-
vations from Tarifa and Ceuta, that a large enemy convoy, forty to fifty units includ-
ing possibly two carriers and nineteen freighters, had entered the Mediterranean. 
The enemy convoy was on an easterly course and sailing at a speed of thirteen or 
fourteen knots. The Germans estimated the convoy would be south of Majorca, in 
the Balearic Islands, by 0600 on August 11 and south of Sardinia at about 0600 the 
next day.187
At 1700 on August 10, a Vichy French aircraft reported two aircraft carriers, 
two battleships, two light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve merchant vessels 
forty-two nautical miles north-northwest from Cape D’Aiguille (some twenty miles 
northeast of Oran) on an easterly course.188 (This report was intercepted by Allied 
intelligence analysts.)189 
German naval intelligence situation analysis at 1800 asserted that given radio 
traffic and the enemy ship movements there was a possibility of a “large English 
combined operation from the west and the east.” A German agent in Gibraltar re-
ported the movement of some fifty ships including three passenger liners and war-
ships between 0000 and 0200 on the 10th and the arrival of the carrier Argus and 
four destroyers at 0700. An Italian agent in Gibraltar reported the arrival of the 
cruiser Cairo.190 The observation station at Melilla on the North African coast re-
ported that by 1800 there were no enemy ships in sight. Madrid placed its agents at 
both Tangier and Ceuta in a state of increased alertness.191 At 1815, some forty-seven 
nautical miles east of Alborán, German aircraft sighted two enemy destroyers.192 
At 1800 on August 10, the Italians believed that an enemy force consisting of 
one battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, twenty-three torpedo craft, and 
nineteen merchantmen were present in the western Mediterranean.193 They as-
sumed that the British carrier-based aircraft would attack the Italian air bases on 
Sardinia. Supermarina estimated that the enemy convoy would transit longitude 
10° east at noon on August 11 and reach Cape Bon around noon on the 12th.194 
During the following night, the convoy would pass through the Sicilian Narrows in 
the area of Pantelleria.195
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German aircraft sighted at 1900 on August 10, forty-two nautical miles north 
(bearing 004°) of Cape D’Aiguille, two enemy carriers, two battleships, two cruis-
ers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve steamers steaming eastward.196 A French report 
had placed the same formation at 1700 forty-two nautical miles northwest (bearing 
334°) of Oran. At 1815 two enemy destroyers were detected forty-seven miles east 
of Alborán.197
From air reconnaissance reports, Kesselring directed II Air Corps to put its 
long-range bombers in the highest state of combat readiness. He also ordered prep-
arations for the transfer of aircraft, including fighters, from Sicily to Sardinia. Kes-
selring transferred the Ju-88 torpedo-bomber squadron at Grosseto, in Tuscany, to 
Catania, Sicily. However, because of the shortage of fuel on Crete, it was not pos-
sible to use German transport aircraft to carry personnel and torpedoes to Sicily 
on August 11. Italian fighter aircraft would be transferred from Sicily to Sardinia. 
It was also decided that the Italian fleet would operate against the convoy, as it had 
against HARPOON in mid-June.198
On August 10, the Allies learned from radio intercepts that during the night of 
August 9/10 the Italian Admiralty (Supermarina) had reported, from preliminary 
information, that on August 8 British naval forces consisting of one or two carri-
ers, possibly one battleship, four cruisers, twenty-three torpedo craft, and nineteen 
merchant vessels had been moving westward toward the central Mediterranean.199 
They also learned that during the morning of August 10 the Luftwaffe had recon-
noitered between Crete and North Africa as far as Port Said.200 The Allies also knew 
that in the evening of August 10 orders were given to fly twenty-five Luftwaffe 
aircraft from Greece to Catania, with absolute priority. Luftwaffe planes and Italian 
fighters were also being deployed to Sardinia.201
The Germans and Italians had fairly accurate knowledge of the operational situ-
ation in the eastern Mediterranean. In particular, British radio traffic revealed to 
the Germans the movements of British forces in the eastern Mediterranean, which 
indicated they were operating in conjunction with those in the west. On August 10, 
German reconnaissance reported intense enemy activity in the eastern Mediterra-
nean. There were four enemy cruisers and ten destroyers about 150 nautical miles 
off Port Said on a westerly course and in Alexandria a destroyer, six smaller naval 
vessels, and thirteen steamers.202 Luftwaffe reconnaissance detected at the Suez an-
chorage five destroyers, one repair ship, and one Southampton-class cruiser.203
The first report on the enemy convoy itself on August 11 was received by the 
Germans at 0450. It was based on a report (mentioned earlier) from a Vichy French 
civilian aircraft made at 1900 on August 10. (It was transmitted to the Germans 
through the Armistice Commission.)204 This report had been passed from Algiers 
to Toulon in French naval cipher at 1940 on August 10. By 0600 on August 11 Ger-
man air units in Africa and Sicily had that information.205 By then the Allied convoy 
was south of the Balearics, headed toward Cape Bon.206 
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On August 11 and 12, the Italian air force organized, in cooperation with the 
Luftwaffe, reconnaissance of the entire western Mediterranean.207 At about 0620 
on August 11, a U-boat sighted the enemy convoy and its screen. At 0815, a Ger-
man aircraft reported the convoy approximately ninety-five miles northwest of 
Algiers.208 However, other German sources say it was not located by German ob-
servers until 0910, when it was near Cape Ténès (about a hundred miles west 
of Algiers).209 Afterward and throughout the day, Ju-88 bombers at twenty and 
twenty-four thousand feet maintained continuous contact with the enemy convoy 
and its covering groups.210
Nevertheless, the Germans apparently did not have a completely clear picture 
of the operational situation on August 11. Their reconnaissance reports were often 
contradictory with respect to the position and composition of the convoy and its 
screening forces. For example, at 1021 a German aircraft reported that the enemy 
force was divided into three groups, all sailing easterly. The first of these, the main 
force, composed of probably two (possibly three) carriers, twenty to twenty-five 
cruisers and destroyers, and twenty merchant vessels, was some forty nautical miles 
southeast of Formentera Island (near Ibiza, in the Balearics). The second group—
one carrier (Eagle), four cruisers, seven destroyers, and one large merchant ship—
was seventy nautical miles north of Algiers. At about 1220 the third group, six de-
stroyers, was sixty-five miles southeast of Formentera.211 Another German aircraft 
report also described three groups but with different compositions: one, with a 
carrier, four cruisers, seven destroyers, and an unidentified unit, seventy-two nau-
tical miles from Algiers at 1240; the second, with three carriers (including possibly 
Wasp), three battleships (including possibly Rodney and Nelson), twenty to twenty-
five cruisers and destroyers, and twenty merchant ships larger than eight thousand 
tons,  ninety-eight nautical miles west-northwest (bearing 326°) of Algiers at 1021; 
and the third, with six destroyers, some seventy-five nautical miles west-northwest 
(bearing 321°) from Algiers at 1220, steaming northeasterly (070°) at between ten 
and twenty-three knots. At 1746, the enemy’s main group was north of (bearing 
22°) and some ninety miles from Algiers.212 
Thus, once the convoy was positively identified, the Germans and Italians had re-
acted quickly to move submarines and warships to the western and central Mediter-
ranean. The Luftwaffe and the Italian air force had quickly shifted their main efforts 
from the eastern to the western and central basins.213 The 3rd, 7th, and 8th Italian 
(Naval) Divisions received orders to be in readiness for combat.214 Allied cryptana-
lysts learned that in the early morning on August 11, ten torpedo-carrying Ju-88s 
had been transferred from Grosseto to Catania.215 Also that morning of August 11 
they learned of a sighting by a French aircraft the afternoon before of two enemy 
carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve merchant 
ships off Cape Ferrat (north of Oran).216 At about noon on August 11 the convoy 
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was in fact about seventy-five miles south of Majorca and zigzagging eastward. The 
French intelligence service in Algiers observed the convoy off that city at 1300, pro-
ceeding east, and so informed German agents in Casablanca.217 
BELLOWS, the RAF reinforcement of Malta, was executed between 1230 and 
1515 on August 11 from approximately 585 miles out. Out of thirty-eight Spitfires 
that flew off from Furious, all but one reached Malta safely.218 On the way back to 
Gibraltar one of the destroyers escorting Furious sank an Italian submarine.219 
The Allies had learned from decrypted ENIGMA messages that on August 11 the 
II Air Corps and the Italian Air Command, Sardinia and Sicily had received orders 
to attack the convoy early on August 12, before it reached Malta. All Axis shipping 
traffic in the Sicilian Narrows had been suspended.220 Also on the 11th they read 
an intercept in which Kesselring averred that if a British threat to Crete existed at 
all it could not materialize before August 14.221 Allied intelligence read the results 
of a Luftwaffe reconnaissance of Alexandria, Port Said, and Malta on August 10.222 
Finally for the 11th, the Allies knew that twenty Ju-88 bombers were to move from 
Crete to Sicily.223
The Allies learned from ENIGMA decrypts that at 1155 on August 11 the Ital-
ian light cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli (7th Division) at 
Cagliari had been placed by Supermarina at two hours’ notice from 1800 on (both 
cruisers, in fact, would leave Cagliari at that time, with two destroyers). These 
cruisers, together with heavy cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia at Messina, were in-
formed at 1300 that Italian submarines were in an area sixty miles long and forty 
wide north of Bizerte. Three Italian submarines, ENIGMA further disclosed, had left 
Cagliari at 2045. Light cruisers Raimondo Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia and 
two destroyers sailed on an easterly course.224
The Italian plan was to assemble the three heavy cruisers of the Messina group 
with eleven destroyers in the Tyrrhenian Sea for a joint foray toward Pantelleria 
early in the morning on August 13.225 The Navarino group of three light cruisers and 
five destroyers—one of them the German destroyer Z.G. 3 (or Hermes, ex-Greek 
Vasilefs Georgios)—would be in readiness against the eastern British group.226 The 
Italians doubted that their battleships could be employed: only one battleship was 
fully fueled, and no destroyers were available for their protection. They believed 
that the cruisers would be sufficient to deal with the British light forces. However, 
a sole Italian battleship would not be able to counter the British heavy ships.227 In 
case of a British attack on the Libyan coast, both cruiser groups would be employed 
in defense.228
Both U-boats on patrol in the western Mediterranean received orders to attack 
the enemy convoy. Six Italian submarines were in a waiting position north of Al-
giers, one north of Bizerte. The Italians had twelve submarines between Bizerte and 
Cape Bon. In addition, one submarine was deployed southwest of Malta and five off 
Genoa, in case the enemy attempted a landing or bombardment.229 
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The Italian plan was to send torpedo boats during the night of August 12/13 
south of the newly laid mine barrier, within French territorial waters.230 Also, five 
German S-boats based at Porto Empedocle, on the southern shore of Sicily, were 
to operate north of Cape Bon, while the Italian MASs would operate eastward of 
the cape.231 On August 11, the Germans sent two more S-boats in Soudha Bay to 
Empedocle. The same order was given to the S-boats in Augusta, Sicily. The two 
in Mersa Matrûh remained there, at the disposal of the commander in North 
Africa.232
In the meantime, the Allies had suffered a major loss on August 11, when at 
about 1315 U-73 penetrated the screen and fired four torpedoes at the carrier Eagle 
(27,230 tons full load), about eighty miles north of Algiers (latitude 38° 5ʹ north, 
longitude 3° 3ʹ east).233 The carrier sank in only eight minutes, with heavy loss of 
life and all its aircraft.234
B-Dienst reported that at about 1807 the enemy convoy, twenty-one merchant 
ships, was some eighty-five nautical miles north-northeast of Algiers and had 
been joined by three carriers, two battleships, six cruisers, and twenty destroyers. 
At 1955, German aircraft reported one carrier and five cruisers or destroyers plus 
one steamer seventy-seven nautical miles north of Algiers on a south-southeasterly 
course at ten knots.235 
At 1425 on August 11 the convoy’s main body was about seventy nautical miles 
north of Algiers. German aircraft counted three carriers (including Furious and 
Wasp), the two Nelson-class battleships, four light cruisers, eleven destroyers, twen-
ty merchant ships, and one tanker. Aircraft also reported north of Algiers another 
enemy group, composed of a carrier, probably one battleship, two cruisers, fifteen 
destroyers, and eight merchant ships.236
At 2045 (one hour after sunset), when the convoy was about two hundred miles 
west of Sardinia, thirty-six German Ju-88 bombers and He-111 torpedo bombers car-
ried out several attacks. The Ju-88s dove from about eight thousand feet to between 
two and three thousand. Thanks to the convoy’s strong AA defenses, no ship was 
hit.237 At 2010 and 2135, Allied Liberators and Beaufighters attacked the Axis airfields 
near Cagliari and inflicted some damage.238 During the night of August 11/12 (or one 
day before the anticipated passage of the convoy) an Italian destroyer laid a tempo-
rary minefield (i.e., to be active for only seventy-two hours) in French waters between 
Cape Bon and Ras el Mirh (adjacent to Kélibia, about twenty miles southeast).239 
During the morning of the 11th, the X Air Corps had ordered a comprehensive 
reconnaissance of the eastern Mediterranean east of longitude 25° east.240 One of 
those aircraft sighted four cruisers and ten destroyers southwest of Cyprus, moving 
west.241 The same group was sighted at 1700 by a U-boat 155 nautical miles west of 
Haifa, still on a westerly course. These reports suggested to the Germans that an-
other major enemy operation was possible, this one in the eastern Mediterranean. 
However, comprehensive air reconnaissance on August 12 sighted no major enemy 
forces in the eastern basin.242
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The Abwehr had unconfirmed information that on August 12 several freighters 
at Alexandria were loaded and ready to sail for Malta. This report, coupled with 
several sightings of submarines off Italian and Greek ports, led the Italians to believe 
that the enemy movement in the western Mediterranean was more than just a relief 
convoy to Malta.243 Indeed, Allied intelligence learned on August 11 that the Panzer 
Army Africa believed that the convoy posed a direct threat to Tobruk. Kesselring 
too believed that the enemy might attempt to land on the North African coast. The 
Germans therefore put their forces in North Africa on the highest alert.244 
At 0020 on August 12, the Allies learned from ENIGMA intercepts that Italian 
intelligence believed that four enemy cruisers, ten destroyers, and part of the con-
voy from Gibraltar might be headed for the eastern Mediterranean.245 Later that 
morning Allied intelligence read ENIGMA messages in which the Germans claimed 
that the Luftwaffe aircraft operating from Sicily had made direct hits with two two-
thousand-pound bombs on an enemy aircraft carrier, one five-hundred-pound 
bomb had hit what was believed to be an aircraft carrier, a cruiser had been hit 
by a torpedo, and a large enemy merchant ship had been hit by a two-thousand-
pounder. A cruiser and a destroyer were possibly on fire.246 The Allies also read that 
Supermarina had suspended until further notice sailings of Axis ships from Africa 
to Italy or Greece.247
The Allies also intercepted and decoded operation orders issued for the 12th by 
the II Air Corps to the 77th Fighter Wing, at Elmas, on Sardinia. The wing was to 
expect an enemy formation approaching the Sicilian Narrows early that morning. 
The II Air Corps would cooperate with the Italian air force in Sicily and Sardinia 
from the early morning of the 12th, operating in waves with fighter escorts.248 
On August 12, Allied decrypts indicated that during the evening of August 11 
Supermarina was informed of the sighting of four enemy cruisers and ten destroy-
ers south of Cyprus proceeding west. The Italians concluded (erroneously) that 
part of the convoy from Gibraltar would proceed west (into the Atlantic). They 
also considered employing a single German destroyer (Z.G. 3) jointly with the 6th 
(Naval) Division in Navarino if the latter were called on to operate. This division 
was put on three hours’ notice for action until further orders.249
Allied intelligence decrypted an ENIGMA message in which Göring informed 
Kesselring on August 12 that the destruction of the Malta convoy was of vital im-
portance, and the destruction of aircraft carriers and transports should be the first 
priority.250 Allied analysts also learned that the same day Kesselring had issued an 
order of the day that, among other things, stated that “for the third time the English 
with very strong forces were trying to break through the Sicilian Straits and that it 
was possible they would attempt landing in order to influence the military situation 
in North Africa.” He insisted that “this must not be allowed to happen. If the Brit-
ish were successful lives of many Germans, which had already been lost in Africa 
would have been in vain.”251
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On August 12, the Germans believed that “landings on the African coast be-
tween Tripoli and Benghazi were likely on the 13th and 14th in view of very strong 
Malta convoy which was attempting to pass through the Sicilian Channel.”252 Hence, 
Kesselring decided to deploy fighter aircraft and dive-bombers from Sicily and to 
move ammunition and fuel to Castel Benito (near Tripoli).253 A single-engine-fighter 
squadron and long-range bombers at Derna would be moved to Benghazi or Tripoli 
as necessary. The Germans increased readiness of the Ju-52 transport aircraft.254 Avi-
ation fuel would be transported to Benghazi by all available aircraft—flying without 
fighter escort—and Tripoli would be supplied with ammunition and fuel by using 
all available transport aircraft and an Italian submarine.255 The Panzer Army Africa 
held motorized detachments ready to repel landings. It moved some forces to the 
Sollum–Mersa Matrûh area to defend the coast east of Tobruk with three large mo-
torized groups of artillery. Additional troops were prepared for deployment. (These 
measures were lifted on August 13 in the light of the success in the attacks on the 
convoy).256 In the morning of August 12, the convoy was north of Cape Bougarouni 
(Cap Bougaron today, Algeria).257 German and Italian aircraft started to shadow 
Force F at 0500 on August 12.258 At about 0610, the Allied carriers launched twelve 
fighters to protect the convoy. That number of aircraft was maintained throughout 
the day.259 At 0830, intercepts of German radio indicated the presence of two Allied 
destroyers and merchant ships some thirty nautical miles west of La Galite on a 
westerly course.260 
The first attack, carried out by twenty or more Ju-88s, came at about 0915. The 
German aircraft were intercepted by FAA fighters some twenty-five miles from the 
convoy and inflicted no damage. The Allies claimed eight enemy planes were shot 
down.261 At 1100 German aircraft assessed that the convoy consisted of two or three 
battleships, two carriers, five cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, and nineteen merchant 
ships, including a passenger ship, and passing eastward fifty nautical miles north of 
Cape Bon at thirteen to fifteen knots. The convoy was dispersed over a large area.262 
At about noon on August 12, some seventy enemy aircraft based on Sardinia, 
with a strong fighter escort, approached the convoy. At 1215, the first wave, some ten 
Italian torpedo bombers using new parachute-dropped “circling” (pattern-running) 
torpedoes, attacked the convoy.263 They did not score any hits. They were followed 
by a few German fighter-bombers. The main attack, by forty-two Italian torpedo 
bombers, was to have followed after a five-minute interval, but was not carried out 
for thirty minutes. The torpedo bombers had been reduced to between twenty-five 
and thirty machines when they reached their targets at 1245. They scored no hits, 
because of the skillful maneuvering of the convoy.264 
The Italian torpedo bombers were followed at 1315 by some twenty German 
dive-bombers. Their attack was broken up by the Allied fighters, and only twelve 
penetrated to the convoy. However, these hit and heavily damaged a merchant ship, 
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Deucalion. At 1345, Italian aircraft attacked the carrier Victorious without result. 
Axis losses in the 1315 and 1345 attacks were nine aircraft to Allied fighters and 
two shot down by the ships’ AA defenses.265 
Allied intelligence at this point concluded (erroneously) that the combination 
of a large convoy with strong naval forces from Gibraltar and a feint in the eastern 
Mediterranean had induced great uncertainty and apprehension along the entire 
North African coast and on Crete, lest a landing take place. The Germans had been 
obliged to take several precautionary measures. Yet in fact the Germans recognized 
by August 11, as has been seen, that Crete could not be threatened before August 
14, and the Allies saw little indication that the Germans were much concerned 
about the possibility.266
B-Dienst reported that at 1700 on the 12th the convoy was twenty-six nauti-
cal miles northeast of Cape Bon steaming eastward at sixteen knots.267 At 1820 it 
plotted the main body of the Allied convoy near Bizerte.268 Between 1800 and 1850 
about eighty German and twenty Italian torpedo bombers attacked. Three bombs 
struck the carrier Indomitable, and two or three were near misses. As a result, In-
domitable was unable to operate aircraft, but it continued steaming at twenty-eight 
and a half knots.269 An aerial torpedo hit and heavily damaged the destroyer Fore-
sight, which was subsequently sunk by the British.270 
The Allies learned from ENIGMA messages that the Luftwaffe had been in-
formed at 1830 on August 12 that an S-boat flotilla of five (actually four) boats had 
left Porto Empedocle at 1600 on a westerly course for Cape Bon. After completing 
their mission, the S-boats would leave Cape Bon at about 0430 on August 13, run 
on a northerly course as far as latitude 39° north, turn south toward Marettimo, and 
then hug the coast to Augusta.271
In general, that evening the Allies’ situation looked promising. Eagle had been lost 
to a U-boat, but the mass air attacks south of Sardinia had damaged just one merchant 
ship and, among warships, only the carrier Indomitable, lightly, and one destroyer, 
heavily.272 However, things would change radically for the worse later that night.
Admiral Syfret had intended that Admiral Lyster’s Force Z would turn back to the 
west upon reaching Skerki Bank at 1915, and he had informed the fleet accordingly. 
However, because of a twenty-minute delay in reaching that point (because of the 
enemy air attacks) Syfret decided to turn back at 1855. He believed further air attacks 
prior to darkness were unlikely. Syfret was wrong in that, and wrong too in assum-
ing that after the convoy reached Skerki Bank the threat from submarines would be 
eliminated. In his view, the greatest dangers were aircraft by day and torpedo boats 
by night. Soon after Force Z reversed course, at 1855, Ju-87s attacked Force X and the 
convoy. The convoy was obliged to change the formation from five columns to four 
columns at the entrance of Skerki Channel; at 2000, just as it was doing so, an Ital-
ian submarine, Axum, torpedoed the light cruisers Nigeria and Cairo and the tanker 
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Ohio. Nigeria, damaged, was directed to head to Gibraltar escorted by two destroyers 
(and later by a third). Ohio was heavily damaged but remained afloat and was taken 
under tow. Cairo was abandoned and eventually sank.273 
In the aftermath of the submarine attacks, as several destroyers were helping 
damaged ships, at 2030 some twenty Ju-88 bombers and torpedo bombers attacked 
again. To compound the problem, fighters from Malta were fired on by Allied 
ships. The convoy was protected by only six Beaufighters. The German aircraft 
hit two merchant ships, Empire Hope and Clan Ferguson, with bombs and another, 
Brisbane Star, with torpedoes. Empire Hope had to be sunk, and Clan Ferguson blew 
up, but Brisbane Star would eventually reach Malta.274 
Owing to the submarine and air attacks, the convoy was now widely dispersed. 
The light cruisers Kenya and Manchester, two merchant ships, and three mine-
sweeping destroyers (Intercept, Icarus, and Fury) sailed ahead along the convoy’s 
intended track across Skerki Bank. One destroyer, Pathfinder, was rounding up the 
remaining nine merchant ships, spread over several miles to the northwestward.275 
At 2112 Kenya was torpedoed by an Italian submarine; it was damaged but re-
mained with the convoy. The already heavily damaged Deucalion was torpedoed 
and sunk by the destroyer Bramham at 2212 near the Cani Rocks in the Sicilian 
Narrows.276 At 2230, the rest of the convoy was near Cape Bon.277
Because of the loss of Nigeria and Cairo, Admiral Syfret decided to reinforce 
Force X by detaching to it one light cruiser, Charybdis, and two destroyers, Eskimo 
and Somali, from Force Z. However, the latter was already far to the west, and it 
would take these reinforcements several hours to join. Force X’s situation was criti-
cal. Syfret had information on the approach of enemy surface forces from the north. 
That force was reported at 1922 to be some ninety miles north of Marettimo.278 
The Allies intercepted a Luftwaffe report at 1955 of damage probably inflicted 
on a carrier, five light cruisers, and one merchant ship. Later in the evening, the 
Luftwaffe reported hits on two enemy carriers and probably a cruiser and a de-
stroyer. A ship had been seen afire. A merchant ship larger than twenty thousand 
tons had been hit with heavy bombs by Luftwaffe and Italian aircraft. The Italians 
probably hit one cruiser and two merchant ships.279 By decrypting ENIGMA mes-
sages, Allied intelligence learned that the Germans believed they had damaged an 
aircraft carrier, a cruiser, a destroyer, and a twenty-thousand-ton merchant ship.280 
While the German and Italian bombers and submarines were attacking, Su-
permarina executed its plan for intercepting the convoy. The Allies read in inter-
cepted messages that the eight-inch-gun cruiser Trieste had sailed southward from 
a northern Tyrrhenian port during the night of August 11/12. Between 0840 and 
1000 on the 12th, the eight-inch cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia had left Messina with 
four destroyers and steamed northward, and at 0930, the six-inch cruiser Muzio 
Attendolo, with two destroyers, had sailed from Naples.
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ENIGMA further indicated that an (unidentified) Italian naval force received or-
ders at 1835 on August 12 to proceed south at twenty knots and join with other 
forces ninety miles north of Trapani. Allied analysts inferred correctly that these 
orders had been addressed to the cruisers based at Messina and Cagliari. The Allies 
also read Supermarina’s orders at 1945 to the cruiser divisions to be ten miles east 
of Pantelleria at 0530 the next morning. Supermarina also informed the cruiser 
force that all Italian torpedo boats, thirteen torpedo-armed MASs and six MSs, and 
four German S-boats, would patrol from south of Marettimo to Cape Bon, keeping 
west of longitude 11° 40ʹ east, until dawn on August 13, when they would proceed 
toward Pantelleria. At 2200, the cruiser force was directed to reduce speed so as 
not to arrive off San Vito, northeast of Trapani, before midnight on August 12/13.
However, at 2345 on the 12th, the Italians abruptly abandoned this operation. 
The light cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli, with three de-
stroyers, received orders to proceed to Naples, the heavy cruisers Gorizia, Bolzano, 
and Trieste, the light cruiser Muzio Attendolo, and the remaining destroyers to Mes-
sina.281 Supermarina now directed the 7th (Naval) Division to move into the Ionian 
Sea in indirect support of the 3rd Division. Eventually that too was reversed and 
the 7th Division returned to its base.282 
The British official history would later claim that the reason Supermarina abort-
ed the operation was probably an RAF demonstration meant to give the impres-
sion that a much larger Allied striking force was on the way.283 An Italian source 
argues (implausibly) that the problem was inadequate combat readiness of the 
Italian ships.284 However, what really forced Supermarina to abandon the opera-
tion was lack of air support for its cruiser/destroyer force. As Admiral Weichold, 
the German liaison to Supermarina, had been told, there were enough Luftwaffe 
and Italian fighter aircraft to protect either the bombers or surface forces but not 
both.285 Weichold had argued that if the choice were not in favor of the warships a 
great opportunity would be lost to obtain numerical and weapon superiority, after 
the withdrawal of the enemy heavy covering forces, and therewith to destroy the 
convoy.286 In the event, so it was.
To avoid enemy minefields in the Sicilian Narrows, the convoy’s route had been 
laid south of Zembra Island and then close to the coast as far south as Kélibia.287 At 
about midnight on August 12/13 the convoy passed near Cape Bon.288 Its attenuated 
merchant ships and escorts provided the torpedo boats lying in ambush off Kélibia 
many opportunities for attack. The first torpedo boat was detected at about 0040; 
between 0120 and 0430, they carried out a large number of attacks on the convoy 
and its screen. They were very successful, perhaps surprisingly so. The small tor-
pedo boats were extremely difficult for the cruisers and destroyers to engage. The 
first major loss was the cruiser Manchester, torpedoed by two Italian boats near 
Kélibia at 0120; the cruiser had to be scuttled, and it sank at 0500. Between 0315 
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and 0430, enemy boats torpedoed five merchant ships, all stragglers: Glenorchy, 
Wairangi, Almeria Lykes, Rochester Castle, and Santa Elisa. By 0330, Charybdis, 
Somali, and Eskimo had joined Admiral Burrough’s main body.289 
At daylight the enemy torpedo boats stopped their attacks.290 The scattered ships 
were now comparatively easy prey for enemy aircraft.291 At this point (0740), B-
Dienst estimated, the convoy was widely dispersed some twenty-five nautical miles 
southeast of Pantelleria and consisted of three or four cruisers, ten destroyers, and 
ten merchant ships.292 As all this was happening, early in the morning of August 
13, the British submarine Unbroken, in an ambush position twelve miles south 
of Stromboli Island, hit and damaged the heavy cruiser Bolzano and light cruiser 
Muzio Attendolo with four torpedoes.293
At dawn on August 13, Force X comprised two light cruisers (Charybdis, Kenya) 
and seven destroyers (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Fury, Pathfinder, Somali, and Eskimo). 
It protected directly only three merchant ships, Rochester Castle, Waimarama, and 
Melbourne Star. One destroyer, Ledbury, accompanied the heavily damaged tanker 
Ohio some five miles astern of the main force. Some ten miles northwest was the 
merchant ship Port Chalmers and two destroyers, Penn and Bramham. The mer-
chant vessel Santa Elisa was dead in the water and on fire; another, Dorset, sailed 
alone; and Brisbane Star, torpedoed the previous night, hugged Tunisia’s coast.294 
By 0700 on August 13, Force X and the convoy were about 120 miles west of Malta.295 
At 0740, German aircraft reported that the enemy convoy, fifteen light units and 
nine merchant ships, was seventy-two nautical miles east of Cape Mahmur, moving 
southeastward.296 The convoy had been delayed by torpedo boat attacks but, some 
thirty miles south-southeast of Pantelleria, was finally within the effective range of 
Malta’s long-range fighters. Beaufighters and Spitfires had begun to patrol above 
the convoy 170 miles from Malta and, although without fighter direction, inflicted 
considerable losses on enemy aircraft.297 
On August 13, the first air attack on the convoy came at about 0810. Twelve 
Ju-88s made shallow dives from six thousand to two thousand feet. One merchant 
ship, Waimarama, was hit and blew up. Soon afterward, two more merchant ships, 
Dorset and Port Chalmers, were attacked too. The next attack, at 0925, was carried 
out by six Ju-87s diving to between a thousand and 1,500 feet; Ohio suffered further 
damage.298 
German and Italian aircraft together struck again at 1017. The Italian aircraft 
dropped pattern-running torpedoes on the convoy’s flanks. At 1050, the convoy 
was attacked by some twenty bombers, mostly Ju-88s but a few Ju-87s.299 Ohio, al-
though not directly hit, suffered damage from four or five near misses. The last 
attack on the convoy’s main body came at 1125. It was carried out by about five 
Italian Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79 torpedo bombers accompanied by several aircraft 
dropping pattern-running torpedoes. Beaufighters and Spitfires shot down at least 
four of them.300 By 1240 the convoy had come within the effective range of the 
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short-range Spitfires on Malta. Operating seventy to eighty miles from their bases, 
they were able to provide solid protection of the convoy.301 
At 1355, German aircraft reported that the convoy consisted of four to six light 
units, four or five merchant ships, two damaged merchant ships screened by two 
destroyers, and an aircraft mother ship, Unicorn (which in fact was still under con-
struction). The group was some twenty miles west of Malta, moving east at thirteen 
knots. In the area of Cape Bon were, they claimed to have sighted, one heavily 
damaged carrier, probably of the Wasp class, and three burning merchant ships, 
including one tanker.302 The enemy heavy units that had been reported as turning 
westward on August 12 were now, at midday on the 13th, twenty-six miles north 
of Cape Bougarouni, steaming west at sixteen knots. They comprised a battleship, 
a cruiser, and four destroyers. While the aircraft did not observe them, it was as-
sumed that a second battleship and a fourth carrier too were on a westerly course.303
Around 1430 that afternoon the convoy was joined by the Malta Escort Force. 
The main convoy now had only three merchant ships. At about 1600, Admiral Bur-
rough with two cruisers and five remaining destroyers turned westward toward 
Gibraltar.304 That evening at about 1800 Port Chalmers, Melbourne Star, and Roch-
ester Castle reached Malta. At 1900, enemy aircraft hit and sank the merchant vessel 
Dorset. At daylight on August 14, Ledbury arrived at Valletta after its unsuccessful 
search for the torpedoed cruiser Manchester in the Gulf of Hammamet. Brisbane 
Star, attacked twice after daylight on the 14th by a single enemy aircraft, reached 
Malta the same day at 1530. Penn and Bramham towed the heavily damaged Ohio 
about a hundred miles to Grand Harbour, Valletta, in Malta, arriving in the morn-
ing of the 15th. Shortly afterward, the cargo having just been removed, Ohio broke 
in two and became a total loss.305 
The German intent for the night of August 13/14 was to employ two S-boats 
near Cape Bon. Between twelve and fifteen torpedo boats were sent south of lati-
tude 36° 40ʹ north, longitude 12° east. Luftwaffe aircraft were to carry out night at-
tacks.306 However, because of engine malfunctions the S-boats had to be withdrawn 
before they came in contact with the enemy.307 
Force X, meanwhile, having left the convoy, had passed twelve miles off the is-
land of Linosa and then steered toward “position R,” seven miles south of Kélibia. 
That point was reached at 0012 on August 14. At 0450, when Force X was near the 
Fratelli Rocks, Granito, an Italian submarine, fired five torpedoes at the destroyer 
Ashanti, Admiral Burrough’s flagship, but scored no hits. By daylight Force X was 
south-southeast of La Galite, where it was shadowed by German aircraft. The first 
attack, by a few Ju-88s, came at 0730.308 
On August 14, German and Italian aircraft continued their reconnaissance of 
the western and central Mediterranean. At 1000 an Italian aircraft reported an ene-
my group including a carrier, some thirty nautical miles north of Cape Fer, moving 
westward. German analysts commented that if the report was true, the ship might 
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be the fourth enemy carrier, which had not been observed for a long time. German 
aircraft reported, from some forty nautical miles west-southwest of Malta, a carrier 
and a large merchant ship under tow.309
At 1110, an enemy destroyer was sighted thirty nautical miles east of La Galite 
Island steaming west at high speed. At 1310 a force estimated to consist of two 
cruisers and five destroyers was sighted thirty-two nautical miles northwest of Cape 
Bougarouni moving to the west at between twenty-three and twenty-five knots.310 
Between 1030 and 1050, Force X was attacked by some thirty Ju-88s and Ju-87s 
and an hour later by about fifteen Italian high-level bombers. Afterward and until 
about 1315 twenty Italian S.M.79s struck, nearly hitting several ships but causing 
no serious damage. After the S.M.79s broke off, Force X was left alone. At about 
1800 on August 14, Force X rejoined Admiral Syfret’s Force Z at latitude 37° 29ʹ 
north, longitude 3° 25ʹ east.311 
In the central Mediterranean, German aircraft sighted an enemy group of prob-
ably four steamers, two or three light cruisers, and three or four destroyers.312 How-
ever, a German photoreconnaissance aircraft during the forenoon of August 14 
was unable to obtain a clear picture, because of a high-density smoke screen. Later 
in the day German aircraft reported the presence in Valletta of four freighters and 
the tanker that had been observed under tow the previous day. During the night of 
August 14/15, despite the unclear operational picture, Italian MASs and German 
S-boats were directed to operate on the route to Malta yet did not establish contact 
with the enemy.313
The remainder of Force X arrived at Gibraltar independently. Nigeria and the 
destroyers Derwent, Bicester, and Wilton reached Gibraltar at 0010 on August 15. 
Several hours later two other destroyers, Somali and Eskimo, also arrived. The three 
destroyers that had helped Ohio—Penn, Ledbury, and Bramham—returned on the 
21st.314 Force R cruised in the western basin until it was certain it would not be re-
quired, then received orders to return to Gibraltar, where it arrived on the morning 
of August 16.315
Secondary Operations 
While the main action was taking place in the western Mediterranean, there was 
rather intense Allied activity in the eastern basin. As planned, the Allies carried out 
MG 3, a feint to distract enemy attention away from the western Mediterranean. 
The convoy, MW 12, composed of three merchant ships, left Port Said after dusk 
on August 10, accompanied by two cruisers, ten destroyers, and two other escorts; 
one more merchant ship, escorted by two cruisers and three destroyers, left Haifa 
at 0300 on the 11th. These two groups joined in the early morning, then sailed 
westward to the longitude of Alexandria, where they turned back and dispersed. 
Their specific aim had been to lure the Italian 8th (Naval) Division out from Nava-
rino and to keep Luftwaffe aircraft on Crete in place.316 German aircraft observed 
 MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA 123 122 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
these movements. Early in the morning of August 12, Kesselring informed X Air 
Corps of the position (latitude 33° 40ʹ north, longitude 28° 34ʹ east) of four enemy 
merchant vessels, six cruisers, and an unknown number of destroyers sailing on a 
northeasterly course at twelve knots. He believed this convoy to be possibly an Eng-
lish “spoof ” but did not exclude the possibility of a simultaneous supply operation 
bound for Malta from the eastern Mediterranean. He directed the X Air Corps to 
arrange exhaustive reconnaissance of the entire eastern Mediterranean area on the 
morning of August 12.317
During the night of August 12/13 Allied cruisers and destroyers shelled the 
port of Rhodes, and that day RAF aircraft attacked the airfield at Maritsa, on the 
northern tip of Rhodes. Also, that day a British submarine put commandos ashore 
at Simeto, near Catania, to set explosives on the pylons of a cable-stayed bridge. 
However, the Allied actions apparently did not faze the Italians: the 8th (Naval) 
Division remained in port, where it was reinforced by a German destroyer. The 
Italians contented themselves with holding up local traffic along the North African 
coast and, as noted above, shipping between Italy and Greece. MG 3, then, did not 
deceive the Axis and therefore failed to reduce the intensity of attacks on the main 
convoy in the western Mediterranean.318
The Allies also executed Operation ASCENDANT—the return to Gibraltar of the 
two merchant ships that had survived the June convoy—as originally planned. Force 
Y, with the two freighters, left Malta at about 2030 on August 10. It reached the area 
of Cape Bon the next day and arrived at Gibraltar at about 1000 on the 14th.
The RAF’s long-range bombers made only sporadic attacks against enemy air-
fields on Sardinia and the airfield on Pantelleria. In addition to the night attack on 
Cagliari on August 11, the next day RAF bombers attacked the airfields near Ca-
gliari from 0045 to 0315 and Pantelleria at 0245 and from 2110 to 2203. On August 
13, they attacked Trapani from 0105 to 0345 and Pantelleria from 0515 to 0545.319 
Aftermath 
Despite the all-out Axis effort to destroy the Allied convoy and then its remnants, 
five merchant ships—four freighters and the heavily damaged Ohio—out of fourteen 
eventually reached Malta. The convoy and its defensive forces had been subjected to 
intense attacks by some 240 enemy bombers and ninety torpedo bombers.320 Two of 
the ships that reached Malta had sustained so much damage that they almost sank 
on the way.321 Ohio never sailed again. The Allies had lost a carrier (Eagle), two light 
cruisers (Manchester and Cairo), and one destroyer (Foresight); another carrier (In-
domitable), two light cruisers (Nigeria and Kenya), and one destroyer were put out 
of commission for a considerable time. Some 350 men had lost their lives. The Fleet 
Air Arm had lost thirteen aircraft in combat, plus sixteen others sunk with Eagle.322 
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The RAF had lost five. The enemy losses were thirty-five aircraft, including two shot 
down over Malta.323 The Allies were unable to risk such losses in warships again 
anytime soon; they would not attempt another large convoy operation to resupply 
Malta until November 1942.324
For their part, as of August 16 the Germans estimated that the enemy had com-
mitted forty-one ships for the defense and protection of the convoy from August 12 
through the 15th: three carriers, two battleships, five cruisers, twenty-six destroy-
ers, one submarine, and four corvettes. They considered that of the enemy order of 
battle remaining on August 12, one carrier (Eagle) and one cruiser (Manchester) had 
been sunk.325 The next day the Germans concluded the enemy convoy had consisted 
of twelve merchant ships, including at least one tanker, had sailed from Greenock, 
Scotland, and was bound to Malta. They correctly assessed that each ship was load-
ed with gasoline, petroleum, cooking oil, ammunition, and soup and other food. 
The convoy did not include any U.S. carriers, they noted, but an American unit had 
taken part in the night battle off Kélibia. The French confirmed from prisoners that 
the convoy had consisted of twelve ships, not twenty-one, as B-Dienst had thought 
at one point.326 
The Germans estimated enemy losses as at least seven warships and sixteen 
merchant ships, one transport, and one tanker, for a total of twenty-five units. The 
merchant ship tonnage destroyed was 180,000 BRT (the average size of the ships 
being eleven thousand BRT).327 Specifically, they claimed to have sunk the carrier 
Eagle, the cruisers Manchester and Cairo, and a destroyer.328 They estimated that the 
enemy had also lost three other destroyers and other units were variously damaged. 
The enemy had lost—for certain, it was assessed—nine freighters and probably 
more, up to sixteen.329 The Germans believed that thirty-nine enemy ships (three 
carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, plus eight other units 
of unknown class, probably destroyers) had returned to Gibraltar.330
Nevertheless, despite these successes, the Germans concluded, with reason, that 
the outcome of the operation was unsatisfactory. The enemy had succeeded in get-
ting four freighters and one tanker to Malta. The Germans also presumed (cor-
rectly) that cargo had been distributed among the freighters in such a way that if 
any of them reached Malta, the island would be supplied with some of everything it 
needed. The arrival of even so few freighters would have prolonged its survival for 
several weeks, enabling the enemy to interfere seriously with Axis supplies during 
the decisive phase of the struggle in North Africa.331
The Axis forces, then, did not accomplish their stated operational objective. 
They had achieved, however, a great tactical victory. German and Italian aircraft 
carried out twenty-nine attacks, all but two against ships at sea; of the total attacks, 
Italian aircraft conducted eleven. Axis aircraft sank the destroyer Foresight and four 
merchant ships and damaged the carrier Indomitable and three merchant vessels. A 
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single German U-boat sank one large aircraft carrier, Eagle. Italian submarines sank 
the light cruiser Cairo and two merchant ships (one of them in cooperation with 
aircraft). Italian submarines also damaged two light cruisers (Nigeria and Kenya) and 
one merchant ship. An Italian submarine and German bombers heavily damaged 
the tanker Ohio.332 Especially noteworthy were the successes achieved by the Italian 
MSs/MASs, which sank the light cruiser Manchester and three merchant ships and 
damaged one merchant ship.333 
On the other side, Allied submarines heavily damaged one heavy and one light 
Italian cruiser (Bolzano and Muzio Attendolo, respectively); neither put to sea again. 
The Axis lost forty-two aircraft.334 Allied destroyers sank two Italian submarines 
(Cobalto and Dagabur), and aircraft damaged another, Giada.335
Despite the heavy losses suffered, PEDESTAL was a clear operational success for the 
Allies. About thirty-two thousand tons of supplies arrived safely, allowing Malta to 
carry on for another ten weeks. By August 22 all cargo had been unloaded from the 
five surviving ships, as well as the fifteen thousand tons of fuel Ohio had carried. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Axis aircraft did not attempt to interfere with the unload-
ing.336 Moreover, while PEDESTAL was in progress three Allied submarines carried 
ammunition, torpedoes, and aviation fuel from the east to Malta. These supply 
trips continued in September and October 1942.337
Taken altogether, these supplies allowed Allied submarines and aircraft to in-
tensify their attacks on the Axis supply lines to North Africa in the critical period 
of the campaign there. The Allies were able to obtain air superiority over Malta 
and thereby dramatically change in their favor the situation in the central Medi-
terranean.338 During September 1942, the Allies sank more than a hundred thou-
sand tons of enemy supplies destined for North Africa. By mid-October the Africa 
Corps had only three days’ supply in reserve instead of the minimum fifteen days’ 
worth prescribed for starting an offensive. In November 1942, Field Marshal Rom-
mel lost the battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 11, 1942)—and the tide 
of war in North Africa turned in favor of the Allies.339
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
Operation PEDESTAL took place at a time when Allied fortunes in the Mediterra-
nean were at their nadir. The island of Malta was close to being unable to serve as 
the air and submarine base for Allied efforts against the Axis forces in North Afri-
ca. While the Axis forces on the ground had been forced to stop their advance after 
the inconclusive first battle of El Alamein, they were still within striking distance 
of the Nile valley. They were preparing to resume their advance and seize Egypt as 
soon as they had sufficient reserves of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. For 
the Allies, it was vital that Malta remain in their hands; otherwise, they knew, the 
Axis would, by seizing Egypt, radically improve its position in the Middle East. The 
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operational decision to run a major resupply operation to Malta, accordingly, was 
made by the strategic leadership in London, not by the Admiralty or the fleet com-
manders in the theater.
In making a decision, the operational commander always should carefully weigh 
the potential risks versus the benefits of a pending major operation in terms of its 
effect on the campaign as a whole. Potential losses might be prohibitive, yet in some 
situations taking such a high risk can be prudent if the outcome would gain valuable 
time for the campaign as a whole.
The strategic leadership normally should not make decisions that rightfully belong 
to the operational or tactical commanders. An exception is when the strategic situa-
tion is so serious that failure to take decisive action might have a major impact on the 
course, or even the outcome, of the war in a theater. Then, only the strategic leadership 
can ensure that adequate forces are or become available to accomplish the ultimate 
objective.
In the summer of 1942, the Allied command organization in the Mediterranean 
was highly fragmented. No single commander had the authority and responsibil-
ity to conduct the planning and employment of all three services. The basic plan 
for the Malta resupply operation was prepared in London; plans in support of the 
operation were then prepared by the respective service component commanders 
in the Mediterranean. These headquarters were separated by long distances. The 
mission’s success depended almost entirely on cooperation among the services, but 
strong parochialism made that very difficult to achieve. Even though Malta’s sur-
vival was vital to its own campaign in North Africa, the British army was unwilling 
to support the operation with a diversionary attack.
The Axis command organization in the Mediterranean lacked unity not only 
of command but also of effort. The Germans and Italians had separate command 
structures and prepared plans separately. The German theater structure itself was 
also highly fragmented. Kesselring was nominally in command of the entire south-
ern theater, but he did not control the Axis campaign in North Africa or, even de 
facto, the employment of German naval forces. The Italian command organization 
was made chaotic by overlaps of responsibility and authority. Also, the higher na-
val authorities constantly interfered with the decisions and actions of subordinate 
tactical commanders.
In a sound theater organization, a single operational commander has full (at least 
operational) command over and control of the assigned multiservice and multina-
tional forces. The chain of command should be simple and straightforward, with ide-
ally no overlap of authority and responsibility among command echelons. Sound lines 
of authority and responsibilities are simple and clear at all levels of command, but 
especially at the operational and theater-strategic levels. Unity of effort is best en-
sured by appointing the same commander for both planning and execution. Service 
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parochialism is one of the major impediments to the necessary cooperation in the 
drafting of plans for major operations or campaigns and one of the major causes of 
duplication of effort, which wastes sorely needed resources and time.
The Allies’ single greatest advantage was their ability to intercept and decode 
German ENIGMA messages in a timely fashion. Allied commanders thereby ob-
tained generally accurate and detailed knowledge of the enemy’s plans, actions, 
and pending reactions. The Allies possessed excellent knowledge of the strength 
and the planned movements of Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean. They also 
had reliable knowledge of the strength and movement of Italian submarines and 
surface forces. However, their assessment of German U-boat strength was faulty. 
For its part, the Axis had only limited capability to intercept and decode enemy ra-
dio messages. Its commanders relied mostly on air reconnaissance and submarine 
reports for the location, composition, and movements of an enemy force. Yet they 
also had a solid network of agents in the Gibraltar area and in Ceuta and some in 
the Suez Canal zone.
The ability to obtain accurate, reliable, timely, and relevant information on the en-
emy order of battle, plans, intentions, and movements is of inestimable value in the 
planning and execution of a major operation or campaign. However, the importance of 
good intelligence should not be overestimated. Having what is today called “information 
dominance” is only one among many factors involved in making a sound decision, often 
not even the most important one. Much more important are commanders’ experience 
and character and the soundness of their judgment. Also, an operational commander 
might make a sound decision but still suffer a setback or even defeat at the hands of a 
weaker opponent who acts faster, not having waited for perfect knowledge of the situ-
ation. In some situations, the weaker side can succeed without knowledge of the stron-
ger side’s plans and intentions by virtue of a much more favorable geographic position, 
qualitative superiority, or faster and more determined action.
Planning for PEDESTAL was sound and thorough. A major problem that it faced 
was finding enough freighters given the simultaneous Allied commitments to sup-
ply the Soviet Union. Another problem was assembling a powerful force for distant 
cover and support and direct screen of the convoy; commitments in British home 
waters and the Indian Ocean stretched naval resources to the limit. The Allies had 
learned, however, the proper lessons from the failure of the dual convoy opera-
tion in June 1942, and they applied them to the PEDESTAL plan. Geographically, the 
configuration of the western and central Mediterranean was a major and negative 
planning factor in PEDESTAL. The long distance from Gibraltar to Malta vis-à-vis 
the proximity of the Axis airfields dictated the types and numbers of forces avail-
able for support and their employment in combat.
It probably would have been wiser not to conduct the ferrying operation simul-
taneously with the resupply effort. Air reinforcements to Malta could have been 
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sent instead either before or shortly after PEDESTAL. Also, destroyers for the carrier 
Furious would have greatly strengthened the air and antisubmarine defenses of the 
convoy, Force Z, or Force X. 
In planning a major operation, the commander should avoid adding tasks unre-
lated to the accomplishment of the ultimate operational objective. Additional tasks 
not only unnecessarily complicate the basic plan but also reduce the forces available 
to accomplish the main objective. Additional tasks also usually require more time 
and thereby may considerably complicate or even endanger the outcome of a major 
operation.
The Allied feint in the eastern Mediterranean was poorly conceived: the real 
objectives of the pending operation were simply obvious to the enemy. In addi-
tion, the forces assigned to the feint were too small in themselves to compel the 
Germans and Italians to draw forces from the western and central Mediterranean. 
Only a viable threat of an Allied invasion of Crete or mainland Greece would have 
forced the enemy to react operationally, let alone strategically. It is quite possible, 
however, that a sizable diversionary attack by the British army in the Libyan Desert 
might have forced the Germans and Italians to divert land-based aircraft from the 
attack on Force F.
A major operation is likely to be more successful if the planners also prepare a 
plausible operational deception plan. Feints, demonstrations, or ruses should be con-
ducted not in isolation from but, without exception, integrally with such a plan. A 
feint or operational deception is unlikely to succeed if the objective is unmistakable. 
In any case, forces assigned to operational deception should pose in themselves such 
a threat as to lead the enemy to react operationally or even strategically, not merely 
tactically.
Lacking good prior intelligence on the movements of enemy forces, the Axis 
leaders could not make their plans until mid-August, largely in response to enemy 
actions. Nevertheless, their plans for the employment were solidly based. The Axis 
partners commanded an extremely favorable geographic position. A large number 
of Italian airfields and naval bases flanked the route of enemy convoy in the west-
ern and central basins; Axis aircraft and surface forces based on Sardinia and Sicily 
operated from exterior positions but along short lines. The single major error on 
the German side was Kesselring’s decision not to provide strong air cover for the 
Italian heavy surface forces.
Lack of adequate air strength on Malta greatly complicated the Allied challenges. 
The Allies did not have enough heavy bombers on Malta to inflict substantial dam-
age on the air bases on Sicily and Sardinia. They also lacked fighters to assure the 
safety of the convoy once it came within range. The Germans and Italians, in con-
trast, had a large number of land-based aircraft available for attack as well as sup-
port. The Germans also were able to redeploy from Crete to Sicily. Yet despite the 
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large number of aircraft overall, the Axis lacked sufficient fighters to escort bomb-
ers and also cover surface ships. As for the Italians, lack of fuel essentially immobi-
lized their battleships. They were, however, able to assemble a considerable number 
of submarines, while the Germans had only two U-boats.
Both the German and Italian pilots showed a great deal of determination, skill, 
and courage in their repeated attacks against the convoy and its supporting forces. 
The Italian submarines and the U-boats achieved great success against both surface 
ships and merchant vessels. Most striking was the effectiveness of the Italian and 
German torpedo boats against the scattered convoy on the night of August 12/13. 
Yet the Germans and Italians made a major mistake in deciding to focus on the 
enemy’s undamaged ships. This most likely is why Ohio reached Malta. The Italian 
decision to cancel the planned heavy surface force attack on the remnants of the 
convoy also was a great mistake probably costing the Axis a tactical, even opera-
tional, success.
Warfare in a typical narrow (enclosed or semienclosed) sea differs considerably 
from that on the open ocean or in littorals bordering the open ocean. Land-based 
aviation is a formidable threat to surface ships operating in a narrow sea. Success in 
a narrow sea cannot be ensured without an adequate degree of air superiority within 
the given area of operations. Also, in narrow seas a weaker side can inflict substantial 
losses on a stronger opponent by skillful use of favorable geographic position, subma-
rines, small surface combatants, and mines.
The Allies enjoyed an almost uninterrupted stream of decoded ENIGMA mes-
sages and from them unprecedented knowledge and understanding of the enemy 
situation, plans, and pending actions. The Allied commanders knew the German 
intentions and orders of the day. Further, and despite the great odds against them, 
Allied aviators and sailors displayed a superb fighting spirit—especially the mer-
chant mariners. One of the major errors on the Allied side was the decision, based 
on false assumptions, to turn Force Z westward; heavy Allied losses resulted. Op-
eration MG 3 failed to make any impression on the Axis commanders. This is no 
surprise, because Allied planners had based the entire effort on a faulty premise: 
the operation represented a waste of time and resources.
The Axis commanders had a reasonably accurate picture of the situation in the 
western Mediterranean once the enemy convoy transited the Strait of Gibraltar. 
Most of their intelligence came from reconnaissance aircraft. Nonetheless, the Ger-
mans and Italians formed an exaggerated impression of the true capabilities of the 
Allied force that entered the Mediterranean. The probable reason was the sheer size 
of the surface force assigned to support the convoy.
With their almost total destruction of the enemy convoy to Malta, the Germans 
and Italians achieved a major tactical victory; however, they failed to gain opera-
tional success, because they did not destroy the last five Allied merchant ships. 
Those ships alone brought enough supplies to Malta to enable it to survive for 
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III The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno
January 22–March 4, 1944 (Operation SHINGLE)
The Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on January 22, 1944, Op-eration SHINGLE, began a major offensive joint/combined operation. For the Germans, it necessitated a major anti-amphibious operation. Despite 
Allied superiority in the air and at sea, the Germans were able to bring up large 
forces quickly and seal the beachhead. The two sides suffered almost equal losses 
during some four months of fighting. The Allied forces on the beachhead were un-
able to break out or to capture the critically important Colli Laziali (Alban Hills), 
which dominated the two main supply routes to the German forces on the Gustav 
Line, until the main Fifth Army advanced close to the beachhead. Only the naval 
part of the operation was planned and executed excellently.
The decision to launch Operation SHINGLE primarily was made on the basis of 
political and strategic, not operational, considerations. Ironically, the Allied po-
litical leaders—Winston S. Churchill in particular but other high-ranking, opera-
tional commanders as well—grossly underestimated the Germans’ will to fight and 
their war-fighting capabilities. Another major reason for the failure of Operation 
SHINGLE was very poor leadership by the Allied operational commanders. In retro-
spect, on the basis of the true situation at the time, SHINGLE should not have been 
planned, let alone executed. It never had a realistic chance of success. It was a vast 
gamble that ultimately failed.
STRATEGIC SETTING
In the spring of 1943, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean was highly fa-
vorable to the Western Allies. The campaign in North Africa had ended with the 
surrender of the German-Italian forces in Tunisia on May 12. At a conference in 
Washington, DC, May 12–27 (TRIDENT), the highest Allied leaders had confirmed 
their decision to seize Sicily next (Operation HUSKY). The Combined Chiefs of 
Staff (CCS) directed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been Supreme Com-
mander Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, to prepare options for 
continuing the war in southern Europe after capturing Sicily.1
Eisenhower’s staff considered three such options. One envisaged the capture 
of Sardinia and Corsica, followed by a descent on southern France; the greatest 
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advantage of this option was that it would support the main, upcoming effort in 
Normandy. The second option, which the British favored, contemplated a thrust 
through Italy to support guerrillas in the Balkans and to bring Turkey into the 
war on the Allied side. The third was a landing in southern Italy, then an advance 
northward, using Italy as a logistical base and acquiring airfields for the long-range 
bombing of Germany and the Balkans. The general belief was that the latter option 
would force Italy out of the war, which would remove twenty-one Italian divisions 
from the Balkans and five from France. The Germans would be forced to take over 
the defense of the Italian Peninsula, weakening their forces in Western Europe.2
The Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, fell from power on July 25, 1943, after 
the Fascist Grand Council passed a vote of no confidence. Shortly afterward, the 
Italian king, Vittorio Emanuele III, appointed Marshal Pietro Badoglio as the new 
prime minister. Hitler wasted no time in reacting to the new developments in Italy. 
On July 26, he directed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to “assemble troops in the 
Alps and prepare for a possible entry into Italy.”3 On July 30, Rommel gave these 
troops orders to cross the Italo-German frontier and seize the Alpine passes, under 
the pretext of securing supply routes. The Italians protested, but they did not want 
an open clash with the Germans. The Germans then moved into northern Italy, 
explaining that this would permit the Italians to concentrate more of their forces to 
defend southern Italy.4 By early September, eight German divisions had moved into 
northern Italy, where they eventually supported other German forces stationed in 
the south. The 2nd Parachute Division (ParaDiv) was moved from France to Ostia, 
near Rome—as, so the Germans informed the Italians, a reinforcement for the Axis 
forces in Sicily. After the successful evacuation of the German forces in Sicily across 
the Strait of Messina in mid-August, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, CINC South, 
organized four severely depleted German divisions into a new Tenth Army.5
The relative ease of the victory on Sicily convinced the British that the Allies 
should now assume higher risks and invade Italy’s mainland, to drive the country 
out of the war. The first step, the British argued, should be the capture of Naples, 
then Rome. American planners hesitated to embark on such a course of action. 
They were much concerned (correctly, as it turned out) that an invasion of the 
Italian mainland would lead to a long and indecisive peninsular campaign. It also 
probably would require additional resources and thereby impede the buildup of 
Allied forces for the planned Normandy invasion (Operation OVERLORD).6
On September 3, 1943, in Cassibile, Sicily, the Allies signed an armistice with 
the Italian government. It was kept secret until September 8, when Italy’s surrender 
was formally announced.7 However, the Germans had anticipated that the Italians 
would change sides and had prepared Case AXIS (ACHSE) (formerly ALARIC) for such 
an eventuality. Shortly after September 8, German forces moved rapidly to disarm 
their erstwhile allies in Italy, France, the Balkans, and the Aegean Islands. On the 
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12th, German paratroopers raided Gran Sasso (Operation EICHE/OAK) and liber-
ated Mussolini from captivity. Afterward, Mussolini established the so-called Ital-
ian Social Republic—in effect a German puppet state—in the northern part of Italy.
On September 3, the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina and 
landed in Reggio di Calabria (Operation BAYTOWN). Six days later, the Allies car-
ried out a large amphibious landing in the Bay of Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE). 
The invading force was composed of the U.S. Fifth Army, commanded by Mark W. 
Clark and comprising the U.S. VI Corps and the British 10 Corps. It was transport-
ed in some 450 ships.8 The majority of the invading force had assembled at bases in 
North Africa and made a “shore-to-shore” assault. All the Allied landing craft and 
smaller escort vessels had to be refueled on their way from the North African ports 
and hence were staged through two ports on Sicily’s north coast.9
The enemy landing did not surprise Field Marshal Kesselring.10 He ordered an 
all-out effort to throw the enemy force back into the sea. When that attempt failed 
on September 15–16, Kesselring ordered a delaying defense and an orderly with-
drawal. The battle for Salerno was costly for both sides: German casualties were esti-
mated at 3,500 men; American losses were also about 3,500, the British some 5,500.11
After landing at Salerno, the U.S. Fifth Army advanced along the west coast to 
Naples, while the British Eighth Army moved up the east coast. By the end of Sep-
tember, the Fifth Army had reached the Volturno River. Naples was liberated on 
October 1, its port virtually destroyed.12 The Allies had bombed the city, but German 
demolition teams had inflicted most of the damage, destroying all communications, 
transportation, water, and power-grid infrastructure.13 The British Eighth Army 
seized the Foggia airfield complex intact on September 29; Allied heavy bombers 
later used these airfields.14 The Eighth Army outflanked German positions by an 
amphibious landing at Termoli. Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery paused to reorganize 
and resupply his forces, after which his Eighth Army crossed the Biferno River on 
October 3.15 By that time, and despite a considerable numerical superiority on the 
ground, at sea, and in the air, the Allies had suffered over twelve thousand casualties 
(two thousand killed, seven thousand wounded, 3,500 missing).16 
The German Tenth Army’s stubborn delaying defense of southern Italy con-
vinced Adolf Hitler not to abandon Italy. On October 4, he decided that a stand 
would be made south of Rome. At that time, the Germans had only eight divisions 
of the Tenth Army in the southern part of Italy. In northern Italy, there were nine 
divisions of Army Group B. By the end of October three of these were to leave for 
the Eastern Front, two for southern Italy. Two other divisions would arrive from 
southern France.17 Kesselring was directed to continue the delaying defense as far 
back as the Gaeta–Ortona line.18
The Germans hurriedly constructed several successive defense lines across the 
Italian Peninsula.19 The first, the Victor Line, stretched from Termoli in the east to 
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the Biferno and along it through the Apennine Mountains to the Volturno River in 
the west. Behind that line was the Barbara Line, a series of fortified hilltops extending 
from Colli al Volturno along the Trigno River to the Adriatic coast.20 On the 12th, 
Kesselring ordered the withdrawal of German forces to the Barbara Line. By mid-
October, the German defensive line ran along the Volturno and Trigno Rivers.21
The U.S. Fifth Army breached the Barbara Line in early November. The 
Germans fell back to the Bernhardt (or Reinhard) Line, which had been es-
tablished some seventy-five miles south of Rome. It was a ninety-mile-long 
salient running over the massif of Monte Camino, enclosing the peak of Mon-
te Camino, Monte la Difensa, Monte la Remetanea, and Monte Maggiore. It 
consisted of gun pits, concrete bunkers, turreted machine-gun emplacements, 
barbed wire, and minefields.
By early November, Hitler and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht be-
lieved that it was unlikely that the enemy would use Italy as a springboard for in-
vading the Balkans. The German strategy in Italy remained what Hitler had stated 
in his directive of October 4, 1943: a protracted defense of the barriers across the 
Italian Peninsula.22 Kesselring was ready to do everything possible to defend the ap-
proaches to Rome. In mid-November, he had eleven German divisions in southern 
Italy versus twelve Allied.23
The Allies held an important conference in Cairo on November 22–26, 1943 
(SEXTANT). Prime Minister Churchill wanted the Allies to make a more determined 
effort in Italy. He argued that the Allied forces needed to reach the Po River by the 
spring of 1944, even if that meant weakening or delaying the Normandy invasion. 
In contrast, the Americans insisted that no new operations in the Mediterranean 
should be allowed to affect adversely any planned redeployments of Allied forces 
for the Normandy invasion. The Allies decided at Cairo to cancel a planned land-
ing on the Andaman Islands (Operation BUCCANEER), in the eastern Indian Ocean, 
and released its forces for other theaters. Adm. Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Com-
mander, South East Asia Command, was directed to send about half of his am-
phibious craft to the Mediterranean and England.24
At the Allied conference in Tehran on November 28–December 1, 1943 (EU-
REKA), the main topic was whether to focus on the planned invasion of Normandy 
or intensify Anglo-American efforts in the Mediterranean. Both President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and the Soviet dictator, Stalin, insisted on an attack across the English 
Channel, combined with a landing in southern France. Churchill agreed regarding 
southern France but insisted on a more determined effort in Italy. For him, it was of 
paramount importance that the Allies capture the Italian capital, Rome, by mount-
ing a large amphibious landing in its vicinity. Churchill also advocated intensified 
efforts to entice Turkey to enter the war against Germany. However, Roosevelt and 
Stalin were adamant that the focus remain on Normandy. A second conference in 
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Cairo, held December 4–6, confirmed the decision of the Tehran Conference that 
OVERLORD would be the most important Allied effort in 1944, that nothing was to 
be done elsewhere to endanger its success.25
By December 1, 1943, the Allied armies had reached the Bernhardt Line, defend-
ed by Tenth Army’s XIV Panzer Corps (PzCorps), commanded by Gen. Fridolin 
von Senger und Etterlin. The Bernhardt Line was a bulge in front of the more formi-
dable Gustav Line (protecting the approaches to Rome through the Liri Valley). The 
latter, eighty-four miles long and ten miles deep, consisted of a series of interlocking 
positions extending across the peninsula from just north of the mouth of the Gari-
gliano River on the Tyrrhenian Sea to the mouth of the Sangro River on the Adriatic. 
It centered on the town of Cassino, near which was a peak 1,700 feet high on top 
of which stood a sixth-century monastery. The Gustav Line’s positions consisted 
of deep underground bunkers, labyrinthine tunnels, machine-gun emplacements, 
antitank ditches, minefields, and concertina wire.26 The Todt Organization (Orga-
nisation Todt, or OT, a civil and military engineering organization named after its 
founder, Dr. Fritz Todt) pressed prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians into service 
to build it.27 Kesselring promised Hitler that his forces would hold the Gustav Line 
for at least six months.28 Behind the central part of the Gustav Line and about five 
miles north of it the Germans established the Hitler Line, based on strongpoints at 
Aquino and Piedimonte. This would be a fallback position (or “switch line”) if the 
Gustav Line was penetrated. In May 1944, the Hitler Line would be renamed the 
Senger Line (after Gen. Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin). The Bernhardt, Gustav, 
and Hitler/Senger Lines together constituted the “Winter Line.”
On November 20, the British Eighth Army opened an offensive with three divi-
sions on the Adriatic front. However, torrential rains stopped its attack for about 
a week. By December 2, the Eighth Army had resumed its offensive, but German 
resistance was slowing its progress. On December 27 Montgomery stopped his ad-
vance without achieving his objectives. On the Fifth Army front, the British 10 
Corps, deployed along the Garigliano River, carried out a demonstration aimed at 
drawing the German forces toward the coast. Afterward, it attacked in the direction 
of Monte Camino. On December 2–3, the U.S. II Corps attacked Monte Camino 
but took more than a week to secure this important position.29
By early December 1943, the Allies had fourteen divisions in southern Italy; two 
more were anticipated to arrive by the end of the month. The arrival of these units 
would make it possible to pull out VI Corps for the Anzio landing.30
Allied Theater Command Organization
The Allied command structure in the Mediterranean was highly fragmented. The 
various Allied headquarters in the theater were separated by long distances, making 
operational planning very difficult. The planning procedures of the British and the 
American staffs differed considerably. So too did the American and British views 
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on the degree of control the strategic leadership would grant to theater command-
ers and other high-level military leaders. In general, an American theater com-
mander had more independence in exercising his responsibilities than his British 
counterpart. The Americans interpreted CCS directives as guidance, not orders. In 
contrast, British theater commanders were controlled tightly by the British chiefs of 
staff, who in turn were strictly subordinate to their prime minister.31 This situation 
was made even more difficult by personal animosities between higher command-
ers, national differences, and the parochialism of services.
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was CINC, Allied Forces, North Africa until Decem-
ber 10, 1943, when his title changed to Allied CINC, Mediterranean Theater. The 
same day, the CCS directed consolidation of Allied major commands in the theater. 
All British forces in the Middle East were placed under Allied Forces Headquarters 
(AFHQ), commanded by General Eisenhower. A major problem in the new structure 
was the absence of a component commander for ground forces. Eisenhower’s deputy 
was a British general, Harold Alexander, who was also commander of the 15th Army 
Group, which was composed of the U.S. Fifth Army (General Clark) and the British 
Eighth Army (General Montgomery). Directly subordinate to Eisenhower were Gen. 
George S. Patton Jr., commander of the U.S. Seventh Army (in Sicily); Gen. Alphonse 
Juin, commander of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC); and Gen. Władysław 
Anders, commander of the Polish 2nd Corps.
The decision made at the Tehran and Cairo Conferences in December 1943 
to consider the Normandy landing the highest priority in 1944 led to several ma-
jor command changes in the Mediterranean theater. The most important was the 
departure of Eisenhower to become Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary 
Forces for the invasion of northwestern Europe. The CCS did not expect Eisen-
hower to leave the theater until after the capture of Rome, but he transferred his 
staff to London right away, believing the immediate prospects for taking Rome to 
be poor.32 On January 2, 1944, Eisenhower formally became Supreme Allied Com-
mander for the pending Normandy invasion.33 On the 8th he was replaced in the 
Mediterranean by a British general, Henry Maitland Wilson. (Wilson’s title was 
later changed to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.)34 A U.S. 
general, Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General European Theater of Operations, 
was appointed Alexander’s deputy. Devers also became Commander, North Af-
rican Theater of Operations, heading all U.S. forces in the Mediterranean.35 Gen-
eral Montgomery, of the Eighth Army, was chosen to lead an army group in the 
cross-Channel invasion; he was replaced by Lt. Gen. Oliver W. H. Leese on January 
1, 1944. (These command changes had originally been planned to go into effect 
in late December 1943.)36 On March 9, 1944, Alexander became Supreme Allied 
Commander, Mediterranean Theater. His 15th Army Group became on January 11 
the Allied Forces in Italy, seven days later the Allied Central Mediterranean Force, 
and then, on March 9, 1944, the Allied Armies in Italy.37
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The highest-ranking Allied air commander in the theater was British air chief 
marshal Arthur W. Tedder, Commander, Mediterranean Air Command (changed to 
the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, or MAAF, on December 10, 1943). In December 
1943 it was announced that Tedder would go to England and become Eisenhower’s 
deputy. He was replaced by Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker of the U.S. Army Air Forces.38 
The principal components of the theater’s Allied air forces were the Middle East 
Air Command (renamed Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East on Decem-
ber 10, 1943), the U.S. Ninth Air Force, and the Northwest African Air Forces. The 
latter consisted of the following (listed with designations before and after January 
1, 1944): Northwest African Strategic Air Force (Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air 
Force); Northwest African Coastal Air Force (Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air 
Force); Northwest African Tactical Air Force (Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air 
Force); Northwest African Troop Carrier Command (disbanded); Northwest African 
Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (Mediterranean Allied Photographic Recon-
naissance Wing); and Northwest African Air Service Command (disbanded).39
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Royal Navy, was Commander in 
Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. Directly subordinate to him were Commander in Chief, 
Levant and six flag officer commands (Gibraltar and Mediterranean Approaches, 
Western Mediterranean, Malta and Central Mediterranean, Levant and Eastern 
Mediterranean, Western Italy, and Tunisia), plus a number of type commands (e.g., 
Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers and Commodore Destroyers, Eastern Mediterra-
nean). When in October Admiral Cunningham was appointed First Sea Lord, he was 
relieved by another British admiral, John H. D. Cunningham (no relation).40
The most senior U.S. Navy officer in the Mediterranean was Vice Adm. H. Kent 
Hewitt, whose title had changed for each major amphibious landing operation, in-
cluding AVALANCHE. On September 16, 1943, Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry relieved 
Richard L. Conolly as Commander, Landing Craft and Base, North African Waters. 
Lowry also replaced Rear Adm. John L. Hall as Commander, VIII Amphibious 
Force, on November 8, 1943. 
German Theater Organization
Prior to the end of September 1943, Field Marshal Kesselring, as CINC South, had 
full command over all three services of the German armed forces deployed in the-
ater. However, just when the Germans most needed unified command in the Italian 
theater, Hitler ordered a drastic change that fragmented it severely.41 So in November, 
Naval Command, Italy (Deutsches Marinekommando Italien) and 2nd Air Fleet were 
resubordinated to their respective services and directed thereafter merely to cooper-
ate with Kesselring.42 As CINC South, Kesselring directly commanded eight divisions, 
mostly mechanized or panzer units. Some of these forces were newly arrived from 
North Africa and had not been brought back to full strength. All German ground 
units had been weakened considerably during the long withdrawal from Salerno.43
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On August 16, 1943, Field Marshal Rommel and his Army Group B were de-
ployed to the northern part of Italy. Rommel’s mission was to seize the threatened 
Genoa–Leghorn (Livorno)–Venice–Trento area and the Apennine crossing be-
tween Leghorn and Ancona. A larger mission was to pacify northern Italy, crush 
the insurgents in Istria and Slovenia, protect the lines of communication and 
coastal flanks of the theater, and organize the defense of northern Italy.44 Rommel’s 
headquarters (HQ) was established on the Lago di Garda, fifteen miles northwest 
of Verona. Army Group B’s thirteen divisions were mostly reorganized or reac-
tivated units from the Eastern Front—generally unsuitable, because of a lack of 
mobility, for combat in the southern part of Italy.45 Normally, Kesselring, as theater 
commander, should have been in control of both Army Group B and Tenth Army; 
in fact, however, he and Rommel were coequal, both directly subordinate to Hitler. 
On November 6, however, Kesselring was appointed CINC of a newly estab-
lished theater command, Oberbefehlshaber Südwest (Southwest), as well as com-
mander of Army Group C (formally established on the 21st). Army Group B was 
dissolved.46 Rommel was sent to strengthen the Atlantikwall (Atlantic Wall) de-
fenses in Western Europe against an anticipated large-scale invasion. Part of Rom-
mel’s staff was assigned to the headquarters of CINC Southwest, the rest to the 
newly created Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando) 14. Organization-
ally, this command was between an army group and an army corps, but it com-
monly was known as the “Fourteenth Army.” On November 21, 1943, Kesselring 
formally took over the entire Italian theater. Yet he did not command the navy or 
air force. However, Kesselring did have under his control the Luftwaffe’s paratroop 
units and administrative control over the Luftwaffe units deployed in his theater.47 
Those operating from Italy had been subordinated on June 10, 1940, to the Kom-
mandierender General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Italien, the Commanding Gen-
eral of the German Luftwaffe in Italy. (In 1941 this title was changed to General 
of the German Luftwaffe at the Supreme Command of the Royal Italian Air Force 
and in July 1944 to Commanding General of the German Luftwaffe, Central Italy, 
or Kommandierender General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Mittelitalien.) 
German Naval Command, Italy, with HQ at Levico Terme (after February 1944 
at Montecatini Terme), controlled surface forces and all other elements of the 
Kriegsmarine that were present. The exception was that the chief of naval trans-
port was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command of the Navy. In February 
1943, a special staff was created within the Italian Naval Ministry for the convoy-
ing service. After the fall of Tunisia in May 1943, this staff was merged with the 
German Naval Command, Italy. In November 1941, the newly created staff of the 
Commander, U-Boats, Italy (F.d.U. Italien) was incorporated into the German Na-
val Command, Italy, in Rome. In August 1943, this command was renamed Com-
mander, U-Boats, Mediterranean (F.d.U. Mittelmeer), with headquarters in Toulon, 
southern France. It was to be dissolved in September 1944.48 
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After the capitulation of Italy in September 1943, the Germans took over coastal 
defense in northern Italy. In late spring 1944, the major commands of the German 
Naval Command, Italy were the 7th Defense Division (HQ in Nervi); Sea Defense 
Commandant, Italian Riviera (La Spezia); and Sea Defense Commandant, Western 
Adriatic (Venice).49 
In January 1944, the most important command on the western coast of Italy 
was Naval Commander, Italian Coast (established in September 1943) at La Spezia, 
subordinate to German Naval Command, Italy. It encompassed four naval district 
commands: Genoa, La Spezia, Leghorn–Viareggio, and Civitavecchia. Naval Com-
mand, Istria, however, reported to CINC Southeast, in Salonika, Greece. Set up 
in September 1943 at Duino, near Monfalcone, its responsibility encompassed the 
area from the mouth of the Tagliamento River up to the island of Sušak, Croatia, 
including the islands of Cres and Lošinj. Other commands subordinate to German 
Naval Command, Italy were High Commander, Coastal Artillery, Italy (established 
in August 1943); Chief, German Naval Transport, Italy (Deutscher Seetransport, 
Italien); the naval arsenals in La Spezia, Pola, and Venice; and the naval artillery 
arsenal in Florence/Sangunetto (near Verona). 
Allied Operational Intelligence
The main sources of information of Allied intelligence were ULTRA intercepts, 
agents in German-occupied territory, German prisoners of war, air reconnaissance, 
and various modes of technical collection. Of these by far the most important for 
German orders of battle, locations and activities of forces, states of supply, and plans 
and intentions were the ULTRA decrypts from Bletchley Park. At this point, ULTRA 
analysts were reading two, sometimes three, messages from the Luftwaffe’s liaison 
officers (Flivo-Flug-Verbindungsoffiziere) almost every day. For example, ULTRA re-
vealed the timing of Kesselring’s successive withdrawals all the way back to the Gus-
tav Line. ULTRA also read the situation reports of the Tenth Army and Army Group 
B (and its successor the Fourteenth Army), as well as messages exchanged among 
Hitler, OKW, and Kesselring. Divisional reliefs and withdrawals rarely escaped the 
attention of the ULTRA analysts. The Allied decoders kept planners informed about 
the current state of and shortages in Axis fuel, ammunition, and rations.50 ULTRA 
revealed Hitler’s decision to appoint Kesselring CINC of all German forces in Italy 
(he became CINC South on November 21). It also intercepted on November 20 a 
message that OKW had sent to Kesselring on the 11th concerning how he intended 
to regroup his forces. The dissolution of Army Group B was confirmed when the 
newly created Fourteenth Army took control of all its divisions.51 On November 18, 
ULTRA indicated that Luftwaffe aircraft were reconnoitering the Naples area, prob-
ably, analysts assessed, to determine the status of landing craft in the bay. Another 
ULTRA message made clear that Kesselring had replaced some of the German divi-
sions along the Gustav Line opposite the Fifth Army. 
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In practice, the benefits of ULTRA could be mixed. For example, the Allies 
learned that Kesselring considered the 26th Panzer Division (PzDiv) and 29th 
Panzer-Grenadier Division (PzGrDiv, combining armor and mechanized infantry) 
ill-suited to positional combat in mountainous terrain (he probably also wanted a 
more mobile reserve in case the Allies landed on either of Italy’s coasts).52 But the 
Allies were unable to take advantage of the implied enemy weakness, because the 
message was only decoded on November 20, nine days after being intercepted; by 
then these two formations had been replaced by the 44th and 371st Infantry Divi-
sions (IDs). Still, this decrypt had value in that it gave the Allies some inkling of 
the forces they might encounter in an Anzio landing. Another ULTRA message on 
November 20 revealed that four German parachute divisions were being reconsti-
tuted in the vicinity of Rome. However, ULTRA was unable to disclose where these 
divisions were later deployed. These two messages seem to indicate that the Anzio 
landing might be more risky than decision makers assumed.53 
Taken together, however, these messages suggested that an Anzio landing might 
be more risky than Allied decision makers had assumed.54 On three occasions in 
December ULTRA decrypts described in detail the defensive works (e.g., guns em-
placed and mines laid) that would be faced, as well as estimated effectiveness of 
deliberate flooding. On December 27, Gen. Walter Warlimont, head of the OKW 
planning staff, declared to Kesselring that in view of the situation in both the East 
and West manpower had to be economized in Italy, so Kesselring’s watchword must 
be “build, build, and keep on building.”55
ULTRA messages generally (with some exceptions) were shared only within Al-
lied headquarters at the army level or higher. This meant that none of the Allied 
corps and division commanders received them. Moreover, even at the army level 
ULTRA reports were not known to many American planners. For example, only 
four persons within Fifth Army headquarters were authorized to read ULTRA inter-
cepts: General Clark; his chief of staff, Gen. Alfred Gruenther; the staff intelligence 
officer (G-2), Col. Edwin B. Howard; and the deputy G-2, a Major Riggs.56 The Fifth 
Army’s operations officer (G-3), Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann, was not authorized 
to know about ULTRA, but the 15th Army Group’s G-3, Brig. Gen. R. B. Mainwa-
ring, was. That put General Clark’s G-3 at a great disadvantage in discussions with 
General Alexander’s G-3.57
The Allied MAAF intelligence section focused on collecting information and 
disseminating it to subordinate commands in the form of digests, appreciations, 
and special reports. The air planners emphasized targeting for interdiction. Throughout 
the MAAF chain of command, however, top priority was given to photoreconnaissance, 
for determining the effectiveness of air strikes. ULTRA supported photoreconnaissance 
by pinpointing areas where photographs should be taken. Otherwise, Allied air 
planners were especially concerned about German air-surveillance radars and flak 
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units. B-17 heavy bombers were fitted with directional antennas and receivers to 
monitor the frequencies of the radars.58
British intelligence estimates generally were excellent. However, sometimes they 
were overly optimistic—to enhance troop morale.59 According to Clark, Brig. Terence 
Airey, the 15th Army Group’s intelligence officer responsible for German forces 
in northern Italy beyond the immediate battle area, estimated that if the Allied 
landing at Anzio was successful the Germans would attempt to seal off the beach-
head—and in so doing leave their strong position at Cassino. Airey’s expectation 
was that the Germans would then fight a delaying action northward past Rome, to 
where several German divisions then idle in southern France could be sent.60 Colo-
nel Howard, Fifth Army G-2, was skeptical. He suggested that the enemy would 
concentrate all available forces to defeat the landing and prevent the Allies from 
reaching the Alban Hills. In other words, a landing at Anzio would not lead the 
Germans to abandon their southern front. Clark wrote that he was fully aware of 
the enemy divisions outside of Italy and that they might be dragged into the battle 
but hoped “that [they] would not be.”61
In essence, the ULTRA decrypts showed how the Allied front line looked from 
the German side. They frequently revealed what the Germans knew about Allied 
forces and how they interpreted their own reconnaissance reports. For example, on 
January 10, 1944, ULTRA showed that Kesselring learned the previous day from a 
report sent on January 3 by the Abwehr (military intelligence) station chief in Paris 
that General Wilson was pushing preparations for landings on both coasts, with 
all forces available in the Mediterranean theater, to be expected around the 15th.62 
In the first three weeks of January 1944, ULTRA revealed that the Germans repeat-
edly had misinterpreted the movements of Allied naval vessels. For example, the 
Germans were apparently unconcerned by the disappearance of landing craft from 
Bizerte or by the presence of Allied carriers in the eastern Mediterranean—they 
thought the latter were carrying reinforcements of land-based aircraft.63
German Operational Intelligence 
Kesselring and his major subordinate commanders apparently had fairly accurate 
knowledge of the Allied forces positioned along the Gustav Line and in southern 
Italy. The Germans knew the approximate size and composition of enemy air and 
naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Their main sources of intelligence were 
radio intercepts by B-Dienst, Luftwaffe reconnaissance, and enemy POWs. Their 
greatest problem was that they did not have information on enemy plans and in-
tentions. Hence, they relied on patterns in past Allied actions to make assessments 
about the future.
Reliance on these sources—inadequate and limited in comparison to those of 
the Allies—meant that the Germans had only an approximate knowledge of the en-
emy’s forces and the availability of amphibious shipping. They also lacked precise 
information on preparations for amphibious landings, including possible beaches. 
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Most of the German air-reconnaissance reports pertained to enemy naval move-
ments in the western and central Mediterranean, with a focus on the sea area be-
tween Sicily and North Africa, and the port of Alexandria, Egypt. For example, 
during the night of January 8 a German reconnaissance aircraft reported an enemy 
battleship, two carriers, and five escorts north of Cape Bougarouni, near Skikda 
(Algeria). On January 11 at about 1520, a German aircraft sighted three enemy 
battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, and five destroyers some forty nautical miles 
north-northwest of Alexandria on a southeasterly course. About five nautical miles 
eastward were some twenty commercial ships. The Luftwaffe expressed caution 
about the reliability of that report: it had been sent by young and inexperienced 
airmen.64 On the evening of January 11, a German aircraft reported a large number 
of commercial vessels and landing craft between Sicily and southern Italy, as well 
as destroyer escorts in the Bay of Salerno.65 In its summary of the situation in the 
Mediterranean on December 31, 1943, Naval Group Command Southwest noted 
that the enemy had withdrawn about twelve tank landing ships (LSTs) from the 
Mediterranean but had moved in eighteen smaller tank landing craft (LCTs) from 
the Atlantic.66 
In the ten days prior to the landing at Anzio, German aircraft observed intense 
shipping traffic in the Naples area. For example, on January 13 they reported the 
presence of forty commercial vessels or “landing boats,” three probable cruisers, 
and five patrol boats twenty nautical miles west of Naples steaming northward.67 
At 2102 the same day, Luftwaffe aircraft sixty-five nautical miles northwest of Mes-
sina observed seven (probably commercial) ships and five patrol boats, also north-
bound. At 2135, near Palermo, aircraft sighted sixteen merchant ships and one es-
cort on a northeasterly course.68 At 1850 on January 13, some twenty nautical miles 
west of Naples, Luftwaffe aircraft sighted about forty ships (probably merchant 
ships but perhaps landing craft), three probable cruisers, and five patrol boats, all 
moving north. At 2100 the same day, the aircraft sighted seven probable merchant 
ships and one destroyer southwest of Naples on an east-northeasterly course (i.e., 
probably bound for Naples).69 On January 18, about three nautical miles southwest 
of the mouth of the Garigliano River, in the Gulf of Gaeta, German aircraft report-
ed four enemy destroyers firing at positions on land.70 At about 1810, about three 
miles southwest of that point, four enemy destroyers, one probable heavy unit, one 
destroyer, and a few small ships were sighted.71 At 1625 the next day, Luftwaffe air-
craft reported four probable destroyers in the western part of the Gulf of Gaeta and 
two transports in the eastern part.72 
ALLIED PRELIMINARY PLANS 
SHINGLE originated in concept as an amphibious landing in the German rear. The 
idea arose in October 1943, when it became obvious that the Germans would fight 
for the entire peninsula rather than quickly withdrawing to northern Italy. Their 
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stiffening resistance, combined with rough terrain, and poor weather had pro-
duced a stalemate, and Allied planners looked for a way to break it.73 The British 
successfully carried out a landing at Termoli, on Italy’s eastern coast, on October 
2–3. This raised hopes that the Allies might replicate that success on the western 
coast, thereby outflanking the Gustav Line.74
At a meeting at La Marsa, Tunisia, on October 9 Eisenhower and his senior 
commanders considered how to increase the tempo of the lagging campaign in 
Italy. General Alexander strongly advocated a landing behind the German right 
flank, as a part of the general offensive to seize Rome.75 He envisioned landing five 
divisions, an idea that never got traction, because it was clearly unrealistic: the Al-
lies had neither the troops nor the amphibious lift for so large an operation.76 But 
on October 26 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt, “I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander 
must have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what effect is pro-
duced on subsequent operations.” He thus was threatening Operation OVERLORD 
directly.77
Eisenhower approved Alexander’s idea for a landing south of the Tiber River 
(which passes through Rome) after the Fifth Army reached a position from which 
it could link up with the landing force within forty-eight hours.78 He also promised 
to press the CCS to retain enough LSTs in the Mediterranean for such a landing. At 
the Allied conference in Quebec on August 17–24, 1943 (QUADRANT), the decision 
had been made to redeploy immediately sixty-eight of the ninety LSTs in the Medi-
terranean to other theaters for operations scheduled for 1944.79 However, now the 
British wanted to retain fifty-six British and twelve American LSTs in the theater 
until December 15 and were looking for more troops for a divisional amphibious 
assault.80 The situation with LCTs was little better: out of 201 in the Mediterranean, 
some 120 were scheduled to leave for Britain and India. The remaining amphibious 
craft were all lighter-type ships, already operating continuously: ferrying, supply-
ing the Eighth Army in the Adriatic, and working ports on both Italian coasts.81 
So, mainly because of the paucity of landing ships, the earliest possible date for a 
landing was December 20. Alexander projected that lift capacity was required for 
23,000 men, 2,250 vehicles, and 1,200 tons of stores. This estimate included 1,300 
men per assault wave in assault landing craft (LCAs) and landing craft, vehicle, 
personnel (LCVPs).82
On November 3, Eisenhower met with his principal subordinates at Carthage, 
Tunisia, to confirm plans already tentatively agreed to. The Fifth Army could 
advance quickly a dozen miles through the Cassino line (the Gustav Line), then 
northward an additional twenty-five miles. When it reached the Frosinone area, 
Eisenhower would authorize an amphibious assault somewhere in the Rome vicin-
ity. Frosinone is about forty miles south of Rome, close enough that the main force 
of the Fifth Army could achieve a rapid linkup with the landing force.83 Eisenhower 
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believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the Germans held a line near Cassino to 
cover Rome and to support a retrograde movement. The German evacuations of 
Sardinia and Corsica seemed to indicate an intention to withdraw rapidly from 
southern and central Italy. In Eisenhower’s view, the Germans might well pull back 
all the way to the Pisa–Rimini line.84
By November 17, the 15th Army Group had completed plans for a two-phase 
offensive in southern Italy. The Eighth Army would attack as soon as the 20th. 
After seven to ten days, the Fifth Army would follow up with another attack. If op-
portune, an amphibious landing would be launched when the Fifth Army reached 
the Capistrano–Priverno–Ferentino line.85 Beaches near Anzio were chosen as the 
site.86 Originally, the landing was tentatively scheduled for December 20, 1943.87 
Fifth Army HQ established a planning staff at Caserta (twenty-three miles north 
of Naples), headed by its G-3.88 The staff studied possible landings south of the 
Volturno River; south of the Garigliano River, in the Mondragone area; in the Gulf 
of Gaeta, in the Sperlonga and Terracina areas; at Anzio; and at Civitavecchia.89 
Clark proposed landing a single division, reinforced to 24,000 troops and 2,700 ve-
hicles, some hundred miles behind the enemy rear, to “cling to a shingle” for about 
a week.90 He planned to use one of his best divisions, the U.S. 3rd ID. However, Maj. 
Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., its commander, protested, “You are going to destroy the 
best damned division in the United States Army. . . . [T]here will be no survivors.”91 
The controlling factor was the weather. The planners considered that a minimum 
of seven days would be necessary for loading, rehearsal, and approach. Because 
of the shortness of good weather in January and February, sustaining forces that 
landed ashore would be very difficult.92 
A possibility for a major amphibious operation appeared when the Fifth Army 
reached the Winter Line. Because of his limited number of troops, Clark did not 
think a landing was feasible; however, Alexander had just the opposite view.93 At a 
conference that Alexander organized in Bari on November 8, Alexander proposed 
to keep the LSTs after December 15 for an amphibious landing in support of the 
main offensive on Rome. In his view, an Allied force landing at Anzio, south of 
Rome, might threaten the enemy’s main supply lines to the Gustav Line; it might 
even, combined with a penetration of the Gustav Line, force the Germans to aban-
don their positions.94
On November 8, Alexander issued Operations Instruction Nr. 31, directing the 
Eighth Army to drive up the Adriatic coast to Chieti, then wheel west of Highway 
5 toward Rome (Phase I). The Fifth Army would advance up to the Liri-Sacco val-
ley and then to Frosinone (Phase II). The one-division amphibious landing south 
of Rome aimed at the Alban Hills would be carried out after the Fifth Army came 
within a supporting distance (Phase III).95 That landing might be combined with 
an airborne drop of one regimental combat team (RCT). Planning for Phase III 
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would be the responsibility of the Fifth Army HQ, assisted by a naval planning staff 
under Rear Admiral Lowry.96 At that time, only a single division could be detached 
from the main front; yet, because the Allies believed the Germans capable of a rapid 
buildup, a single-division landing clearly would fail unless the main front linked up 
with it within forty-eight hours of the landing.97
On November 24, Clark issued his Operations Instruction Nr. 11, in which he 
specified that the Fifth Army would resume its advance in several phases, with the 
main thrust toward the Liri Valley.98 It was essential to attack as soon as possible so 
that the army could support the amphibious landing prior to the withdrawal of the 
LSTs.99 Clark also believed that if the main Fifth Army could not reach a mutually 
supporting position within a week prior to the landing’s D-day, the entire operation 
would have to be either postponed or abandoned.100
As noted, the landing at Anzio originally was scheduled for December 20, 
1943.101 However, December was the worst time of the year for an amphibious land-
ing, because it was the peak month of the rainy season; January was little better. 
Rain and low clouds would hamper air operations and severely restrict the Allies’ 
ability to supply the landing force over the beaches. Only an estimated two out of 
seven days in January would be good for an amphibious landing. This meant that 
the entire operation would have to be completed within forty-eight hours.102
Lack of sufficient amphibious lift was a major and continuous problem for the 
prospective Anzio landing (which had acquired the code name Operation SHIN-
GLE). The original lift allocation by CINC, Mediterranean—forty-two LSTs, sixty 
infantry landing craft (LCIs), plus attendant support craft—was sufficient for only 
one reinforced division. Clark wanted to add the 1st Armored Division (ArmdDiv) 
to the landing force. However, he was unable to do that, because of the shortage 
of amphibious shipping.103 The Fifth Army staff, especially its logistics officer (G-
4), estimated the need as forty-two LSTs (including seventeen, vice the allocated 
ten, equipped with six davits apiece), thirty-five operating and fifteen supply LCTs, 
and 250 DUKW amphibious vehicles to carry artillery pieces.104 This would pro-
vide lift for about 24,600 men and 2,700 vehicles. The additional seven six-davit 
LSTs would be necessary to provide more LCAs or LCVPs for the assault wave; the 
beaches were too shallow for larger landing ships. The Navy was able to assign the 
additional LSTs. Nevertheless, conflicting Army space requirements continued to 
be a major problem.105
At the SEXTANT conference in Cairo, Eisenhower suggested that the proposed 
landing at Anzio be carried out as planned. He still expected that the Fifth Army 
would capture Frosinone in mid-December. Although the conference as a whole 
did not actually endorse the operation, the general assumption was that it would be 
executed once the Eighth Army and the main Fifth Army broke through the Gustav 
Line and advanced northward as planned.106
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First Outline Plan
An outline plan for the Anzio landing was issued on November 25. The Navy con-
sidered that fifteen days were required for preparation and that five days should be 
allowed for the possibility of bad weather. This meant that the decision on whether 
to launch Operation SHINGLE would have to be made by December 20.107 The plan 
called for the amphibious landing east of Anzio to be executed after the main Fifth 
Army reached the Capistrano–Ferentino–Priverno line. The landing force would 
link up with it within seven days after landing and then attack the Alban Hills.108 
The assault plan assigned the assault to the U.S. 3rd ID, reinforced by a tank bat-
talion and a tank-destroyer battalion, plus light antiaircraft battalions.109
To achieve surprise, there would be no preliminary shore bombardment. In-
stead, two Ranger battalions would land near Anzio before H-hour on December 
20 and move to Anzio to take out coastal defenses. However, the distance was too 
great, and the plan was modified later to land the Rangers in Anzio itself. The 504th 
Parachute Regimental Combat Team (ParaRCT) would be dropped along the main 
road leading inland from Anzio to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching 
the beaches. The Allied planners estimated that the Germans had 27,500 men in 
the Rome area and that these forces could be reinforced with one division from 
near Sezze (east-northeast of Anzio) and perhaps two more from northern Italy.110 
Before daylight on the 20th, 3rd ID would land with seven days’ supplies but no 
follow-up forces. It would hold the beachhead until the main Fifth Army reached 
Frosinone, then join in the advance on Rome.111
The main Fifth Army offensive against the Gustav Line started on December 1. 
Monte Camino was captured, but progress into the Liri Valley was slow. To clear 
the way to Cassino it would be necessary to break through the Mignano Gap, a nar-
row pass.112 Yet even after ten days of fighting, Fifth Army had failed to reach either 
Monte Cassino or Frosinone.113 The British Eighth Army, on the Adriatic front, also 
bogged down.114 In his memoirs, Truscott would write that “a worse plan would be 
difficult to conceive.” The plan envisaged not a sector of main effort but instead “a 
simultaneous attack across the entire front with the same worn divisions. No over-
whelming air support was provided.”115 
Because of the lack of success in breaking through the Gustav Line, Clark pro-
posed on December 10 that the landing at Anzio not be tied to the advance of the 
main Fifth Army.116 He suggested instead that the landing force dig in, consolidate 
the beachhead, and wait for it. But that would require a much larger landing force 
than previously and would place much greater demands on lift, support, and sus-
tainment. The landing at Anzio would essentially become an independent major 
operation. In any case, meeting the original schedule of December 20 for the Anzio 
landing was impossible; he projected that the earliest Fifth Army could reach Frosi-
none was January 10, 1944.117 This delay would complicate the matter of amphibious 
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shipping. When the LSTs needed for the buildup on Corsica in preparation for the 
invasion of southern France had detached, there would be only thirty-seven on 
hand, not the forty-two Fifth Army’s staff considered necessary.118 Hence, on De-
cember 18, Clark recommended that Alexander cancel the landing at Anzio; four 
days later, Alexander did so.119 The Fifth Army planning staff was reduced, and 3rd 
ID, earmarked for the Anzio landing, recalled its planning personnel to prepare for 
its employment on the main front.120
The Plan Is Revived
But by the end of the month the operation had been unexpectedly brought back on 
the table, and in an equally unexpected way. The major command changes in the 
Mediterranean theater had an immediate and significant effect on Allied strategy. 
Until then, Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, had essen-
tially made the strategic decisions for that theater, through Eisenhower. However, 
when Eisenhower moved to England, Marshall’s influence in the Mediterranean 
was weakened greatly. The British Chief of Staff, Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, de facto 
assumed the primary planning responsibility there. As a result, Churchill began to 
play a greater role in formulating strategy for the Mediterranean.121
Consequently, political-strategic, not operational, considerations were most im-
portant in the final decision to conduct a landing at Anzio.122 Churchill was both 
physically and mentally exhausted after the Cairo Conference. Leaving Cairo by 
plane on December 11, he had planned to stop at Eisenhower’s headquarters in 
Tunis, then visit Alexander and Montgomery in Italy. However, Churchill fell seri-
ously ill for about a week and spent several weeks thereafter recuperating. This gave 
him ample time to review the results of the Cairo and Tehran Conferences and the 
reasons for his inability to persuade Roosevelt to focus Allied efforts on the eastern 
Mediterranean.123 
Churchill was in particular very dissatisfied with the progress of the war in Italy. 
On December 19 he wrote to the British chiefs of staff that “the total neglect to 
provide amphibious action on the Adriatic side and the failure to strike any similar 
blow on the west have been disastrous. None of the landing craft in the Mediter-
ranean have been put to the slightest use for three months. Neither coming home 
in preparation for OVERLORD nor in the Italian battle. There are few instances even 
in this war, of such valuable assets being so completely wasted.”124 
On December 22, Churchill received a positive response from the British chiefs 
of staff: they agreed that “the stagnation in Italy cannot be allowed to continue and 
that an amphibious landing should be used to strike around the enemy flank and 
open up the way for a rapid advance to Rome.” They suggested that if more landing 
craft were made available for a landing at Anzio, a larger force could be put ashore, 
and long before the main Fifth Army reached Frosinone. Doing so would have a 
far-reaching effect on the progress of the campaign and likely open the way for a 
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rapid advance. This statement captured Churchill’s imagination. It gave him what 
he believed to be an achievable objective. He was now convinced that SHINGLE was 
the answer to the stalemate on the Italian front.125 Churchill greatly exaggerated the 
stakes, however, writing that “if Rome were not captured, the world would ‘regard 
our campaign as a failure.’ . . . [W]hoever holds Rome holds the title deeds of Italy.” 
He wrote to Clark that without Rome the campaign would “peter out ingloriously.”126
At the end of December, indeed, the operational situation in southern Italy was 
not very favorable for the Allies. The front line extended from the east banks of the 
Sangro River in the east to the Garigliano River and the Gulf of Gaeta in the west. 
Eighth Army had failed to reach the Pescara–Popoli road. The main Fifth Army 
was unable to advance northward and seize the Liri Valley, the main avenue to 
Rome. Churchill and his senior commander in the Mediterranean theater agreed 
that the only way to break the stalemate was an amphibious landing to threaten the 
German supply routes to the right (western) flank of the Gustav Line.127
Churchill, though ill, convened and presided over a special conference at Tunis 
on Christmas Day. There he argued—overoptimistically—that a landing at Anzio 
would cause the Germans to withdraw forces from central and southern Italy and 
thereby hasten the liberation of Rome. Eisenhower disagreed but was overruled.128 
Churchill’s subordinates were unwilling to challenge his strongly held views—he 
had pneumonia, and he already had made up his mind.
Thus, it was Churchill who ultimately made the decision to land at Anzio. Op-
posing and skeptical views did not receive proper hearings. Clark would write in 
his memoirs that Brig. Kenneth W. D. Strong, the British G-2 at AFHQ and thus 
Eisenhower’s intelligence officer, was dubious. Strong was well aware of the po-
litical importance of Rome to Hitler. He also knew that the German divisions in 
France and Yugoslavia were not busy during the winter months and so could be 
moved to Italy if needed. Churchill disregarded this view, believing the capture of 
Rome worth the risk.129 Not surprisingly, General Alexander deferred to his prime 
minister. Another factor in the decision to go ahead was the doubling of the origi-
nal size of the landing force by the addition of a British division.130
Even so, Churchill and his advisers were mistaken in believing that a two-division 
landing force plus some paratroopers could, by cutting off the German Tenth Army’s 
lines of communication, force it to withdraw from the front or at least immediately 
retreat.131 Underlying their error was their having allowed the size and composition 
of the landing force to be determined not by the objective to be accomplished but 
by the availability of troops and landing craft.132 The planned landing force clearly 
was inadequate to accomplish its stated objective.
On December 26, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that the Anzio landing would 
decide the battle for Rome and probably achieve the destruction of a substantial 
part of the German army. He asked Roosevelt to approve keeping the LSTs in place 
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for a few weeks. Two days later, Roosevelt replied favorably, agreeing to delay re-
deployment of fifty-eight LSTs scheduled for Operation OVERLORD.133 However, 
Roosevelt imposed conditions: that OVERLORD remain the paramount operation 
and that proposed landings on Rhodes and in the Aegean be sidetracked.134 He also 
stipulated that Anzio should not interfere with the air buildup on Corsica for the 
invasion of southern France (Operation ANVIL, later DRAGOON).135
Alexander assured Churchill by radio that “Clark and I are confident of great 
chance of pulling off something big if given the means.” He also suggested the pos-
sibility of landing VI Corps (i.e., part of it) south of Anzio, near the front line, 
which would eliminate the need for an extended resupply. In his view, one division 
followed by other forces could land and cut off Highway 7 (which paralleled the 
coast about ten miles inland and led to Rome) and perhaps make it possible to 
bypass Frosinone.136
Churchill’s idea of landing at Anzio was complicating the American plan to sup-
port the cross-Channel invasion with a landing in southern France. General Mar-
shall later recalled the struggle over the size, composition, and timing of ANVIL as 
“a bitter and unremitting fight with the British right up to the launching.”137 On 
January 6 Churchill tried to persuade General Brooke to visit him in Marrakesh, 
where the prime minister was still recovering: “We must get this SHINGLE business 
settled, especially in view of the repercussions of the new proposals about ANVIL 
which will certainly make the U.S. Chiefs of Staff Committee stare.”138
As it turned out, Brooke did not visit Marrakesh.139 However, on January 7 
Churchill presided at a conference there attended by Maitland Wilson, Alexander, 
Maj. Gen. (promoted to lieutenant general in January 1944) Walter Bedell Smith 
(Chief of Staff, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force), and Adm. An-
drew B. Cunningham. There a decision was made to move D-day for the Anzio 
landing ahead as much as possible, to gain time before the required redeployment 
of the LSTs to England. The aim was to give the LSTs time for at least two trips to 
Anzio, three if the weather was favorable, speeding up the transport of supplies and 
follow-up forces. On the second and final day of the conference, Alexander and 
Cunningham did most of the talking.140 Alexander was able to secure twenty-four 
LSTs until the end of February.141 Churchill was very happy with the results of the 
Marrakesh conference, wiring Roosevelt that “unanimous agreement for action as 
proposed was reached by the responsible officials of both countries and all ser-
vices.” Churchill left Marrakesh on January 14, having won his argument that the 
Anzio landing must be carried out.142
The Amphibious Objective Area
Anzio (Roman Antium) was selected as the amphibious objective because of its prox-
imity both to Rome and to the German front line (see map 11). Anzio is some thirty-
five miles southwest of Rome and was about sixty-two miles from the front, which 
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was then on the Garigliano River.143 Anzio itself was a small port, its harbor enclosed 
within a six-hundred-yard-long breakwater. Yet the port was still subject to consider-
able swell. Anzio’s harbor could provide anchorage for ships that drew no more than 
ten feet.144 About a mile and a half east is the small port of Nettuno. The two were 
connected by a good road, and both were linked to Rome by rail.145
North and east of Anzio (i.e., the south-facing shore of the point near Anzio), 
the coast is one of sandy, gently shelving beaches with long dunes above the high-
water mark. All these beaches are exposed.146 Farther southeast, all the beaches, 
with the exception of the northwesternmost, were too rocky, too small, or of too 
shallow a gradient for a landing (i.e., craft would ground too far out).147 No gradient 
was better than one foot in sixty: the average was 1 : 90, that on the west beach was 
1 : 120.148 
The coastal area extending from Fiumara Grande, northwest of Ostia, toward 
Anzio is low, almost flat, and sandy—full of dunes. The area immediately around 
Anzio is of moderate elevation, averaging two hundred feet in height, constitut-
ing a plateau that at the time was thickly wooded.149 The area immediately north 
(i.e., inland) of Anzio and Nettuno consisted of scrub timberland, bog, and rolling 
grazing land.150 There were also many ditches, up to fifty feet wide. The roads were 
generally good; however, tanks had difficulty moving during the rainy season. The 
terrain offered little cover from enemy fire except for some minor woods.151 
The area between Point Torre Astura, not quite ten miles south of Anzio, and 
the Tiber, about fifty miles north, and extending inland to the round, volcanic mass 
of the Alban Hills is generally a low plateau. It drops off to the south toward the 
Pontine Marshes and in the north rises sharply to the Alban Hills. The Alban Hills 
are some twelve miles southeast of Rome and fifteen miles north of Anzio. The 
dominant (but second highest) peak of the Alban Hills is the 3,114-foot Mount 
Cavo. The area is cut by several streams and drainage canals. The coastal plain 
is very swampy in spots, especially during the rainy season.152 The larger coastal 
plain, stretching from Terracina (about thirty miles south of Anzio) to the Tiber, is 
dry, gently rolling countryside, wooded in many spots. It rises slowly to a railway 
embankment some thirteen miles north of Anzio. It was then cultivated ground, 
characterized by vineyards and small farms.153 The area west of the Alban road is 
cut by a series of gullies (waterworn ravines), of which the largest two, Moletta and 
Incastro, run southwest from the Alban Hills toward the sea. Often fifty feet deep, 
these gullies would prove difficult obstacles for armor.154
Southeast of Anzio were the Pontine Marshes, originally a low, swampy, ma-
larial area, wet and spongy, growing chiefly sphagnum moss. They extend from 
the Alban Hills to Mount Circeo, 1,775 feet high. As part of a large reclamation 
and resettlement project undertaken by Mussolini’s Fascist government, the Pon-
tine Marshes had been carefully drained, irrigated, and converted into cultivated 
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fields. An extensive system of ditches, canals, and pumping stations made move-
ment difficult in general; during the rainy season the area was impassable to most 
heavy equipment. Being largely treeless, it offered scant cover for the troops. Cover 
was available in the Padiglione Woods, which extended three to five miles north of 
Nettuno. There a force might be prepared for an attack. However, after leaving the 
forest such a force would be vulnerable, its movements easily observable—there 
was no cover between the woods and the coastal railway.155 
East of the Padiglione Woods the entire right flank of the planned beachhead 
line was protected by the 170-foot-wide Mussolini Canal, which drained the north-
ern Pontine Marshes.156 The main canal was built like an antitank ditch, with steep 
sides sloping to a shallow, sixteen-foot-wide streambed. The combination of canals 
and marshes made the right flank of the beachhead a poor avenue for attack.157
The 3,100-foot mountain mass of the Alban Hills, about twenty miles inland by 
good roads from the beaches of Anzio, controls the southern approaches to Rome, 
fifteen miles north. East of the Alban Hills is the Velletri Gap. The 5,040-foot Monti 
Lepini (the Lepini Mountains) stretch along the inner edge of the Pontine Marshes 
southeastward toward Terracina.158 Both the Alban Hills and the Lepini Mountains 
protected the German Tenth Army’s vital supply lines. In operational terms, the 
Alban Hills were a “decisive point,” because they dominated Highway 6 (the Via 
Casilina) and Highway 7 (the Via Appia). They also formed the last barrier the 
Germans could defend to prevent Allied entry into Rome.159
The road network on the Anzio plain was well developed, but the roads them-
selves were of poor quality. The most important road used for supplying German 
troops on the front line was Highway 7, which was narrow and easily defensible. 
It ran along the coast, around the Aurunci Mountains, then through the Pontine 
Marshes. Highway 6 runs from Rome through the Liri Valley. A defender could 
easily block it in the narrow Mignano Gap, ten miles southeast of the Liri Valley.160 
The main west coast railway paralleled these highways. Along the network of paved 
and gravel roads crisscrossing the farmlands were numerous two-story podere 
(farmhouses) for recent settlers. The provincial town of Aprilia (whose community 
center the Allied troops would call “the Factory”) was modern.161
In the Anzio-Nettuno area, the mean wind velocity is 9.3 knots. The winds blow 
from the northern quadrant 42 percent of the time, from the western quadrant 26 
percent. Only 2–3 percent of the time are there gale-force winds, thunderstorms 
perhaps 1 percent. In January and February, the wind comes largely from the north 
and east. The offshore/inshore wind cycle is extremely irregular.162 Along the coast 
between Elba and Civitavecchia, southerly winds prevail. Gales lasting two or three 
days and their accompanying depressions move eastward across the northwestern 
Mediterranean. Southerly and southwesterly gales bring low clouds, drizzle or con-
tinuous rain, and sometimes snow, until the wind veers to the westward. South-
westerly winds generate heavy seas on the Italian coast.163
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THE FINAL PLAN
Operation SHINGLE was now essentially an independent operation, to be executed 
whether the main Fifth Army was within striking distance or not.164 (The modified 
operation is sometimes referred to as SHINGLE II.) The landing at Anzio would be 
a two-division instead of a single-division assault.165 The CCS also approved the 
request that the 504th ParaRCT, which was due to leave the Mediterranean in early 
January 1944, remain long enough to conduct a parachute drop.166
On January 2, General Alexander issued his Operational Instruction Nr. 32. 
Fifth Army’s mission would be to carry out an assault landing in the vicinity of 
Rome, with the “object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threaten-
ing the rear of the German 14 [Panzer] Corps.” The operation would take place 
in the period of January 20–31, 1944, as early as the weather made possible. The 
initial landing force would be composed of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, two ar-
mored elements (one U.S., one British), U.S. Army Ranger battalions, one RCT, the 
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, the British 1st Division, and two British commandos 
(units of about four hundred men).167
Alexander’s operational instruction stated that if Eighth Army, despite its reduc-
tion in strength, could reach the Pescara line and pose a threat to Rome through 
Popoli (in the province of Pescara) by January 20, it would “have a great bearing on 
the success of the whole situation.” Canadian Corps HQ and the 4th Indian Divi-
sion “will be moved forward to make a show of strength on Eighth Army front.” 
Cover plans would be coordinated by 15th Army Group HQ. Fifth Army “will 
make as strong a threat as possible” toward Cassino and Frosinone shortly prior to 
the assault landing at Anzio to draw the enemy reserves that might be employed 
against the landing forces, then breach the enemy front and take all opportunities 
to “link up rapidly with the seaborne operation.”168
Clark was of two minds about the prospects for success of the Anzio landing. 
On the one hand, he realized fully the disadvantages of weakening the main Fifth 
Army forces on the front line, the long distance separating the landing force from 
the main Fifth Army, German strength, and the problems of retaining enough LSTs 
to sustain VI Corps after the landing. On the other hand, however, Clark saw a 
great opportunity for speeding up his drive to Rome—if the gamble at Anzio paid 
off. In the end, his ambition got the better of him, and he became an enthusiastic 
supporter of Operation SHINGLE.169 Clark predicted to Alexander on January 2 that 
the Anzio landing would “exercise a decisive influence on the operation to capture 
Rome.”170 After he received the final decision on the Anzio landing, Clark asked 
Alexander to be relieved of responsibility for planning the invasion of southern 
France so he could remain in Italy as commander of Fifth Army.171
Yet in his memoirs Truscott wrote that no one below the army level believed 
that the landing of two divisions at Anzio would cause the Germans to withdraw 
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from the southern front. Neither, he recalled, did any see even a remote chance that 
the main Fifth Army would be able to cross the Rapido River and fight its way up 
the Liri and Sacco valleys to join the Anzio forces within a month.172 Be that as it 
may, shortly after the Christmas conference in Tunis, Clark appointed Maj. Gen. 
John P. Lucas, commander of the U.S. VI Corps, to command the ground forces at 
Anzio. Lucas had commanded a division and a corps prior to being assigned to the 
Mediterranean theater.173
Composition of VI Corps
During the planning for the Anzio landing, a major problem was that VI Corps, 
as constituted for the operation (it also possessed an armored division and an-
other of infantry, both remaining on the mainland), would consist of both U.S. 
and British units. Eisenhower shared some misgivings about that in a personal let-
ter on December 29 to Alexander, especially concerning the great difficulties of 
supporting such a landing force logistically.174 Different equipment and spare parts 
requirements would exacerbate supply problems. Also, the British division was at 
only two-thirds of its prescribed strength. Eisenhower asked Alexander whether he 
might not prefer a corps composed of two U.S. divisions, “when you as a British of-
ficer had the deciding responsibility and when the Prime Minister has been such a 
staunch advocate of the project.” Or perhaps Alexander may have thought it “unde-
sirable from a political point of view for a corps of two British divisions to be given 
the opportunity for the direct capture of Rome.” Eisenhower concluded, “Neither of 
these two factors should be allowed to outweigh the military advantages of launch-
ing the assault by any troops you believe best fitted and most available.”175 Neither 
Lucas nor Truscott wanted a British division to be part of VI Corps. They believed 
that a mixed corps would complicate not only supply but command and control, as 
well—though neither explained exactly what command problem he anticipated.176
On January 8, General Wilson, in a response to Eisenhower’s letter to Alexan-
der, explained that the reason for the mixed corps was the lack of time to organize 
a corps composed of only British or only U.S. forces. In his view, should a British 
corps now be assigned, the reshuffle would be difficult to conceal from the Ger-
mans. An all-U.S. corps would require the withdrawal of a second American divi-
sion from the front. This would weaken the main Fifth Army’s pending offensive 
against the Gustav Line, which could not be allowed to happen.177
The Problem of Amphibious Lift
As has been seen, one of the major problems facing the Allied high commanders 
was how long the LSTs could remain to support the Anzio landing. The doubling of 
the original landing force meant much more amphibious lift and a larger logistical 
effort. Fifty-six LSTs were now scheduled to sail for Britain on January 15, 1944, 
leaving only thirty LSTs in the Mediterranean—less than half the number needed.178 
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So few LSTs would have been sufficient only for a regimental-size landing.179 The 
lift required for SHINGLE could be secured by delaying until February 5 the rede-
ployment of fifty-six LSTs to Britain and by temporarily withdrawing sixteen from 
the buildup on Corsica. That would make a total of eighty-eight LSTs, ninety LCIs, 
sixty LCTs, and eight infantry landing ships (LSIs) available for Anzio.180 Because 
fifty-eight LSTs had to be redeployed immediately after the landing at Anzio to the 
United Kingdom, the initial landing force would not have the benefit of continued 
maintenance over the beaches or subsequent buildup of the initial force.181
Alexander asked Churchill to resolve the situation with LSTs, because only six 
would be available after D+2 to land vehicles for two divisions. The planners esti-
mated that fourteen LSTs were required to maintain the landing force until it was 
joined with the main Fifth Army.182 
Shortly after the Tunis conference, the CCS decided to delay the scheduled de-
parture of the LSTs for Britain for three weeks. Ten LSTs were taken off the Corsica 
run for the moment, and eight were diverted from an operation formerly planned 
for the Indian Ocean in 1944. Thus, some ninety LSTs were available to launch the 
Anzio operation, more than sufficient. Because of the need to redeploy LSTs to 
Britain it would not have been possible to run resupply or follow-up convoys. In 
addition, some sixteen LSTs had to be returned to the Corsica run not later than 
February 5, to compensate for time lost in their diversion to the Anzio landing. 
Other LSTs had to be withdrawn immediately after the landing at Anzio for over-
haul and refit. In fact, only six serviceable LSTs would be available for the operation 
after D+2—and even that number might be reduced by operational losses.183An 
additional ten LSTs were needed for fifteen days after D-day to build up supplies.184 
Both Alexander and Clark considered follow-up convoys essential to the ul-
timate success of an Anzio landing, so they made every effort to secure them. 
Admiral Lowry too argued that the combination of too few LSTs and bad weather 
would jeopardize the supply for a two-division force. Because of the anticipated 
heavy German resistance on the Gustav Line, it was not possible to anticipate pre-
cisely where the main Fifth Army front line would be on the landing’s D-day; 
neither could it be predicted when the main Fifth Army would link up with the 
landing force. However, an enemy counterattack on the beachhead could certainly 
be expected. Hence, it was critically important that the Anzio landing be self-
supportable indefinitely.185
On January 2, Clark warned Alexander that the release of all but six LSTs by 
February 3 would make the entire operation extremely hazardous. He requested 
that Alexander make “every effort to hold adequate number of craft for SHINGLE 
until such time as success of operation is assured.” Clark had also seen that the 
small number of assault craft would allow landing only one Ranger battalion and 
five infantry battalions fully combat loaded. Clark had been willing nevertheless to 
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land VI Corps at reduced strength, but on the assumption that “we would be able to 
retain a reasonable number of LSTs for resupply purposes and to transport the nec-
essary vehicles needed by the assault force.” He considered twenty LSTs the mini-
mum: ten for two weeks to transport vehicles and ten indefinitely for supply pur-
poses. The figure of twenty postulated that the Navy would remove its load limit of 
four hundred tons per LST; if not, twenty-four would be required. In Clark’s view, 
supply by sea would be necessary for at least fifteen days after the landing.186 In all 
of this he was presuming a main Fifth Army “attack in greatest possible strength in 
Liri Valley several days in advance of Shingle with the object of drawing maximum 
number of enemy reserves to that front and fixing them there.” That was the only 
way that “the Shingle force exercises a decisive influence in the operation to capture 
Rome.” That raised the point that his estimate of twenty (or twenty-four) LSTs did 
not allow for the possibility of a buildup after the initial invasion, although it was 
“quite conceivable that the enemy situation may make that action necessary.”187
At a CINCs’ meeting in Tunis on January 3, concern was expressed that with 
the LSTs promised elsewhere, the Operation SHINGLE landing force would have 
only eight days’ sustainment. That meant that if the main Fifth Army did not link 
up with VI Corps within eight days, the Anzio force would have to choose between 
remaining on the beachhead and withdrawing. Yet it was agreed that despite these 
risks the possible gains justified the calculated risk. Because the situation on the 
front was unfavorable, Alexander believed that a linkup between the main Fifth 
Army and VI Corps within the eight days was highly improbable, and accordingly 
he made every effort to keep enough LSTs on hand for SHINGLE’s separate needs.188
Timing
The timing of the landing at Anzio-Nettuno depended on many factors. For one thing, 
D-day was contingent on the advance of Fifth Army; the release of an Army division 
for the landing was being withheld pending developments on that front. Also, the Navy 
asked for a minimum of twenty days to complete its own plans and that all craft 
arrive in the Naples area ten days in advance for briefing, rehearsals, and loading.189
The impending removal from the Mediterranean of many of SHINGLE’s LSTs 
required the main Fifth Army to conduct an all-out offensive, as Clark had envi-
sioned. The purpose was to obtain a new position in sufficient time to allow the 
landing at Anzio to be completed prior to the withdrawal of these craft. No reli-
ance could be placed on maintaining the landing force over the beaches, because of 
unfavorable weather conditions; any extensive follow-up was also precluded. The 
weather forecast was unreliable beyond forty-eight hours. Having no assurance of 
more than two days of operational weather in seven demanded that the operation 
start during clear or clearing weather and be completed within forty-eight hours. 
Hence, no ship or craft could be bulk loaded; all equipment and supplies had to be 
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either packed or carried on wheels. Enough supplies for seven days had to be car-
ried in the ships and craft of the assault convoy.190 
A conference in Marrakesh on January 7 decided that the Anzio D-day had to be 
moved as far forward as possible to maximize the availability of landing ships and 
craft. If D-day were January 22, for instance, the enemy would have little time to 
prepare; some eighty-two LSTs could be used; and all, or at least more, of these LSTs 
would be available for the possible landing of a third, small division after D+5 (which 
in that case would be January 27) if the weather were favorable. The current plan was 
that all the LSTs would remain in the theater until February 3. By February 23 their 
number would be reduced to twenty-five, to twelve by the end of the month.191
The landing at Anzio was provisionally scheduled to take place between January 
20 and 31, 1944. Eisenhower, and the Royal Navy in particular, wanted to assemble 
landing craft in England as soon as possible for Operation OVERLORD. Hence, and 
as outlined above, a D-day as close to January 20 as possible was highly desirable.192 
Also, ULTRA decrypts had revealed that the Germans planned to demolish harbor 
facilities in the Anzio-Nettuno area. For example, an ULTRA intercept on the 11th 
reported that demolition charges at Nettuno required renewal, owing to deteriora-
tion by the weather; preparations were to commence shortly. Five days later, ULTRA 
decrypted a January 14 request by the German regional commander at Civitavecchia 
to discuss with I Parachute Corps (ParaCorps) whether, and if so to what extent, par-
tial demolition of Nettuno and Civitavecchia harbors could be carried out without 
making them useless for German supply traffic. On the 21st, as the invasion force 
was in the final hours of preparation, an ULTRA analysis of another intercept reported 
that “on nineteenth [January], task of preparing demolitions in above harbors [Net-
tuno and Civitavecchia] [was] allotted to two technical detachments.”193 Here was one 
of the reasons Clark decided to adhere to the previously agreed “invasion schedule 
and, if anything, establish D-Day as close to 20 January as possible. Otherwise, [the] 
limited numbers of landing craft [assigned] might encounter severe obstacles result-
ing from German demolitions in the harbors preventing [Clark] from landing troops 
and equipment ashore in a timely manner.” Any delay in landing would give the Ger-
mans more time to destroy the Anzio-Nettuno port facilities, which would be critical 
for unloading the material necessary to sustain the beachhead.194 
Indeed, General Lucas asked for a delay, to January 25 to allow proper rehearsal. 
As a compromise, the 22nd was selected as D-day.195 H-hour was set for 0200, to 
give the landing forces four hours of darkness. Morning twilight would begin a few 
minutes before 0600, and the sun would rise at 0731.196 Sunset would occur at 1711. 
Fifth Army Planning
Fifth Army headquarters started detailed planning on December 31. The Navy’s 
planning staff was headed by Admiral Lowry, commander of the VIII Amphibious 
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Force and of Task Force 81, already formed for the operation. The air plan was 
prepared by Maj. Gen. J. K. Cannon, Commander, XII Air Support Command, 
and his staff.197 It was decided that the British contingent would be transported by a 
separate but subordinate task force under Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge, RN. 
Troubridge and his staff worked at the planning section of the 15th Army Group 
headquarters in Caserta.198 However, some key commanders were not involved in 
planning, specifically General Lucas, who was with his staff at Maddaloni (south-
east of Caserta), and Capt. E. C. L. Turner, in charge of the Rangers, who spent most 
of the time at Pozzuoli, on the Gulf of Naples.199 Plans for Operation SHINGLE were 
approved on January 12, only ten days before D-day.200
Clark’s plan to breach the Gustav Line concurrently with the Anzio landing was 
promulgated by Operations Instruction Nr. 12, issued on December 16, 1943, and 
amended by Operations Instruction Nr. 13 of January 10, 1944. Clark’s intent was 
that the main Fifth Army, reinforced with two divisions from Eighth Army, would 
attack the German Tenth Army across the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, break 
through the Gustav Line, and drive up the Liri Valley. This offensive should have 
sufficient strength, he projected, to draw the German reserves. While the enemy was 
preoccupied defending the Gustav Line, the Allies would land at Anzio-Nettuno.201
Clark’s Operations Instruction Nr. 13 specified that the French Expeditionary 
Corps (2nd Moroccan and 3rd Algerian Divisions, reinforced, and the 3rd and 4th 
Groups of Tabors—irregular Moroccan troops) would start the general offensive 
of Fifth Army at H-hour on D-day, set for January 12 (see map 12). It would at-
tack east “along the general axes Cardito–Atina and Aquafondale–S. Elia and seize 
the high ground north and northwest of Cassino.” On D+3 (January 15), II Corps 
(34th and 36th IDs, reinforced, and 1st ArmdDiv) would attack and secure Mount 
Trocchio. On order (estimated on D+8, i.e., January 20), II Corps would force the 
Rapido River, establish a bridgehead in the vicinity of Sant’Angelo, and then, with 
maximum use of armor, advance west and northwest. On the left flank, the British 
10 Corps (5th, 46th, and 56th Divisions and 23rd Armoured Brigade) would on 
order (estimated D+5) cross the Liri River and seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of 
Sant’Ambrogio. It would then attack northward in the direction of San Giorgio. The 
main Fifth Army’s reserve (45th ID) would be prepared to reinforce Allied forces in 
the Liri Valley between the Rapido and Melfa Rivers.202 On D+10 (January 22), VI 
Corps would land at Anzio-Nettuno.203
Clark’s Field Order Nr. 5, issued on January 12, pertained specifically to the An-
zio landing force, which was meant to “launch attacks in the Anzio area on H-Hour, 
D-Day,” its mission “(a) to seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio,” 
and “(b) advance on Colli Laziali.”204 The word advance implied a significant change 
in the mission.205 In fact, the second part of Clark’s order generally was vague: it 
seemed to contradict the first part, by directing Lucas not just to hold the beach-
head but to advance out of it, toward the Alban Hills (for the linkup with the main 
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Fifth Army seven days after the landing). In any case, since the first outline plan 
(above) it had been understood that the attack on the Alban Hills would be made 
after the linkup, not by VI Corps alone. This change in mission caused much con-
troversy, in the immediate aftermath and continuing to the present.206 
Alexander did not help matters by failing to warn Clark not to change his mis-
sion statement for VI Corps. In a personal meeting with Clark, Alexander was cau-
tious. Alexander knew from ULTRA that the Germans had a sizable force in the 
Rome area (I ParaCorps, of two divisions), but he was not sure whether it would be 
in the vicinity of Anzio on D-day. Hence, he emphasized to Clark the importance of 
securing the beachhead as the first order of business. Afterward, Clark could focus 
on the mission assigned to VI Corps.207
On January 12, Brigadier General Brann visited Lucas to brief him about the final 
main Fifth Army order for the Anzio operation, specifically the vaguely worded mis-
sion statement. Brann made it clear that Lucas’s primary task was to seize and secure 
a beachhead; Clark expected no more. At the same time, it was understood that Lucas 
was free to take advantage of an opportunity to capture the Alban Hills; however, in 
Brann’s view the chance of one arising was slim. Clark too did not think it would be 
possible for Lucas to reach the hill mass while at the same time holding the beach-
head to protect the port and the landing beaches. Loss of the port and beaches would 
completely isolate VI Corps, leaving it at the mercy of the Germans. Clark did not 
want Lucas to push on to the Alban Hills at the risk of sacrificing VI Corps.208
Brann’s visit to Lucas was highly unusual. It probably shows how uncomfortable 
Clark was at that time with the entire operation. After the war, Clark confirmed this 
unease: “There was no possibility of going ahead and capturing the Alban Hills in 
the face of the concentrated troops that were ordered to meet us and did meet us.”209
Allied Assumptions
The Fifth Army plan for the Anzio landing was based on several assumptions. The 
planners expected the Germans to react very strongly to the Allied landing in the 
rear of XIV PzCorps.210 Alexander and his G-2 were convinced that the Anzio force, 
by cutting off the enemy forces at the Alban Hills, would threaten the German rear. 
The landing would compel the Germans to weaken their forces deployed along the 
Gustav Line. This, in turn, would enable the main Fifth Army to break through the 
German defenses and quickly make contact with Allied forces at the beachhead.211 
Clearly, Alexander relied on presumed enemy intentions rather than on enemy ca-
pabilities—thereby making one of the most fundamental errors that can arise in 
estimating a situation and making a decision.
Colonel Howard, G-2 of the main Fifth Army, was much less optimistic. He es-
timated that the Germans had one corps headquarters and two divisions, plus con-
tingents of paratroopers and panzer forces, in the vicinity of Rome. Like Alexander, 
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he believed that the landing at Anzio would constitute such a serious threat that 
the Germans would have to react very strongly: “an emergency to be met by all the 
resources and strength available to the German high command in Italy.” The Ger-
mans would concentrate forces against the beachhead to prevent the invaders from 
advancing to the Alban Hills; otherwise German withdrawal from southern Italy 
would become necessary. But to do that, the G-2 estimated, the Germans need not 
weaken the Gustav Line; they could move in additional divisions from the Adriatic 
front; also, they could count on two more divisions arriving from northern Italy 
over the ensuing two weeks.212
Specifically, Colonel Howard assessed that VI Corps could expect initial D-day 
resistance from one division assigned to watch the coast, four parachute battalions 
from Rome, a tank and an antitank battalion, and coast-defense personnel—al-
together 14,300 men by D+1. Another division and an SS (Schutzstaffel) infan-
try regiment (InfRgt) were north of Rome. Also, an RCT and perhaps elements of 
the Hermann Göring Panzer Division could arrive by D+2 or D+3. The Germans 
might bring the 26th PzDiv from the Eighth Army front. That would give them 
some thirty-one thousand men. If the main Fifth Army attack was sufficiently 
strong, however, it should pin down all the enemy reserves in the beachhead area. 
Ironically, in light of later events, the G-2 did not believe the Germans could bring 
reinforcements down quickly from northern Italy, especially in the face of over-
whelming Allied air superiority. The estimate was that the German buildup north 
of Florence would probably amount to not more than two divisions by D+16. The 
final summary by the main Fifth Army on January 16 also pointed out the increas-
ing attrition of enemy troops.213
The Luftwaffe was not considered a major threat. By early January almost the 
entire 2nd Air Fleet, under Gen. Wolfram von Richthofen, had left Italy for Ger-
many. There, Allied planners assumed, air attacks on German air bases would re-
duce Luftwaffe strength by 60 percent.214 They considered it unlikely therefore that 
the Luftwaffe would reinforce its units in Italy to counter the Anzio landing, so the 
“enemy air effort, never strong, should gradually diminish.”215
Clark would later say that another consideration in his plans was the presump-
tion that Eighth Army would attack with sufficient force during this period to pre-
vent any movement of German troops from its front to either the Gustav Line or 
the Anzio sector. He also believed (erroneously) that Allied air forces could isolate 
the beachhead area by heavy and coordinated attacks to destroy enemy communi-
cations and that accordingly the Germans would be unable to shift their reserves 
rapidly enough to counter the Allied landing and the planned thrust inland. How-
ever, in this instance and throughout the Italian campaign Clark would see this 
“isolation” theory invoked repeatedly, only to see the enemy, again and again, move 
his forces by railroad and highway, with some difficulty but with great effective-
ness, even when the weather was bad.216
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The VI Corps Plan 
The mission of VI Corps in Phase I of the landing, as stated in Clark’s outline plan 
of January 12, was “by first light D-Day to capture and/or reduce enemy gun bat-
teries capable of seriously interfering with the assault on the beaches and to launch 
assaults on the beaches north and northeast of Anzio and establish a beachhead.” 
In Phase II, the mission was simply to “attack in the direction of Colli Laziali.”217 
Confusingly, D-day in the VI Corps plan was January 22, while the Fifth Army’s 
plan referred to the landing at Anzio-Nettuno as occurring ten days after the D-
day of its own offensive. Clearly, the VI Corps planners should have referred to the 
landing date as Fifth Army’s D+10, not their own D-day.
The VI Corps scheme of maneuver (or “operational idea”) envisaged a simulta-
neous landing on the Anzio and Nettuno beaches. The U.S. 3rd ID (under Major 
General Truscott) would land three regiments over the X-RAY beaches, two miles 
south of Nettuno. In the center, the 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional), with the 
83rd Chemical Battalion and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, would land 
over YELLOW Beach adjacent to Anzio harbor, with the mission of seizing the port 
and clearing out any coastal-defense batteries there. On the PETER beaches, six 
miles northwest of Anzio, the 2nd Brigade Group of the British 1st Division (Maj. 
Gen. W. R. C. Penney) would land. The 2nd Special Service Brigade of the 9th and 
43rd Commando would advance eastward to establish a roadblock on the main 
road leading from Anzio to Campoleone and Albano. The various forces landing 
would link up to consolidate a beachhead seven miles deep that centered on the 
port of Anzio.218
The original discussion called for landing the Rangers over the PETER beaches. 
The Rangers would then drive to the south and take out heavy gun emplacements 
at Anzio before daylight. However, because of the distance between PETER and 
Anzio, the Rangers’ landing was moved to the beaches just southeast of Anzio har-
bor. Also, it had been planned to have the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing drop the 504th 
RCT behind the beaches shortly prior to H-hour, to cut the Anzio–Albano road. It 
was realized, however, that an airdrop most likely would give warning to the enemy 
defenders; in any case, the 504th RCT’s mission would be similar to that of the Brit-
ish 1st Division.219 Moreover, if enemy planes attacked at the same time, the 504th 
might be fired on by friendly antiaircraft artillery.220 Hence, the paratroop drop was 
canceled on D–2.221 
The planners assumed initial heavy German resistance, so they provided a 
strong floating reserve: the bulk of the British 1st Division, with the 46th Royal 
Tank Regiment. In addition, the 24th Field Regiment, the 80th Medium Regiment, 
and the 504th Parachute Infantry would land behind the 3rd ID and assemble in 
a VI Corps reserve.222 Lucas tentatively planned to use the corps reserve in two 
ways. If the enemy reacted in strength, the reserve would be assembled and would 
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counterattack; or, if the situation permitted, it could advance toward the Colli 
Laziali to cut the enemy communication routes. This attack could be conducted 
either up the Albano road and then toward Rome or via Cisterna and Velletri to cut 
Highway 6 near Valmontone.223
The 15th Army Group headquarters prepared a “cover plan” (or operational 
deception plan) aimed at misleading the enemy with regard to the timing and di-
rection of the Anzio landing. Because it was hardly possible to conceal that an am-
phibious landing was being prepared at Naples, the Germans had to be convinced 
that the Allied intent was to land farther north on Italy’s western coast, near Civita-
vecchia or even Leghorn, toward the end of January.224
Originally, a naval feint was planned at Ostia Lido, at the mouth of the Tiber River, 
on D-day. This site was changed first to Palo, about fifteen miles north of the Tiber’s 
mouth, and then, at General Clark’s insistence, to Civitavecchia, some forty miles 
north. The reason was that most of the German troops already were north of the 
Tiber River; a feint at Ostia Lido, if successful, would tend to draw the enemy closer 
to, not farther from, the landing area.225 Instead, a British antiaircraft cruiser and two 
destroyers would shell Civitavecchia at H-hour. At the same time, six cruisers and 
destroyers would appear off Terracina, again to distract German attention from An-
zio.226 Civitavecchia would be bombarded once more at midnight on D+1 by cruis-
ers and destroyers.227 In addition, fishing craft were assembled in Corsican harbors, 
where army engineers made a great show of “secret” activity, assembling dummy sup-
ply dumps and constructing imitation landing craft. Information was “leaked” from 
Caserta that Fifth Army would not advance in January but that the British Eighth 
Army, with fresh troops, would move up the Italian Adriatic coast.228
A radio deception plan included the establishment on Corsica of a radio station 
purporting to be the advance headquarters of VI Army Corps. This station would 
transmit messages, plausibly building up in volume until H-hour at Anzio.229 There 
were also to be wireless broadcasts to resistance forces and agents in Italy, using a 
cipher it was known the Germans could read. The messages notified the recipients 
that an invasion was imminent at Civitavecchia.230
Logistical Support and Sustainment
Logistics for Operation SHINGLE required a great deal of planning. Innovative ways 
to sustain the landing force ashore had to be found. The likelihood of clear weather 
no more than two days out of seven dictated that the assault convoy be completely 
unloaded within forty-eight hours; everything would be “combat loaded,” ready 
for quick removal in the sequence in which it would be needed.231 The available 
LSTs could carry only seven days of supplies for the troops.232 Admirals John Cun-
ningham and Lowry wanted to warn Lucas not to rely on support over the beach, 
because of the probability of bad weather and the urgent need for the LSTs in other 
operations, but rather disembark the whole force immediately after the landing.233 
 THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO 171 170 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
At a conference in Marrakesh on January 7, an American colonel, Edward J. 
O’Neill, Clark’s assistant chief of logistics, suggested driving loaded trucks onto 
DUKWs, and driving the DUKWs into LSTs, through their bow doors. At Anzio-
Nettuno the DUKWs would disembark and proceed to the beach, where the trucks 
would drive ashore and then directly to supply dumps on the beachhead. Mean-
while, the LSTs would embark empty trucks of the previous echelon and take them 
back to Naples. The U.S. Seventh Fleet had used a similar procedure successfully in 
the Southwest Pacific Area. However, this idea was rejected by Churchill, Adm. An-
drew Cunningham, and Gen. Bedell Smith, who objected that unpredictable winter 
weather could make it difficult to land the DUKWs carrying loaded trucks. Also, 
sandbars might block them. In addition, the Royal Navy was concerned that the 
Germans might destroy the port facilities at Anzio-Nettuno. As it turned out, the 
DUKWs were able to reach the shore (though ultimately for other purposes), and 
the Germans failed to demolish the port facilities.234
Clark himself, however, eventually accepted the idea of carrying preloaded 
trucks on LSTs, albeit without DUKWs.235 The trucks would load up to their five-
ton capacities at Naples dumps and drive directly into the LSTs. Arriving at Anzio-
Nettuno the LSTs would beach themselves (as they were designed to do), open their 
bow doors, and drop the bow ramps, down which the trucks would drive and con-
tinue to the VI Corps dumps. Some 1,500 trucks were assembled expressly for this 
purpose.236 This method reduced the unloading time from a full day to a single hour. 
Without it, maintaining the Allied forces at Anzio would have been impossible.237
The assault and follow-up shipping would be mounted from Naples and its 
satellite ports. Organization of the convoys for the British contingent was the re-
sponsibility of the AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon, while the Peninsular 
Base Section had the same responsibility for the U.S. contingent. Because, as noted, 
all unloading had to be completed within forty-eight hours and the beaches were 
poor, the port had to be put into operation quickly. Some thirty LCTs, all available 
DUKWs, and both U.S. and British assault landing craft (LCVPs and LCAs, respec-
tively) would be used to unload larger ships. Heavy stores and equipment would be 
loaded in Algiers, instead of the heavily congested port of Naples, on eight Liberty 
ships. Four of the Liberty ships would sail with the assault convoy, and the other 
four would follow.238
For logisticians, it was difficult to project sustainment requirements, because of 
uncertainty about when the landing force would join up with the main Fifth Army. 
They settled on supplies for thirty-five days to be delivered by sea. The weather fore-
cast dictated that a convoy be scheduled every three days, with the expectation that 
at least one convoy would get through and arrive between periods of bad weather.239 
The assault units would carry supplies for two days, and the convoy would bring 
seven hundred trucks and a hundred DUKWs loaded with three days’ supplies of 
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all types. An additional ten days’ worth would be carried by the second group of 
Liberty ships. The follow-up convoys would each consist of four Liberty ships and 
fourteen LSTs carrying five hundred trucks, plus landing craft as needed.240
Another problem to be resolved to ensure a continuous flow of supplies, given 
the inadequate port facilities, was the shallow water of the approaches to the beach-
es. The Fifth Army’s G-4 intended to maintain the flow of supplies over the beaches 
as long as necessary, but it would be impossible if the weather was unfavorable. It 
would then be necessary to rely on the port of Anzio, which, while small, could 
handle LSTs. The plan provided for the assault force to be followed on the first 
day by port reconstruction engineers to deal with any German demolition. If the 
port was unavailable, the LSTs and LCTs would be unloaded exclusively over the 
beaches, over pontoon causeways (prefabricated sectional floating bridges) across 
the shallow water. Tonnage restrictions were placed on landing ships and craft to 
ensure the shallowest possible beaching draft.241
Naval Plans
Naval planning for the original Operation SHINGLE started on November 18, 1943. 
It was a joint effort of Task Force 81’s planning staff and Fifth Army headquarters at 
Caserta.242 The work on the final plan (i.e., for SHINGLE II) started on December 31, 
1943, and ended on January 12. The chief planner was Admiral Lowry. Adm. John 
Cunningham, CINC, Mediterranean, set up an advance headquarters at Naples.243 
TF 81’s area of responsibility was bounded on the east by Italy’s west coast, to the 
west by longitude 11° 20ʹ east, and to the south by latitude 40° 50ʹ north.244
During the planning process a thorough study of the proposed beaches and their 
gradients was made, from aerial photographs and reconnaissance on the ground. 
The photographic reconnaissance was exceedingly accurate and highly satisfacto-
ry.245 Beach reconnaissance by divers, however, accomplished little other than to 
establish the depth of water over the outlying bars.246 Loading restrictions were put 
on LSTs and LCTs because of an unfavorable (i.e., too flat) beach gradient.247 Scouts 
and raiders brought back descriptions and images that were used to familiarize the 
amphibious force personnel with silhouettes of the selected beaches, for recogni-
tion at night.248
The beach study assessed that the port of Anzio—if not demolished—could 
handle six LSTs at one time and thereby relieve traffic over the X-RAY beaches.249 
Because the beach east of Anzio could not accommodate two divisions, it was de-
cided, after consultation with the AFHQ Joint Beach Committee, to land the Brit-
ish division over the west beach. Naval reconnaissance parties sent ashore there 
reported that light assault craft could land, despite the shallowness of the beach.250 
The planners selected two main landing sites. One was a 5,600-yard stretch 
about five miles west of Anzio. The approach was very shallow (a gradient of 
1 : 110), and the sand was too soft for vehicles, especially in the exits through the 
dunes.251 This sector was selected for the PETER force and was in turn divided into 
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three beaches, designated GREEN, AMBER, and RED, each thirty to sixty yards wide. 
Not only the soft sand but in some places five-foot banks impeded entrance to the 
dunes in the rear. The dunes were backed by a tree belt that varied in depth from 
fifty to four hundred yards. Behind the trees were fields and orchards. A “metaled 
road” (paved with stone chips mixed with tar) ran roughly parallel to, and five hun-
dred to eight hundred yards behind, the beach.252
From the sea, the beaches would be difficult to locate at night, and any heavy 
winds would seriously impede reaching them. A sandbar (only one was known of 
at this point) approximately 150 yards offshore extended almost the entire length 
of these beaches; it was for this reason that, as mentioned, LSTs had to unload over 
causeways, four hundred feet long. LCVPs, LCAs, DUKWs, and possibly LCTs, 
however, could reach the beaches directly.253 The Navy recommended to the Army 
that at the PETER beaches neither troops nor equipment be landed from LSTs, LCTs, 
or infantry landing craft. The troops would be required to wade through several 
hundred feet of water to the beaches.254
Another landing site was at Nettuno, four miles northeast of Anzio. The ap-
proach to the Nettuno beaches also was shallow (with gradients of 1 : 80 to 1 : 85).255 
Designated as the X-RAY sector, the Nettuno site was divided into three beaches, 
RED, GREEN, and YELLOW; they were 2,860 yards long in all and each ten to twenty-
five yards wide. Here two sandbars lay 150 yards offshore, extending the entire 
length of the beach; a minimum of six feet of water over the bar could be expected. 
These beaches were suitable for LCVPs and LCAs, and in some places LCTs and 
LCIs. Pontoon causeways would be required for LSTs.256 YELLOW Beach, 820 yards 
long and forty yards wide, was composed of rough sand. There were no offshore 
rocks or bars, but the gradient was so shallow (gradient 1 : 130 to 1 : 150) that YEL-
LOW was suitable only for LCVPs, LCIs, LCAs, DUKWs, and some LCT variants. 
Craft drawing three feet or more would ground 150 yards offshore.257
Allocation of craft to the beach groups depended primarily on the beach gradi-
ents. None of the LCIs or the LCTs Mark 3 or 4 were assigned to the PETER beaches. 
All the LCIs were assigned to X-RAY, most of the LCT Mark 5s to PETER.258
TF 81’s Operation Plan Nr. 147-43, issued on January 12, 1944, stated that the task 
force’s mission was to “establish 3rd ID (reinforced) Major Gen. Lucian Truscott in 
positions ashore near Cape D’Anzio in order to attack the rear of the enemy’s right 
flank.” Clearly, TF 81’s mission was not consonant with what Clark had laid out 
to Lucas; it more resembled the mission General Alexander had issued to Clark’s 
Fifth Army. In Plan 147-43 the mission of the PETER force was simply “the landing 
of the First British division (reinforced).”259 It did not elaborate on what the Brit-
ish contingent’s mission would be ashore. Otherwise, the TF 81 plan postulated 
that the enemy would offer strong resistance and that “strong enemy submarine, 
E[nemy]-boat and air attacks are to be expected.” The planners also assumed that 
mines would be encountered but that the weather would allow landing through 
surf on the designated beaches.260
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For gunfire support of the X-RAY force, TF 81 planners organized four fire-
support groups plus a rocket and AA support group to deliver “prearranged fires” 
prior to H-hour. The British Bombarding Squadron would do the same in support 
of the PETER force.261 To achieve surprise, no preliminary bombardment would be 
conducted except for a short, intense rocket barrage at H–10 and H+5 by three 
specially modified craft known as LCT (R)s.262 Shore fire-control parties would be 
provided by the 3rd ID for RED and GREEN Beaches. The Rangers would be sup-
ported by a British forward observation officer (FOO) party during their advance 
from YELLOW Beach, the British 1st Division by a British bombardment troop (four 
FOO parties). The 504th Paratroop Regiment would be accompanied by one shore 
fire-control party.263
Finally, TF 81’s plan envisaged that the Allied air forces would provide compre-
hensive support of the landing force during the sea transit and the landing on the 
Anzio and Nettuno beaches.
Air Plans
One of the most controversial aspects of Operation SHINGLE was air support for 
the troops on the ground. Eisenhower planned to isolate the area of operations by 
employing strategic bombing to divert and slow the German units that he believed 
would inevitably be sent toward the Anzio beachhead. British and American army 
and air force planners in London believed the best way to accomplish that was to 
attack marshaling yards, rail centers, and large repair facilities. Intelligence analysts 
and air force planners in the Mediterranean commands disagreed; they wanted rail 
bridges, road bridges, and viaducts destroyed.264 Finally, it was agreed that bridges 
and the railway system would be targeted. Yet General Clark did not have much 
faith in strategic bombing or air interdiction. The disagreement over targets with 
the Army Air Forces (which had subsumed Army Air Corps) did little to convince 
Clark that airpower would help his command.265
Planning by air commands for Operation SHINGLE was completed on December 
30, 1943. The effort was divided into three related phases. Phase I (January 1–14) 
aimed to disrupt enemy communications in northern Italy and deceive the enemy 
about Allied intentions by supporting the deception plan. Phase II (January 15–21) 
was to isolate the landing area by attacks on road and rail communications north of 
Rome (as discussed above) and in front of the Fifth and Eighth Armies.266 In Phase 
III (from January 22 to the end of the operation), Allied aircraft would provide 
cover to convoys and the beachhead and close air support to the landing forces.267
Specifically, the XII Tactical Air Command, the Desert Air Force, the Coastal 
Air Force, and the Tactical Bomber Command would obtain air superiority over 
the beaches, provide close air support, destroy enemy airfields, and hinder ene-
my communications. The 64th Fighter Wing would protect the battle area dur-
ing the landing.268 The XII Air Support Command, reinforced by two groups from 
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the Desert Air Force, would provide direct air support, while the Tactical Bomber 
Force would conduct heavier bombing. 
The primary air mission was the interdiction of rail communications in west 
and central Italy from south of latitude 44° north to the Rome area. The 42nd Bom-
bardment Wing would interdict the Florence–Rome, Arezzo–Orte, and Pisa–Rome 
lines; two alternative routes, Empoli–Siena and Pisa–Pistoia–Florence; the bypass 
lines through Viterbo–Rome; and the Nice–Genoa–La Spezia–Pisa line. This plan 
was modified on January 15, with highest priority awarded to attacking rail traffic 
on the Arezzo–Rome and Arezzo–Orte lines; the Leghorn–Civitavecchia–Rome 
line if it was reopened; the Terni–Sulmona line; and the Viterbo–Rome bypass. The 
secondary missions were interdiction of communications on the southern coast of 
France (from Nice to Pisa via Genoa) and on the Italian east coast (the Pescara–
Falconara line) and neutralization of Piombino’s harbor and marshaling yards.269
The Coastal Air Force would provide both day- and night-fighter cover over the 
Naples and Salerno loading areas and the Ischia swept channel to the Pontine Islands, 
as well as A/S protection for the latter. By night, radar patrol aircraft would fly A/S 
patrols from the Ischia swept channel up to the landing beaches. In addition, the 
Coastal Air Force would ensure both night- and day-fighter cover for rehearsal ar-
eas and convoy routes near Salerno. The XII Air Support Command would provide 
fighter cover over the convoy routes from the Pontine Islands to the assault areas, 
over the assault beaches themselves, and over the transport area off the beaches.270 
ALLIED PREPARATIONS 
Orders for the naval part of the operation were issued on January 16. All com-
manders taking part were briefed that day at Naples.271 Admiral Lowry directed that 
all landing craft were to arrive at Naples prior to the 15th; their commanders too 
were briefed on the 16th. Five (later ten) LSTs and a group of LCIs and LCTs had 
already assembled in the Naples vicinity for training with the British 1st Division 
and the U.S. 3rd ID.272
The Anzio-Nettuno landing had by then required significant redeployment of 
forces on the Allied front. The 3rd ID was assembled at Pozzuoli on New Year’s Day. 
VI Corps turned over its sector of the Fifth Army front to the French Expeditionary 
Corps on January 3 and moved its headquarters to Maddaloni (three miles south-
east of Caserta). The most difficult redeployment involved Eighth Army, which 
shifted no fewer than three divisions and attached units to the main Fifth Army 
front. Between January 1 and 5, the British 1st Division was moved from Foggia on 
the Adriatic front to Salerno; it was followed by the 2nd Special Service Brigade. 
The British 5th Division was shifted to reinforce the British 10 Corps in an attack 
across the Garigliano River.273 The New Zealand 2nd ID was moved from Orsogna 
to Venafro to join the 15th Army Group reserve.274 To minimize the possibility of 
enemy detection of these movements, the affected units were ordered to maintain 
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radio silence; however, because of the absence of enemy aircraft, they were allowed 
to move during daylight.275 To support the demonstration that Eighth Army was to 
make to fix the German forces on its front, the headquarters of the Canadian Corps 
and the 4th Indian Division had to be brought forward from reserve.276
In the short time between January 4 and 19, VI Corps ran large-scale landing 
exercises. Their focus was on the movement to the beach, initially small units, then 
battalions and regiments. Infantry battalions rehearsed tactical landings under 
simulated fire, removing minefields and barbed wire and knocking out pillboxes. 
Artillery units rehearsed loading and unloading their guns, and so forth, into and 
out of DUKWs. Assault landings were practiced, first using landing craft mock-ups 
on dry land and then, in the battalion and regimental exercises, with craft provided 
by the Navy.277
Preparations for the Anzio landing culminated in a corps landing exercise (WEB-
FOOT) six miles south of Salerno on January 17–19.278 It was not really a full-scale 
rehearsal, although all the assault units, DUKWs with their organic weapons, and 
token support weapons and vehicles took part.279 The rehearsal went reasonably 
well for the British; however, the U.S. contingent encountered heavy weather on 
the night of the 17/18th.280 Few of its landing craft arrived at the proper beaches.281 
Some disembarked so far out from shore that the forces arrived at the beach late.282 
About twenty DUKWs sank.283 With them were lost several men and a number 
of 105 mm howitzers.284 In general, the situation on the U.S. beaches was chaotic. 
Generals Lucas and Truscott both insisted on another rehearsal, but Clark refused, 
for lack of time.285
In the meantime, the Allied air forces were interdicting road and rail communi-
cations in northern Italy. These massive “operational fires” were designed, by pre-
venting the movement of enemy troops or supplies, to have a major impact on the 
course and outcome of Operation SHINGLE. German troops in Italy moved mostly 
by rail, using three main routes: on the western coast, the eastern coast, and in 
the middle, from Florence to Rome. All of them ran through very mountainous 
terrain. Allied tactical bombers attacked key marshaling yards and bridges almost 
constantly; their main targets were the rail yards at Florence, Pisa, Arezzo, and 
Terni and the bridges at Orte, Orvieto, and Cecina, on the central and west coast 
routes.286
In addition, between January 1 and 13 Allied bombers systematically struck rail 
communications in central Italy with the aim of preventing resupply of German 
units on the front in southern Italy.287 They also conducted massive attacks on Ger-
man airfields, specifically four fighter airfields near Rome and three at Perugia for 
reconnaissance aircraft.288 On January 21, bombers also attacked German airfields 
at Montpellier, Salon-de-Provence, and Istres (used by torpedo bombers and glide 
bombers) in southern France.289
 THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO 177 176 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
By the 19th, the Allied airmen claimed, “all communications from northern 
Italy to Rome [had been] cut.” In the event, however, this bombing did not do much 
good for the forces that landed at Anzio-Nettuno. The Germans filled runway cra-
ters overnight, and their engineers always kept at least one rail track open—that 
was all they needed for troop and supply trains, and the needs of the civilian pop-
ulation could wait. Nevertheless, the attacks grounded the Luftwaffe’s reconnais-
sance aircraft at Perugia just before the assault convoy sailed.290
Complicating all these preparations for the Anzio landing were very unsatisfac-
tory Anglo-American military relations in the Mediterranean. The problem was 
especially apparent in the combined headquarters, where American and British 
officers were “clannish” and did not mix freely with their counterparts. The Ameri-
cans, for instance, viewed the British as selfish and obstinate. The exception was 
Fifth Army headquarters, which did not seem to suffer from such British-American 
friction. Clark, the first U.S. Army commander to command large combined for-
mations, had by January 7, 1944, six British divisions and one Moroccan, one New 
Zealand, one Indian, and one Canadian division to support his four American 
divisions.291
Even for Fifth Army, however, the chain of command above Clark was a breed-
ing ground for Anglo-American difficulties. Formally, there was a single chain of 
command running from the CCS through the British or American theater com-
manders, then to the American, British, and other Allied forces, all the way to the 
division level. However, there was also an informal but very important personal 
chain of command, which ran along national lines. For example, General Alexan-
der regularly communicated with General Brooke without going through Eisen-
hower. But then, Clark often communicated with Eisenhower without notifying 
Alexander. Eisenhower attempted to ensure that Clark kept Alexander fully in-
formed about these direct discussions but did not try to stop them.292
Both the Americans and the British accepted this informal approach to the 
chain of command. It did not become a problem in itself until Alexander and Gen. 
Ronald Penney, commander of the British 1st Division, began to criticize between 
themselves the performance of General Lucas, Penney’s direct superior, during the 
Anzio landing. Penney complained that Lucas did not inspire confidence in his 
subordinates and did not know what to do about the situation after the Allies went 
ashore. (Penney had been Alexander’s signal officer prior to assuming his com-
mand within VI Corps.)293
Also, Alexander believed that Clark did not like the British. If Clark in fact did 
not, Alexander had given him a reason, by often giving instructions to division-
level commanders, Clark’s Fifth Army subordinates, directly and visiting them 
for discussions. Whatever his prior opinion of the British, Clark certainly did not 
like that, and a certain degree of animosity did develop on Clark’s side. For their 
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part, the British generally regarded Clark as excessively ambitious, as well as vain, 
temperamental, and sensitive.294 Clark argues in his memoirs that he encouraged 
cooperation and understanding to strengthen Americans’ ties with their British 
comrades.295 Truscott would write in his own memoirs of a lack of understanding 
among British and American commanders and staffs. This he recalled as being 
especially true in the case of VI Corps and its British divisions. Reportedly, Lucas 
had little trust in his British subordinate commanders or their troops, and the Brit-
ish commanders returned the favor. The VI Corps staff worked with British units 
a great deal but was not familiar with their organization, staff procedures, or tacti-
cal methods. Some American staff members failed to appreciate the difference in 
national characteristics generally and tended to be critical of all things British and 
impatient with methods that were unfamiliar to them.296
GERMAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 
There were barely enough German troops in Italy to hold the southern front and 
protect rear areas. In case of a large enemy landing, Army Group C would be threat-
ened with collapse, and reinforcements would have to come from adjacent theaters 
and Germany proper. Foreseeing this contingency, the OKW issued orders at the 
end of December 1943 to the CINCs of the West (France and the Low Countries) 
and the Southeast (the Balkans) and to the commander of the Replacement Army 
(Ersatzheer) specifying the units that would be transferred to Italy in that event. 
Kesselring thus was assured that reinforcements would be on the way shortly; until 
they arrived, however, he was to employ all immediately available forces to repulse 
the landing.297 The Germans believed that while they could not prevent an enemy 
landing, they could contain and destroy the forces that got ashore.298
By December 20, 1943, the OKW’s Joint Operations Staff (Wehrmachtfüh-
rungsstab) had prepared contingency plans in case of a major enemy landing on 
the Ligurian coast (MARDER 1) and on the Adriatic coast (MARDER 2). Each de-
tailed the movements of specific units then in southern France, southern Germany, 
or the Balkans to the Italian theater. In addition, Kesselring had prepared five con-
tingency plans of his own for, respectively, the following scenarios: a landing in the 
Rome area (Case RICHARD), near Leghorn (Case LUDWIG), in the vicinity of Genoa 
(Case GUSTAV), in the Rimini–Venice area (Case VIKTOR), and on the Istrian Pen-
insula (Case IDA) (see map 13).299 By the end of 1943 it was clear to Kesselring that 
the coast opposite Rome from Civitavecchia to Gaeta, especially Campagna, was 
particularly vulnerable. His chief preoccupation was to create a reserve to counter 
any large-scale landings. Prearranged code words would bring forces from all parts 
of the Italian Peninsula to mass at the invasion point.300
Case RICHARD called for moving forces subordinate to the Tenth and Fourteenth 
Armies, as well as the SS & Police Command, Italy; the XI Air Corps; and the 2nd 
Air Fleet. Specifically, Tenth Army would make available one of the panzer divisions 
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or panzer-grenadier (i.e., mechanized infantry) divisions in its reserve, one panzer 
reconnaissance detachment, and other smaller units. Fourteenth Army headquarters 
would be relocated from northern Italy to the Rome area. It would move combat-
ready forces of the 362nd ID, 114th Light (Jäger) ID, and two reinforced regimental 
groups, one from the 356th ID, and another from the 65th ID. The SS & Police Com-
mand would make available the 16th PzGrDiv Reichsführer-SS (less one regiment) 
and the 35th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment (PzGrRgt). XI Air Corps (redesignated as 
I Parachute Corps on January 1, 1944) would move 4th ParaDiv and some corps 
troops; 2nd Air Fleet would make available four heavy AA detachments.301
More broadly, the defense of Italy’s coast had a very high priority for the Ger-
mans. They considered all of it to be threatened by an enemy landing, ranging in 
size from the tactical—in support of enemy forces on the front line—to the “strate-
gic” (actually, operational)—meant to cut off an entire army group. Kesselring’s own 
contingency plans for defense against landings on Italy’s western and eastern coasts 
involved reaction forces created from rear-echelon troops, such as AA units along 
the coast, replacement units, engineers, and other support units. They would fight 
as infantry until maneuver units could reach the beachhead.302 For the Germans, the 
main lesson of Salerno had been that a landing force had to be thrown back into 
the sea within twenty-four hours—that is, before the enemy could deploy its artil-
lery and so consolidate the beachhead. Hence, the German reaction units had to be 
deployed close enough to the coast to reach the scene in one night’s march—being 
unable to move during daylight hours because of Allied air superiority.303
The Germans had organized five coastal-defense sectors, centered on Genoa, 
Leghorn, Rome, Rimini–Ravenna, and Istria (in the southeast theater). Each was 
fortified and guarded by small units. In October 1943, Fourteenth Army consoli-
dated the defenses on the Gothic Line (Pisa–Rimini) and between La Spezia on the 
west coast and Pesaro on the east coast. The Germans also paid attention to the de-
fense of the Voralpen (Alpine foothills) Line, stretching from the Italo-Swiss border 
to Istria. In the case of a successful enemy landing, these lines would offer prepared 
defensive positions in the rear of the central Italian front.304
For defense against a large enemy landing, Army Group C prepared orders de-
tailing which armies and independent corps would move to the threatened coastal-
defense sector. These orders pertained only to combat units and essential service 
troops; the remaining forces would stay in their respective sectors. For security, the 
various defense sectors had code designations. Army Group C issued a timetable 
for alerting and redeploying specific units. It assigned to all units their march and 
convoy routes; gave the locations of dumps for fuel, munitions, and food rations; 
assigned troops to road and bridge repair; and provided for communications dur-
ing the march. All rear-area forces were to be prepared to repulse airborne land-
ings. All affected units were to be ready to start moving between eight and twelve 
hours after the alert was received.305
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Map 3: GERMAN CONTINGENCY PLANS, 20 DECEMBER 1943
Map 13
German contingency plans, 
December 20, 1943
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Army Group C was well aware of the inadequacy of the fortifications and forces 
close to the coast. Neither OKW nor Army Group C believed it possible to de-
fend Italy’s coast successfully against a large amphibious landing with the forces on 
hand. Nevertheless, the Germans made constant efforts to strengthen what they 
considered threatened sectors. They emplaced additional coastal guns, constructed 
obstacles, mined offshore waters, and inundated certain coastal areas. But the situ-
ation on Tenth Army’s front limited the extent to which forces could be spared for 
coastal defense. Whenever an enemy offensive caused a crisis on its front, rein-
forcements were sent from northern Italy, weakening those potentially available to 
coastal defenses.306 
Prior to the Allied landing at Anzio-Nettuno, only three divisions of Fourteenth 
Army were combat ready—the 44th ID, the 90th PzGrDiv, and the 334th ID—and 
all of them had been transferred to Tenth Army. At the same time, the battle-weary 
65th ID was moved from Ortona, south of Pescara on the Adriatic coast, to north-
ern Italy. The Germans had activated the 278th ID and the 16th SS PzGrDiv. Also, 
the OKW had directed Fourteenth Army to release the 371st ID for redeployment 
to the Eastern Front. All this left Fourteenth Army with only eight divisions—none 
of them fully combat ready.307
The situation west of Rome was especially acute. The Germans had long con-
sidered it possible that the Allies might land in Tenth Army’s rear to support Allied 
forces on that front. However, Fourteenth Army was unable to accept the additional 
responsibility of defense south of Rome; for its part, OKW was unwilling to weaken 
defenses any further in northern Italy, because of uncertainty about whether the en-
emy intended to land west or south of Rome, in the Gulf of Genoa, or on the Istrian 
Peninsula. For this reason, Tenth Army was left to secure on its own the coastal sector 
in the vicinity of Rome; Tenth Army, in turn, gave I ParaCorps this responsibility.308
After World War II, some of Kesselring’s staff officers, in interviews with rep-
resentatives of the U.S. Army’s Information Office, would state that OKW had be-
lieved the most probable areas for an enemy landing to be Genoa, Leghorn, Rome, 
Venice, and Istria. Of these, they would recall, the most critical had been that around 
Rome, because an enemy landing there would cut off Tenth Army communications, 
probably causing a rapid collapse of the southern front.309 When, therefore, OKW 
received in early January more information pointing to a landing in the Rome area, 
it decided to replace the 3rd PzGrDiv with the much stronger 90th PzGrDiv, then 
on the Adriatic coast. A lull in the first two weeks of January allowed the Germans 
to do so.310 The regrouping started on January 10.311 The 29th and 90th PzDivs of I 
ParaCorps were assigned to the coastal sector, and the Hermann Göring PzDiv was 
held as a mobile reserve, between Rome and the southern front.312
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OPPOSING COMMANDERS AND FORCES, JANUARY 22, 1944
The Allies initially enjoyed a large superiority in forces on the ground, and their 
strength at sea and in the air was overwhelming for the duration of the Anzio-
Nettuno operation. 
The Allies
General Alexander’s 15th Army Group was the highest command echelon of ground 
forces on the Italian mainland. Alexander personally had intelligence, good looks, 
and charm—everything came easily to him. An imperturbable coolness made him 
appear unconcerned even in moments of the gravest crisis; Alexander always gave 
the impression that he had something in reserve. For him, no situation was so hope-
less that it did not allow of some remedy.313 General Brooke would say that Alexander 
never had “the slightest doubt that all would come out right in the end.”314 Alexander 
was charming, gallant, and professional, more persuasive than forceful. In planning, 
he always sought the advice of his subordinates. He listened to their arguments and 
thought aloud. Alexander would never impose a decision on an unwilling subordi-
nate commander. In his view, if he did so a subordinate would have misgivings, and 
if the operation failed, would lose confidence in Alexander. Less appealingly, how-
ever, Alexander’s operations were neither daring nor creative.315 
Fifth Army, led by General Clark, was the command most directly involved 
in Operation SHINGLE. Clark had graduated 110th in a class of 139 from the U.S. 
Military Academy, at West Point, in 1917; had been wounded in World War I; and 
passed through the Army War College, class of 1937. He had earned a reputation 
as one of the U.S. Army’s most talented (and ambitious) officers. Yet he had never 
commanded a large formation in combat before he took over Fifth Army.316 For 
most of his career, Clark had served in various training establishments and staffs. 
He had been Gen. Lesley McNair’s staff operations officer. In June 1942, Clark took 
command of U.S. ground forces in the European theater; that November he be-
came Eisenhower’s deputy. Clark made a secret and dangerous submarine trip to 
North Africa just prior to the Allied invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH). 
Now forty-eight, he was much younger than most lieutenant generals—he had 
been promoted to that grade from lieutenant colonel in just three years. Clark 
was aggressive, hardworking, and efficient; Eisenhower thought that Clark was 
“the best organizer, planner, and trainer of troops that I have met.” Before Clark’s 
Fifth Army had made the landing at Salerno he had (because of his youth and in-
experience) shown great deference to his superiors. However, after Salerno he had 
become more self-assured and less deferential. Clark was cordial with the British, 
although he grew disenchanted with them. In general, he tried to hide his sensibili-
ties behind a mask of coldness.317
The main Fifth Army was deployed along a thirty-five-mile-long front line 
stretching from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Abruzzi National Park. On the left flank 
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was the British 10 Corps (Lt. Gen. Richard L. McCreery); the U.S. II Corps (Maj. 
Gen. Geoffrey Keyes) held the central part of the front. On the right was the FEC 
(General Juin). The Allied positions were a short distance from a line between the 
Garigliano and Rapido Rivers.318
General Lucas, at the head of VI Corps, had been characterized by General Mar-
shall as having “military stature, prestige, and experience.” He had assumed com-
mand of VI Corps at Salerno on September 20, 1943, when Clark relieved Maj. 
Gen. Ernest J. Dawley, who appeared to be a victim of battle fatigue and stress. 
General Clark wanted an experienced corps commander who could reestablish 
leadership of the corps’s operations at Salerno.319
As finalized, the “first wave” consisted of the U.S. 3rd ID, the British 1st Division, 
the 46th Royal Tank Regiment, the U.S. 751st Tank Battalion, the U.S. 504th Para-
chute Infantry Battalion, three U.S. Ranger battalions, and two British commando 
battalions (see sidebar “VI Corps Composition, January 22, 1944”). The 45th ID 
(Combat Command A, a task-organized combined-arms unit of about brigade size) 
would be in reserve as reinforcement once the lodgment had been established.320 
Enough LSTs being available, it was proposed to send as the first follow-up force 
the U.S. 1st Armored Division (Combat Command B) and one RCT of the 45th ID, 
plus three more battalions of the corps artillery. The timing of the follow-on force 
would depend on how quickly the assault convoy could turn around. That, in turn, 
was contingent on the weather and enemy resistance. It also was decided provision-
ally to send the remainder of the 45th ID and the 1st Armored Division.321 
VI Corps Composition, January 22,1944
(Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas; HQ / HQ Co.)
Antiaircraft Artillery
35th AAA Bde
68th Coast Artillery Rgt (AA) (minus 3rd Bn)
Armor
1st Armored Division (Combat Command B)
(Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon)
6th Armd InfRgt
1st Armd Rgt
27th/91st Armored Field ArtyBns (105 mm howitzers) 
Attached to 1st Armored Division:
191st TankBn
751st TankBn
81st Armd Recce Bn
18th Field ArtyBde
35th Field ArtyGrp
15th Field Arty Observation Bn
1st Battalion, 36th Field ArtyRgt (155 mm guns) 
1st Battalion, 77th Field ArtyRgt (155 mm howitzers)
141st/938th Field ArtyRgt (155 mm howitzers) 
69th Armored Field ArtyRgt (105 mm howitzers) 
456th Parachute Field ArtyBn (minus Batteries C and D) (75 mm pack howitzers)
 THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO 183 182 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
976th/977th Field ArtyBns (155 mm guns) 
434th AAA Automatic Weapons Bn
Infantry
3rd Infantry Division
(Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott)
3rd CavRecce Troops (Mechanized)
9th Field ArtyBn (155 mm howitzers)
7th RCT
 7th InfRgt 
 10th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers) 
15th RCT
 15th InfRgt 
 39th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers) 
30th RCT
 30th InfRgt
 41st Field ArtyBn
Attached to 3rd Infantry Division:
441st AAA Automatic Weapons Bn
601st Tank Destroyer Bn 
45th Infantry Division (Combat Command A)
(Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles)
45th CavRecce Troop (Mechanized)
189th Field ArtyBn (155 mm howitzers)
 157th RCT
 157th InfRgt
158th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)
179th RCT
 179th InfRgt
 160th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)
180th RCT
 180th InfRgt
 171st Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)




 645th Tank Destroyer Bn
British 1st Division 
(Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)
1st Division Royal Artillery 





46th Royal Tank Rgt
56th (London) Infantry Division 
(Maj. Gen. G. W. R. Templer)
64, 65, and 113 Field Rgts RA





701st Tank Destroyer Bn
894th Tank Destroyer Bn
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Task Force 81 Composition, January 22, 1944
81 Control Force
VI Corps (Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas)
U.S. 3rd ID (Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott)
British 1st Armoured Division (Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)
81.1 Force Flagship (Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry) 
USS Biscayne (AVP 11)
USS Frederick C. Davis (DE 136) 
 81.10 Beach Company Group
 1st Navy Beach Bn
 81.11 Salvage Group
 1 ARS (Prosperous)
 81.12 Air Navigation Group
 2 PTs 
 81.13 Loading Control Group
Admiral Lowry was responsible for mounting, embarking, and landing the 
ground force and supporting it until the beachhead was established.322 The as-
sault convoy consisted of two command ships, four Liberty cargo ships, eight LSIs, 
eighty-four LSTs, ninety-six LCIs, and fifty LCTs, escorted by cruisers, destroyers, 
and a large number of smaller naval vessels (see sidebar “Task Force 81 Composi-
tion, January 22, 1944”).323 TF 81 consisted of the X-RAY and PETER forces, respec-
tively. Lowry commanded seventy-four ships of the X-RAY force carrying American 
troops, Admiral Troubridge ninety-four ships of the PETER force with the British 
part of VI Corps.324 
The X-RAY force was divided into several functional groups: a control group 
of two flagships, a minesweeper group (to establish a mine-free channel), and an 
escort group (for antiair and antisubmarine defense). A beach identification group 
would precede the assault craft to locate the beaches accurately and mark them 
with colored lights. Then three landing-craft groups would land the assault waves. 
The 1st Naval Beach Battalion would follow the first wave to improve the mark-
ing of beach approaches and control boat traffic. After daylight a salvage group 
1st Special Service Force (“Devil’s Brigade”)




6615th Ranger Force 





2,700 aircraft (more than half based at Brindisi, Foggia, and Termoli)
Sources:  Forsythe et al., Cassino and Anzio, pp. 254–60; Clark, Anzio, pp. 274–77; Molony, Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the 
Campaign in Italy, pp. 648–49, 653; Wilhelmsmeyer, Der Krieg In Italien, pp. 240–41.
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 81.14 Return Convoy Group 
 1 LCI (L) 
 81.2 Ranger Group (Capt. E. C. L. Turner, RN)
 2 LSI (M)s (Royal Ulsterman, Princess Beatrix)
 1 transport (Winchester Castle)
 1 LST, 3 LCTs, 3 SCs, 1 LCI (H)
X-rAy Force (Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry)
 81.3 red Beach Group (Cdr. William O. Floyd, USN)
 12 LSTs, 31 LCI (L)s, 22 LCTs; British: 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT (R), 4 PCs, SCs
 81.4 Green Beach Group (Cdr. O. F. Gregor, USN)
 1 LCI (L) (flagship)
 2 British LSI (L)s (Circasia, Ascania)
 16 LCI (L)s, 11 LCTs, 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT (R), 2 PCs, 2 SCs
 81.5 First Follow-Up Group (Capt. J. P. Clay, USN)
 39 British LSTs, 20 LCI (L)s, 7 LCTs
 81.6 Escort Group (Capt. J. P. Clay, USN)
 1 DD (Plunkett) (flagship)
 4 DDs (Gleaves, Niblack, HMS Croome, HHMS Themistocles)
 2 DEs (Herbert C. Jones, Frederick C. Davis)
 2 AMs (Ready, Sustain)
 81.7 Sweeper Group (Cdr. A. H. Richards, USN) 
 1 AM (Pilot) (flagship)
 7 AMs (Strive, Pioneer, Portent, Symbol, Dextrous, Sway, Prevail)
 14 YMSs
 1 SC
 X-rAy Fire Support Group 
  81.8 Gunfire Support Group (Capt. Robert W. Cary)
  81.8.2 Fire Support Group One 
  1 DD (Mayo) 
  1 LCG
  81.8.2 Fire Support Group Two
  2 DDs (Woolsey, Ludlow) 
  1 LCG
  81.8.3 Fire Support Group Three 
  1 CL (HMS Penelope)
  1 DD (Edison)
  81.8.4 Fire Support Group Four 
  1 CL (Brooklyn) 
  1 DD (Trippe)
  81.8.5 Rocket and AA Support Group 
  3 LCT (R)s, 1 LCF
  81.9 Beach Identification Group
  1 SS (HMS Uproar, P31)
  1 DD (Crete) 
  3 PCs, 2 SCs
Peter Force (Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge, RN)
British 1st ArmdDiv 
4 transports (HMS Bulolo, Glengyle, Derbyshire, Sobieski [Polish])
2 AA and fighter-direction ships (HMS Ulster Queen, Palomares)
8 DDs (HMS Beaufort, Brecon, Englefield, Kempenfelt, Tenacious, Tetcott, Urchin, Wilton)
2 gunboats (HNLMS Flores, Soemba)
6 minesweepers (HMS Bude, Rothsay, Rinaldo, Fly, Cadmus, Waterwitch)
4 PCs (trawlers) (HMT Two Step, Sheppey, Hornpipe, St. Kilda)
14 British LSTs, 5 U.S. LSTs, 2 LCG (L)s, 31 LCIs, 1 LCI (H), 1 LCT (R)
2 PCs (U.S.)
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would lay pontoon causeways for unloading heavier craft. A loading control group 
at Naples would handle berthing and loading of craft there.325
MAAF had about 2,600 aircraft, organized in nearly fifty-nine squadrons (twenty-
two fighter, six fighter-bomber, four light-bomber, twenty-four medium-bomber, 
and two and a half reconnaissance).326 About 75 percent of the Allied aircraft were 
operational. In late 1943 they had been moved from North Africa to new bases on 
Sardinia, Corsica, and the mainland of Italy. The MAAF’s B-17 and B-24 heavy 
bombers were used for strategic bombing. Its B-25 Mitchell, B-26 Marauder, and 
Wellington medium bombers were to attack targets fifty to a hundred miles be-
hind the enemy front. The MAAF’s A-20 Havoc and Martin 187 Baltimore medium 
bombers would destroy installations and facilities closer to the front. De Havilland 
Mosquitoes and A-36 Apaches (also known as Invaders) provided direct support to 
ground troops. Spitfire, Hurricane, P-38 Lightning, P-40 Hawk, P-47 Thunderbolt, 
and P-51 Mustang fighters escorted Allied bombers and intercepted and destroyed 
enemy fighters.327
The Germans
On the German side, all ground forces in the Italian theater were subordinate to 
Army Group C, led by Field Marshal Kesselring, who was, as noted, also CINC 
Southwest. Kesselring was one of the best German commanders in World War II.328 
He was a born leader, highly intelligent and always open to new ideas.329 Kesselring 
was by nature genial, optimistic, and cheerful. He had a great and rare ability to 
distinguish between what was essential and what could be disregarded. He had a 
strong sense of what it was possible to accomplish.330 A Luftwaffe officer, he had no 
experience as an army field commander, but he had a cool head, reacted quickly to 
unforeseen events, and made sound decisions. Kesselring was extremely effective 
in conducting a delaying defense in Italy. He applied the principle of mobility and 
always had a reserve available.331
1 oiler (British Chancellor)
1 net tender (HMS Barndale)
2 tugs (U.S.) (Evea, Edenshaw)
4 hospital ships (HMS St. Julien, St. Andrew, Leinster, St. David)
1 beacon submarine (HMS Ultor, P53)
 Peter Force Fire Support Group (Rear Adm. J. M. Mansfield, RN)
 81.8.6 British Bombarding Squadron 
 2 CLs (HMS Spartan, Orion [flagship])
 4 DDs (Laforey, Loyal, Jervis, Janus)
Sources: Operation Plan Nr. 147-43, pp. 1–2; Annex F: Gunfire Support Plan Nr. 153-43, p. 1; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, 
app. 3, “Naval Forces Engaged in the Assault on Anzio, 22 January 1944," pp. 395–97.
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The German ground forces under Kesselring comprised Tenth and Four-
teenth Armies, totaling twenty-four divisions. Fourteenth Army, under Gen. 
Eberhard von Mackensen, was deployed north of the Grosseto–Ancona line. 
It consisted of eleven and a half divisions, of which four were in the process of 
forming and four were in defensive positions. Tenth Army, under Gen. Heinrich 
von Vietinghoff genannt (known as) Scheel, consisted on January 20, 1944, of 
two army corps plus one panzer and one infantry division. Opposed to the Brit-
ish Eighth Army was LXXVI PzCorps, with four divisions; Fifth Army faced 
four divisions of XIV PzCorps.332 (For details see sidebar “German Order of 
Battle, January 1944.”)
In the late fall of 1943, the Axis powers had about two thousand aircraft in the 
Mediterranean. However, no more than 50 percent of them were operational. Some 
five hundred Italian aircraft were considered obsolete and of little combat value. By 
the end of 1943 the Luftwaffe had about 550 aircraft in service in Italy, southern 
France, and the Balkans. However, almost all the heavy bombers were withdrawn 
from Italy, leaving only about fifty Ju-88s in Greece and Crete and some sixty Ju-
88s, He-111s, and Dornier Do-217s in southern France. Most of the fighters, some 
230 Messerschmitt Me-109s and Focke-Wulf Fw-190s, were in Italy, about a third 
of them at fields around Rome.333 On December 31, 1943, 2nd Air Fleet had in ser-
vice 288 aircraft (147 of them operational). The overall number included 184 fight-
ers (seventy-eight operational) and thirty-one reconnaissance aircraft (twenty-five 
German Order of Battle, January 1944
Supreme Commander, Southwest / Army Group C
 (Oberbefehlshaber, Südwest / Heeresgruppe C)
(Field Marshal Albert Kesselring)
Tenth Army (January 20, 1944)
(Gen. Heinrich Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel)
XIV Panzer Corps 
(Gen. of Panzer Troops Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin)
15th PzGrDiv (Lt. Gen. Eberhard Rodt)
16th SS PzGrDiv (SS-Gruppenführer Max Simon)
71st ID (Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Raapke)
94th ID (Lt. Gen. Bernhard Steinmetz)
LI Mountain Corps
(Gen. of Mountain Troops Valentin Feuerstein)
1st ParaDiv (Lt. Gen. Richard Heidrich)
44th GrDiv “Hoch und Deutschmeister” (Maj. Gen. Hans-Günther von Rost)
5th Mountain Div (Maj. Gen. Max-Günther Schrank)
Group Hauck 
(Gen. of Artillery Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck)
305th ID (Gen. of Artillery Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck)
334th ID (Maj. Gen. Helmuth Böhlke)
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Fourteenth Army (February 9, 1944)
(Gen. Eberhard von Mackensen)
I Parachute Corps
(Gen. Alfred Schlemm)
4th ParaDiv (Maj. Gen. Heinrich Trettner)
65th ID (Maj. Gen. Helmuth Pfeiffer)
29th PzGrDiv (Lt. Gen. Walther Fries)
715th ID (Motorized) (Maj. Gen. Hans-Georg Hildebrandt)
114th Light (Jäger) Div (formerly 714th ID) (Lt. Gen. Karl Eglseer)
LXXVI Army Corps
(Gen. Traugott Herr)
Hermann Göring PzDiv (Maj. Gen. Paul Conrath)
3rd PzGrDiv (Lt. Gen. Fritz-Hubert Gräser)
26th PzDiv (Lt. Gen. Smilo Freiherr von Lüttwitz)
362nd ID (Lt. Gen. Heinz Greiner)
Independent Regiments
Inf Training (Lehr) Rgt
1027th Reinforced PzGrRgt (2 Bns)
1028th Reinforced PzGrRgt (2 Bns)
Directly Subordinate to the Fourteenth Army
“Nembo” Bn / ParaRgt “Folgore” (Capt. Corradino Alvino) (Italian Social Republic)
“Barbarigo” Bn / Decima Flottiglia MAS (Capt. Umberto Bardelli) (Italian Social Republic)
German Forces Defending the Bridgehead, January 28, 1944:
ParaPzDiv Hermann Göring (1 PzRgt; 2 PzGrRgts)
29th PzGrDiv (1 PzGrRgt; 1 RecceDet)
3rd PzGrDiv (2 PzRgts)
15th PzGrDiv (2 PzRgts)
90th PzGrDiv (1 PzRgt)
16th SS PzGrDiv (2 PzGrRgts)
1st Para Light Div (1 Para Light Rgt; 1 Para Machine Gun Bn)
4th Para Light Div (3 Para Light Rgts)
65th ID (3 GrRgts)
71st ID (3 GrRgts)
356th ID (1 RecceDet)
114th Light Div (1 Light Rgt)
Inf Training (Lehr) Rgt
Para Light Training (Lehr) Rgt
2nd Luftwaffe Light Bn
Sources: Clark, Anzio, pp. 277–78; D’Este, Fatal Decision, pp. 444–48; Wilhelmsmeyer, Der Krieg in Italien, p. 247; Molony, 
Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, pp. 653, 663–65.
operational).334 Specifically, the Germans had operational eighteen short-range Me-
109s and seven Ju-88/Me-410 long-range reconnaissance aircraft.335 By January 20, 
1944, 2nd Air Fleet had 337 aircraft, among them two hundred fighters (136 opera-
tional) and twenty-five short-range (twenty operational) and six long-range (two 
operational) reconnaissance aircraft.336
The Kriegsmarine had in Italy only three S-boats and two U-boats.337 On Janu-
ary 1 thirteen U-boats were deployed in the Mediterranean, but only three were at 
sea during that month.338
FIFTH ARMY’S JANUARY OFFENSIVE
On January 12, Fifth Army resumed its offensive against the Gustav Line (see map 
14). The FEC attacked in the direction of Monte Cassino, and the British 10 Corps 
advanced across the lower Garigliano River toward Minturno–Ausonia (Operation 
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PANTHER).339 The attackers gained initial successes with the assistance of a surprise 
landing of strong forces west of the mouth of the Garigliano.340
Alexander issued Operational Instruction Nr. 34, “The Battle for Rome,” on Jan-
uary 12. The forces of the Fifth Army, it stated, “have now started a series of opera-
tions on their present front designed to break through the enemy’s main defensive 
positions in the area south of Cassino, and to draw in his reserves. These operations 
will culminate with an attack by two corps across the Rapido River on or about 20 
January.”341 In paragraph 3 of the same document, Alexander stated that Fifth Army 
would also prepare an amphibious operation
to land a corps of two divisions and the necessary corps troops, followed by a strong and 
fully mobile striking force based on elements of a third division in the Nettuno area. The 
“object[ive] of this operation will be to cut the enemy’s main communications in the Colli  
Laziali area southeast of Rome and to threaten the rear of the 14 Army [actually Panzer] 
Corps.” Weather permitting this amphibious operation will be launched on 22 January 
which will be D-Day. The decision whether the weather is suitable or not will be made by 
the CINC 15th Army Group in consultation with the CINC of the Mediterranean [Fleet]. If 
the weather prohibits its being launched on 22 January it will be postponed from day to day 
until the weather is suitable. It will not be postponed for any other reason than because of 
weather.342 
Alexander stressed the importance of not allowing the enemy “any respite in 
which to reorganize or take up new positions.”343 The mission of the main Fifth 
Army was to force the enemy to withdraw to the north of Rome, in the process 
inflicting maximum enemy losses south of Rome. At the same time, the neigh-
boring Eighth Army would “maintain sufficient pressure on the enemy forces to 
prevent movement of the 76 German Corps [LXXVI PzCorps] to the Fifth Army 
front.”344 The enemy, Alexander predicted, would be compelled to react to the threat 
posed by the landing to his communications and rear, giving the Allied forces an 
opportunity to break through the German main defenses; the main Fifth Army 
and VI Corps would “join hands at the earliest possible moment.” Afterward, Fifth 
Army would advance past Rome as quickly as possible and reach the general line 
of Terni–Viterbo–Civitavecchia. The objective for Eighth Army was more distant, 
the Ravenna–Rimini–Faenza (some thirty miles southeast of Bologna) line; Fifth 
Army would meanwhile carry on to the Pistoia–Florence–Pisa line.345
Further, Alexander laid out, a naval task force under the command of Rear 
Admiral Lowry “will be supporting the amphibious operation.”346 As for aviation, 
the missions of the Tactical Air Force (assisted by the Strategic Air Force) prior 
to D-day were, in order of priority, destroying enemy air forces and attacking rail 
communications north of Rome. After D-day, the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces 
would concentrate on the following, again in order of priority: maintenance of air 
superiority over the battle area, interruption (interdiction) of enemy road commu-
nications leading to the area of the amphibious operation, and attacks on enemy 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Offensive by main Fifth 
Army, January 17–20, and 
Anzio-Nettuno landing, 
January 22, 1944
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columns approaching the area of the amphibious operation and also troop concen-
trations within striking distance of the beaches.347
On January 16, the main Fifth Army G-2 issued what proved to be a false and 
highly optimistic assessment of the enemy’s situation and intentions. Among other 
things, it estimated that “within the last few days there have been increasing indica-
tions that enemy strength on the Fifth Army front is ebbing, due to casualties, exhaus-
tion, and possibly lowering of morale. One of the causes of this condition, no doubt, 
has been the recent, continuous Allied attacks.”348 Moreover, it appeared doubtful, in 
view of that weakening, that “the enemy [could] hold [an] organized defensive line 
through Cassino against a co-ordinated army attack. Since this attack is to be launched 
before SHINGLE, it is considered likely that this additional thrust will cause him to 
withdraw from his defensive position once he has appreciated the magnitude of that 
operation.”349
In heavy fighting on January 18 and 19, British forces crossed the lower Gari-
gliano River on a wide front. It appeared that the German front in the south would 
indeed collapse. The bulk of the Hermann Göring PzDiv and all local reserves al-
ready had been committed, and the 3rd PzGrDiv and 71st ID could not arrive before 
the 22nd.350 ULTRA disclosed that the Fifth Army offensive was in fact against German 
reserves from the Rome area: General Senger und Etterlin, commander of the XIV 
PzCorps, had asked for reinforcements, and Kesselring, confident that there would 
be no seaborne landing in his rear, had agreed to send the 29th and 90th PzGrDivs to 
the front line on January 18—exactly what Alexander had hoped to accomplish.351 
It is not known whether the G-2s privately revised their views on receiving reports 
about the movement of the two German divisions to the Gustav Line. In any case, 
they were not authorized to disseminate changes to their estimates that would com-
promise ULTRA sources.352 
Nevertheless, and despite successive attacks, neither the French nor the British 
were able to break through the German mountain defenses. On January 20, the U.S. 
II Corps tried to cross the Rapido River; after two days of bitter fighting and heavy 
losses, that attack too proved unsuccessful. By the 22nd the attack on the Gustav 
Line had bogged down amid strong German counterattacks. It would prove fortu-
nate for the Allies at Anzio, however, that the German Tenth Army had been forced 
to commit most of its operational reserves.353
On January 18, ULTRA disclosed that Hitler had ordered Kesselring to commit a 
major part of his forces on the Foro position (also called the Hitler Line).354 ULTRA 
also intercepted Kesselring’s situation assessment the same day—that only two bat-
talions and two engineer companies were left in the Rome area, too weak to repulse 
even a strong commando raid. In other words, for several hours the roads to Rome 
were wide open. However, that message was not decrypted in time to change Alex-
ander’s or Clark’s plans.355 
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On January 20, ULTRA learned that the I ParaCorps headquarters would take 
over operational command on the main front, relocating from near Rome at 0900 
on January 21. Its eastern boundary would coincide with what had been the western 
boundary of the 15th PzGrDiv on the Gustav Line, and its mission was to regain that 
line. The movement left the Anzio-Rome area essentially without effective combat 
assets to respond to the Anzio-Nettuno landing.356 Only two weak battalions of 29th 
PzGrDiv remained south of the Tiber River in a position to oppose VI Corps.357
After the Anzio landing on January 22, the Allies would learn from ULTRA that 
the headquarters of I ParaCorps had assumed control over the 24th, 90th, and 
29th Divisions. That meant initial German resistance at the beachhead in the first 
few hours would be light, because the nearest reserves were committed elsewhere. 
However, that intelligence was unknown to Lucas, because security regulations 
prohibited Fifth Army HQ from sharing ULTRA with him, a corps commander. 
Also, neither the 29th nor the 90th PzGrDiv was identified by contact in combat 
until January 22.358 During the first three weeks of January ULTRA revealed that the 
Germans had repeatedly misinterpreted the movements of Allied naval vessels in 
the Mediterranean. For example, the Germans apparently were unconcerned by 
the disappearance of landing craft from Bizerte. Also, they assessed that Allied 
carriers were in the eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of reinforcing land-
based aircraft.359
Notwithstanding, the Germans were very interested in Allied amphibious ships 
and craft in the Mediterranean theater, and ULTRA read the reports of German 
reconnaissance aircraft collecting information on them. For example, on January 
12 the Kriegsmarine reported that enemy naval vessels had left Gibraltar on the 
night of January 5/6 bound for the Gulf of Taranto, calling at Algiers and Malta. 
On arrival, they would await, the German analysts assessed, four smaller units that 
had left Gibraltar on January 8 or 9. An aircraft carrier was in Sicilian waters. A 
large convoy would leave Gibraltar between the 12th and 15th bound for Barletta 
(on the southern Adriatic coast of Italy), carrying English troops whose equipment 
suggested they were destined for landing operations. On January 14, ULTRA inter-
cepts disclosed reporting from German agents that “an Anglo-American landing 
intended on the night of 23 or 24 January” was being planned, possibly in Italy or 
Greece.360 It also revealed that Kesselring had directed one of three battalions of the 
Hermann Göring PzDiv to watch the coast in the rear of the 94th ID. This meant 
that Kesselring was strengthening coastal defenses somewhere around Gaeta with 
thirty or forty tanks.361 An ULTRA intercept on January 15 made clear the level of 
German concern over an imminent amphibious landing: Kesselring had the pre-
vious day directed X Air Corps to conduct high-altitude photoreconnaissance of 
Port Said, with special attention to carriers and landing craft.362 ULTRA revealed 
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that Kesselring knew the identification and location of each of the fifteen Allied 
divisions, even the American units in Sicily as of January 7 just prior to the Anzio 
operation.363
THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
On January 19–20, activity in the port of Naples and its satellite harbors greatly in-
tensified as troops, weapons, equipment, and supplies were embarked. The sched-
ule had been prepared and coordinated by the joint loading board of the Peninsular 
Base Section, Fifth Army, and by VI Corps.
 
Each division was responsible for its 
own loading areas, movement to the docks, and embarkation. Vehicles were wa-
terproofed in division areas and loaded on January 19.364 The troops of X-RAY force 
were loaded at four locations in the Gulf of Naples. The PETER force was assembled 
in the afternoon of January 21 north of Capri.365 The initial assault force of fifty 
thousand men, 5,200 vehicles, and some 375 ships and craft was comparable in size 
to that which had landed at Salerno in September 1943.366
General Lucas established his command post on board the small seaplane tender 
Biscayne on the afternoon of the 20th. The weather forecast predicted negligible 
swell and a thick morning haze to cover the landing beaches. That same day, TF 
81 received confirmation that D-day would be January 22 and H-hour, 0200.367 At 
0500 on January 21, the ships of TF 81 put to sea.368
The distance from Naples to the Anzio-Nettuno beaches is some 110 miles. The 
convoys sortied, rendezvoused, and approached the beaches exactly as planned.369 
TF 81’s track from the Gulf of Naples to Anzio was roundabout, to keep the ships 
clear of minefields and conceal their destination as long as possible.370 Proceed-
ing at about five knots, the assault convoy passed four to twelve miles seaward of 
Ischia and the Pontine Islands.371 The LCTs and other landing craft of X-RAY force, 
however, took a shorter course, closer to shore. Minesweepers were ahead of the 
convoy; cruisers and destroyers protected the flanks against U-boats and torpedo 
boats; fighters provided air cover.372 The sea was calm, the temperature about fifty-
five degrees Fahrenheit, and the ceiling about six thousand feet—good for air re-
connaissance and attacks.373 However, TF 81 was not detected during its transit.374 
Reportedly, the last German air reconnaissance of the port of Naples had been on 
December 11, 1943.375 When the convoy came within five miles of reference vessel 
CHARLIE (about three and a half miles from the center point of the landing beaches) 
it reduced speed by half a knot to allow stragglers to catch up.376
Also on January 22, just before the landing force moved to the beach, the British 
bombardment group composed of two light cruisers (HMS Orion, Spartan) and 
four destroyers (HMS Janus, Jervis, Laforey, and Loyal) attacked the coastal batter-
ies at Terracina. The 12th Minesweeping Flotilla cleared mines for the transit of the 
bombardment force through the Gulf of Gaeta.377
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The Landing
At 0005 on January 22, in the darkness of a moonless night, the Allied assault 
force dropped anchor off Anzio-Nettuno.378 Lucas would later remark that it had 
“achieved what is certainly one of the most complete surprises in history.” However, 
Clark and others who possessed ULTRA information recognized that the surprise 
was only limited and tactical. In any case, the factors that had contributed to it in-
cluded the wireless silence TF 81 maintained during its transit; inadequate German 
air and sea reconnaissance; the absence of German radar posts on the western coast 
south of Piombino; and, more broadly, a failure of German military intelligence.379
As discussed earlier, Allied troops and landing craft had been assembled at Cor-
sica and Sardinia for a deception effort.380 During the night of January 21/22, the 
British cruiser Dido, the French destroyer Le Fantasque, and the British destroyer 
Inglefield conducted a diversionary bombardment of Civitavecchia. At daybreak 
this force moved south to bombard the coast between Formia and Terracina to 
check any enemy reinforcements toward Anzio.381 Allied coastal craft also made 
dummy landings. The Germans, preoccupied by heavy fighting along the Gustav 
Line, paid little attention to the diversionary landing.382 In general, ULTRA did not 
reveal whether the Germans believed the deception story the various diversions 
had been designed to convey. It seems, however, that they did not: they conducted 
no troop movements in apparent response, as if discounting the credibility of these 
distractions and preferring to rely on their aerial reconnaissance to warn them of 
actual, imminent amphibious attack.383
The landing at Anzio-Nettuno was carried out as planned (see map 15). All the 
waves except the DUKWs (which did not roll out of their LSTs until 0400) landed 
within two minutes of their scheduled times. Some LCIs grounded on the inner 
bar and unloaded via LCVPs. The CHARLIE reference vessel proved effective.384 In 
the PETER sector, a British submarine, HMS Ultor (P53), had helped minesweepers 
clear mines at 2030 on D–1. However, because of inadequate rehearsal, gear was 
fouled, and there were near collisions and narrow escapes from floating mines.385
The PETER force arrived at its landing sector at about midnight.386 At H–10 (ear-
lier than planned), two British LCT (R)s launched a powerful five-minute barrage 
of five-inch rockets;387 they fired some eight hundred rockets.388 Two cruisers (USS 
Brooklyn and HMS Penelope) and five U.S. destroyers also provided fire support. 
In X-RAY force’s sector, fire support was provided by Orion and Spartan. In reserve 
were two Dutch gunboats, Flores and Soemba.389 Enemy movements detected on 
the coast road in the Formia area brought shelling by Dido and a destroyer.390 The 
Tactical Air Force flew about 810 sorties in support of the landing on D-day, while 
the Strategic Air Force conducted operational fires, attacking the enemy airfields 
in southern France.391
In the PETER sector, both the LSTs and LCTs unloaded over pontoon cause-
ways. Ten LSTs assigned to PETER were sent to X-RAY for unloading.392 Unloading 
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on PETER beaches was complicated by sandy cliffs that extended some four miles 
northward from the lighthouse. The LCTs did not beach until 0645 and, owing to 
the absence of exits from the beach and delays in rigging causeways, did not unload 
until 1045.393 Because of the unfavorable beach gradient, troops disembarking from 
LSTs had to wade over three hundred feet to shore. Everything except infantry had 
to roll ashore over a causeway, and only a single ship could unload at a time. Also, 
the movement of vehicles off the beach was impeded by soft and boggy ground.394 
By 1600 on D+1 all SHINGLE assault craft had been unloaded except on the PETER 
beaches, and those were completed during the night of D+1. On D+3, the PETER 
beaches closed out; the craft and three pontoon sections there were sent to the X-
RAY beaches, the latter under tow.395 
In the X-RAY sector, two miles east of Nettuno, the 3rd ID landed on RED and 
GREEN Beaches. A British submarine, HMS Uproar (P31), had guided through the 
approach lanes a force of twenty-three minesweepers, which found only a few mines 
there.396 The larger ships were discharged quickly over pontoons laid in threes. By 
1500 on D-day, supplies were being trucked directly to the VI Corps dumps. Mean-
while, the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment cleared the port of Nettuno, which was 
by early afternoon able to receive four LSTs and three LCTs simultaneously.397
TF 81 did not have precise information on the enemy minefields. The only 
mines found were in the fire-support area, within the twenty-five-fathom curve. 
One minesweeper, USS Portent, was sunk by a mine;398 the AA ship HMS Palomares 
and the destroyer USS Mayo were damaged.399
The Luftwaffe’s initial missions were to hinder the enemy buildup and attack 
supply shipping, mainly with torpedo and glide bombers.400 But the Luftwaffe flew 
only 140 sorties on D-day, January 22.401 At about 0850, eighteen to twenty-eight 
fighter-bombers made three attacks on the unloading areas but sank only a single 
160-foot LCI.402 That same day, Allied aircraft flew 1,200 sorties.403 Their main tar-
gets were the roads leading to the landing beaches. However, the Germans quickly 
repaired them.404
TF 81’s after-action report identified a number of lessons learned from the land-
ing at Anzio-Nettuno. One was that in assaults on beaches defended by minefields, 
beach obstacles, coastal batteries, and radar installations, prior air bombardment is 
necessary to soften them. Also required was heavy strafing of beaches just prior to 
H-hour. The approach to the shore should be made during the night hours to obtain 
tactical surprise, but H-hour should be at dawn. The increased risks of a daylight 
landing, particularly the likelihood of more-accurate and heavier enemy gunfire, 
had to be accepted over those of landing in pitch darkness through minefields and 
over beach obstacles. To deal with the latter, the TF 81 report recommended prior 
insertion of Beach Jumper (BJ) units and raids by parties of five hundred to a thou-
sand men. The landing plan, TF 81 indicated, had to be flexible; should one targeted 
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beach—or even all of them—prove impossible to cross, any opening or soft spot in 
defenses the BJs had identified had to be exploited with the least possible delay.405
The report emphasized the need for the maximum use of vehicle-loaded LSTs to 
reduce unloading times to the minimum. It took much longer and required many 
more personnel to unload Liberty ships into LCTs and then LCTs onto the beaches. 
Good organization, not only for managing the assault waves but also during pre-
loading, was essential. It also was necessary to delineate clearly the responsibilities 
of the Army logistical and Navy beachmaster parties, both shipboard and ashore.406 
TF 81’s after-action report also emphasized both strict enforcement of fire disci-
pline and the value of using LCT (R)s on all landing beaches.407
Finally, TF 81 recommended that several dress rehearsals with loaded craft be 
held. The timing and execution of an assault depend on many factors, any of which 
may spell disaster. The landing at Anzio-Nettuno was successful because of the 
favorable weather and the relative lack of enemy opposition. However, this success 
hid some serious mistakes, which could be corrected only by training. During the 
dress rehearsal for Operation SHINGLE in the Gulf of Salerno, Admiral Lowry near-
ly called the landing off. If that decision had been made, the landing delayed, and 
the assault attempted in weather similar to that encountered during the rehearsal, 
the result would have been catastrophic. It is simply not acceptable to run the “risk 
of lack of proper training against a well-defended shore.”408
Establishing the Lodgment, January 22–24
VI Corps captured all its initial objectives by noon on January 22.409 The only resis-
tance came from elements of two depleted battalions of the 29th PzGrDiv.410 These 
units had just been withdrawn from hard fighting along the Gustav Line and as-
signed to what had been expected to be a long rest, coast watching between the 
Tiber River and Nettuno. A few scattered minefields, mostly in the port and on the 
PETER beaches, were at first the greatest hazard to VI Corps.411 After sunrise on D-
day, however, 88 mm batteries far inland began sporadically shelling the port and 
the PETER beaches. Despite the attempts of Allied cruisers and destroyers, these 
guns were not silenced all day.412
After the landing, the Allied forces advanced and expanded the beachhead. The 
British 1st Division began to move up the Anzio–Alban Hills road toward Campo-
leone, supported by the 179th Rgt. of the U.S. 45th ID, and captured Aprilia.413 By 
the evening of D-day, advance elements of the 30th Infantry and the 3rd Reconnais-
sance Regiments had seized all the bridges across the Mussolini Canal. However, 
the Hermann Göring PzDiv recaptured most of them that night.414 By midnight on 
D-day, about 36,000 men and 3,070 vehicles, plus large quantities of supplies—90 
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percent of the assault convoy load—had been brought ashore.415 VI Corps losses 
were minor: thirteen killed, forty-four missing, and ninety-seven wounded.416
Despite later claims to the contrary, some ULTRA messages were shared with the 
“uncleared” commanders taking part in SHINGLE. On January 20 the British Admiral-
ty informed Commander, Task Force 81 that “service of Ultra will open for Admiral 
Lowry and Major General Lucas immediately.”417 Three days later the British Opera-
tional Intelligence Centre in the Mediterranean reported that “naval information for 
Admiral Lowry being passed as Admiralty Ultra but no service to General Lucas until 
the recently requested special party [i.e., to handle and protect the material] has been 
formed.”418
Alexander and Clark visited the beachhead on January 22. Both seemed sat-
isfied with the VI Corps progress. Alexander was very optimistic, but Clark was 
somewhat subdued, warning Lucas, “Don’t stick your neck out, Johnny. I did it at 
Salerno and got into trouble.”419 Alexander and Clark visited Lucas again on the 
24th to be briefed on the situation and the measures VI Corps had taken. In nei-
ther of these meetings did Alexander or Clark urge Lucas to be more aggressive 
or expand the lodgment; in fact, Lucas later claimed that Alexander told him the 
“operation was a shining piece of work.”420
By January 24, VI Corps had moved about a mile and a half north of Aprilia, 
creating a large salient in the German lines. Probing attacks by the 3rd ID toward 
Cisterna and by the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (ParaInfRgt) toward Lit-
toria made some progress but were halted by stiff resistance.421 By that day it had be-
come clear that the main Fifth Army could not link up with VI Corps as originally 
planned. Accordingly, VI Corps was directed to consolidate its gains on the ground 
before starting an advance toward the Alban Hills, in the process of which Lucas’s 
intermediate objectives would be the capture of Cisterna and Campoleone.422 
Allied fighters and light bombers strafed and bombed rail transport and high-
way networks. A few days prior to the landing, heavy bombers had flown missions 
against key airfields in Italy and southern France to forestall interference by the 
Luftwaffe. Attacks were conducted on the Italian railways and highways the Ger-
mans used for moving supplies and reinforcements toward their southern front, as 
well as on key bridges and railroad yards from Rome north to the Brenner Pass.423 
The Luftwaffe’s medium bombers, armed with radio-guided glide bombs, and 
torpedo aircraft made frequent raids on the Anzio-Nettuno area. They skimmed 
at low altitude at dusk through the mist and hails of AA fire, releasing bombs on 
and torpedoes at the shipping in the crowded harbor.424 They carried out twenty 
attacks on shipping, with 150 sorties, on the nights of January 23/24 and 24/25.425 
At dark on the 23rd, a radio-guided glide bomb sank HMS Janus and heavily dam-
aged Jervis.426 The next day, the anchorage was attacked in daylight by fifteen Luft-
waffe heavy fighters, followed by another forty-three at dusk. After dark, fifty-two 
 THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO 199 198 MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945
aircraft repeatedly attacked the transport area.427 The aircraft attacked the British 
hospital ships St. David, Leinster, and St. Andrew, sinking St. David and damaging 
Leinster.428 The U.S. destroyer Plunkett (DD 431) was hit by a single bomb; fifty-
three men were killed, but Plunkett reached Palermo under its own power. The 
light cruiser Brooklyn (CL 40) was nearly struck several times.429
The unloading of the Liberty ships proceeded slowly, by DUKWs—all the LCTs 
were unloading LSTs. During the evening of D+2 the wind increased to Force 7. By 
morning, seven LCTs and all the pontoons were broached on the beach, the victims 
of high surf and shallow beach gradients. These craft were high and dry—in some 
cases, a hundred feet from the water. The unloading of Liberty ships stopped. LSTs 
just arriving were diverted to the port area of Anzio, but unloading remained slow 
owing to poor control of the incoming craft, restrictions in the harbor, and insuf-
ficient turning room in the basin. By the end of D+9, 201 LSTs and seven Liberty 
ships had been unloaded in all, including 137 LSTs in the port of Anzio.430
The unloaded amphibious ships and craft were returned to Naples in small 
groups rather than being held for assembly into larger convoys. They were in some 
cases inadequately escorted, but the risk had to be taken, and no losses from sub-
marine torpedoes were suffered.431
Lucas’s Decision 
After the landing, General Lucas had two courses of action open to him: the first 
was to move quickly to attempt to capture the Alban Hills, twenty miles distant; the 
second was to consolidate the beachhead and prepare for a counterattack. Lucas re-
jected the first course of action, partly because at Salerno the Germans had reacted 
quickly and almost defeated the Allied landing force. He was completely unaware 
of the ULTRA report that the two German divisions in the Rome area had been sent 
to the Gustav Line. Lucas also did not know that the Germans had only two ma-
neuver battalions in the Anzio-Nettuno area. As it was, he thought his two-division 
force inadequate for a move so far inland, which would leave its flanks vulnerable.
By adopting the second course of action Lucas could consolidate a small beach-
head; expand it to encompass Campoleone and Cisterna, along with their roads 
and railroad intersections; or send an RCT to occupy the Alban Hills to screen the 
beachhead and disrupt any approaching German forces. In the end, Lucas com-
bined the first two, seeking to consolidate a small beachhead, then gradually en-
large it.432 By January 24, Lucas had made that decision, and VI Corps conducted 
only limited operations. Lucas showed more interest in capturing the port of Anzio 
intact and putting it to work handling troops and matériel.433
Lucas’s decision not to advance toward and attempt to capture the Alban Hills 
was to become highly controversial. Predictably, Churchill blamed Lucas for fail-
ing not only to capture the Alban Hills but also to take Rome immediately.434 Clark 
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would write in his memoirs that he had been disappointed by the “lack of aggres-
siveness of VI Corps [at Anzio], although it would have been wrong in my opinion 
to attack to capture our final objective [Alban Hills] on this front. [But] reconnais-
sance in force with tanks should have been more aggressive to capture Cisterna and 
Campoleone.”435 Clark also after the war remarked that when Lucas landed,
he established himself ashore securely on that little beachhead as far as he could. You can’t 
go way out because you’d get cut off. You just can’t spread it that thin with no reserves, you 
see. So, he did right. I was up there, frequently and I checked him. We began immediately 
to get the [ULTRA] intercepts, you see, as to what counteractions the Germans were tak-
ing[,] and to have ordered Lucas to go with his two divisions and to start forward march 
was asinine.436
Clark believed at the time that while Lucas could have captured the Alban Hills, 
he could not have held them—the Germans would have cut his extended force to 
pieces. This was why he had rephrased Lucas’s mission orders. Clark also felt it 
would not have been wise before the operation to order Lucas to seize the Alban 
Hills, because doing so would have jeopardized Lucas’s efforts to secure the initial 
beachhead line.437 Alexander too supported Lucas’s decision. In his memoirs he was 
to conclude that, in hindsight, Lucas had been right to consolidate before striking 
out. Alexander also remarked that the enemy “is quicker than we are, quicker at 
regrouping his forces, quicker at thinning out on a defensive front to provide troops 
to close gaps at decisive points, quicker in effecting reliefs, quicker at mounting at-
tacks and counterattacks, and above all quicker at reaching decisions on the battle-
field. By comparison our methods are often slow and cumbersome, and this applies 
to all our troops, both British and American.”438  
Eisenhower also approved Lucas’s actions. He stated,
The situation was almost a model for the classical picture for initiating battle of destruc-
tion. . . . The Nettuno landing was really not much heavier in scale than an airborne 
landing would have been during those critical days when time was all-important. The force 
was immobile and could not carry out the promise that was implicit in the situation then 
existing. . . . [T]here will be no great destruction of German divisions as a result thereof.
General Marshall essentially endorsed the decision made by General Lucas not 
to move to the Alban Hills, at least immediately or until the beachhead was fully 
secured.439 
The Fifth Army’s two main efforts at Anzio and Monte Cassino were incapable 
of mutual support, and neither was powerful enough to do the job (capture Rome) 
alone. The Allies simply did not have sufficient forces to secure a beachhead, cap-
ture the Alban Hills, then seize Rome, while simultaneously protecting the lines of 
communication required to consolidate these objectives.440
On the German side, Kesselring and his chief of staff, Gen. Siegfried Westphal, 
apparently were convinced that Lucas had missed a great opportunity by not cap-
turing the Alban Hills shortly after the landing. Kesselring would write in his mem-
oirs that Lucas could have cut the German lines of communication, placing Axis 
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forces along the Gustav Line in jeopardy.441 Westphal would point out that the road 
to Rome was practically open to the enemy until January 25.442
The German Reaction 
Kesselring and the OKW had long anticipated a major landing in the rear of their 
forces in Italy. Kesselring and his staff had noted the concentrations of troops and 
ships between Naples and Sicily after January 13. However, they believed a landing 
improbable prior to the resolution of the enemy attack on the Garigliano River, 
because the German Tenth Army was counterattacking from its right flank against 
that advance. Kesselring interpreted the heavy air raids on railways and roads in 
central and northern Italy as attempts to cut off the Tenth Army’s supply lines, not 
as preparations for a landing.443
Nevertheless, from that point Kesselring took specific and prudent steps to 
guard against a landing. On the basis of reconnaissance reports, Kesselring believed 
that the enemy had sufficient forces to start a new offensive on the land front and to 
conduct an amphibious landing simultaneously. Having observed increased naval 
activity in the Naples region, he decided not to move reserves from the Rome area 
to the Garigliano River but to weaken defenses on the southern front in places not 
threatened immediately, especially in the Adriatic sector. He ordered the immedi-
ate transfer of the 3rd PzGrDiv to the south.444
On January 18, Kesselring ordered alerts for German forces throughout Italy 
(with the exception of the German Naval Command, Italy, which did not alert its 
forces against the enemy landing, supposedly because of its shortage of personnel). 
The Allied commanders learned about Kesselring’s orders on the 19th, through UL-
TRA. (Ironically, Kesselring’s staff would try to dissuade him from alerting forces on the 
night of January 21/22, because constant alerts were wearing down the troops.)445 
Because of the threat of a breach of the Gustav Line on the Garigliano, Kessel-
ring moved combat forces in the Rome area southward for a possible counterattack; 
west of Rome, the remaining forces were so weak that they could be employed only 
for coastal observation in the Tarquinia–Terracina sector.446 The only headquarters 
in the Rome area was that of Army Group C; no other staff was available to orga-
nize an emergency defense.447
At 0235 on January 22, the first report of four or five enemy cruisers in the 
Anzio-Nettuno area was sent by the 8th Company of the 71st PzGrRgt to its battal-
ion command.448 Westphal was awakened at 0300 and informed that enemy forces 
had landed at Anzio-Nettuno at about 0200. At 0600 Kesselring reported to the 
OKW that a landing had taken place.449 Westphal immediately alerted the subor-
dinate forces affected.450 Soon afterward, the first alerted German units began to 
move.451 RICHARD, as previously noted, called for forces in the Rome area to con-
tain the beachhead and for uncommitted forces on the Gustav Line to move to the 
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scene. Battalion and regimental forces on the line but in minimal contact with the 
enemy would also be moved to the Anzio area.452
ULTRA disclosed that Army Group C had informed OKW that a 
strong Allied formation landed area Anzio Nettuno 0100 hours according to [Luftwaffe’s] 
intelligence 1100 hours [on January 22]. In whole sea area west of Anzio about 250–300 
units. Close inshore about 100 units unloading, including fifteen large transports. Twenty 
five kilometers [15.5 miles] west of Anzio further units including destroyers and cruisers. 
Impression thus gained of large scale landing as at Salerno. Second large landing formation 
sighted between Anzio and Tiber estuary.453
The German Navy High Command overestimated the size of the enemy forces sup-
porting the landing as comprising a carrier, four cruisers, and twenty destroyers.454
The situation on the German Tenth Army’s southern flank was now critical and 
required redeployment of all reserves in the Italian theater. Failure to take immedi-
ate countermeasures could lead to the cutting off of Tenth Army and the collapse 
of the entire southern Italian front. Therefore, Kesselring intended to establish a 
defensive line against the beachhead as quickly as possible. At that point, he had 
to assume that the enemy might seize the Alban Hills before sufficient German 
troops could be brought up. These considerations made a counterattack necessary; 
to conduct it, reinforcements would have to be transferred from other theaters.455
By using the advantages offered by central position and good railroads and roads, 
the Germans were able to mass quickly much larger forces in the Anzio-Nettuno area 
than the main Fifth Army’s G-2 had anticipated.456 By the end of January 22 the 
Germans had about ten thousand men sealing the enemy beachhead. The next day, 
the Germans had in the Anzio area some sixteen thousand combat troops. By the 
24th the Germans had encircled the beachhead, and the Allied reconnaissance pa-
trols were met with German resistance.457 Kesselring also had immediately alerted 
the 4th ParaDiv and replacement units of the Hermann Göring PzDiv in the Rome 
area and directed them to block all roads leading to Rome from the Alban Hills.458 
ULTRA detected all the related movements, except those of two battalions that used 
telephone instead of radio.459 At 0600 Kesselring requested that the forces from 
other theaters earmarked for Case RICHARD be sent to Italy.460 He decided to divert 
temporarily some of the reinforcements for Tenth Army arriving from northern 
Italy, southern France, and Yugoslavia.461 Gen. Alfred Schlemm’s I ParaCorps was 
ordered to stop its attack on the Garigliano River, withdraw the 29th PzGrDiv, and 
send it to the Anzio area. Tenth Army was directed to release from the Adriatic 
front various units, especially motorized reconnaissance detachments and infantry 
divisions, and send them to Anzio.462
At 0710 on January 22, Kesselring directed General Mackensen to transfer all 
forces earmarked for Case RICHARD.463 Mackensen accordingly ordered the follow-
ing units to proceed immediately to the Anzio area: the 65th ID (less one regiment) 
at Genoa, the 362nd ID (less one regiment) at Rimini, and two regiments of the 
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newly formed 16th SS PzGrDiv at Leghorn. Their movements started that evening 
and continued through January 23.464
At 0830 on the 22nd, Kesselring directed General Vietinghoff to transfer I Para-
Corps headquarters and all its combat troops that could be spared to the Anzio area 
as quickly as possible. The forces most suitable for release by the Tenth Army were 
the 71st ID and the parts of the 3rd Panzer-Grenadier Division and of the Hermann 
Göring Panzer Division that were then on the Tenth Army front (the remainder 
of each was still on the march from the north).465 In addition, local reserves were 
withdrawn from the southern front. Since the enemy had landed tanks, antitank 
forces and artillery had to be released for Anzio. From the Adriatic front, the Tenth 
Army sent elements of the 26th Panzer Division and the 1st Parachute Division.466
Tenth Army sent to the Anzio front the following forces on January 22 and that 
night: from the area of Cassino, the 3rd PzGrDiv (less one regiment, one artillery 
battalion, and one engineer company), elements of the Hermann Göring PzDiv 
(the staff, reconnaissance battalion, one artillery battalion), the 26th PzDiv (2nd 
Artillery Detachment, one panzer artillery detachment), and four artillery battal-
ions of troops controlled by the Army High Command (known as general head-
quarters, or GHQ, troops)—the 525th Heavy Anti-Tank (A/T) Battalion, the 450th 
and 451st Light and 764th Heavy Artillery Battalions—that were now directly sub-
ordinate to divisional or corps headquarters. Also directed to move to the Anzio 
area were 2nd Parachute Brigade of the 2nd Light Parachute (Jäger) Division; two 
“employment groups” (Einsatzgruppen) of 4th Light Parachute (Jäger) Division; 
one fortress-construction and one pioneer battalion; and two Russian “volunteer” 
(actually conscript) battalions (Ost battalions) from the Senger Line.467
From the Adriatic defenses the 33rd Battalion (Bn) of the 1st Regiment (Rgt), 
the Machine Gun Bn of the 1st ParaDiv, and the 500th Heavy A/T Bn (GHQ troops) 
were directed to move to the Anzio area. HQ 71st ID and all of its elements then en 
route from the north to join Tenth Army were also thrown into Anzio positions.468 
The 26th PzDiv was ordered to leave the front in the Avezzano area and become a 
reserve in the Anzio area. These movements were conducted under conditions of 
intense enemy air activity, fog, and icy railroad tracks in the Apennines.469
After the withdrawal of units from the Gustav Line, the defense of the Garigliano 
sector became questionable. Kesselring believed that during the night of January 
22/23 the enemy would attack with strong forces from west of the Alban Hills to-
ward Rome. He planned to counter by joining forces south of Rome. I ParaCorps 
could be expected in the Anzio area in the afternoon of the 23rd or early the next 
day. This corps received orders to defend between the Tiber River and the Alban 
Hills and Sezze and under no circumstance allow the enemy to close with Rome or 
control the Frosinone–Rome road. Kesselring also established defenses on the west 
and south edges of Rome.470
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Late in the morning of January 22, the Joint Operations Staff of the OKW is-
sued by telephone the code word “Marder 1.” That triggered a series of preplanned 
movements: CINC West (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) transferred by rail to 
CINC Southwest (Field Marshal Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs) the par-
tially mechanized 715th ID, the 998th Artillery Battalion (GHQ troops), the 1st 
Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment (PzRgt, with Panther tanks), the 301st Pan-
zer Battalion (PzBn), and the 216th Assault Howitzer Detachment. CINC South-
east deployed the 114th Light (Jäger) Division and two artillery battalions of GHQ 
troops.471 The Replacement Army in Germany sent to Italy the headquarters of 
LXXV Corps, the Infantry Demonstration (Lehr) Regiment, the 1026th Infantry 
Grenadier Regiment, the 1027th PzGrRgt, the Artillery Demonstration Regiment, 
the Rocket Launcher Demonstration Battalion, three battalions of security troops, 
two battalions of Russian “volunteers,” six construction battalions, and the 508th 
PzBn (with Tiger tanks). Neither CINC West nor CINC Southeast could provide 
a second division as planned in Case RICHARD, because of the previous transfer of 
troops to the Russian front. Immediate activation of the 92nd ID in Viterbo was 
ordered.472
On the eve of the landing at Anzio, the Luftwaffe’s strength in the Mediter-
ranean had been reduced to about two hundred aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe 
reacted quickly and energetically to the new threat.473 After a phone conversation 
with Hitler, Göring ordered all available aircraft to Italy. During the night of Janu-
ary 22/23, the OKW directed CINC Southeast to send the 1st and 2nd Air Groups 
(Gruppen) of the 26th Battle Wing (Kampfgeschwader), the 2nd Air Group of the 
100th Battle Wing (flying Do-17s), and the 2nd Air Group of the 50th Battle Wing 
(with He-177s).474 Luftwaffe Command / CINC Southeast would transfer to the 
2nd Air Fleet the 3rd Squadron, 1st Group of the 1st Battle Wing (Ju-88s); the 1st 
Squadron, 2nd and 3rd Groups of the 100th Bomber Wing (Do-217s); and the 2nd 
Group of the 40th Battle Wing (He-177s).475
Between January 23 and February 3, some 140 long-range bombers were 
brought in from northwestern Germany, southern France, and Greece. Antiship-
ping aircraft in southern France were reinforced by between fifty and sixty Do-217s 
and He-177s armed with radio-controlled glide bombs. By February 23, about fifty 
single-engine fighters had been moved down from northern Italy to the Anzio area. 
By the end of the month about forty more single-engine fighters had been sent 
(though the Germans never had more than thirty-five fighters available within ef-
fective range of the enemy lodgment at Anzio). Despite all difficulties, Luftwaffe 
strength in the Mediterranean by March 1944 had grown to 750–75 aircraft, in-
cluding around six hundred in the central Mediterranean, of which about 475 were 
available for operations in the Anzio area.476
Tenth Army units moved to the beachhead rapidly, despite enemy air raids. This 
was made possible by employing staff officers from Headquarters Army Group 
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C, Tenth Army, and I ParaCorps to direct the traffic. These officers had to divert 
troops that were arriving from northern Italy for Tenth Army’s southern front to-
ward the beachhead. Units with no organic transportation (i.e., of their own) were 
brought up quickly via supply columns already at hand. Rear-area troops were em-
ployed to clear mountain passes of ice and snow.477
At 1700 on January 22, I ParaCorps established a defensive line at the Anzio 
beachhead and took command of all arriving troops.478 That evening it became 
clear to Kesselring that the landing was a major enemy effort. Vietinghoff back at 
Tenth Army recommended withdrawing immediately from the Gustav Line and 
shortening the Garigliano–Rapido front to free two combat-hardened divisions for 
Anzio. But Kesselring, perceiving a lack of aggressiveness by the enemy VI Corps, 
instructed Vietinghoff to stand fast. This was a bold decision, because the first 
strong contingents from Tenth Army could not be expected earlier than the 24th 
and if the enemy tried a breakout before then, Kesselring estimated, his forces on 
hand would not be strong enough to resist.479
Kesselring, however, decided to stop a counterattack then in progress on the 
Garigliano River, thereby freeing up yet more forces. During the evening of January 
22, Kesselring directed Tenth Army to send to the beachhead three grenadier bat-
talions and one artillery battalion from the Hermann Göring PzDiv, one PzGrRgt 
and two artillery battalions from the 15th PzGrDiv, one battalion from the Bran-
denburg Regiment, the 60th Engineer Bn (GHQ troops), and one AA artillery bat-
talion (GHQ troops). In addition, the 26th PzDiv, which was employed on Tenth 
Army’s left flank, was relieved and transferred to Avezzano so as to participate in 
the intended counterattack at Anzio.480 
Regiments from Fourteenth Army, CINC West, CINC Southeast, and the Re-
placement Army had all been planned for and now proceeded without special 
orders. At 1900 on January 22, the troops of Fourteenth Army began to leave 
their areas in northern Italy. On January 23–24 the transportation of troops from 
France, Germany, and the Balkans began. Those forces had all arrived in Italy by 
the 31st, despite constant air attacks on roads and railroads. By this time, their 
advance elements were already deployed at the beachhead.481
The bulk of the Hermann Göring PzDiv remained available as a reserve in the 
Rome area. The original plan of OKW was to transfer that division to France on 
January 20. Its replacement was the 71st ID, on the way from Istria. OKW believed 
that Tenth Army would be able to contain local reserve units until the arrival of the 
new reinforcements.482
Kesselring moved his headquarters about twenty-eight miles north to under-
ground bunkers at Monte Sorrate, a secure and bombproof place.483 He directed 
General Mackensen to take over the defense in the Anzio area; I ParaCorps and 
LXXVI PzCorps became subordinate to him. Mackensen’s mission was to strength-
en the defensive ring and reduce the enemy bridgehead.484
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The Germans anticipated that the landing force would limit itself to recon- 
naissance, patrols toward the north, and artillery fire on German positions. By the 
24th Kesselring was convinced that there was no danger of an enemy breakout. By 
then the German defenders had seventy artillery batteries in place, including AA. 
Kesselring assessed that the enemy did not have sufficient troops on the beachhead 
for a large-scale attack, only for local attacks. The Germans did learn that the U.S. 
2nd ArmdDiv and a British tank brigade were newly on the beachhead, but that 
would give the enemy at most three infantry divisions, one armored division, and 
two or three armored battalions or brigades. That strength he considered insuffi-
cient for an attack on the Alban Hills, which would require effective flank protec-
tion. Therefore Kesselring expected (correctly, as it turned out) that for the next 
few days the enemy would attempt only to expand and consolidate his beachhead 
in preparation for a full-scale attack later and that even local attacks or raids would 
not begin before January 26.485
Relying on these assumptions, Kesselring decided to counterattack, with the 
objective of destroying the landing force or driving it back into the sea. Every effort 
would be made to deliver this blow before the enemy had completed his initial 
consolidation. Kesselring directed Mackensen to speed up the concentration of 
forces of Fourteenth Army, for use in the counterattacks; the 26th PzDiv and 56th 
Rocket Regiment (at Monte Cassino) were directed to the beachhead.486 However, 
a concerted attack could not start before the 28th, because forces could not be 
assembled earlier. If the enemy attacked after all, the counterattack would start 
immediately, regardless.487
On January 24, ULTRA disclosed to the Allies that the 3rd PzGrDiv, then serv-
ing as a Tenth Army reserve, had arrived on January 23, with lead elements of the 
71st ID, in the Anzio beachhead area. A German report that the 3rd PzGrDiv was 
in Tenth Army’s reserve was intercepted on January 21 but was not deciphered and 
disseminated to Fifth Army until 0533 on the 23rd. Yet it was clear from ULTRA 
that Kesselring intended to defend, not withdraw from, the Gustav Line, and at the 
same time bring in a large number of troops to contain the Allies in the Anzio area. 
ULTRA correctly reported which German units were pulled out from the Gustav 
Line and revealed that elements of the 15th PzGrDiv, the Hermann Göring PzDiv, 
and 1st ParaDiv had been ordered to the beachhead.488 
By the end of January 25, the Germans had almost twenty-six thousand combat 
troops on the line. Instead of weakening the Gustav Line, the Germans had brought 
in some thirty-four thousand troops to the area.489 By January 25, elements of eight 
German divisions were facing Anzio, and five more, with many supporting units, 
were on the way.490 This number was much larger than Allied intelligence had be-
lieved possible. The Allies had estimated that German commitments in northern 
Italy and elsewhere would limit reinforcements to only two divisions from north of 
Rome, and those not for sixteen days.491
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THE BATTLE ASHORE, JANUARY 24–29 
By D+3 (January 25), VI Corps had seized a solid beachhead ashore.492 The initial 
beachhead was an area roughly seven miles deep and fifteen miles wide centered on 
the port of Anzio. Its twenty-six-mile perimeter was considered the maximum VI 
Corps could hold.493 Yet the beachhead was too small: enemy artillery could reach 
any part of it, and the Allied forces within it had little space for maneuver.494 Ger-
man artillery observers in the Alban Hills possessed an unobstructed, even spec-
tacular, view of the congested beachhead by which to direct fire.495 
Clark paid another visit to Lucas and the beachhead on January 25. He was 
then very concerned with the progress of the main Fifth Army, fighting bloody 
battles with the Germans.496 That day ULTRA indicated that the 26th PzDiv on the 
Gustav Line was being sent to Avezzano for refitting and eventual deployment to 
the beachhead, to be replaced by the 305th ID. The ULTRA intercept collectors were 
virtually flooded with orders going to various German units.497 
Also on January 25, the Germans conducted aggressive, tank-supported patrols 
to probe Allied dispositions and strength. At the same time they concealed the 
massing of the newly arrived forces and tried to delay any attempt to expand the 
beachhead. The first major unit after the Hermann Göring PzDiv to arrive in the 
Anzio-Nettuno area was the 29th PzGrDiv from Pescara. The 104th PzGrRgt was 
disengaged in the Liri Valley and sent to a position in the central beachhead sector 
near Padiglione. The German main force was concentrating farther inland, near 
Velletri. Some five thousand paratroopers of the newly formed 4th ParaDiv were 
moved from the Rome area to the beachhead.498
On January 26, American troops were within three miles of Cisterna and two 
miles beyond the west branch of the Mussolini Canal. Lucas directed 3rd ID to stop 
attacking.499 Rain, hail, and sleet at Anzio hindered logistics; that day only seven 
LSTs were unloaded. Two heavy raids by Luftwaffe bombers during the night de-
stroyed numerous trucks and caused ammunition explosions.500
On January 27, Alexander expressed dissatisfaction to Clark that VI Corps was 
not pushing rapidly enough. The next day, Clark visited Lucas again and got the im-
pression that the outcome depended on which side could increase its forces more 
quickly, the Allies or the Germans. Clark urged Lucas to take bold offensive action. 
As Clark remembered later, he wanted Lucas to secure Cisterna as a strongpoint in 
a defensive line; however, either Clark did not remember correctly later or Lucas 
misinterpreted his remarks at the time.501
On January 29, the British light cruiser Spartan and destroyers Loyal and Laforey 
bombarded the enemy positions along VI Corps’s flanks; the destroyers would con-
tinue their support for the next two days.502 The Luftwaffe carried out its two heavi-
est air raids to date that day, at dusk and at midnight; the 110 Do-217s, Ju-88s, and 
Me-210s sank a Liberty ship and Spartan.503 They also destroyed a large part of the 
supplies on the beaches.504 The arrival of the German reinforcements to the Anzio 
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area generally was misinterpreted by Lucas and his staff. As each new German divi-
sion or one of its units was identified by reports of POW interrogations, listening 
posts, or other routine intelligence sources, Lucas and his G-2 assumed that an 
entire German division was present, nearby, or en route. Therefore, VI Corps esti-
mates of the enemy’s forces often were exaggerated.505 For example, Lucas assumed 
on January 28 that the entire 65th ID had arrived at the beachhead when in fact one 
of its regiments never moved from northern Italy. Lucas made these errors because 
the pertinent ULTRA intercepts were never sent to him from General Clark. ULTRA 
laid out a pretty accurate picture of all the movements of all the German forces to-
ward the beachhead, down to the regimental, even battalion, level, with the excep-
tion of information on the movements of the 362nd ID and the 16th SS PzGrDiv.506
THE BATTLE ASHORE, JANUARY 30–MARCH 4 
By January 30, the Germans had built a strong defensive line in front of Cisterna 
and Campoleone (see map 16). The terrain—riven with gullies and made soggy by 
rain—worked in their favor. They concentrated about thirty battalions, supported 
by panzers and artillery, for a February 1 counterattack; they kept six battalions in 
reserve.507 For his part, Lucas, also on January 30, planned a two-pronged attack: 
one force would cut Highway 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Alban Hills; 
the second would advance northeast up to the Albano road and break through the 
Campoleone salient. Lucas still believed that a quick linkup with the main Fifth 
Army in the south was possible; yet German resistance all along the perimeter was 
growing stronger, not weaker.508
It was the 3rd ID and two Ranger battalions that were to attack Cisterna. Rang-
ers would spearhead the attack, infiltrate the German lines, and hold Cisterna until 
other forces arrived. In the meantime, two infantry regiments (the 7th and 15th) 
would cut Highway 7 in the vicinity of Cisterna. The 504th Parachute Regiment 
would attack along the Mussolini Canal to divert enemy attention.509 The British 1st 
Division and 1st Armoured Division would advance toward the Alban Hills.510 No 
preliminary artillery preparation was considered necessary, but extensive air sup-
porting fires, plus a smoke screen laid by aircraft, and naval gunfire support were 
scheduled. The air force prepared an elaborate air support plan.511 But unknown to 
Lucas, his attack would be aimed directly at the center of a concentration of thirty-
six German battalions massing for their counterattack, planned for February 1.512
On January 28–30, in a preliminary move prior to the VI Corps attack, the 45th 
ID, then in reserve, relieved the British 1st Division and U.S. 3rd Infantry Division 
on the beachhead flanks so these two divisions could use their full strengths in the 
assault. Elements of the 45th ID and VI Corps engineers took over the positions of 
an infantry brigade along the Moletta River and a paratroop regiment on the op-
posite flank along the Mussolini Canal. At the same time, the Ranger force and an 
infantry battalion were relieved by a British reconnaissance regiment in the quiet 
central beachhead sector.513
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The attack on Cisterna was launched on January 30, spearheaded by the two 
U.S. Ranger battalions. Both were ambushed and trapped by the Germans. Most 
of the Rangers were captured; out of 767, only six escaped.514 The 3rd ID, attacking 
Cisterna on January 30–31, fought stubbornly but was unable to break through—in 
part because the division attacked along a seven-mile front toward an objective 
three or four miles away. At the same time, the British 1st Division tried to breach 
the enemy’s defense line along a railroad by seizing a crossing at Campoleone.515 
After three days of heavy fighting, growing enemy strength forced Lucas to aban-
don his assault. The Allied attack had failed to reach its stated objectives. Allied 
troops did, however, drive sixteen miles inland to Campoleone and seventeen miles 
toward Cisterna before the swift enemy reaction sealed in the beachhead.516 It also 
forced the German Fourteenth Army to commit most of its forces, which in turn 
forced postponement of the counterattack intended to wipe out the beachhead.517 
By February 2, VI Corps had taken about 1,500 prisoners and had inflicted heavy 
casualties. Its own casualties ran to about 6,500.518
The failure of the Allied breakout convinced Clark, Alexander, and Lucas that the 
Germans were preparing to counterattack. Hence, a decision was made to send about 
1,800 men of the American-Canadian 1st Special Service Force and artillery units to 
the beaches, quickly. This reinforcement raised the total number of Allied troops on 
the beachhead to about one hundred thousand men. The German Fourteenth Army 
still outnumbered the Allies in the Anzio area; however, many of its units were short 
of ammunition, inadequately trained, and lacking in experienced leaders.519
On February 2, Alexander issued Operations Instruction Nr. 37, “Development 
of the Operations from the Anzio Bridgehead.” The enemy, the instruction stated, 
would be driven out of Cisterna. The left flank of the “bridgehead” (Alexander’s 
soldierly term) would advance to the general line defined at each end by the Cam-
poleone railway station and the south bank of the Incastro River. Afterward, the 
new defensive line would be held by a minimal number of troops. At the same time, 
the right flank of the beachhead would advance generally from the Cisterna area to 
the canal junction and thence along the Mussolini Canal to the sea. That line too 
would be held with a small force.520
On February 2, Admiral Cunningham directed Admiral Lowry to turn over com-
mand of the naval forces supporting the Anzio-Nettuno operation to Rear Adm. J. A. V. 
Morse, RN, who was Flag Officer, Western Italy. Morse established standing A/S 
patrols to cover the new inshore route from Naples to Anzio so Allied ships could 
transit that route unescorted, thereby releasing escorts for other commitments. 
First German Counterattack, February 3–5
The Germans had planned to attack from north to south along the Albano–Anzio 
road, with the main concentration on either side of the Factory at Aprilia. The 
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original date for the attack was January 28. But on the 26th Kesselring and Mackensen 
postponed it to February 1 to await the arrival of reinforcements (the 1027th and 
1028th InfRgts, the Special Artillery Demonstration Regiment, the Special Rocket 
Projector Demonstration Battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the 4th PzRgt).521 These 
reinforcements had left Germany by train and were expected to arrive in Italy around 
January 26–27.522 Allied bombing of roads and railways delayed them.523 By January 
28, Fourteenth Army had deployed the Hermann Göring PzDiv to the eastern sector, 
around Cisterna; the 3rd PzGrDiv to the central sector, at Campoleone; and the 65th 
ID to the western sector, in the vicinity of the Moletta River. In the rear of this perim-
eter, other units also were grouped for counterattacks. Four to five miles separated 
the Germans’ main defense line from the front line occupied by VI Corps.524
The German plan called for three main phases: Phase I (February 3–10), pre-
paratory attacks to cut off the British salient at the Albano road and capture the 
Factory; Phase II (February 16–20), penetration of the enemy perimeter along the 
Albano road; and Phase III (February 28–March 2), an attack on Cisterna com-
bined with penetration of the beachhead defenses along the Mussolini Canal.525 
Although doubtful of the plan’s prospect for success, Mackensen prepared a force-
ful counterattack. The 4th ParaDiv and 65th ID of the I ParaCorps would pinch 
off the Campoleone salient, recapture the Factory, and then break out to the sea 
along the Albano road. LXXVI PzCorps (3rd PzGrDiv, 715th Motorized ID, 71st 
ID, Hermann Göring PzDiv, and 26th PzDiv) would attack south of Cisterna along 
the Mussolini Canal and try to reach the enemy perimeter at Nettuno and Anzio.526
On February 3, Clark learned via ULTRA about the pending German counterof-
fensive.527 The relevant decrypt disclosed Mackensen’s estimate of the situation to 
Kesselring: that two Allied infantry divisions had appeared in the forward lines; 
that to the west, opposite the northern flank of the 65th ID and opposite Combat 
Group Gräser, was the British 1st Division; in the east, opposite the eastern flank 
of the 71st ID and the western flank and center of the Hermann Göring PzDiv, 
was the U.S. 3rd ID. Each Allied division was supported by one tank brigade. On 
the eastern flank the enemy had two or three Ranger battalions and one parachute 
regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. The enemy units facing the flank of the 
65th ID and the 4th ParaDiv were not identified. Mackensen assumed that the U.S. 
1st ArmdDiv and 45th ID were deployed in the rear of the beachhead. He was un-
sure, however, about the whereabouts of the 2nd ArmdDiv (U.S.), one British corps 
headquarters, and another British division. Intense shipping traffic indicated the 
imminent arrival of reinforcements. Mackensen assessed that the Allies had suf-
fered heavy losses in men and tanks, which prisoners confirmed, but that neither 
their will to attack nor their endurance to resist had been broken. The enemy’s ad-
vantages lay in his strong, accurate artillery abundantly supplied with ammunition, 
his naval gunfire support, and his air forces.528
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Mackensen intended to launch limited attacks and then, after the enemy was 
sufficiently weakened, an all-out counteroffensive. The first attack would be 
launched during the night of February 3/4 by one reinforced regiment, with tanks, 
in the bulge north of Aprilia. I ParaCorps would exploit its progress by advancing 
south past the line running from a point 0.9 miles northwest of Colle Vallelata to 
Colle della Mandria. If successful, the attack would continue during the night of 
February 4/5, led now by the 65th ID and Combat Group Gräser. The objective 
would be to recover ground on both sides of Aprilia. No further attacks were spe-
cifically planned, but in general, similar attacks would be launched in rapid succes-
sion to prevent effective countermeasures by the enemy. Anticipating strong Allied 
artillery, air support, and stubborn, determined resistance, the Germans expected 
substantial losses. It appeared doubtful to Fourteenth Army that it would be able 
to eliminate the beachhead with the forces then available; to do that, it requested 
additional troops from Army Group C. While coastal defenses in other areas might 
be depleted, Fourteenth Army considered this calculated risk worthwhile.529
On February 4, the Germans reorganized their forces. I ParaCorps (4th ParaDiv 
and 65th ID) came under the command of Fourteenth Army and was assigned the 
western sector, from a point west of the Albano road to behind the Moletta River. 
LXXVI PzCorps (71st ID, 715th Motorized ID, 26th PzDiv, 3rd PzGrDiv, and the 
Hermann Göring PzDiv) was transferred from Tenth Army to Fourteenth Army 
and deployed in the central and eastern sectors of the beachhead perimeter.530 The 
Germans resumed their attack against the weakened British 1st Division on Febru-
ary 7. In two days of bitter fighting, they pushed the British out of the Factory and 
Carroceto. On the 11th, American troops tried to retake Aprilia; they failed but 
inflicted heavy casualties on the German defenders.531 
The Germans had now launched their counterattack as planned; the first and 
second phases had been successful, but the third had failed.532 On February 11, Al-
exander issued Operations Instruction Nr. 42 for the conduct of future operations. 
He considered it essential to ultimately driving the enemy north of Rome that VI 
Corps resume its own offensive as soon as the tactical situation permitted. In his 
view, the enemy forces facing VI Corps must surely be exhausted for the moment 
by their counterattacks.533 VI Corps had to be able to resume the offensive on short 
notice: it was possible that, perhaps prompted by the success of an advance against 
the Gustav Line by the New Zealand Corps, the enemy would move troops from 
the beachhead to the main front, and should that happen, it was critical that VI 
Corps immediately take advantage of it. Alexander’s new instruction laid down that 
VI Corps must drive the enemy out of Cisterna and secure that place as the pivot 
for a further advance on Velletri; there would be some hard fighting. Alexander 
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directed VI Corps to plan an all-out offensive. The advantage gained would be even 
greater if it coincided with operations in the Liri Valley.534
Between February 3 and 15, the Luftwaffe carried out only seven attacks against 
Allied shipping in the Anzio-Nettuno area. The highest number of sorties on a sin-
gle night was no more than fifty. There were about twenty sorties by Do-217s and 
He-177s armed with Hs-293 radio-controlled glide bombs. The Ju-88s in northern 
Italy were capable of no more than harassing raids, mainly on ground targets, and 
daylight raids on shipping by fighter-bombers were even less effective.535
Second German Counterattack, February 16–22 (Operation FISCHFANG) 
On February 9, Mackensen issued an order for a major attack aimed to capture the 
Factory, Carroceto, and Buonriposo Ridge. These positions would allow the Ger-
mans to launch an all-out attack on the Anzio beachhead.536 His order noted that 
during the last days the enemy has brought to and employed on the beachhead fresh rein-
forcements. The 56th Infantry Division (Br) has just been identified. More reinforcements 
can be counted on. After the seizure of Aprilia, heavy enemy attacks against that sector are 
expected. 
The Fourteenth Army will attack the enemy beachhead on X day, 15 February, 1944 at Y 
hour, with its main effort between 1.5 km west of Aprilia–Nettuno highway and the Fosso di 
Spaccasassi. . . . The front will be pierced and the attacking forces will push through to Net-
tuno and destroy enemy forces of the beachhead.537 
Mackensen’s main effort would be made along a four-mile front astride the Anzio–
Albano road and anchored on Buonriposo Ridge in the west and on Spaccasassi 
Creek to the east. After breaking through the main enemy defensive line, the Ger-
mans planned to drive through to Anzio and Nettuno, splitting VI Corps in two 
and defeating it in detail. Forces for the counterattack would be under the com-
mand of I ParaCorps to the west of Anzio and LXXVI PzCorps to the east.538
The Germans launched their new counterattack on February 16. As planned, 
they moved down the Anzio–Albano road on a four-mile front, but the initial at-
tacks by the 3rd PzGrDiv and 715th Motorized ID were beaten back with heavy 
losses; the Germans achieved only minor penetrations. They had better success in 
a more intensive assault against the 45th ID at dawn on February 18, destroying a 
battalion of the 179th Infantry Regiment and pushing the remainder back half a 
mile to the VI Corps’s final defensive line by midmorning.539 By noon on February 
19, however, Allied air and artillery superiority had turned the tide. A final assault 
against the 180th and 179th InfRgts was stopped by air strikes and massed mortar, 
machine-gun, artillery, and tank fire. Renewed attacks on the 19th and 20th were 
much weaker, and Allied defenders readily broke them up.540
Nevertheless, the Germans did not abandon their objective—to destroy the Al-
lied forces on the beachhead—but simply changed their tactics. Instead of the fron-
tal assaults in the center, they would now attack the Allied flanks. The Germans 
initially massed their forces on the eastern flank and struck along the Spaccasassi 
Creek on the Carano–Aprilia road near Padiglione; on February 20 they shifted to 
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the western flank and attacked at Buonriposo Ridge.541 On the 20th Kesselring told 
his commanders that the number of enemy troops had been overestimated and 
that undue cautiousness among both officers and the rank and file had resulted. He 
urged his subordinates to regain their old self-confidence and aggressiveness and 
to be, as they had been in the past, “inspired by an impetuous urge to attack.” It was 
necessary to advance even if adjacent friendly troops had been stopped. The enemy 
strongpoint had to be bypassed. The objective would be to establish bridgeheads 
across the Mussolini Canal and Astura Creek.542
Although the Germans continued harassing attacks until February 22, for the 
Allies the crisis had passed; VI Corps went on the offensive locally and retook some 
lost ground.543 The German Fourteenth Army truly was now close to the point of 
exhaustion. It had either to bring up additional troops or to pause for rest.544 In 
the meantime, and unknown to the Germans, the Allies in the Anzio lodgment 
were in great difficulties themselves. Their troops were exhausted too. VI Corps 
was defending a perimeter almost thirty-five miles long with fewer than five divi-
sions; many of its soldiers had been in combat almost continuously for more than a 
month. Also, the Germans were able to concentrate their artillery fire on the salient 
and did so, bombarding the Allied troops mercilessly.545
The VI Corps’s inability to break out had become a matter of great and increas-
ing concern to Churchill and Gen. Maitland Wilson, the Mediterranean com-
mander. On February 11 Churchill wrote to Alexander, “I am sure you realize how 
great disappointment was caused at home and in the United States by the stand-still 
at Anzio.” While he did not know what orders Lucas had received, Churchill ac-
knowledged, “it is a root principle to push out and form contact with the enemy.”546 
Wilson had informed Churchill that as of February 10 the Allies had in the Anzio 
bridgehead some eighteen thousand vehicles, including four hundred tanks and 
more than 1,200 carriers and half-tracks.547 This prompted Churchill to remark 
that for him it was a “spectacle” to see eighteen thousand vehicles “accumulated 
by the 14th day [after D-day] for only 70,000 men or less than four men to a ve-
hicle including drivers and attendants, though they did not move more than 12 
or 14 miles”—it was “most astonishing.” He also wondered why seventy thousand 
American and British troops were being blocked by at most sixty thousand Ger-
mans. Churchill clearly was impressed by “the ease with which the enemy moved 
their pieces about on the board and the rapidity with which they adjusted the peril-
ous gaps they had to make on their southern front is most impressive.” He saw in 
all that “very awkward data in regard to OVERLORD.”548 General Wilson noted how 
rapidly the Germans had built up their forces to seal the beachhead. Their troop 
strength had increased from ten infantry battalions and two reconnaissance units 
on January 24 to twenty-nine infantry battalions and seven reconnaissance units on 
the 30th, to forty infantry battalions and seven reconnaissance units on February 
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5. In his view, bad weather was the main factor that had prevented Allied air forces 
from cutting off railway traffic from northern Italy to Rome.549 
Lucas Is Relieved, February 22
Neither Alexander nor Clark was entirely happy with Lucas’s performance. They 
believed Lucas was tired, physically and mentally. Clark intended first to make 
General Truscott Lucas’s deputy commander and soon thereafter to transfer Lucas 
and appoint Truscott as VI Corps commander. This and other command changes 
within VI Corps became effective on February 17.550 On the 22nd Clark formally 
relieved Lucas and appointed Truscott. (Lucas served for three weeks as Clark’s 
deputy at Fifth Army HQ before returning to the United States to be first deputy 
and then commander of Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.)
Clark later explained that he had been unable to resist pressure from Alexander 
and Alexander’s deputy Devers to relieve Lucas. Yet he thought that Lucas had done 
all he could at Anzio.551 For his part, Lucas had reportedly been frustrated as VI 
Corps commander because, he strongly suspected, Fifth Army was not giving him 
all the available intelligence on the enemy.552 However, as discussed elsewhere, this 
was only true until January 20. Afterward, Lucas was put on the list of recipients of 
ULTRA intercepts. 
Truscott, Clark thought, was the most outstanding of all the Fifth Army division 
commanders. A quiet, competent, and courageous officer with extensive battle expe-
rience in North Africa, Sicily, and mainland Italy, Truscott inspired confidence.553 He 
had been on the General Staff in 1941. In April 1942, General Marshall had sent him 
to the Combined Operations HQ under Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten. Truscott was 
directly responsible for the organization of the U.S. Army’s Ranger battalions. He 
was sent to North Africa to coordinate British, French, and American efforts to cut 
Rommel’s lines of communication to Tunisia. Afterward, he became commander 
of the 3rd ID under General Clark. He worked well with the British, who had the 
highest regard for his judgment.554
Apparently, Truscott found conditions in VI Corps headquarters highly unsatis-
factory. He later recalled that the VI Corps staff had never been positive or confident 
in planning or execution. Although it had many able staff officers, proposals often 
were put forward without proper analysis, orders were based on cursory study of 
maps and intelligence, and few staff officers bothered much about reconnaissance. 
Conferences often became debates, usually making for decisions that were accepted 
only with reluctance and rarely supported in a way that inspired confidence.555
Third German Counterattack, February 28–29
The third and last major German effort to throw the Allied forces back into 
the sea started at midnight on February 28/29. VI Corps and 3rd ID responded 
strongly; for each German shell, they fired twenty—sixty-six thousand rounds 
on February 29 alone. The Germans’ biggest success, albeit at heavy cost, was an 
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eight-hundred-yard penetration north of Carano.556 The German main effort was 
against the U.S. 3rd ID, holding the Cisterna sector. LXXVI PzCorps (the 114th 
Light Division, 362nd ID, 26th PzDiv, and Hermann Göring PzDiv) aimed at pen-
etrating the Allied defenses from Carano to Isola Bella. Success would open the 
road for the 29th PzGrDiv all the way to Nettuno and Anzio.557
On February 22, Allied signals intelligence disclosed that the enemy attack 
would come along the axis of the Cisterna–Nettuno road. On February 24, Clark 
issued Operations Instruction Nr. 16, directing VI Corps to restore its forward po-
sitions and prepare those positions for defense.558 By the time the attack started on 
February 29, General Truscott knew which German forces would take part in it 
and had regrouped accordingly.559 The German attack failed, but when on March 
1 Mackensen reported the fact to Kesselring he gave as the main reason the insuf-
ficient training and lack of experience of replacement troops. That meant, in his 
view, he would be unable to eliminate the beachhead. Mackensen suggested instead 
that new methods be applied to counter eventual large-scale enemy attacks from 
it. He thought that any such attack would probably be made in connection with an 
offensive against Tenth Army and, possibly, simultaneously with the expected inva-
sion of Western Europe. German troops should try to reduce gradually the size of 
the beachhead, thereby improving the likelihood of repulsing such an attack when 
it occurred.560
In a message sent to Mackensen at 1840 on March 1, Kesselring stated that the 
weather had made the ground so muddy—contrary to predictions, it had been 
raining continuously for eighteen hours—that neither tanks nor horse-drawn ve-
hicles could move. Therefore, all concentrated attacks had to be halted. Divisions 
with carefully prepared local raids already in train would carry on with them, but 
all units not involved were to be withdrawn for rest and for reception and integra-
tion of replacements.561
Afterward, Mackensen explained in an order to his subordinate commanders 
Fourteenth Army would now launch only minor (but well-prepared) attacks to re-
duce the enemy beachhead. The 26th PzDiv and the 29th PzGrDiv would be with-
drawn from the front and used as tactical (actually part of operational) reserves. 
The enemy was to be engaged along the entire front by the remaining forces. Each 
division on the front was to launch at least two raids every night. Starting immedi-
ately, attacks in company to battalion strength would be made, to improve German 
positions and inflict losses on the enemy. Newly seized lines would be fortified and 
mined immediately, to prevent effective enemy counteraction.562
Mackensen’s order added instructions specific to various sectors and combat 
arms. For I ParaCorps it was most important to gain ground on the western flank 
of the 4th ParaDiv, and thereby reduce further the beachhead there. It also would 
be necessary to push forward to the Buonriposo and Botaccia gorges. I ParaCorps 
would carry out its company-to-battalion-strength attacks on March 2, 4, and 6.563
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In the LXXVI PzCorps sector, the front was to be pushed to Colle Biadaretto, 
Colle Carano, Colle del Pozzo, Rubbia Woods and Rubbia Hill, Isola Bella, and a 
small forest northeast of Isola Bella. The 29th PzGrDiv and 26th PzDiv were to be 
withdrawn to form the operational reserve already mentioned: the former as soon 
as possible, to the vicinity of the Cisterna–Velletri area, the latter in the near future, 
to the area defined by Cecchina–Genzano–Albano. The mission of the artillery, 
including the antiaircraft variety, would be to support the offensive operations of 
the corps; systematically shell enemy artillery; annihilate all observed enemy points 
of resistance; fire on all profitable moving targets; and shell enemy ships, harbor 
installations, and disembarkation points.564
STALEMATE, MARCH 5–MAY 22
Five days of fighting ensued, during which the Germans lost 3,500 men killed, 
wounded, and missing.565 On March 4, Mackensen decided that further attacks 
were useless and went over to the defensive.566 The best German divisions were 
withdrawn to the area south of Rome as Army Group C’s operational reserves.567 
Others, including elements of the 16th SS PzGrDiv, were sent to northern Italy. In 
early March, the Hermann Göring PzDiv left for Leghorn for rest and refitting, pre-
paratory to an expected redeployment to France. The 114th Light (Jäger) Division 
withdrew in early March for a rest period; it was to reappear on the Eighth Army 
front. As of the 14th, Fourteenth Army’s strength was about 135,700 men, 65,800 
of them combat troops.568 
In the course of these changes, battle-hardened troops generally were replaced 
with second-rate units; an exception was the 8th PzGrRgt (the 8th) of the 3rd 
PzGrDiv, which was withdrawn from the Gustav Line.569 A major part of the re-
inforcements were Italian troops who had remained loyal to Mussolini when Italy 
changed sides in October 1943 and now fought with the Germans. In mid-March 
the Barbarigo Battalion of the San Marco Marine Regiment and one battalion of 
the 1st Regiment, Milizia Armata, appeared in the Littoria sector. Not trusting their 
Italian allies, the Germans mixed Italian units with German ones down to the pla-
toon level.570 In spite of these precautions, some fifty men of the San Marco Marines 
deserted during their first ten days on the front line.571 
After six days of continuous bombing, shelling, and fighting, the men of VI Corps 
were as exhausted as their German counterparts and were replaced with fresh forces.572 
The British 56th Division was relieved by the British 5th Division in early March and 
left the beachhead. The British commando units also were withdrawn. The British 
1st Division remained at Anzio except for the 24th Guards Brigade, which was sent 
to Naples, replaced by the 18th Brigade. The 504th ParaInfRgt rejoined the 82nd 
Airborne Division and left for Britain in late March. On April 1, the 4th ParaDiv 
also departed. The withdrawal of these forces was more than offset by the arrival of 
the 34th ID on March 21. This division relieved the 3rd ID in the Cisterna sector on 
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March 28. The arrival of fourteen thousand fresh reinforcements in March brought 
the Allied strength up to ninety thousand troops by the end of March.573
After March 4, there was a lull in the fighting for almost ten weeks. Both sides 
limited themselves to defending, though actively, the positions they held.574 In many 
ways, the Anzio-Nettuno front now resembled the western front of World War I. 
Most Allied casualties were caused by artillery and air attacks. The Germans used to 
devastating effect their 280 mm K5(E) Leopold railway guns (called “Anzio Annies”) 
mounted on the Alban Hills.575 VI Corps built up a huge logistical reserve in prepara-
tion for a May offensive, to be followed by a drive to Rome. Allied aircraft and artil-
lery constantly pounded enemy positions.576
The Germans, despite their reduced strength around the beachhead, still consid-
ered a new offensive. Tentative plans drafted on March 13 envisaged a large-scale at-
tack on March 29, either in the Alban road sector or from Cisterna. But the planned 
counteroffensive was postponed on March 23, then abandoned entirely on April 10.577 
The Allies too planned a large-scale attack, in the Cisterna sector. Field Order 
Nr. 18, issued on March 18, directed a frontal assault by the British 1st and 5th 
Divisions astride the Albano road against the German salient, while the U.S. 45th 
Division attacked from the southeast toward the Factory.578
But no large-scale actions actually occurred after March 4. Allied and German 
troops both carried out aggressive patrolling and frequent raids to improve their 
positions, feel out the enemy, and keep him under constant pressure. The nightly 
raids and patrol clashes, the constant exchange of harassing fire, and continual air 
attacks kept the front at the beachhead very much alive.579
BREAKOUT, MAY 23–JUNE 1
On May 5, Clark gave orders to Truscott to start Operation BUFFALO. VI Corps 
would break out of the beachhead on the Cisterna front—at Cori, at the base of 
the Lepini Mountains, and at Velletri, near the base of the Alban Hills (see map 
17). It would then drive east through the Velletri Gap to cut Highway 6 and trap 
the major part of the enemy forces trying to withdraw north through the Liri Val-
ley. The ultimate objective was to destroy the entire Tenth Army south of Rome at 
Valmontone.580
Alexander had dictated these plans, and Clark had little faith in their feasibili-
ty.581 Clark informed Truscott that VI Corps should be prepared at any moment 
during the breakout to swing north for a quick advance to Rome, especially if it 
encountered stiff resistance on the route to Valmontone or if the British advance 
up to the Liri Valley was slower than anticipated. The plan was that the U.S. 1st ID 
would make the initial assault, supported by the 3rd ID and the 2nd Special Service 
Force. The 45th ID would move beyond Carano on the left as far as the Campoleone–
Cisterna railroad, while the 36th ID would exploit the breakthrough.582
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On the night of May 11/12, Fifth and Eighth Armies launched the long-awaited 
offensive against the Gustav Line. The main Fifth Army attack was staged from a 
bridgehead north of the Garigliano River, between the Liri Valley and the sea. Eighth 
Army launched its attack on the Cassino front, which it had taken over after the fail-
ure of an offensive in February.583 After a week of fighting, the Germans abandoned 
Monte Cassino. By May 15, the FEC and the U.S. II Corps had broken the Gustav 
Line.584 Clark had a plan to shift two divisions of II Corps (the 85th and 88th IDs) to 
Anzio after they completed the initial breakthrough in the south. They would have 
combined with VI Corps to start a powerful drive out of the beachhead.585
On May 20, Clark directed the main Fifth Army to advance toward Terracina, 
which fell into Allied hands on the night of May 23/24. American troops then ad-
vanced northward over the flat terrain toward the Pontine Marshes to meet elements 
of VI Corps.586 In the meantime, at 0545 on May 23, the VI Corps artillery opened a 
barrage on the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry advancing along the 
entire line from Carano to the Mussolini Canal. The German resistance was very 
stiff, but the British 1st Armoured Division penetrated the enemy lines. The XII 
Tactical Air Command completed the last of its 722 sorties on May 24. VI Corps cut 
Highway 7 above Cisterna and encircled the town, which fell into Allied hands on 
May 25, at the cost of 475 Americans killed, 2,320 wounded, and 785 missing.587 The 
main Fifth Army and VI Corps finally joined up in the early morning of May 25.588
The breakout was costly to VI Corps, which took about four thousand casualties 
in the five-day offensive. The 1st Cavalry Division alone lost a hundred armored 
vehicles. But Allied troops took 4,840 German prisoners, including about a thou-
sand in Cisterna, and destroyed or damaged some 2,700 vehicles.589 
On May 26, Clark directed VI Corps to shift the weight of its main effort from 
Valmontone to the west of the Colli Laziali and then to capture the Factory. This 
order was carried out, but the enemy resistance was stiffening.590 By dusk on the 
30th, Fifth Army’s drive appeared to have stalled; from May 31 to June 2 Four-
teenth Army fought hard to check its advance. The Germans offered especially stiff 
resistance to VI Corps, which had been on the offensive since the 23rd. But finally, 
on the night of June 2/3, the main German forces withdrew northward from the 
Alban Hills, leaving only scattered rear-guard elements. At 0800 on the 4th, the first 
American troops entered Rome. With that, the ultimate operational objective of 
the Anzio-Nettuno landing had been accomplished—but by other forces.591
RESULTS
During the Anzio-Nettuno landing and battle ashore, VI Corps suffered 29,200 
combat casualties: 4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded, and 6,800 missing or made pris-
oner. About two-thirds of these casualties occurred in the heavy fighting that end-
ed on March 4. In addition, the Allies suffered some 37,000 noncombat casualties 
(26,000 Americans). Out of the total combat losses, 16,200 were American (2,800 
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killed, 11,000 wounded, and 2,400 missing or made prisoner). During the first 
thirty days, the overall combat-casualty rate in VI Corps was 17 percent, for the 
British units 27 percent.  During the entire operation, about thirty-three thousand 
casualties (twenty-four thousand Americans) were evacuated by sea. Fourteenth 
Army suffered 27,500 casualties (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, 4,500 missing or 
made prisoner).592
The Allies made a tremendous and highly successful effort to sustain their forces 
ashore. Supplies were brought in on preloaded trucks in LSTs, by LCTs, and on 
Liberty ships. Starting on January 28, a convoy of six LSTs was sent each day from 
Naples, each vessel carrying fifty loaded trucks. Each convoy brought 1,500 tons of 
cargo (60 percent ammunition, 20 percent fuel, 20 percent rations).593 Some fifteen 
LCTs also made a weekly turnaround from Naples with supplies. Every ten days 
four Liberty ships loaded with supplies at Naples and North African ports arrived 
at Anzio. The LSTs and LCTs could dock at Anzio; Liberty ships had to be unloaded 
offshore and their cargo brought ashore by LCTs or, in calm weather, by DUKWs. 
Fifth Army managed the port and dump areas. On February 6, the 504th Engineers 
took over operation of the port and beaches.594
The beachhead was within range of the German artillery, and it was subjected 
to constant air raids. That vulnerability made the supply situation at Anzio more 
difficult. The air raids and artillery bombardments reduced the efficiency of beach 
personnel by some 10 percent. Some of the ammunition and gasoline dumps were 
concentrated in a small and especially vulnerable area. Between January 22 and 
March 10 bombing destroyed about a thousand tons of ammunition, artillery 228 
tons more. Yet such losses were never (with the possible exception noted below) 
critical. Supplies were dispersed in many separate dumps and protected by earthen 
bunkers.595
The bunkers were erected by bulldozers and, critically, Italian laborers. By the 
end of January the security of the beachhead was threatened by ammunition and la-
bor shortages. The beachhead needed many civilian laborers to clean up debris and 
to dig in the dumps. However, after the landing some twenty-two thousand civilians 
had been evacuated; only about 730 able-bodied men were left. It was to alleviate 
these shortages that Italian laborers were hired in Naples and brought to Anzio.
Initially, a port battalion was stationed at the beachhead to unload Liberty ships. 
But unloading needed to be quicker, because of the constant danger of Luftwaffe 
raids. So on about March 1, a new procedure was adopted: one port company was 
embarked in each Liberty ship.596
At the beginning of February there was a shortage of LCTs to unload the Lib-
erty ships. Most of those on hand had been in service more than a year without 
overhaul: on February 6, only fifteen were serviceable, a number that increased 
only to twenty-two by February 12. As stopgaps, between ten and twenty LCIs were 
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employed and the Liberty ships anchored closer to shore so DUKWs could help 
in unloading; between 450 and 490 DUKWs were so used at Anzio. The situation 
improved greatly in late February when more LCTs became available. By March, 
supply problems at the beachhead had been largely solved. With the seasonal im-
provement in the weather, it became possible to unload five or six Liberty ships at a 
time.597 The greatest volume of supplies arrived in March, when some 157,275 tons 
were discharged; the peak was on March 28, when 7,830 tons were unloaded. Large 
reserves of supplies, as noted above, were built up in anticipation of the Fifth Army 
offensive in May. By May 23, the beachhead had, in addition to its normal ten-day 
reserve, an additional thirty days’ worth. Overall, between January 22 and June 1, 
some 513,500 tons of supplies were discharged, about 3,920 tons per day.598
CONCLUSIONS AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on January 22 did not itself ac-
complish its stated ultimate operational objective, despite the enormous superiority 
of the forces the Allies committed to it, on land, in the air, and at sea. The main 
reasons for this failure were, first, unsound decisions by Allied political and military 
leaders, and second, deficient performance by operational commanders in planning 
and execution. The Germans proved much tougher and more resourceful than the 
Allies anticipated, and the German operational commanders performed much more 
effectively than their counterparts.
The Allied command organization in the Mediterranean was fragmented and 
complex. Some high commanders held two positions or even more. The names of 
service components and major tactical commands changed frequently, sometimes 
for no apparent reason. Perhaps the most fragmented command structure was that 
of the air forces—there were simply too many tactical commands in the Mediter-
ranean theater, and their responsibilities overlapped. The German command or-
ganization in the Mediterranean, after the capitulation of Italy, underwent major 
changes as well, after which it too lacked badly needed unity of command.
Command organization is one of the key prerequisites of sound command and 
control. It should be simple and straightforward. It should avoid overlapping responsi-
bilities. Changes in the command structure should not be made often, especially in the 
course of a campaign or major operation. Optimally, a single operational commander 
should be entrusted with command responsibilities for all forces taking part in a cam-
paign or major operation.
One of the Allies’ greatest advantages was their ability to intercept and read 
high-level German radio messages. ULTRA intercepts provided a steady stream of 
information about orders of battle and the state of fuel, ammunition, and food. The 
cryptologists at Bletchley Park were able to read the estimates and plans of Kessel-
ring and his subordinate commanders and the exchanges between Hitler, the OKW, 
and Kesselring. Allied high commanders were informed in this way about German 
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assessments of Allied forces. However, Allied commanders could not “sanitize” the 
information sufficiently—that is, package it in a way that would not compromise 
the source—to relay it to their major subordinates. In addition, British intelligence 
officers in the theater did not share all ULTRA information with their American 
counterparts, not trusting them to protect it properly. Here was a source of not only 
distrust but difficulty in reaching agreement.
An ability to intercept and read in a timely way coded enemy messages provides 
an enormous advantage. Such a capability must be highly classified, yet subordinate 
commanders directly involved in combat must possess information that will allow 
them to make sound decisions. At a minimum, higher commanders should have 
the authority to sanitize received information and transmit the result to subordi-
nate tactical commanders. In any case, one’s operational intelligence should not 
rely overly on technical means but should use other sources as well—in particular, 
human intelligence.
The idea of an Anzio-Nettuno landing, set aside in mid-December, was revived 
by Churchill late that month. His insistence, strongly supported by other Allied 
leaders, on capturing Rome as soon as possible led to the adoption of Operation 
SHINGLE. This decision was based primarily on political, not military, consider-
ations—it was an operational decision made by strategic leadership. It also was 
based on highly suspect assumptions about the timing and scope of the enemy’s 
likely reaction to a landing in its rear. Allied commanders and their staffs paid more 
attention to the enemy’s supposed intentions than to his capabilities—a common, 
but often fatal, mistake.
Political and other nonmilitary considerations always should be taken fully into 
account. In some exceptional cases, the operational commander should consult the 
higher political-military leadership about the advisability of a proposed major opera-
tion and the availability of the resources necessary for it. But otherwise, the opera-
tional commander—not high political leaders—should be primarily responsible for 
and have the principal role in determination of the need for and in the planning, 
preparation, and execution of a major operation.
Clark’s proposal on December 10 to disconnect the landing at Anzio-Nettuno 
from Fifth Army’s progress from south to north constituted a radical change. It 
made the landing an independent major joint operation instead of an integral part 
of a renewed Fifth Army offensive. It also largely doomed the landing.
An amphibious landing whose aim is to envelop an enemy flank on the coast 
should be planned and executed not as an independent major operation but as an 
integral part of a major offensive joint/combined operation by the main forces on the 
land front. Hence, the landing’s timing and the amphibious objective area should be 
selected to ensure a rapid linkup between the landing force and the main force on the 
land front; otherwise, an amphibious landing, notwithstanding its accomplishment of 
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a major tactical objective, will likely fail to impact the course of the larger operation. 
In such a case, the operational commander risks too much for too little. Against a 
strong and skillful enemy such an error can be fatal.
The lack of sufficient reserves and the situation on the main Italian front re-
quired that the Anzio-Nettuno landing force be a mix of American and British 
units. This created problems in both planning and execution. American and Brit-
ish units used different staff and tactical procedures, and relationships among the 
Allied commanders and their staffs were generally poor. Relatedly, the timing and 
duration of Operation SHINGLE were affected heavily by the need to redeploy a 
large number of LSTs from the Mediterranean in time to support the Normandy in-
vasion. Another complicating factor was the necessity of a sizable number of LSTs 
to build up forces on Corsica for the planned invasion of southern France.
In the planning and execution of SHINGLE itself, a major problem was a diver-
gence of views on the main mission of VI Corps. Capture of the Alban Hills, as en-
visioned in Alexander’s operations instruction, clearly would have constituted what 
the Germans would have considered a serious threat to supplies vital to the Tenth 
Army on the main front and so might have forced a general German retreat toward 
Rome—that is, served an operational objective. In contrast, capturing a lodgment 
in the Anzio-Nettuno area and essentially staying within it, as laid down in Clark’s 
operations instruction, achieved only a tactical objective, if a major one.
Operational commanders must formulate missions for subordinate commanders that 
are in consonance with the mission set by their higher commanders. Even if they have res-
ervations about the missions laid out, they are not authorized to change higher operational 
commanders’ mission unilaterally and drastically. Missions laid out for and issued to sub-
ordinate commanders should be short, clear, and above all militarily achievable. There is 
in this context perhaps nothing worse than vague or open-ended missions.
VI Corps was simply too small to accomplish the mission Alexander had stipulat-
ed. It could capture the Alban Hills, but it could not hold them if the enemy reacted in 
force. Yet without seizing and holding the Alban Hills it was not possible to endanger 
seriously the supply routes to the Gustav Line, which is what would have forced the 
Germans to react operationally—that is, to start withdrawing toward Rome.
One of the most important and fundamental requirements in determining a mili-
tary objective is to balance the factors of space, time, and force. Any serious imbalance 
has to be resolved, whether by scaling down the objective, reducing distances, increas-
ing the time available, assigning larger forces, or some other action. This process is 
more an art than a science.
The prospects of a landing at Anzio-Nettuno were highly dependent on the main 
Fifth Army’s ability to break through on the Gustav Line and advance quickly up 
the Liri Valley in the direction of the Alban Hills and ultimately Rome. However, its 
offensive should have been renewed much earlier than January 12, when plans were 
issued for the Anzio-Nettuno attack. Still, before the landing a decision could have 
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been made on whether to go ahead with or cancel SHINGLE. As it was, the main Fifth 
Army’s attack on the Gustav Line, although sequenced, lacked a clear main effort. 
Instead of the majority of forces being staged in one sector—on the right or left flank 
or in the center—each corps attacked within its own sector toward one of two wide-
ly separated objectives, Monte Cassino and the Liri Valley. The 15th Army Group 
should not have been expected to carry out, almost simultaneously, both attacks.
Lucas’s decision to consolidate the beachhead, once established, instead of mov-
ing quickly to capture the Alban Hills has been criticized heavily by commanders 
and historians. Yet it should be evaluated on the basis of the information Lucas had 
at that time. He apparently did not know that only weak forces defended the ap-
proaches to Rome. But the most important reason for his decision not to advance to 
the Alban Hills was that two divisions were inadequate to defend a greatly enlarged 
beachhead. He might have sent either the Rangers or one regimental combat team 
to the hills in the hope that the Germans would be induced to withdraw from the 
Gustav Line, but it is unlikely that they would have done so.
Lucas was apparently quite content to dig in on the beachhead—perhaps too 
content. A more energetic and aggressive commander, such as Gen. George S. Pat-
ton Jr., almost certainly would have tried to capture the Alban Hills, only twenty 
miles away. Yet one cannot say, even with the benefit of hindsight, whether such a 
commander ultimately would have been more successful than Lucas.
But perhaps the biggest mistake the Allied high command made was allocating 
an inadequate force to the Anzio-Nettuno landing and then failing to ensure that it 
could join up with Fifth Army within forty-eight hours.
Major amphibious landings are perhaps the most complex and risky of all military 
undertakings. They require detailed planning and must be executed energetically yet 
flexibly. The commander of the landing force must make quick but sound decisions. 
Freedom of action can be achieved only by acting quickly, aggressively, and without 
waiting for orders from a higher commander. Hence, the operational commander 
must pay great attention to professional abilities, command style, and personality 
traits in selecting a landing force commander.
It is hard to understand how Churchill and many higher Allied commanders 
at this point in the war so badly and repeatedly underestimated the German will 
to resist stubbornly any large-scale threat to the Gustav Line. The Germans rarely, 
when faced with serious situations in their rear, simply folded their tents and si-
lently stole away.
VI Corps eventually tied up large enemy forces that otherwise would have 
been available on the southern Italian front or possibly in France. Yet one wonders 
whether a better solution to the stalemate in southern Italy in the winter of 1943 
might not have been an advance through the Liri Valley toward Rome instead of 
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almost simultaneous attacks toward Rome and Monte Cassino. If VI Corps had 
been deployed in such a sector of main effort, it might have been possible to breach 
the German defenses on the Gustav Line much earlier than mid-May 1944. With 
four army corps at his disposal instead of three, General Clark might have captured 
Rome much earlier than he did.
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